

**SURVEY OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1927**

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1927

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Et operta tumescere bella
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And he said, I saw all Israel scattered upon the hills, as sheep that have not a shepherd: and the Lord said, These have no master: let them return every man to his house in peace.

1 *Kings* xxii. 17.

And if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.

The Gospel according to St. Matthew xv. 14.

Woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!

The Gospel according to St. Matthew xviii. 7.

PART I

SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

(i) Introduction

IN 1927 there were two outstanding attempts to grapple with the problem of security and disarmament: the third session of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, which was held at Geneva from the 21st March to the 26th April, 1927, and the Three-Power Naval Conference which met at the same place from the 20th June to the 4th August, 1927. Both these attempts were made from the angle of disarmament (or, more accurately, limitation of armaments) and not from that of security, and both failed to achieve positive results; but, beyond these two features, the resemblances between them were less conspicuous than the differences. The Preparatory Commission sought to deal with the problem of disarmament on a universal plan which would be applicable to all arms and to all countries. The Three-Power Naval Conference sought to deal with a specific question—or, rather, residue of a question—relating to a single branch of a single arm, and this as between the British Empire, the United States, and Japan alone.

This difference in the respective procedures of the two Geneva disarmament conferences of 1927 corresponded to a contrast between two schools of thought—a contrast which was clearly defined in a letter¹ addressed by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, on the 11th January, 1927, to a Congressman who had suggested that the United States should cease to participate in the work of the League Preparatory Commission. Mr. Kellogg's letter was a plea for continued participation, and it was published on the very day (the 11th February, 1927) on which President Coolidge's invitation to take part in the Naval Conference reached those Governments to which it was addressed. Presumably the intention was to intimate that, in the American Government's view, the Commission and the Conference were not incompatible or even rival enterprises. At the same time, Mr. Kellogg took occasion to draw the distinction between the American school of thought and that of 'a group of Governments chiefly situated within a limited area of the European Continent'.

The Secretary of State tabulated his contrast between these two schools of thought under five heads: (a) and (b) the Continental

¹ Text in *The United States Daily*, 15th February, 1927.

School held that the organization of disarmament must be preceded by the organization of security through guarantees, inspections and controls, whereas the American School believed in a direct attack upon the disarmament problem and held that inspection and control could not be effective substitutes for mutual trust; (c) the Continental School believed in the interdependence of all arms, whereas the American School held that it was easier to deal with them separately; (d) the Continental School felt 'that it is not sufficient to deal with the actual peace-time armaments of nations, but that industrial, financial, economic and other factors must be taken into account in any general scheme that may be drawn up', whereas the American School felt that 'the only practical approach to the question . . . is through dealing with visible armaments at peace strength'; finally (e) the Continental School was in favour of a world-wide agreement, whereas the American School thought that land and air armaments constituted an essentially regional problem and that naval armament could best be dealt with through direct agreement among a limited number of naval Powers.

The upshot of the two conferences seemed to show that the American School was right in insisting upon the fundamental need for mutual trust, and that the Continental School was right in maintaining that it was impossible to eliminate the element of 'the potentials of war' from the problem.

On the 28th December, 1927, the United States Government responded to Monsieur Briand's initiative in a fresh attempt to create the indispensable spirit of trust by launching the project of a pact for the outlawry of war as an instrument of national policy.¹ The problem of 'the potentials of war', which eventually obtruded itself upon both the Conferences of 1927, proved peculiarly difficult to handle in international negotiations; and the year closed without any international solution of this problem being yet in view. Meanwhile the French, with characteristic clear-sightedness, had sought to cope with this problem in their own national life by legislating for the general organization of the nation in war-time. On the 7th March, 1927, a drastic bill for this purpose, which was sponsored by the Socialist leader Monsieur Paul-Boncour, was voted by the Chamber of Deputies unanimously, with the sole exception of the Communist members.² Thereafter, the rapporteur of the Senate on the bill, Monsieur Klotz, suggested that it should be pruned of those clauses which provided for the conscription of wealth and culture in addition

¹ The 'Kellogg Pact' will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

² *Le Temps*, 9th March, 1927.

to the conscription of man-power; and it was in this modified form that the bill eventually passed the Senate on the 17th February, 1928. In essence, however, the pre-suppositions and the purport of the bill were preserved unchanged, as is indicated in the following passage of Monsieur Klotz's report to his colleagues:

The conception of *la guerre totale*, which is the formula that we have to envisage in the future and the formula to which the organization that we contemplate must respond (and on this point your Army Commission is in complete agreement with the authors of the bill)—this conception condemns the peoples who to-morrow may find themselves engaged in a fresh conflict to find that their efforts can no longer be limited to the action of armed masses, but that they must be ready to throw into the battle, in order to snatch victory out of it, the totality of their forces and their resources. Their duty is to attain superiority in means of warfare up to the maximum degree; and, in pursuing this aim, they will never be able to allow themselves to relax, since no one can feel sure that he is strong enough so long as he has the possibility of being still stronger than he is already.¹

It was the institution of war, conceived in these terms, that Mr. Kellogg proposed, in his note of the 28th December, 1927, to 'outlaw' as an instrument of national policy.

(ii) The Work of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission.

In a previous volume² it has been recorded that, on the 25th September, 1925, the Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations asked the Council 'to make a preparatory study with a view to a conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments in order that, as soon as satisfactory conditions have been assured from the point of view of general security . . . the said conference may be convened . . .' It has also been recorded that the Council, in fulfilment of these instructions, decided on the 12th December, 1925, to establish a body to be known as the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, which should consist of delegates from the ten states represented on the Council,³ from the three Great Powers which were not at that time members of the League (Germany, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R.), and from certain other states whose geographical position or special circumstances gave them an exceptional interest in the question of disarmament, namely, Bulgaria, Finland, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Poland and Rumania. The Council further agreed, in the course of its December session,

¹ Quoted *ibid.*, 30th July, 1927.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part I A, Section (iv).

³ i.e. France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Brazil, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay.

on a list of questions ¹ to be submitted to the Preparatory Commission. This list has been printed in full in a previous volume.²

The original intention was that the Preparatory Commission should begin its first session on the 15th February, 1926, but on the 30th January the French, Italian, Japanese, Czechoslovak and Uruguayan representatives on the Council sent a joint note to the League Secretariat suggesting the postponement of the meeting till a date not later than the 15th May, to be fixed by the Council during its March session.³ The proposal for postponement was generally attributed to two reasons—the desire that the admission of Germany into the League (an event which was then expected to take place very shortly) should be accomplished before the discussions on disarmament began, and the hope that a further delay might ensure the representation of Soviet Russia on the Preparatory Commission.⁴ By the end of January, all the Governments which had been invited to send delegates to the Preparatory Commission had accepted ⁵ with the exception of the Soviet Government, which had indicated its willingness in principle to join in the work of the Preparatory Commission, but only on condition that the meetings were held outside Switzerland.⁶ The reason for this stipulation was the controversy which had been in progress between Switzerland and the U.S.S.R. ever since the murder in 1923 of Monsieur Vorovsky, the Soviet delegate to the Lausanne Conference.⁷ The Soviet Government refused on this, as on previous occasions, to be represented at a conference held at Geneva, on the ground that its delegates could not be sure of adequate protection. Negotiations for the settlement of the Soviet-Swiss dispute were in progress at the beginning of 1926,⁸ however, and it was hoped that a satisfactory solution might be reached in the course of the next few weeks, which would enable

¹ The questionnaire in its final form represented a combination of two different sets of questions, one submitted by France and the other by Great Britain (statement by Lord Cecil at the first session of the Preparatory Commission, quoted in *The New York Times*, 20th May, 1926).

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, *loc. cit.*

³ *The Times*, 2nd February, 1926.

⁴ See *Le Temps*, 28th January; *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd February, 1926.

⁵ Germany had accepted the invitation on the 22nd January (the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 26th January), and the United States on the 30th (*The New York Times*, 30th January, 1926).

⁶ *Le Temps*, 14th January and 11th February; *The Times*, 15th January, 1926.

⁷ See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 258–9. The part played by the Russo-Swiss dispute in hindering co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the League of Nations is discussed elsewhere in the present volume (Part II E, Section (vi)).

⁸ *Le Temps*, 28th January; *The Times*, 1st February, 1926.

Soviet Russia to take part in the activities of the Preparatory Commission. It was universally agreed that the absence of Russia would greatly hamper the Commission's work, and, in particular, the states bordering on Soviet territory were known to feel strongly that deliberations on disarmament could lead to little practical result so long as Russia's attitude remained uncertain.¹

Early in February the negotiations between Switzerland and Russia were reported to have broken down;² and when the Council, on the 18th March, had to fix the date of the postponed meeting of the Preparatory Commission, the crisis which had arisen over the composition of the Council had made it necessary to postpone the admission of Germany into the League.³ Thus in deciding that the Preparatory Commission should meet at Geneva on the 18th May the Council had to face the fact that neither of the conditions which had made postponement seem desirable in January was likely to be fulfilled in May. Nevertheless, it was determined to make a further attempt to induce the Soviet Government to modify its attitude, and a note from the Secretariat, which was dispatched on the 22nd March, once more invited Soviet representatives to the meeting of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva on the 18th May.⁴ Monsieur Chicherin's reply to this note, which was received on the 13th April, indicated that in the view of the Soviet Government the Council's decision that the Commission should meet at Geneva was proof of a desire to prevent Russia from taking part and of a lack of seriousness and sincerity in the proposal for disarmament discussions. The Soviet Government would readily collaborate in the work of a Disarmament Commission 'specially created for the purpose, and free from the Geneva atmosphere of tradition and intrigue'.⁵

The U.S.S.R. was therefore not among the eighteen states whose representatives met at Geneva on the 18th May. The first session of the Preparatory Commission,⁶ which lasted until the 26th May, was mainly occupied with the organization of the Commission's work. The Council's questionnaire was supplemented by various proposals put forward by delegations. The Belgian representative, Monsieur de Brouckère, suggested an examination of possible methods for ensuring the interchange between members of the League of 'full and

¹ See *The Times*, 23rd January; *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd February, 1926.

² *The Times*, 8th February, 1926.

³ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, Section (i).

⁴ *The New York Times*, 23rd March, 1926.

⁵ Text in *Le Temps*, 14th April, 1926.

⁶ See the *Report to the Council on the Work of the First Session of the Commission* (Cmd. 2681 of 1926).

frank information as to the scale of their armaments,' &c., which was contemplated in Article 8 of the Covenant; of the desirability of inserting in a disarmament convention provisions for complaints by one signatory that another had infringed the terms of the convention; and of the possibility of a general supervision of armaments. Lord Cecil, on behalf of the British Government, proposed that the Commission should investigate the question of chemical warfare and the adaptability of chemical factories to the manufacture of poisonous gases. Monsieur Paul-Boncour, the principal French delegate, re-introduced into the discussion the inveterate question of priority, as between disarmament and security, by putting forward the view that before armaments could be reduced it was necessary to determine methods and machinery for giving help to a state which might be attacked; and he suggested an examination of the practical steps which might be taken to ensure speedy assistance in case of need. Cognate proposals, submitted by the Polish and Finnish delegations, dealt with the possibilities of regional assistance and of special arrangements for guaranteeing states which were unfavourably placed owing to geographical or other exceptional circumstances.

At the opening meeting on the 18th May, Jonkheer J. Loudon (Netherlands) was elected chairman of the Commission (after the honour had been declined by Monsieur Paul-Boncour, on the ground that France was too closely concerned in the question of disarmament) and Messieurs Cobian and Buero, delegates of Spain and Uruguay, were appointed Vice-Chairmen, with the duty of presiding over the two sub-commissions which were to study technical details. Sub-Commission A was to deal with military, naval and air questions, and Sub-Commission B with economic and other non-military questions. The composition of Sub-Commission A was practically identical with that of the League's Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval and Air Questions, with the important addition of representatives from two states at that time non-members of the League, namely, Germany and the United States. The intention of the Council¹ had been that the Preparatory Commission should be advised on military questions by the Permanent Advisory Commission, and on economic questions by a Joint Commission consisting of members of the Economic, Financial and Transit Organizations of the League and of the Employers' and Workers' Groups of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office. The decision to appoint sub-commissions constituted by and directly responsible to the Preparatory

¹ See the Council's decision of the 12th December, 1925 (*Official Journal*, February 1926, p. 166).

Commission to deal with technical matters was taken in deference to American objections, since the United States Government had indicated that it would feel a certain difficulty in delegating part of the Preparatory Commission's work to other organs of the League on which the United States was not represented.¹

After a preliminary consideration of its agenda the Preparatory Commission appointed a drafting committee to draw up the terms of reference for the sub-commissions. It was understood that the sub-commissions were to study the points referred to them from the technical point of view only, and that the political aspect was to be reserved for the consideration of the Commission. The discussions both in the plenary Commission and in the drafting committee revealed considerable differences of opinion on certain points which in themselves indicated that the Commission's work would be neither rapid nor easy. The debates showed that the fundamental question of the precedence of security over disarmament or *vice versa* could not yet be considered settled.² There was also a decided divergence of views on the point raised in Question 2 (a) of the Council's questionnaire—whether or not it was possible to base disarmament proposals on the potential strength of a state in war-time (that is, on the aggregate resources at the disposal of a state), as opposed to its military strength in time of peace.³

By the end of its first week's work the Preparatory Commission had divided its agenda into three groups, the first of which it referred to Sub-Commission A, the second (which overlapped to a large extent with the first) to Sub-Commission B, and the third to the Council.⁴

The French proposal for the investigation of methods to ensure prompt aid to a state when it was attacked raised certain difficulties. The aim of the proposal was to elaborate the machinery for action by the Council under Article 16 of the Covenant; and the Commission felt that there were 'obvious inconveniences in asking a body comprising representatives of countries not members of the League of Nations to discuss new means of carrying out the provisions of an instrument which they have not signed'.⁵ It was therefore decided

¹ See *Le Temps*, 19th May, 1926. The Joint Commission, which was an *ad hoc* body, was called into consultation by Sub-Commission B (see below, p. 8).

² See *The Times*, 19th and 21st May; *The New York Times*, 20th and 21st May; *Le Temps*, 21st May, 1926.

³ See *The New York Times*, 19th May; *Le Temps*, 23rd May; *The Times*, 24th May, 1926.

⁴ For the Sub-Commissions' terms of reference, see the *Report to the Council on the Work of the First Session of the Commission* (Cmd. 2681).

⁵ *Report to the Council on the Work of the First Session of the Commission* (Cmd. 2681), p. 7.

to forward the French proposal to the Council, and with it the Polish and Finnish proposals regarding regional assistance. All these suggestions, in fact, were less closely connected with the question of disarmament than with that of rapid procedure in case of menace of war, which was already being investigated by a Council Committee.

Sub-Commission B (non-military questions) met on the 26th May, with Monsieur Buero in the chair. It referred certain questions on its agenda to the Joint Commission for its opinion, and it decided to postpone examination of other points until their military aspect had been considered by Sub-Commission A. The Joint Commission met from the 28th June to the 1st July, 1926, and appointed three sub-commissions to consider respectively the questions of military expenditure, of the insertion in a Disarmament Convention of provisions for complaints of infraction, and of the adaptability of chemical factories to the manufacture of poisonous gases.

Sub-Commission A, with Señor Cobian in the chair, met for the first time on the 28th May, 1926, and remained in session (with an interval from the 6th July to the 2nd August) until the 9th September, when its work was suspended owing to the meeting of the Assembly. It is not possible here to give any detailed account of the arduous labours of this Sub-Commission. In eleven weeks it held fifty-one plenary sessions, in addition to numerous meetings of military, naval and air sub-committees. By the 9th September it had adopted, on a first reading and for the most part by a majority vote, the text of replies to a number of questions. The debate which had taken place on such questions as the inclusion of trained reserves in peace-time armaments¹ and the choice between total tonnage and tonnage by classes as the standard of comparison for naval armaments² had illustrated the extreme difficulty of reconciling the conflicting views on disarmament problems held by nations of widely different interests. On the important question of supervision of armaments, a sharp division of opinion had appeared. The United States naval representative, Admiral Jones, had announced that his Government would in no case accept international supervision in any shape or form,³ and the discussion on a French proposal for a permanent supervisory organ had revealed considerable divergence of views among other delegates.⁴ As Jonkheer Loudon, the Chairman

¹ See *The New York Times*, 2nd and 30th June, 1926; *Le Temps*, 4th June, 1926.

² See *Le Temps*, 25th June; *The New York Times*, 28th June and 3rd July, 1926. The majority report on standards of comparison recommended total tonnage as the basis; the minority report, tonnage by classes.

³ *The Times*, 11th August, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 14th August, 1926.

of the Preparatory Commission, pointed out in his report on the Commission's work to the Third Committee of the Seventh Assembly, 'the differences of opinion which had been manifested within this Sub-Commission were only the reflection in the technical field of differences of a political character'.

When the Seventh Assembly of the League of Nations opened on the 6th September, 1926, Sub-Commission A of the Preparatory Commission had by no means completed its task, Sub-Commission B was still in a state of suspended animation, and the Preparatory Commission itself was waiting for its sub-commissions' reports. If, therefore, the technical work of preparation was to proceed at the same pace as before, the prospects were not bright for an early convocation of the Disarmament Conference for which the Preparatory Commission and its sub-commissions were merely paving the way. During the debate on the work of the Preparatory Commission which took place in the Third Committee of the Assembly¹ certain delegates criticized the Commission's programme of work as, on the one hand, too complicated and theoretical² and, on the other hand, unduly limited in scope;³ and the hope was widely expressed that it might be possible to hasten the preparatory work in order that the Disarmament Conference might be convened in the course of the year 1927. A resolution was proposed by Monsieur Paul-Boncour (France) which, if adopted by the Assembly, would 'call upon the Preparatory Commission to take steps to hasten the completion of the technical work' in order that the Disarmament Conference might meet 'before the eighth session of the Assembly'. In deference to the fears which were expressed (notably by the Italian and British delegates) that undue speed might be dangerous, in view of the extremely complex nature of the disarmament problem, a modified form of Monsieur Paul-Boncour's resolution was finally submitted to the Assembly by the Third Committee, by which the Council was to be asked to convene the Disarmament Conference 'before the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly unless material difficulties render this impossible'. In this form the resolution was adopted by the Assembly on the 24th September. The Third Committee's conclusion that the time had come when a Disarmament Conference might usefully be convened seems to have been based partly on the fact that the Preparatory Commission's experts, even if their rate

¹ See Records of the Seventh Assembly: Minutes of the Third Committee (*League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 47).

² e.g. Monsieur Munch (Denmark) and Monsieur Engberg (Sweden).

³ e.g. Monsieur Lange (Norway).

of progress had been slow and their views had diverged on many important points, had yet produced certain concrete results and had attacked technical problems which had not hitherto been closely examined. The main consideration, however, which led the Third Committee to make its recommendation seems to have been the vital change in the situation, from the point of view of security, which was brought about by the coming into effect of the Locarno Treaties and the admission of Germany into the League—events which were consummated during the Seventh Session of the Assembly.¹

The Preparatory Commission met in plenary session on the 22nd September and again on the 27th, mainly in order to settle questions concerning the changes in its composition which resulted from the changes in the Council. The new members of the Council (Chile, China, Colombia and Salvador) became *ex officio* members of the Commission; but the retiring members (Brazil, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay) were invited to continue their co-operation.² Two new Vice-Chairmen were elected—Monsieur de Brouckère (Belgium) to preside over Sub-Commission A, and Monsieur Veverka (Czechoslovakia) over Sub-Commission B. The Commission also adopted a resolution proposed by the principal American delegate, Mr. Hugh Gibson (U.S. Minister to Belgium). On the 22nd September Mr. Gibson put forward the view that Sub-Commission A, which, according to its instructions, should have studied the questions referred to it purely from the technical aspect, had in fact been influenced by political and economic factors and had shown a tendency to limit the views expressed in its report to the opinions of a majority.³ The terms of Mr. Gibson's original resolution were modified after consultation with other delegates, but on the 27th September the Preparatory Commission adopted the substance of his proposals and instructed Sub-Commission A to complete its work as soon as possible, taking into account the fact that the Preparatory Commission alone was competent to consider the political aspect of the questions raised, and to embody in its final report both minority and majority views as well as the arguments brought forward in support of the various opinions expressed.

With these new instructions, Sub-Commission A was able to make more rapid progress with the remainder of its agenda. Its third and last session opened on the 27th September and closed on the 5th November. Its report⁴—a bulky document of 176 folio pages—

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, Section (i).

² The invitation was refused by Brazil.

³ See *The New York Times*, 23rd September, 1926.

⁴ League of Nations Document C. 739. M. 278. 1926. IX.

replied at length to the questions which had been referred to it, and where alternative texts of replies were put forward the names of the delegations which supported each version were given. In this way the Sub-Commission presented to the Preparatory Commission a most valuable record of expert opinion on the various problems discussed.

In the meantime, the Joint Commission had held two sessions, from the 30th September to the 5th October and from the 19th to the 27th October, and had replied to all the questions referred to it, and its report was adopted,¹ for transmission to the Preparatory Commission, by Sub-Commission B during a session on the 29th and 30th November. On this occasion Sub-Commission B also appointed two new expert committees—one to consider a model form of defence budget designed to eliminate differences between various national systems, the other to examine the economic consequences of a system of aggregate limitation of civil and military aircraft.² Both these expert committees met in February 1927, and Sub-Commission B, meeting on the 16th and 17th March, forwarded their reports to the Preparatory Commission, which opened its third session on the 21st March, 1927.

On the 23rd December, 1926, the Council of the League of Nations had directed the Preparatory Commission at its next plenary session to draw up agenda for the Disarmament Conference, and to make suggestions regarding the date on which that conference should meet. In the opinion of the British Government, the technical investigations which had been carried out during the previous ten months by the expert members of Sub-Commissions A and B and their sub-committees had prepared the ground sufficiently to allow a definite step forward to be taken. The principal British representative, Lord Cecil, therefore went to Geneva with instructions to submit to the Preparatory Commission, as a basis for discussion, a draft convention for the limitation of armaments which had been drawn up by the British Government. The French Government would apparently have preferred a different procedure, by which the Commission would have begun its labours by a general discussion on the reports of its sub-commissions,³ but when the French delegates were faced by the

¹ In March 1927 the United States Government submitted to the League a memorandum criticizing many of the conclusions reached by the Joint Commission (see *The Times*, 18th March, 1927; *The United States Daily*, 22nd and 23rd March, 1927).

² *The Times*, 30th November, 1926; *Le Temps*, 1st December, 1926.

³ Statement by Monsieur Paul-Boncour on the 21st March (*Le Temps*, 23rd March, 1927).

fait accompli of a British draft convention they at once decided to submit an alternative draft of their own. The British draft was deposited by Lord Cecil at the opening meeting on the 21st March and the French draft was circulated to the members of the Commission on the evening of the 22nd.¹

In these alternative conventions were summed up the two main currents of opinion on the problem of disarmament. Two schools of thought had existed before the establishment of the Preparatory Commission and one had included France amongst its leaders, the other Great Britain. The tenets of the two schools had become more clearly defined during the technical discussions which had been in progress during the greater part of 1926. On a number of important points the sub-commissions of the Preparatory Commission had not been able to achieve unanimity, and on the majority of these disputed questions the French and British delegates had taken opposing views. It was therefore inevitable that there should be important points of difference between a French and a British draft for a convention on the limitation of armaments.

These draft conventions are too long for detailed analysis here,² but it may be noted that both drafts provided for limitation and not for reduction of armaments, and that the British was the shorter and simpler of the two. The British draft dealt separately with land, naval and air armaments and proposed a different basis of limitation for each category.³ For land armaments the basis suggested was effectives, defined as troops available within a certain period of the outbreak of hostilities (the exact period was left to be determined); and, in addition to restricting the total number of effectives, the draft proposed to limit the numbers of officers and non-commissioned officers in a definite ratio to other ranks. For naval armaments the basis of limitation was material.⁴ Ships were to be divided into classes, and the number and tonnage of ships in each class were to be limited,

¹ *The Times*, 23rd March, 1927.

² The texts will be found in the Report of the British Representative on the Third Session of the Preparatory Commission (*Cmd.* 2888 of 1927).

³ The British draft proposed that the limits agreed upon might be exceeded by any signatory Power if it became involved in war or were threatened by revolution, or if the increase were approved by the Council of the League. This proposal was criticized on the ground that it contravened Article 8 of the Covenant. Proposals in the British draft regarding the termination of the Disarmament Convention were also opposed for the same reason.

⁴ While the British draft confined the principle of limiting effectives to land armaments, the French draft contemplated limiting the number of men on service with naval and air as well as military forces. The British delegation ultimately agreed to consider the limitation of naval effectives (see p. 14 below).

as well as the calibre of guns. Air armaments were to be restricted by limiting the number of shore-based aircraft of service types. The French draft, on the other hand, laid stress on the interdependence of land, sea and air armaments, and also on the interdependence of military and civil aviation. It proposed that limitation of naval armaments should apply only to total tonnage and not to tonnage by classes; that, in limiting the total number of effectives, the system of the composition and training of reserves should not be interfered with (in other words, that effectives should be defined as the troops actually available on the outbreak of hostilities); that budgetary expenditure on armaments should be taken into consideration; and that there should be some form of international supervision to ensure the carrying out of the terms of the proposed convention. One of the underlying principles of the French draft was that, in any attempt to limit armaments, it was necessary to take into account the 'war potentialities' of a country (such factors as population, geographical position and natural resources).¹

A general discussion, which enabled the various delegations to outline their respective attitudes, lasted from the opening meeting of the Preparatory Commission on the 21st March until the 25th. An interesting feature of the debate was the statement made by the German delegate, Count Bernstorff, on the 22nd March.² Count Bernstorff seized the opportunity to lay stress on the point—which had already been made by Herr Stresemann on the occasion of Germany's admission into the League on the 10th September, 1926³—that the disarmament of Germany, which had been carried out in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, could only be justified, under the terms of that same treaty, as an introduction to general disarmament. Count Bernstorff returned to this thesis whenever opportunity offered throughout the meetings of the Preparatory Commission.⁴

At the close of the general discussion the Commission proceeded to the examination of a 'synoptic table' which was drawn up with the object of enabling the British and French drafts to be considered simultaneously.

With regard to the limitation of land forces, the discussion on the first chapter of the French draft⁵ (limitation of effectives) at once

¹ See *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 23rd March, 1927.

² See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 23rd March, 1927.

³ See below, Part II A, p. 84.

⁴ See *Le Temps*, 30th March and 10th April, 1927; *The Times*, 23rd April, 1927.

⁵ Generally speaking, the French draft, as the fuller, formed the basis of

raised controversial points¹—for instance, whether trained reserves were to be excluded from the effectives to be limited, as the French desired, and whether effectives could or could not be divided into home and overseas forces. The question of trained reserves had caused a division of opinion among the members of Sub-Commission A,² and it was now again debated at length. The British view was that men who had completed their training and were in reserve were at least as efficient as men still under training, and that the real test was therefore the number of men who could be mobilized within, say, a week of the outbreak of war. This view was hotly contested by the conscriptionist countries, and the British delegates finally agreed, subject to reservations and to reconsideration on a second reading, that limitation should apply only to troops actually with the colours, on condition that the proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers to other ranks should be limited so as to render it impracticable for an army to be suddenly expanded beyond its nominal strength.³ On the question of home and overseas forces a compromise was arranged by which the distinction would be maintained, but states would be at liberty to make changes in the distribution of their forces provided the aggregate total was not exceeded.⁴ Agreement was also reached on the principle of restricting the period of service with the colours in conscriptionist countries.⁵

With regard to the limitation of air armaments, the French proposed restriction by engine-power, the British restriction by numbers. After some discussion, a combination of the two methods was agreed upon.⁶ British objections to the limitation of navy as well as army aircraft and to the limitation of air effectives were finally waived,

discussion. Lord Cecil gave his consent to this procedure (*Le Temps*, 3rd April, 1927).

¹ For Lord Cecil's account of the proceedings of the Commission and the outcome of the discussions on the most disputed questions, see his report to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (*Cmd.* 2888). The verbatim record of the proceedings was published by the League of Nations as Document C. 310. M. 109. 1927. IX.

² See above, p. 8.

³ For the debate on trained reserves, see *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 29th and 30th March, 1927. The extension to naval and air forces of the principle of limiting the proportion of officers was suggested, but was opposed by the British, American and Japanese delegations.

⁴ *The Times*, 30th and 31st March; *Le Temps*, 30th and 31st March and 1st April, 1927. The Italian as well as the British delegation showed anxiety on this point.

⁵ *Le Temps*, 1st April; *The Times*, 2nd April, 1927.

⁶ *Le Temps*, 2nd, 3rd and 5th April; *The Times*, 4th and 5th April, 1927. The French delegation also suggested the limitation of air material in reserve, but owing to British opposition this point was not included in the agreed draft.

but the question of the relation between civil and military aircraft presented considerable difficulty. The special expert committee appointed by Sub-Commission B¹ had reported that it was undesirable and impracticable to attempt to limit civil aircraft, and the United States delegate, Mr. Hugh Gibson, made it clear that his Government would not accept any proposal which involved restrictions on civil aircraft.² Although, in view of the impossibility of separating the two branches, the unrestricted development of civil aircraft was widely felt to constitute a serious danger, the Commission was only able to agree that the numbers of civil aircraft of each signatory Power should be published and that, as far as possible, care should be taken in each country to separate the civil from the military side of air development.

The discussion on naval limitation at once raised the crucial point (on which Sub-Commission A had already disagreed) whether tonnage was to be considered in classes or in the aggregate. In the British view, which was supported, up to a certain point, by the other great naval Powers, Japan and the United States, it was essential to apply to all classes of war vessels the principles adopted at the Washington Conference of 1921-2—that is, to place a limit on the tonnage of each class of vessel (battleships, cruisers, submarines, destroyers, &c.),³ on the size of the individual vessel, on the number of ships in each class, and on the calibre of guns. France, Italy and other Powers wished to apply the limitation only to the total tonnage of the fleet and thus secure liberty for each Power to concentrate, should it so desire, on one particular class of ship, such as submarines. After considerable discussion⁴ Monsieur Paul-Boncour, on behalf of France, suggested

¹ See above, p. 11.

² *The Times*, 5th April, 1927. It may be noted that at the Washington Conference of 1921-2 it was decided that it would be 'impracticable to adopt rules for the limitation of aircraft in number, size or character, in view of the fact that such rules would be of little or no value unless the production of commercial aircraft were similarly restricted. It was deemed to be inadvisable thus to hamper the development of a facility which could not fail to be important in the progress of civilization.' (See the *Report of the American Delegation to the Washington Conference*—Senate Document, No. 125, 67th Congress, Second Session—p. 39).

³ On this occasion the U.S. delegate, Mr. Gibson, strongly advocated the desirability of limitation by categories, on the ground that reckoning by total tonnage would inevitably involve competition by classes of ships. The subsequent controversy at the Three-Power Conference at Geneva (see Section (iv) below), in which Mr. Gibson was once again a protagonist, turned on the definition of categories. Were all cruisers to be regarded as falling into a single category, or were two categories of cruisers to be distinguished by the criteria of differences in tonnage and in calibre of guns?

⁴ See *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 6th April, 1927.

on the 6th April a compromise which was afterwards elaborated in greater detail. According to this new French proposal each Power which signed the Disarmament Convention would state the total amount of tonnage which it intended to complete during the period governed by the convention and the amount which it intended to allocate to each class of ship. The signatory Powers would be free to increase the tonnage allocated to any particular class, provided that they made a corresponding decrease in another class, and thus kept within their total tonnage limits; but any change of this kind would have to be notified to the other signatory Powers at least one year in advance.¹ This proposal, in which the French hoped to meet British objections by eliminating the danger of surprise, was referred by Lord Cecil to his Government; but on the 11th April he was obliged to announce that the compromise proposal had not proved acceptable, on the ground that it did not fulfil Great Britain's minimum requirements for security and did not obviate the danger of competition. In view of the Naval Conference which had been called by President Coolidge and which was to take place at Geneva in June,² the British Government felt it particularly undesirable to make any radical change at this stage in the principles established at Washington.³

The British rejection of the French compromise resulted in an anti-British campaign in the French press, which declared that the British Government's decision had brought the conference 'up against a blank wall' and compared Lord Cecil's action with that of Sir Austen Chamberlain in regard to the Geneva Protocol.⁴ Prognostications of the immediate breakdown of the meeting were not fulfilled, but the incident seems to have induced in Monsieur Paul-Boncour the feeling that it was useless to show a conciliatory spirit.⁵

In the few days' interval while the French naval compromise was under consideration by the British Government, the French delegation had failed to secure unanimous approval of another point on which they laid stress. There was general agreement that it was desirable to limit budgetary expenditure on armaments, as the most

¹ See the *Minutes of the Third Session of the Preparatory Commission* (League of Nations Document, C. 310, M. 109, 1927, IX). See also *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 7th April, 1927; *Le Temps*, 10th April, 1927.

² See Section (iv) below.

³ *Cmd.* 2888; *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 12th April, 1927. The British delegation would have stood alone in its opposition to the French compromise had not the Italian delegation also rejected the proposal—on the ground that it went too far in the direction of meeting British wishes.

⁴ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 13th April, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 25th April, 1927.

effective method of limiting material,¹ but while the French and certain other delegations proposed that the budgetary expenditure should be limited to a definite figure, the British representatives saw certain dangers in this scheme and suggested that publication of the details of budgetary expenditure on armaments would be nearly as efficacious and far less likely to arouse ill-feeling. The discussion of these alternative proposals resulted in the Commission deciding, on the 8th April, to place on record its inability to arrive at a unanimous conclusion.²

On the question of international supervision, a serious division of opinion occurred. The French draft convention contained elaborate provisions for a system of international control of armaments to be exercised by a Permanent Commission. The French and their supporters attached great importance to these arrangements and held that a disarmament convention would be of little avail without some means of ensuring that its provisions were duly fulfilled. The British representatives, on the other hand, were convinced that for the enforcement of a disarmament treaty reliance must be placed on the good faith of the contracting parties, since deliberate evasion of treaty obligations could only be restrained by a system of control so rigid that it would be unacceptable to the signatory Powers.³ They therefore suggested an alternative procedure, based on the precedent of Article 11 of the Covenant, by which any signatory Power would have the 'friendly right' of bringing before an international body⁴ any violation of the disarmament convention or any changes in armaments likely to disturb international relations, and all signatory Powers would agree to co-operate in any inquiries found desirable—

¹ Proposals for direct limitation of armament material were put forward by the German and Dutch delegations, but the majority of the Commission believed that direct limitation would be impossible without a degree of supervision which would never be accepted. It could not, of course, be argued that this degree of supervision was technically unattainable, since a very drastic direct limitation of armament material had actually been imposed, by the Versailles Treaty, upon Germany. In view of the rapid advance in the 'mechanization' of war, this problem of the limitation of material was all-important.

² *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 8th and 9th April, 1927. Lord Cecil thought that the British proposal had been provisionally accepted, but, as he pointed out in his report to the Secretary of State, the text as passed by the Commission left the matter open to doubt (*Cmd.* 2888, p. 8).

³ The difficulty of preventing evasion of disarmament provisions, even when a Commission of Control was permanently resident in the country concerned, had been brought out by the history of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany.

⁴ It was suggested that this body should consist of representatives of States Members of the Council, with the addition of the United States.

provided always that no investigation should be made in the territory of a signatory state without that state's consent.¹ The United States Government had already made it known, through the mouth of its representative on Sub-Commission A,² that it would not accept any international supervision over its armaments, but on the 13th April Mr. Hugh Gibson announced that his Government would not refuse to agree to provisions for an International Control Commission provided that the United States were excluded from the Commission's jurisdiction.³ Monsieur Paul-Boncour thereupon outlined a scheme by which the supervision might be made binding only on members of the League of Nations. Lord Cecil was also disposed to be conciliatory, but at this stage the Italian delegate, General de Marinis, put an end to hopes of a compromise by the categorical declaration that Italy could not accept a convention containing any provision for control.⁴

This deadlock on what seemed to the French and their supporters perhaps the most vital point of all virtually marked the breakdown of the discussions. It had been decided on the 11th April (after the British refusal of the French naval proposals) that the Commission should adjourn on completion of the first reading of the draft convention.⁵ One party, headed by the French delegation, now felt that the time had come for the meeting to be adjourned, but the British and other delegations were still reluctant to take a step which must have the appearance of failure. It was finally agreed, on the 15th April, that the session should be adjourned until after Easter, and that an effort should then be made to complete the first reading.⁶

When the Commission resumed work on the 21st April neither Lord Cecil nor Monsieur Paul-Boncour was present—the former owing to indisposition, the latter apparently because he took the view that in the stage which negotiations had reached his presence would serve no useful purpose.⁷ During the next few days the Commission discussed a number of comparatively uncontroversial points. British

¹ *Cmd.* 2888, pp. 8–9. The last provision would, of course, have given signatories the right to veto inquiry in their own territories in just those cases in which inquiry might be desirable in order to disarm suspicion or prevent abuse.

² See above, p. 8.

³ Text of Mr. Gibson's statement in *The United States Daily*, 14th April, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, *Le Temps* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th April; *Le Temps*, 15th April, 1927.

⁵ *The Manchester Guardian*, 12th April, 1927.

⁶ *Le Temps*, 15th and 16th April, 1927.

⁷ See *ibid.*, 25th April, 1927.

and Japanese concessions were notified on the questions of limitation of naval effectives and inclusion of naval aircraft in the total to be limited,¹ and an important reservation was put forward by the states bordering on Russia, by which they would retain the right to suspend the application of certain articles of the convention unless the Soviet Government adhered to it.² Proposals were also put forward by a group of delegations (including those from Belgium and Czechoslovakia) for the inclusion in the convention of an undertaking to abstain from the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare, but the discussion on these proposals was reserved until the second reading.³ On the 23rd April the Commission decided not to spend any more time in attempting to reconcile conflicting views with regard to supervision and other outstanding points;⁴ and on the 26th April the meeting closed. A report was adopted⁵ in which was set out the text of a draft convention so far as it had been established on a first reading. Where unanimity had been attained, a single text was given, with any reservations submitted by various delegations on specific points. Where a single text could not be given, the different proposals which had been submitted were set out side by side. The report pointed out that acceptance of a text by a delegation at the first reading did not prejudice the attitude which might be adopted at the second reading and was not in any way binding, and that various suggestions had been made which did not appear in the report but would be found in the minutes of the Commission.

The President of the Commission, Jonkheer Loudon, convened the next session provisionally for the beginning of November 1927, since, as he remarked, 'we must not meet again too soon, for we must allow our Governments time to reflect and agree and we must allow public opinion . . . to weigh the facts of the situation and come to our assistance.' Jonkheer Loudon reminded his colleagues that the general political situation had not been propitious for their work, but he pointed out that a great step forward had been taken if only because 'the problem of the limitation of armaments in its widest sense had never before in the history of the world been approached by a meeting of political delegates.'

Lord Cecil also deprecated undue pessimism with regard to the work accomplished by the Commission. In the concluding passage

¹ *Le Temps*, 24th April; *The Times*, 25th April, 1927.

² *The Times*, 23rd April, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 26th April, 1927.

⁴ *The Manchester Guardian*, 25th April, 1927.

⁵ Text in *Cmd.* 2888 and in League of Nations Document C. 310. M. 109. 1927. IX.

of his report to the Secretary of State he summed up the results achieved in these words:

It will be seen that on a very large number of the more important questions agreement was reached. The general principles of limitation of the land and air forces are not seriously in dispute. Even with regard to the sea, the differences can scarcely be considered irreconcilable. All the parties were agreed that fleets must be limited by their tonnage, and the only question really was as to how detailed that limitation should be. The French compromise proposal went a certain way in the direction which we desired, and the gap remaining between the respective views of the two countries does not seem to be of an unbridgeable extent.

On the question of budgetary expenditure I certainly understood that a provisional arrangement had been reached; and with respect to international supervision I cannot help hoping that further consideration will show that a very considerable approach has been made to agreement.

In other words, if the countries represented at Geneva really desire a draft convention for the limitation of armaments which shall state the principles and methods by which such limitation may be attained, that agreement is within their grasp. That the British Government desires such an agreement is absolutely certain, and I have no reason to think that other Governments are less anxious than we are to take this step towards the reduction and limitation of armaments which is so essential to the peace of the world.

Another point of view was expressed by Monsieur Sokal, the Polish delegate, on the 25th April. The Commission, in his opinion, had not only 'destroyed the too simple ideas of the public with regard to disarmament'; it had also

brought into prominence the close connexion between the question of security and that of disarmament. Many delegations have expressed their view on the subject, stating that disarmament can only be conditional on security. . . . It seems to me that the work of our Commission affords a striking proof of the fact that those who wish to reach the sanctuary of the temple of peace have no other means of getting there except by passing through the stages of arbitration and security.

The faith of those who shared Monsieur Sokal's conception of the 'bilan moral' of the Preparatory Commission's work was still further strengthened by the failure of the Three Power Conference which met at Geneva from the 20th June to the 4th August, 1927, to come to any agreement for the limitation of naval armaments—the aspect of the problem which had seemed to many people to offer the best hope of solution. One result of the difficulties encountered by the Preparatory Commission and by the Geneva Naval Conference was to convince public opinion (as represented in the Assembly of the League of Nations) that the problem of disarmament must be studied,

after all, in the closest relation to that of security, as it had been, for instance, in 1924, when the architects of the abortive Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes had taken the interdependence of arbitration, security and disarmament as the structural basis of their scheme.¹ The Eighth Session of the Assembly on the 26th September, 1927, adopted a series of resolutions which reaffirmed the relation between arbitration, security and disarmament, and provided for the appointment by the Preparatory Commission of a special committee to consider 'the measures capable of giving all states the guarantees of arbitration and security necessary to enable them to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figure in an international disarmament agreement'.

A new chapter in the history of the attempts made by the League of Nations to solve the problem of security and disarmament opened with the adoption of this resolution, but this must be reserved for a subsequent volume.

(iii) **The Naval Question from the Termination of the Washington Conference on the 6th February, 1922, to the Opening of the Three-Power Conference at Geneva on the 20th June, 1927.**

While the League of Nations, from 1920 to 1927, had been approaching the problem of security and disarmament on general lines, particular Governments had also found themselves confronted with the same problem, in a concrete form, *vis-à-vis* one another. Indeed, it was the cumulation of these concrete cases that made the problem as a whole so difficult to solve. Perhaps the case which was most conspicuous in the public mind, because it was continuously before the public eye, was that of land armaments on the Continent of Europe; but, somewhat unexpectedly, the questions arising over the relations between the three surviving Great Naval Powers proved no more easy than the European problem to handle when in 1927 they were taken up once more after an interval of five years since their partial solution at the Washington Conference of 1921-2. The failure of the Three Power Naval Conference of the 20th June-4th August, 1927, disappointed not only the three nations represented on this occasion at Geneva but the world at large; for in the nature of the case this naval question, unlike the question of land armaments in Europe after 1918, was world-wide in its scope and was fraught with issues of vital import to the whole of Mankind, even though in this instance the crucial decisions lay in the hands of no more than three

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I A, Section (v).

out of the fifty-eight sovereign independent states existing at that time.¹

The two chief issues involved were the possibilities of naval competition between Japan and the United States in the Pacific and between Great Britain and the United States in all the seas; and of these two issues the former, though it seemed to be the more menacing of the two during the years immediately following the War of 1914-18, was found really to be the less formidable in the long run.

During the Washington Conference of 1921-2 Japan appears definitely to have abandoned as impracticable those dreams of sole supremacy in the Far East and the Pacific in which she had indulged on certain occasions since August 1914; her renunciation² was signified in her acceptance of the 5-5-3 ratio for capital ships; and she did not allow herself to be deflected from her new course by her resentment at the exclusion clause in the United States Immigration (Restriction) Act of 1924.³ Indeed, during the next few years she studiously conducted her policy in the Pacific along lines which were calculated to keep the political tension low;⁴ and in 1927 the fruits of this policy became apparent in the contrast between her position at the Three-Power Naval Conference of that year and her position at the Washington Conference of 1921-2. Whereas, at Washington, Japan had been the focus of suspicions and conflicts which had required for their removal the joint efforts of Great Britain and the United States, at Geneva five years later the roles were reversed; for this time it was the turn of Japan, as the most reasonable and the most detached of the three parties, to show her good-will and employ her good offices in attempting to bridge the differences which now appeared between the two English-speaking Powers.⁵ It may be added that, in pursuing this sober policy, Japan was considering her own national interests as well as serving the general cause of peace;

¹ For this number see *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*, pp. 3-4.

² This renunciation was not made without a *quid pro quo*. It was bound up with an agreement (contained in Article 19 of the Five-Power Treaty of the 6th February, 1922) between Japan, the United States and the British Empire not to add to their respective existing fortifications and naval bases in a certain area, the effect of which was to render it impossible for either the United States or Great Britain to attack Japan's existing sphere of influence. In fact, Japan renounced world-wide naval equality with the other two Powers in exchange for the certainty of security or indeed predominance in her own Far Eastern waters. (See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 489-90.)

³ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I B, Section (vi).

⁴ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part III B, Section (i).

⁵ Public testimony to the reasonableness of Japan on this occasion was given by Lord Cecil in the House of Lords on the 16th November, 1927.

for it became apparent, both before and during the Three-Power Conference, that the role of a Great Naval Power, even on the 5-5-3 ratio, was imposing upon Japan a financial burden which she would find it difficult to bear in perpetuity.

In the meantime the possibility of naval competition between Great Britain and the United States, which had also been latent in the international situation since the War of 1914-18, had come to the front; and the roots of this second danger went deep.

Its first root was to be found in the well-known historical phenomenon of the reversal of alliances after a general war with a decisive issue.¹ The surrender of the German navy in 1918 and the renunciation of Japanese naval ambitions at Washington in 1921-2 had completely upset the former distribution of naval power. The natural tendency was for some new distribution to assert itself; and the line of least resistance was that the two naval Powers by whose conjunction in a single scale the former distribution had been upset should establish a new distribution by throwing their weights into opposite scales henceforward. This tendency was inherent in the traditional mechanism of international relations; and, if it was to be counteracted, active exertions would have to be made on both sides.

The second root of the danger was to be found in the particular situations of the two leading naval Powers as they emerged from the War of 1914-18 respectively. Great Britain had just crowned a 'sovereignty of the seas' which she had held for the best part of two centuries by defeating the latest and perhaps the most formidable attempt to wrest it from her and incidentally making thereby what was possibly the greatest single contribution to the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers in a world war. Inevitably, she was inclined to feel herself both entitled by her international achievement and required by her national interest to preserve intact and efficient the naval arm which she had lately wielded to such effect. At the same time the people of the United States, after having concentrated their energies for a century and a half upon the winning and opening up of the North American Continent, had been led by the War of 1914-18 to transcend their own national frontiers and to extend their financial and economic activities overseas more abruptly than they might have done otherwise.² If the protection of maritime trade in war time (whether under conditions of belligerency or under those of

¹ See *The World after the Peace Conference*, pp. 47 *seqq.*

² For this change, and its paramount importance in the international relations of the American Continent, see the present volume, Part IV A, Section (i).

neutrality) had long been essential to the security of Great Britain, this was now becoming essential to the security of the United States likewise—and the American people became alive to this necessity during the interval which elapsed between the Washington Conference of 1921–2 and the Geneva Conference of 1927.¹ Thus the United States after 1918, like Germany after 1871, found herself in a situation which might lead her insensibly into challenging the reigning ‘sovereign of the seas’ and eventually seeking to supplant her, without shrinking from the prospect of a trial of strength if naval supremacy could not be attained without it.

It may be noted that if the people of the United States had once entertained the ambition of bidding for world-power the temptation to take into their own hands the naval paramountcy hitherto exercised by Great Britain might well have been increased by a survey of the relative situations of the two Powers at this time from the naval standpoint; for, from this point of view, the advantage appeared to lie with the United States in many directions. The shifting of the international storm-centre from Europe to the Pacific gave the United States, rather than Great Britain, the central position (which in a naval war would mean the interior lines) in the new strategic map of the world. With coastlines on both the Atlantic and the Pacific and with the Panama Canal in her hands, she could concentrate her whole naval strength in either ocean at will at a few days’ notice; and her maritime lines of communication were not only far shorter than the ‘eighty thousand miles’ of sea-routes which the British Admiralty reckoned that it would have to protect in war-time; they were also far less exposed to attack. It is true that the United States navy, like the British navy, had narrow seas to traverse between its home-ports and the inter-oceanic canal which was the vital link in its communications; but at this time the Caribbean was strategically ‘an American Lake’, whereas in the Mediterranean Great Britain had to share her sovereignty of the seas with France and Italy. It is true, again, that neither France nor Italy was a first-class naval Power; but the experience of the General War of 1914–18 had shown that, at any rate in narrow seas, the invention of the submarine and the aeroplane had at least temporarily given the attack upon maritime lines of communication so great an advantage over the defence that a strong naval Power might be hard put to it to prevent its lines from being cut by a relatively weak Power. Finally, at a moment when Great Britain, in consequence of these same two inventions, was faced with the prospect of labouring under

¹ See the observations of Admiral Hilary Jones, quoted on p. 52 below.

the combined disadvantages of an insular and a continental position,¹ the United States seemed marked out to enjoy the benefits of both positions without their drawbacks. For Great Britain the advent of the submarine meant that, as an island dependent upon imported food supplies and raw materials, she was in greater danger of being starved into surrender in war-time than she had ever been in her history, while the advent of the aeroplane meant that, for the first time in her history, she might be drawn into the field of fire of a continental European battlefield and would find her sea-power challenged from the air by land Powers commanding continental European air-bases. For the United States, on the other hand, these new inventions which were rendering the position of Great Britain in relation to Europe unprecedentedly precarious were robbed of their terrors, since the United States occupied a geographical position which at this time was almost impregnable. America—separated from both Europe and the Far East by ocean spaces still too wide for submarines and aeroplanes to cross in operations of war—retained in 1927 that insular security which Great Britain had enjoyed a century before; yet in extent and resources this vast American island was a continent; and on that continent the United States—instead of being, like Great Britain, only one among several Powers of approximately equal calibre—was the sole Great Power in existence, whose *fiat*, in the matters to which she chose to confine her interposition, was ‘practically law’.²

Finally, as if this extraordinarily advantageous strategic situation were not enough in itself to give impetus to any aspiration towards naval supremacy which might enter the American people’s mind, Fortune had so willed it that the reigning ‘sovereign of the seas’, at whose expense and in whose despite any such aspiration would have to be satisfied, was the very nation whom the people of the United States had once been taught to look upon as their traditional antagonist.

When the full strength of these forces that militated in favour of Anglo-American naval competition is appraised, the greatness of the common achievement of Anglo-American statesmanship at the Washington Conference of 1921-2 becomes apparent. Indeed, that

¹ On this point see *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*, pp. 7-8.

² ‘To-day the United States is practically sovereign in this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition’—Secretary Olney’s dispatch to Lord Salisbury of the 20th July, 1895, on the Venezuelan boundary dispute. For the text of this dispatch see A. Alvarez: *The Monroe Doctrine* (published by the Oxford University Press for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), pp. 61 *seqq.*

achievement would not have been possible without unusual sacrifices on both sides. Great Britain sacrificed a policy which she had long regarded as essential to her security and a sentiment rooted in the memory of the past—a past which had reached its culmination as recently as 1918—when she renounced a naval supremacy which had not yet passed away.¹ The United States sacrificed the same policy (now dictated to her, in her turn, by the expansion of her maritime trade) and the same sentiment (springing in her case from expectations of the future—a future which was just opening out before her eyes) when she renounced a naval supremacy which already seemed within her grasp. The essence of the understanding reached at Washington was that either Power accepted 'parity' with the other, and that this 'parity' was interpreted as arithmetical equality in dealing with that part of the naval arm which the Washington Conference did deal with in concrete terms by the conclusion of a precise and formal agreement: the Five-Power Treaty of the 6th February, 1922, for the limitation of naval armament in respect of capital ships.²

There was, of course, a serious 'gap' in the Washington Agreement. It applied to capital ships and aircraft carriers only, and not to surface auxiliary craft or to submarines. In the American plan laid before the Washington Conference, out of which the Five-Power Treaty had arisen, this 'gap' had not been left open; for definite maximum replacement tonnages had been suggested for all three categories of vessels in the navies of the three principal naval Powers on the uniform 5-5-3 ratio;³ and the United States Government had never abandoned the idea of some day securing international agreement for the complete execution of its original proposals. For example, at the turn of the years 1925 and 1926, when the United States Government accepted the invitation of the Council of the League of Nations to be represented on the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, the State Department was known to prefer that the question of naval armaments should be treated separately, though this policy was not formally enunciated at the time.⁴ When the meeting of the Preparatory Commission was postponed from February to May 1926,⁵ the United States Ambassador in London, Mr. Houghton, reported to President Coolidge that the Powers of the European continent did not genuinely wish to disarm and did not

¹ Great Britain reconciled herself to this sacrifice partly because she could not afford competition and partly because she reckoned that she could trust the United States.

² For extracts from the text, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 509-14.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 496.

⁴ See *The New York Times*, 30th January, 1926.

⁵ See p. 4 above.

desire American participation in their counsels, and that the promoters of the Preparatory Commission did not really intend that it should achieve the purpose for which it had been convened ostensibly.¹ At the opening meeting of the Preparatory Commission on the 18th May, 1926, the United States representative, Mr. Gibson, suggested that concrete proposals appearing to afford an opportunity for practical agreement should be segregated from the discussions, and in this context he mentioned the desire of his Government to supplement the work of the Washington Conference.² On the other hand, down to the summer of 1926 the United States Government does not appear to have contemplated taking the initiative for the closing of the 'gap' in the Washington Five-Power Treaty in the immediate future. For example, the United States was unwilling to participate in the Conference of Naval Experts which met from the 14th to the 25th February, 1924, at Rome under the auspices of the League of Nations in order to consider the application of the Washington Five-Power Treaty to non-signatory States.³ The first clear indication of an intention to take up the unfinished task of the Washington Conference in the near future was given by the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, in a speech delivered on the 18th August, 1926.⁴ While expressing good-will towards the Preparatory Commission, Mr. Kellogg referred to Mr. Gibson's proposal of the 18th May, 1926, which has been mentioned above, and made the following announcement on the United States Government's behalf:

The work on limitation of naval craft has only been partly consummated. There has been a limitation of battleships and aircraft carriers alone. There still remains the task of limiting other units of naval strength as well, namely, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. . . .

I have stated before and I reiterate that the United States would be glad to cooperate with the other naval powers in extending the principles of the Washington Treaty to other classes of naval vessels, and I earnestly hope that such a measure may soon be practicable.

It may be noted that more than four years had elapsed since the signature of the Washington Five-Power Treaty by the date when Mr. Kellogg made this announcement, and a full five years by the date when President Coolidge issued his invitation of the 10th February, 1927. It may be added that the British Government, on its part, does not appear to have felt the need for a fresh naval

¹ For Mr. Houghton's report, its communication to the Press, and the resentment aroused thereby in France, see *The Times*, 19th and 22nd March, 1926; *The New York Times*, 21st and 22nd March, 1926.

² See *The New York Times*, 19th May, 1926.

³ For this Rome Naval Conference see the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 77-80.

⁴ Text in *The New York Times*, 19th August, 1926.

conference until about the same date; for it was about a week before President Coolidge's invitation reached the British Government that the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Bridgeman, submitted to the Prime Minister a plan for limitation of armaments on which the British Admiralty had been working for some months, with the request that the Prime Minister would bring it before the Cabinet, and, if it were accepted there, would call an international conference, if possible, to consider it.¹

There were several reasons why neither the British nor the United States Government began to feel at any earlier date than this the necessity for taking up again those questions which the Washington Conference had left over.

In the first place, both Powers had at first been making drastic reductions in their respective naval armaments: Great Britain from the morrow of the Armistice of 1918 down to the year 1924, and the United States since the Washington Conference of 1921-2. In the second place, since the conclusion of the Washington Five-Power Treaty, both Powers had been observing its terms scrupulously—and it may be added that neither Government accused the other of shortcomings in this respect either before, during or after the Geneva Naval Conference.² The principal reason, however, why both Powers were slow to feel that a fresh naval conference was desirable or necessary as far as they were concerned was no doubt to be found in the

¹ For this British plan and proposal, see statements by Mr. Bridgeman in speeches delivered at Geneva on the 20th June, 1927; at Eastthorpe on the 11th August, 1927 (*The Times*, 12th August, 1927); at the Junior Constitution Club on the 1st December, 1927 (*ibid.*, 2nd December, 1927); and in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 24th November, 1927.

² For a testimony to the loyalty of the British Government, see a statement made at the end of January 1928 by the United States Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Wilbur (*The Times*, 30th January, 1928). One matter over which the question arose on the American side was a proposal to change the elevation of guns on eight United States battleships. On this matter Mr. Hughes, in January 1925, expressed the opinion that, although the proposed work could not be regarded as reconstruction and therefore need not be regarded as a violation of the Five-Power Treaty, it would be unwise to carry it out, and accordingly the proposal was rejected in the Senate. On the other hand, this change was one of the purposes included in an appropriation for the modernization of two battleships, which was voted by the House of Representatives on the 28th January, 1927 (see *The Times*, 9th January, 1925; *Le Temps*, 23rd January, 1925; *The United States Daily*, 1st March, 1927; *The Times*, 2nd March, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 5th March, 1927). The British Government lodged a protest in this matter of gun elevation, but afterwards let it drop. At the time of writing, the change of elevation was actually being carried out on the battleships *Oklahoma* and *Nevada*, and the U.S. Government were said to be contemplating the same change with regard to all their big guns, except those on the oldest battleships.

fact that they had not, either of them, been responsible for that 'gap' in the Washington Five-Power Treaty which still remained to be closed. The failure to obtain international agreement at Washington on the original American plan in respect of auxiliary surface craft and submarines had been due to the opposition not of Great Britain but of France. The French delegation at Washington had only accepted the 5-5-3-1.67-1.67 ratio for capital ships with the reservation that they would not agree to a proportionate limitation of auxiliary craft;¹ and the maximum figures for the two categories of auxiliary craft on which France insisted were not only double and treble the figures to which she was entitled on the agreed capital ship ratio, but 'would have involved for the other Powers an extraordinary increase over their existing fleets and would have been wholly inconsistent with the purpose of the Conference'.² The fact that it was France who had prevented the completion of the work of the Washington Conference evidently had a considerable effect in disinclining both the British and the United States Governments from making a further attempt. In the first place it naturally left both these Governments with a feeling that, since the 'gap' in the Five-Power Treaty had not been left open by the fault of either of them, it presumably might be allowed to remain open without danger to their relations with one another. In the second place, it left them unwilling to risk a diplomatic rebuff by re-opening the question so long as the French view was known to remain unchanged.³

Nevertheless, in 1927 President Coolidge did issue an invitation to a fresh naval conference—without being any longer deterred by the prospect of a French refusal or being led to abandon the project when the expected French refusal was duly received—and simultaneously the British Admiralty did work out a plan for limitation of naval armaments with a view to the convening of a conference on the British Government's initiative. It would seem that the development of

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 495.

² Report of the Canadian delegate to the Washington Conference, quoted in the *Survey for 1920-3*.

³ In November 1925 the appeal to abolish by international agreement the use of the submarine in war—an appeal which had been made without success by the British delegation at Washington—was renewed by the Chairman of Lloyd's in a letter published in *The Times* on the 14th of that month, and was then taken up in letters to *The Times* from Lord Lee of Fareham (one of the British delegates to the Washington Conference), Commander Kenworthy, Professor J. E. G. de Montmorency, Sir Willoughby Dickinson and others (see *The Times*, 14th, 16th, 17th and 18th November, 1925). Once again, however, it encountered opposition from the French Government (*ibid.*, 21st November, 1925) and failed to obtain support in the United States (*ibid.*, 17th November, 1925).

events had brought both Governments, at about the same time, to the conviction that some action in the matter of limiting naval armaments had now become timely.

A consideration of the British plan, as eventually laid before the Three-Power Conference at Geneva on the 20th June, 1927, would suggest that the motive most immediately present to the mind of the British Government—as it certainly was to the mind of the Japanese Government—was that of financial economy. This motive, however, would hardly have become urgent in the British Government's mind if Great Britain had not embarked on a programme of construction, in the domain of auxiliary craft, which was relatively energetic as compared with the 'naval holiday' which she had allowed herself during the preceding years. At the moment when a Conservative was succeeded by a Labour Ministry on the 22nd January, 1924, arrangements had been made for laying down eight 10,000-ton 8-inch gun cruisers. 'This programme was reduced by the Labour Government in 1924 from eight to five, but was partly restored by the so-called Birkenhead programme in 1925, which provided for the construction of a further nine 10,000-ton cruisers and seven 8,000-ton cruisers, four to be built the first year and three in each following year.'¹ Five 10,000-ton cruisers were actually laid down in 1924, two more cruisers of unpublished tonnage in 1926 and another in 1927;² and the policy thus initiated requires explanation in its turn. The tonnage is explained by Article 11 of the Washington Five-Power Treaty, which specified 10,000 tons as the maximum for any single non-capital ship or non-aircraft carrier—a maximum which came to be taken as a minimum by the Governments concerned. The numbers are less easy to explain, for a comparison of dates gives the impression that, in point of numbers, it was Great Britain who set the pace of cruiser construction to other Powers during these years. Whereas Great Britain seems to have made arrangements for laying down eight 10,000-ton 8-inch gun cruisers before the end of 1923 and actually laid down five of these during 1924, Japan laid down only two 10,000-ton and two 7,100-ton cruisers in 1924 and two more 10,000-ton cruisers in the following year. France laid down three 7,873-ton cruisers in 1922 and 1923, one 9,933-ton cruiser in 1924, another of the same displacement in 1925, and one 10,000-ton cruiser in 1926. Italy laid down two 10,000-ton cruisers in 1925. It may be added that, on the 1st February, 1927, Japan had four 10,000-ton cruisers

¹ *The Round Table*, March 1928.

² These figures do not include two 10,000-ton cruisers laid down in British yards for the Australian Government in 1925.

projected, Italy three cruisers (tonnage unspecified), and France two cruisers (tonnage unspecified), while Great Britain had no less than three cruisers (tonnage unspecified) 'building', though not actually yet laid down, and nine cruisers (tonnage unspecified) projected for laying down during the years 1927 to 1929.¹

In the United States a bill authorizing the construction of eight 10,000-ton cruisers was passed by Congress on the 18th December, 1924; appropriations for five of these were made in the naval appropriation acts of 1925 and 1926;² and two of them were actually laid down in the latter year. At the beginning of December 1926, however, there were still three of the eight cruisers authorized in 1924 which had not only not yet been laid down but for which no appropriations had yet been made.

The general situation as it stood on the 1st February, 1927, is shown in the table on p. 32.

The figures just quoted explain, in their turn, President Coolidge's change of attitude, in the course of the year 1926, concerning the urgency of convening a new conference on the limitation of naval armaments. In the course of that year the President was subjected to an increasing pressure at home to embark on a programme of cruiser construction calculated to maintain parity between the United States and other Powers; and it was evident that by the beginning of 1927 he had come to the conclusion that he would no longer be able to resist this pressure unless he could secure a general limitation of auxiliary craft by international agreement. As early as the 6th September, 1926, the President found it advisable to have a statement published in general defence of his policy of limitation in the domain of auxiliary craft;³ and in December 1926 he came into sharp conflict with a 'Big Navy Group' in Congress. In a budget message addressed to Congress on the 8th December, 1926, he set his face against appropriations for laying down the last three out of the batch of eight cruisers 'authorized' by Congress in 1924. 'I feel', he declared in this message, 'that it would be unfortunate at this time and not in keeping with our attitude towards these negotiations [in the Preparatory Commission then in session at Geneva] to commence the construction of these three cruisers.'⁴ On the 15th December the President received a letter of protest against this policy over the

¹ See the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2809 of 1927 (Particulars of the Fleets of the British Empire and Foreign Countries on the 1st February, 1927).

² *The New York Times*, 28th December, 1926.

³ *The Times*, 8th September, 1926.

⁴ *The New York Times*, 9th and 13th December, 1926.

Fleets of the British Empire, the United States, Japan, France and Italy, on the 1st February, 1927 (a).

	Battleships		Battle Cruisers		Cruisers		Destroyers		Submarines Numbers
	Numbers	Tonnage (b)	Numbers	Tonnage (b)	Numbers	Tonnage (b)	Numbers	Tonnage (b)	
British Empire	Built	14	366,250	4	122,700	48	238,400	174 (n)	55
	Building	2	70,000	—	—	14 (o)	70,000 (d)	2	9
	Projected	—	—	—	—	9	—	27 (o)	18
U.S.A.	Built	18	525,850	—	—	32 (e)	269,425	309 (p)	121
	Building	—	—	—	—	5	50,000	—	3
	Projected	—	—	—	—	13 (f)	—	12	4
Japan	Built	6	191,320	4	110,000	33 (g)	195,601	109 (q)	58
	Building	—	—	—	—	6	54,200	18	19
	Projected	—	—	—	—	4 (h)	—	15	6
France	Built	9	194,544	—	—	16 (j)	149,677	54 (r)	44
	Building	—	—	—	—	5 (k)	39,866	30 (s)	43
	Projected	—	—	—	—	2 (t)	—	19 (t)	20
Italy	Built	6	121,015	—	—	14 (m)	75,520	71 (v)	42
	Building	—	—	—	—	2	20,000	8	15
	Projected	—	—	—	—	3	—	8	3

(a) These figures are taken from the British White Paper, *Cmd. 2809* of 1927. The figures both for numbers and tonnage varied somewhat from American estimates (see the summarized return of auxiliary vessels issued by the State Department and published in *The United States Daily*, 23rd June, 1927). In the figures for the British Empire vessels built or under construction for Australia and New Zealand are included. (b) The tonnage of individual vessels is not calculated on the same basis throughout in the British White Paper *Cmd. 2809*, as in the case of vessels laid down since the Washington Conference the tonnage given excludes fuel and reserve feed water. (c) One cruiser minelayer was also under construction. (d) This figure covers only 7 cruisers of 10,000 tons each which were under construction. American estimates allowed 68,000 tons for the other 7. (e) Sixteen of these cruisers were over 20 years old. (f) Only 3 of these had been actually authorized on the 1st February, 1927. (g) Ten of these cruisers were over 20 years old. Japan had also 3 cruiser minelayers in commission. (h) One cruiser minelayer was also projected. (i) Four of these cruisers were over 20 years old. (j) One cruiser minelayer was also under construction. (k) One cruiser minelayer was also projected. (l) One cruiser minelayer was also projected. (m) One of these cruisers was over 20 years old. (n) Including 17 flotilla leaders. (o) Including 3 flotilla leaders. (p) Seven of these were over 16 years old. (q) Twenty-one of these were over 16 years old. (r) Seven of these were over 16 years old. (s) Including 8 flotilla leaders. (t) Including 9 flotilla leaders. (v) Five of these were over 16 years old. The total includes 11 flotilla leaders.

signatures of twenty out of twenty-one members of the House Naval Affairs Committee, including the Chairman, Mr. Butler;¹ but, owing to the President's influence, provision was not made for these three cruisers in the bill making appropriations for the Department of the Navy for the year 1927-8, which passed the House on the 7th January, 1927.² Nevertheless, provision for this purpose was subsequently included in the bill as it passed the Senate on the 1st February;³ and on the 24th the Senate's amendment to this effect was accepted by the House.⁴ Accordingly the President approved the bill on the 2nd March;⁵ and meanwhile, in the vain hope of maintaining his ground on this point, he had also found it necessary in advance to declare himself in favour of another bill, authorizing the construction of ten new 10,000-ton cruisers, which was introduced into the House of Representatives by the Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee on the 18th December, 1926.⁶ This other bill provided for an authorization only, not for appropriations, and it contained a clause under which the President would be empowered to suspend the construction of any or all of the ships authorized in the event of an international agreement being reached at another conference for the limitation of armaments.⁷ Moreover, on the 21st December, it was announced by 'the White House spokesman' that the President was opposed to appropriations at this session for the ten cruisers proposed in the Butler bill, as well as for the three cruisers of the 1924 programme.⁸ In the event, Congress rose without passing the Butler bill;⁹ but this did not diminish the significance of its action in including appropriations for the three remaining cruisers of the 1924 programme in the 1927-8 budget in spite of the President's emphatically expressed disapproval of this course; and during the first half of the year 1927 the pressure upon the President became so severe that even his success in securing, from Great Britain and Japan, acceptances of his invitation to a fresh naval discussion did not enable him to postpone the date of taking those steps which the action of Congress had made incumbent upon him. As soon as the appropriations for the last three cruisers of the 1924 programme had been made, tenders seem to have been invited for laying down not

¹ *The New York Times*, 16th and 28th December, 1926.

² *The United States Daily*, 8th January, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 2nd February, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 25th February, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3rd March, 1927.

⁶ *The New York Times*, 16th and 20th December, 1926; *The Times*, 20th December, 1926; see further *The United States Daily*, 13th January, 1927.

⁷ *The Times*, 20th December, 1926.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 22nd December, 1926; *The New York Times*, 23rd December, 1926.

⁹ *The United States Daily*, 20th August, 1927.

only these but the other three for which appropriations had been made at an earlier date, and in due course the contracts for all six cruisers were signed. The fact, however, that this action had been taken appears not to have been made public until the 28th July, when the failure of the Three-Power Conference was practically certain.¹

Meanwhile, the President had made his attempt to avert the renewal of competition by agreement.

On the 10th February, 1927, President Coolidge sent to the Congress of the United States a Message² announcing that on that same day the American Ambassadors in London, Paris, Rome and Tokyo would present to the Governments to which they were accredited a memorandum 'suggesting that they empower their delegates at the forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva³ to negotiate and conclude at an early date an agreement further limiting naval armament, supplementing the Washington Treaty on that subject and covering the classes of vessels not covered by that Treaty'. President Coolidge's Message then proceeded to explain the considerations which had moved him to take this action. The Washington Conference of 1921-2 had succeeded in imposing 'a specific tonnage limitation upon capital ships and aircraft carriers', but agreement was not then found possible with regard to other classes of ships. Every nation had therefore been at complete liberty since 1922 to build any number of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, and 'it was only to be expected that the spirit of competition, stifled as regards capital ships and aircraft carriers by the Washington Treaty, would sooner or later show itself with regard to the other vessels not limited under the Treaty'. Competitive building, in the President's view, had not actually begun,

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th July, 1927; *Le Temps*, 30th July, 1927. It would appear from a letter published in *The United States Daily* of the 25th April, 1927, that the awards of these six cruisers to various construction yards were made as early as April 1927, though the contracts were not actually signed until some time later.

² Text in *Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments* (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, 70th Congress, 1st Session) and in *The Times*, *The Manchester Guardian* and *The New York Times*, 11th February, 1927.

³ See Section (ii) above. In view of the subsequent criticism to the effect that the diplomatic preparation for the Three-Power Naval Conference at Geneva was inadequate—a criticism to which the United States, as the initiator, was exposed in a greater degree than the other participants—it is only fair to note that President Coolidge's original suggestion was not for a separate conference but simply for certain action to be taken, during a meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, by five of the states participating in it.

but 'far-reaching building programmes' had been adopted by certain Powers and there had appeared, both in the United States and in other countries, 'a sentiment urging naval construction on the ground that such construction is taking place elsewhere. In such sentiments lies the germ of renewed naval competition'. It had been 'the hope of the American Government, constantly expressed by the Congress since the Washington Conference, that a favourable opportunity might present itself to complete the work begun [at Washington] by the conclusion of further agreements covering cruisers, destroyers and submarines'; and the present moment seemed 'particularly opportune' for negotiations to this end, since the 'earnest desire of the nations of the world to relieve themselves in as great a measure as possible of the burden of armaments and to avoid the dangers of competition' had been shown by the establishment and the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. The American delegation on the Preparatory Commission had always expressed the view that the problems of land and air armaments were 'most susceptible of solution by regional agreements'; but the problem of the limitation of naval armaments was not regional in character. It had been 'successfully treated in part by an agreement among the five leading Naval Powers' and, in the President's opinion, it could be 'definitely dealt with by further agreements among those Powers'. It would be 'a contribution to the success of the preliminary work now going on at Geneva should the Great Naval Powers themselves agree upon a further definite limitation of naval armament'.

The memorandum¹ presented to the British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments on the 10th February followed the same general lines as President Coolidge's Message to Congress. The four Powers to whom the memorandum was addressed were asked whether they were 'disposed to empower their representatives at the forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Commission to initiate negotiations looking toward an agreement providing for limitation in the classes of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty'. The memorandum outlined the policy of the United States Government towards the limitation of naval armament in the following passage:

Although hesitating at this time to put forward rigid proposals as regards the ratios of naval strength to be maintained by the different Powers, the American Government, for its part, is disposed to accept, in regard to those classes of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty, an extension of the five-five-three ratio as regards the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and to leave to discussion at Geneva

¹ Text in U.S. Senate Document No. 55; *The New York Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th February, 1926.

the ratios of France and Italy, taking into full account their special conditions and requirements in regard to the types of vessels in question. Ratios for capital ships and aircraft-carriers were established by that Treaty, which would not be affected in any way by an agreement covering other classes of ships.

The first Power to answer the American memorandum of the 10th February was France, who on the 15th February declined the invitation to a Five-Power Conference. It was not surprising that President Coolidge's proposals should not be well received in France, in view of that country's attitude at the Washington Conference¹ and of the support given by French delegates during the disarmament discussions of the previous year to the thesis that the problem of naval disarmament could not be isolated from the general problem for separate treatment.² The note³ in which, on the 15th February, the French Government declined President Coolidge's invitation was, however, couched in cordial terms, and expressed satisfaction that the ideals of the United States Government with regard to world peace were identical with those of the French Government. The proposal for a Naval Conference was declared to be unacceptable to France only because it threatened to compromise the success of the movement for general disarmament. The League of Nations had already taken important steps towards carrying out the disarmament obligations imposed on it by the Covenant, and its authority, in the French Government's opinion, might be weakened if the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference were deprived of an important part of its programme and one aspect of the general problem were discussed by a Conference limited to a few Powers. As additional arguments in favour of the discussion of naval questions by the Preparatory Commission rather than by a separate Conference, the French Government laid stress on the fact that the categories of vessels which would come under consideration interested all states possessing navies and not merely the Great Powers, and referred to the failure of the Rome Naval Conference of 1924⁴ to induce Powers not represented at Washington to adopt the principles agreed upon in 1921-2.

In Italy, also, President Coolidge's proposal was not favourably received. The tone of the Fascist press was frankly hostile, and references were made to Italy's already modest naval programme,

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 495. See also the present volume, p. 29 above.

² See Section (ii) above.

³ Text in U.S. Senate Document No. 55; *The New York Times*, 16th February; *Le Temps*, 17th February, 1927.

⁴ For the Rome Conference, see the *Survey for 1924*, Part I A, Section (viii).

and to the impossibility of agreeing to any limitation of destroyers and submarines.¹ Signor Mussolini's refusal to participate in a Five-Power Conference was conveyed to the American Ambassador on the 21st February. The note² referred to the 'undeniable interdependence of every type of armament of every single Power', to the impossibility of adopting partial measures between five Powers only, and to the failure of the Rome Conference of 1924. So far the Italian Government was on common ground with the French, but the concluding paragraphs of the note introduced a new factor by pleading that Italy's 'unfavourable geographical position' made it impossible for her, without grave risk, to accept a binding limitation of naval armaments. The naval forces which she possessed were already inadequate for the defence of her lines of communication with the rest of the world, of her lengthy coast line, her island possessions, and her colonies. Italy, the note declared, was compelled to consider the problem in relation to other Mediterranean Powers whose geographical position was more favourable and which were 'elaborating naval programmes of great strength'.

In the meantime, on the 19th February, the Japanese Government had accepted President Coolidge's invitation in a note³ which expressed full agreement with the American Government's views on the desirability of completing the work of the Washington Conference and cordially welcomed the initiative taken by President Coolidge. In view of the importance of the problem to be discussed, the Japanese Government considered it essential that part at least of its delegation should be sent specially from Tokyo, and it therefore asked that the conference should be postponed until June, to allow time for adequate preparation and for the journey from Tokyo to Geneva.

The reply of the British Government to the American memorandum was delayed owing to the necessity for consultation with the Dominions.⁴ The note⁵ which was finally presented on the 28th February conveyed an acceptance of President Coolidge's proposal, in the following terms:

His Majesty's Government in Great Britain received with cordial sympathy the invitation of the Government of the United States of America to take part in a conversation at Washington on the further limitation of naval armaments. The views of His Majesty's Government

¹ See *The Times*, 15th February; *Le Temps*, 17th February, 1927.

² Text in U.S. Senate Document No. 55; the *Corriere della Sera*, 22nd February; *The New York Times*, 23rd February, 1927.

³ Text in U.S. Senate Document No. 55; *The New York Times*, 21st February, 1927.

⁴ See *The Times*, 18th and 22nd February, 1927.

⁵ Text in U.S. Senate Document No. 55.

upon the special geographical position of the British Empire, the length of inter-imperial communications, and the necessity for the protection of its food supplies are well known, and, together with the special conditions and requirements of the other countries invited to participate in the conversations, must be taken into account. His Majesty's Government are nevertheless prepared to consider to what extent the principles adopted at Washington can be carried further, either as regards the ratio in different classes of ships between the various Powers or in other important ways. They therefore accept the invitation of the Government of the United States of America, and will do their best to further the success of the proposed conversation. They would, however, observe that the relationship of such a conversation to the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva would require careful adjustment.¹

The position at the end of February therefore was that, of the four Powers to which the American memorandum had been addressed, two—Great Britain and Japan—had accepted the proposal for a separate naval conference, and two—France and Italy—had rejected it. On the 8th March it was announced that the Administration had reached the conclusion that a Three-Power Conference would be better than none, and that informal discussions were in progress on the subject with Great Britain and Japan.² On the 10th March the British Ambassador made known to the State Department his Government's willingness to take part in a Three-Power Conference,³ and a similar step was taken by the Japanese Ambassador on the following day.⁴ Thereupon formal notes⁵ were presented to the representatives of Great Britain and Japan confirming the invitation to a Conference and suggesting that it might open on the 1st June, 1927. On the 14th March the American Ambassadors in Paris and Rome presented communications⁶ to the French and Italian Governments urging them to be represented 'in some manner' at the Conference. The French Government replied to this new invitation on the 2nd April⁷ and the Italian Government on the 16th May⁸—

¹ Sir Austen Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons on the 28th February that the terms of this note had been concurred in by all the Governments of the Empire, except the Government of the Irish Free State, which had not yet communicated its views.

² *The United States Daily*, 9th March, 1927.

³ *Ibid.* and *The Times*, 11th March, 1927.

⁴ *The United States Daily* and *The Times*, 12th March, 1927.

⁵ Texts in U.S. Senate Document No. 55 and in *The United States Daily*, 14th March, 1927.

⁶ Texts in U.S. Senate Document No. 55 and in *The United States Daily*, 16th March, 1927.

⁷ Text of the French memorandum in U.S. Senate Document No. 55. See also *Le Temps*, 6th April, 1927.

⁸ Text of the Italian memorandum in U.S. Senate Document No. 55. See also *The Times*, 19th May, 1927.

both in guarded terms which reserved their right to informal representation at the Conference. Italy finally decided to be represented by an observer, and France by an 'informatteur'.¹

It will be noticed that between the time when President Coolidge decided to convene the Conference and the date on which the meetings actually began there was apparently no serious attempt on either side to set on foot any preliminary joint exploration of the ground with a view to making each party aware of what were the governing considerations in the other parties' minds and to examining, in a preliminary way, how these considerations were related to the great political issues which lay in the background of the technical discussions. After the Conference had failed, a number of experienced and authoritative observers laid their finger upon this lack of diplomatic preparation as the greatest single cause of the failure.² On the 7th August, 1927, for example, this explanation was suggested by General Dawes at the ceremony of the opening of the Peace Bridge across the Niagara River, between Fort Erie and Buffalo, at which he and Mr. Baldwin made the two principal speeches;³ on the 10th November, 1927, in the House of Lords at Westminster, the thesis was developed by Lord Haldane; and it entered into the vote of censure upon the Government of the day which was moved on the 24th November, 1927, in the House of Commons at Westminster, by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. 'I confess frankly', Sir Austen Chamberlain admitted on this occasion in his reply, 'that I take some blame to myself that we did not try to secure further diplomatic preparation. . . . I think it is a lesson of that Conference that such diplomatic preparation is always necessary and always desirable before a conference takes place.'

The British Government's defence, as far as its responsibility was involved, was that it had not been the party that had issued the invitations and that therefore it could not have made overtures for exploring the ground before acceptance without laying itself open to the suspicion that, so far from seeking to secure the success of the proposed conference, it was casting about for plausible pretexts for declining to participate.⁴ 'The only preparation we had to make,' as

¹ See *Le Temps*, 6th June, 1927. It was explained that this official's mission was to keep his Government informed of the progress of the discussions without himself intervening in any way or assuming any responsibility for decisions which might be taken.

² For a good exposition of this diagnosis, see *The Round Table*, March 1928.

³ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 9th August, 1927.

⁴ This point was made, in the debate on the 24th November, 1927, by both Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Bridgeman.

Mr. Bridgeman put it laconically on the 1st December, 1927, 'was whether we would accept President Coolidge's invitation or refuse it'. British critics might retort that an experienced Foreign Office ought to have foreseen clearly the dangers which the absence of diplomatic preparation would entail, and to have commanded sufficient diplomatic dexterity to make the necessary overtures without exposing its motives to misinterpretation. Yet the British Government's defence was evidently pertinent up to a certain point; for *prima facie* it lay with the party which had taken the initiative in convening the conference to take the initiative likewise in securing adequate diplomatic preparation for it. According to one American authority, informal preliminary discussions actually were initiated from the American side and lapsed through lack of response on the British side. If that report proved to be well-founded, the onus would be transferred to the British Government's shoulders. If, on the other hand, the United States Government proved to have made no effort, or at any rate no sustained effort, of this kind, the major responsibility for the lack of diplomatic preparation would then rest with it. The United States Government's defence (if a defence were called for) was that it regarded the new Conference as a kind of epilogue to the Washington Conference in which the parties would not find it necessary to reopen a discussion of the general principles which had been agreed upon at Washington but would simply meet in order to extend a technical convention which had been worked out at Washington, on the basis of those general principles, to the particular domain in which a 'gap' had been left in the Washington Five-Power Treaty. Moreover, the United States Government seems to have held that, at the Washington Conference, the British Government had morally committed itself to an acceptance of the 5-5 ratio, as between Great Britain and the United States, in respect of auxiliary craft as well as capital ships. This view was partly based on an *argumentum ex silentio*—because at Washington it had been France, not Great Britain, who had rejected this part of the American plan, and the British delegation had given no indication at the time that it concurred in the French objection—and partly upon a specific statement made by Lord Balfour at the second plenary session of the Washington Conference, in which he had accepted an American figure of 450,000 tons as an allowance for the auxiliary craft attached to the British and American battle fleets.¹ On this latter point there seems to have been a misunderstanding; for the Americans understood that this figure had been intended by the United States delegation at Washington to cover all

¹ See *The United States Daily*, 11th July, 1927.

auxiliary craft whatsoever in the two respective navies, whereas Lord Balfour had accepted the figure on the assumption that it applied exclusively to the auxiliary craft attached to the battle fleets, without reference to the other purposes—for example, the protection of maritime trade routes—for which cruisers might be required by a Power so situated as the British Empire.¹

Thus the United States Government assumed, perhaps too confidently, that the British Government saw eye to eye with it in regard to the presuppositions on which the new conference was to base its work; and the British Government, on its side, seems to have assumed, perhaps too readily, that the success of the new conference—once convened—was inevitable. Even Lord Cecil, who had lately returned from the session of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission 'exhausted and discouraged', thought, like his colleagues in the Cabinet at Westminster, that in the Three-Power Naval Conference 'there was little doubt of agreement being reached'.²

Accordingly, the Conference, when it opened on the 20th June, plunged without preparation into technical discussions, or rather, into an exchange of technical plans which had already been worked out in considerable detail by the respective Admiralties without reference to one another. Perhaps the most curious feature about the Conference was that neither before, during or after its session was there any official discussion of the great problems of maritime law in war-time at sea, in which the dangerous issue popularly known as 'the Freedom of the Seas' was involved. It was as though the states-

¹ After the termination of the Geneva Three-Power Conference, when Lord Balfour's declaration at Washington had been publicly cited in support of the American case, Lord Balfour himself, in a speech delivered at Whittingehame on the 6th August, 1927, gave his own interpretation of his own words (see *The Times*, 8th August, 1927). The relevant passage in the declaration which he had made at Washington was as follows:

'They [the United States] have, as we think rightly, taken the battle fleet as the aggressive unit which they have in the main to consider; and in the battle fleet you must include those auxiliary ships without which a modern battle fleet has neither eyes nor ears, has little power of defence against certain forms of attack, little power of observation, little power of dealing with any equal foe to which it may be opposed.

'Taking these two—that is, the battleships and the cruisers—as really belonging to one subject—namely the battle fleet—taking these two, the battleships themselves and the vessels auxiliary and necessary to the battle fleet, we think—that is, the British Government think—that the proportion between the various countries is acceptable; we think the limitation of armaments is reasonable; we think it should be accepted; we firmly believe that it will be accepted.'

² See his minute of the 25th August, 1927, to the Prime Minister, announcing his resignation (text in *The Times*, 30th August, 1927), and his speech in the House of Lords on the 16th November, 1927.

men and the experts on both sides had decided, by tacit consent, to grapple with the material instruments of Anglo-American naval competition without touching upon the political issue in which the whole significance, and almost the whole danger, of that competition resided.¹ In the course of previous international discussions of the disarmament problem, the representatives of the English-speaking peoples had, in fact, from time to time expressed impatience at what seemed to them the unduly abstract, logical and academic way in which the problem had been approached by others. This had been their attitude, for example, towards the French formula of 'the potentials of war'.² At the Three-Power Conference of 1927, however, where the 'Anglo-Saxons' had the floor almost entirely to themselves, they carried their cult of 'concreteness' to such extremes that they arrived at a *reductio ad absurdum*; and this time it was the 'Latins'' turn to laugh, as they congratulated themselves on having left the 'practical men' to ride their hobby-horse alone.

So far, indeed, did the British and the Americans carry their common foible on this occasion that they do not seem to have informed one another effectively, in advance, even of the general lines which their respective concrete proposals would follow. It was reported that some informal discussions did take place between Admiral Beatty and Admiral Hilary Jones and between Lord Cecil and Mr. Hugh Gibson before the Conference opened on the 20th June, 1927, at Geneva.³ Yet, 'when we reached Geneva', as Lord Cecil informed his peers in the House of Lords on the 16th November, 1927, 'it was apparent that there had been no previous discussion before we met, so that each set of experts came armed with their own plan, to which they naturally were deeply attached. Indeed, I believe that the first we knew of the American proposals or they of ours was when they were announced at a public meeting of the Conference soon after our arrival. That was very unfortunate, and undoubtedly gave the Conference a bad send-off.' Thus the very thoroughness with which these concrete national proposals had been prepared, at any rate on the British side, became adverse to the success of the Conference, because it heightened the effect of the lack of any international preparation on the political plane. This point was afterwards brought out cogently, because unconsciously, by Mr. Bridgeman in his speech at Eastthorpe on the 11th August, 1927.⁴ 'I think we went to the Conference having given a good deal more consideration to the matter

¹ On this point see *The Round Table*, loc. cit.

² See pp. 7 and 13 above.

³ *The Round Table*, loc. cit.

⁴ See *The Times*, 12th August, 1927.

than some of the other people there,' he said. 'I do not think that they had thought out the question from the point of view which we took.' In the juxtaposition of these two sentences the failure of the Conference is largely explained.¹ The gravity of the failure lay in the fact that, in the absence of political preparation, the experts' concrete plans were based (inevitably and through no fault of the experts themselves) on traditional political assumptions—the assumptions, that is, that war was an instrument of national policy and that each country must be prepared for the contingency of having to wage this 'private' form of war with the other.

(iv) The Three-Power Naval Conference of Geneva (20th June–4th August, 1927).²

The Three-Power Conference opened in Geneva on the 20th June.³ The United States delegation was headed by Mr. Hugh Gibson,⁴ American Ambassador to Belgium (who had also represented the United States on the Preparatory Commission), with Admiral Hilary Jones as naval expert. Mr. Hugh Wilson, the American Minister at Berne, acted as secretary to the United States delegation and to the Conference as a whole. Japan sent Admiral Viscount Saito (whose departure from Tokyo at the end of April had been the occasion of a popular demonstration which indicated the extent of Japanese interest in the success of the Conference)⁵ and Viscount Ishii, Japanese Ambassador in Paris. The British delegates were Mr. Bridgeman, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Cecil, and Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Field, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff. The Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Irish Free State were all separately represented⁶ and

¹ In the debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 24th November, 1927, the distinction between the two kinds of preparation was recognized by Sir Austen Chamberlain, but was apparently missed by Mr. Bridgeman. 'We went most carefully prepared', the First Lord of the Admiralty is reported to have declared on this occasion. 'We thought out a very elaborate plan, and I would like to ask whether any other country which went to that Conference was as well prepared as we were—[interruption] Well, if that is why it broke down, do not blame us.'

² See *Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments held at Geneva, Switzerland, from June 20 to August 4, 1927*. (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, 70th Congress, 1st session.)

³ This date was decided on towards the end of May (*United States Daily*, 25th May, 1927).

⁴ The post had previously been offered to, but refused by, Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, who had played such a notable part in the Washington Conference (*The Times*, 4th June, 1927).

⁵ *The Times*, 27th April, 1927.

⁶ For a list of the Empire delegates see *The Times*, 9th June, 1927. For the

Mr. Bridgeman acted as representative for India. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe was one of the delegates appointed by the New Zealand Government. All the delegations were accompanied by staffs of naval officers, technical and financial experts, and civilian assistants.¹

At the first meeting ² Mr. Gibson, the principal American delegate, was elected President of the Conference. He then proceeded to give an outline of his Government's proposals.³ The United States was prepared to accept a general programme 'providing for as low a total tonnage in each class of auxiliary vessels on the basis of the Washington Treaty ratio as will be acceptable to the other Powers here represented'. The American delegation had come to the Conference with an estimate of what they considered 'equitable tonnage allocation in the various categories of vessels, but with no rigid quantitative proposals'. They were prepared to discuss the question of tonnage 'fully and frankly, in the light of our several legitimate needs'.

The American proposals were based on the following considerations:

(1) That the ratios and principles of the Washington Treaty be applied to cruisers, destroyers and submarines;

(2) That any agreement concluded here by the three Powers to limit the building of auxiliary vessels should be made co-terminous with the Washington Treaty, and contain the same general provisions for extension or modification.

It may be desirable to include an additional provision respecting revision, in the event of an extensive building programme by a Power not a party to any agreement we may conclude;

(3) That, for the purpose of the future limitation of naval armaments, auxiliary vessels may be divided into four categories, three of which, namely, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, shall be subject to limitation, with a fourth category of negligible combatant value not subject to limitation, as follows:

(a) Cruiser class, including surface naval combatant vessels between 3,000 tons and 10,000 tons;

(b) Destroyer class, including all surface naval combatant vessels between 600 and 3,000 tons with a speed greater than 17 knots;

significance of the Geneva Naval Conference in the history of the organization of British Empire foreign policy see *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*, p. 95.

¹ Though the Conference was quite independent of the League of Nations, it was arranged that it should use the offices of the League and that the machinery of the League Secretariat should be at its disposal (see *The Manchester Guardian*, 20th June, 1927).

² Verbatim records of the plenary sessions of the Conference are printed in U.S. Senate Document No. 55.

³ Text of Mr. Gibson's speech in *The United States Daily*, 21st June, 1927.

(c) Submarine class, including all vessels designed to operate below the surface of the sea;

(d) An unrestricted class, including other naval vessels of negligible combatant value, the definition of vessels falling in this class to be subject to technical agreement.

The tonnage allocations suggested by the American delegation as a basis for discussion were as follows:

Cruiser class. Total tonnage limitation: For the United States 250,000 to 300,000 tons; for the British Empire 250,000 to 300,000 tons; for Japan 150,000 to 180,000 tons.

Destroyer Class: For the United States 200,000 to 250,000 tons; for the British Empire 200,000 to 250,000 tons; for Japan 120,000 to 150,000 tons.

Submarine Class: For the United States 60,000 to 90,000 tons; for the British Empire 60,000 to 90,000 tons; for Japan 36,000 to 54,000 tons.

Having thus outlined the American scheme, the technical details of which were elaborated in a memorandum ¹ circulated to the Conference, Mr. Gibson stated that if any Power felt justified in proposing still lower tonnage levels for auxiliary craft the American Government would welcome such proposals. He added that 'if it should eventually be possible to reach a general agreement between all naval Powers to abolish submarines the United States would not be unfavourable to its consideration.'

Mr. Gibson was followed by Mr. Bridgeman,² who said that he was authorized to put before the Conference proposals which would 'mark a further step in the progressive decrease of armaments . . . while maintaining the respective security of our several nations at sea'. He then proceeded to explain 'what are the considerations which govern the position of Great Britain and the British Empire'.

First and foremost there is the insular position of the Mother Country and the fact that she is almost entirely dependent not only for raw materials but also for her food supplies and her very existence upon free passage upon the seas. It is no exaggeration to say that if the seas were closed to ships trading with our country we should be faced with starvation within a few weeks. My countrymen would never consent to take any risk of such a catastrophe. This obvious fact places us in a position totally different from that of any other country in the world, and makes discussion of naval disarmament more difficult for us than any other Power.

¹ Text printed as an annex to U.S. Senate Document No. 55 and in *The United States Daily*, 21st June, 1927.

² The texts of Mr. Bridgeman's speeches at the three plenary sessions of the Conference are printed in the British White Paper *Cmd.* 2964 of 1927 and in U.S. Senate Document No. 55. His speech on the 21st June was also printed in *The Times* of the 23rd June, 1927.

The other important factors in our case are the immense length of the routes over which our trade is carried and the very long coast lines which bound the various parts of the Empire and the necessity of providing reasonable protection for these extensive shores and long lines of communication against any aggression, however unlikely such a menace may appear to be at the moment. In this second consideration, more closely than the first, the welfare of the outlying parts of the Empire is very deeply concerned. Our situation is very plain, but its very simplicity is a measure of its vital seriousness to us.

The British Government, nevertheless, felt that there were limitations of naval armaments to which they could safely agree if other naval Powers also agreed to them, and the British delegation therefore submitted the following proposals:

(1) The extension of the accepted life of existing capital ships from 20 to 26 years, and a consequent waiver by the three Powers of their full rights under replacement tables agreed upon at Washington. Such an arrangement would naturally have to provide for some little elasticity on each side of that figure.

(2) The fixing of the life of other vessels: (a) Eight-inch gun cruisers at 24 years; (b) Destroyers at 20 years; (c) Submarines at 15 years.

(3) The reduction in the size of any battleships to be built in the future from the present limit of 35,000 tons displacement to something under 30,000 tons.

(4) Reduction in the size of guns in battleships from the present limit of 16 inch to 13.5 inch.

(5) Limitation of the displacement of aircraft carriers to 25,000 tons instead of 27,000 tons.

(6) Reduction of guns in aircraft carriers from 8 inch to 6 inch.

(7) Acceptance of the existing ratio 5 : 5 : 3 for cruisers of 10,000 tons displacement carrying 8-inch guns.

(8) The numbers of these larger cruisers which each of the three countries require can be the subject of further discussion.

(9) A limitation of 7,500 tons and 6-inch guns to be placed on all future light cruisers after the number of 10,000-ton cruisers has been decided upon.

(10) Limitation of displacement of: (a) Destroyer leaders to 1,750 tons; (b) Destroyers to 1,400 tons.

(11) Guns in destroyers to be limited to 5 inch.

(12) *Submarines*. We have not changed our mind since the Washington Conference, when our delegates expressed their willingness to agree to the discontinuation of the use of submarines in warfare. But we recognize that Powers which possess fewer of the larger vessels of war regard the possession of submarines as a valuable weapon of defence.

At the same time we feel that if the proposals we have put forward for limitation of battleships and other more powerful vessels of war should be accepted it would not be unreasonable to suggest some limitation in the size, and perhaps also in the number, of submarines.

We therefore propose that the tonnage of the larger type of submarine

be limited to 1,600 and of the smaller type to 600, and the armament of each to 5-inch guns. We also think it would be desirable to discuss the possibility of limiting the numbers of submarines according to our varying requirements. And it must be borne in mind that any limit placed on the number of submarines would make it easier to limit the number of destroyers, and if agreement were reached on these points with other Powers it might be possible also to consider the numbers of cruisers each of us should possess.

Thus both the American and the British delegation put forward definite proposals for the limitation of naval armaments, but the scope of their suggestions and the principles on which they were based differed widely. The Americans wanted a simple extension to auxiliary vessels of the principles applied at Washington to capital ships and suggested a total tonnage limitation for each class of auxiliary vessels in the ratio of 5:5:3. The British proposals suggested the extension of the Washington ratio to only one category of auxiliary vessels (10,000-ton cruisers carrying 8-inch guns) and made no mention of total tonnage, but sought to achieve limitation, on the basis of the number of vessels actually needed by each Power, by reducing the size and lengthening the life not only of auxiliary vessels but also of capital ships (which, in the American scheme, were not touched upon at all but were left for reconsideration in 1931 in accordance with the Washington Treaty).

The Japanese scheme was less concrete; its object was merely to maintain the *status quo*, and it appears to have been drafted purposely in somewhat vague terms, in order to allow greater scope for negotiation.¹ The proposals put forward by Viscount Saito on the 20th June may be summarized as follows: ²

(1) In future no building programme should be adopted and no new ships should be acquired for the purpose of increasing naval strength.

(2) The naval strength to be allowed to each Power should be determined for surface auxiliary craft and submarines respectively on the basis of the tonnage of the existing effective ships and of the ships under construction, taking into consideration the tonnages of the ships authorized but not yet laid down and of the ships attaining age limit during the execution of the authorized programme. The age limits suggested were 16 years for surface auxiliary craft of over 3,000 tons and 12 years for surface auxiliary craft of less than 3,000 tons and also for submarines.

(3) Construction or acquisition of ships in future should be limited to replacements within the limits of the prescribed naval strength of the

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 23rd June, 1927.

² See *The Times*, 21st June, 1927. The full text of Viscount Saito's speech is printed in U.S. Senate Document No. 55.

respective Powers. Due consideration should be given to equalizing as far as possible the amount of annual construction for replacement.

(4) Ships of small dimensions and ships limited in activity should be exempt from limitation.

The Conference did not meet again in plenary session for over three weeks. During the interval a Technical Committee, which was formed on the 21st June and which met in private, was engaged on the examination of the different proposals. The Executive Committee¹ of the Conference, which consisted of the six principal delegates with Mr. Bridgeman as Chairman, met on the 24th June and decided that the technical advisers should be asked to form two groups, one to study the question of the limitation of cruisers and destroyers, the other the limitation of submarines.² In addition to the work of the experts, numerous informal conversations took place between the principal delegates. Until the question of cruisers became the dominating factor early in July, the points which aroused most interest³ were the possible inclusion of capital ships in the discussions, in accordance with the British plan, and the question of parity between the United States and Great Britain.

In a statement to the press on the 24th June⁴ Mr. Bridgeman made it clear that a reduction in the size and an extension of the life of capital ships were integral parts of the British plan, and he was even reported to have declared that 'the British delegation could not go home until this question had been discussed'. The attitude of the American delegation was that the matter was outside their terms of reference, since it had always been assumed in the United States that questions relating to the maximum tonnage and gun-calibre for both battleships and auxiliary ships had been settled at Washington and would not be discussed again until the conference which was to be held in 1931 in accordance with the Washington Treaty. Moreover, the Americans seem to have felt that, apart from the question whether the subject fell within the terms of reference of the Confer-

¹ The minutes of the Executive Committee and of the Technical Committee are printed in U.S. Senate Document No. 55, but the records are not verbatim.

² *The Times*, 25th June, 1927.

³ In the early days of the Conference some excitement was aroused by the report (which was telegraphed to Tokyo by a Japanese correspondent at Geneva) that Viscount Saito was empowered to introduce a proposal by which the adoption of a ratio unfavourable to Japan would be offset by the conclusion of a Security Pact between the United States, Great Britain and Japan (see *The Times*, 23rd June, 1927). The Japanese delegation does not appear to have put this proposal forward in any formal manner and the report that it had intended to do so was in fact contradicted (see *The Times*, 23rd and 25th June, 1927. See also *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th June, 1927).

⁴ See *The Times*, 25th June, 1927.

ence or not, the British had given them no warning of their intention to raise it, and therefore no opportunity, before the Conference met, of either expressing their views as to the desirability of dealing with it, or making their own preparations for dealing with it, if they agreed that it was to be dealt with. The British delegation sought to justify their introduction of the subject by reference to a sentence inserted in the British reply of the 25th February¹ to the original American memorandum of the 10th February, 1927, in which the British Government had agreed to consider to what extent the principles adopted at Washington could be extended 'either as regards the ratio in different classes of ships between the various Powers or in other important ways'. The acceptance by the United States of the last part of this sentence, which had been deliberately included, was assumed, since no objection was raised to it in the subsequent negotiations.² The Americans submitted that they could not have been expected to read that meaning into this vague and allusive phrase; and in fact there seems no doubt that when the subject was specifically introduced by the British during the Conference both the Americans and the Japanese were genuinely taken by surprise. On the British side, again, it was contended that the proposals regarding capital ships would not involve any actual modification of the Washington Treaty (which could not well be effected in the absence of two of the signatories of the Treaty, France and Italy), since the suggestion was merely that the United States, Great Britain and Japan should agree to renounce their rights under the treaty on certain points.³ The argument on this question spun itself out into subtleties which possibly rather increased than diminished the atmosphere of mutual misunderstanding and dissatisfaction which the incident conjured up.

On the 24th June the principal American and Japanese delegates both announced that they had asked for the instructions of their Governments on the matter of capital ships.⁴ The Japanese delegates, however, were obviously inclined to support any proposal which might lead to a reduction of expenditure, and on the 27th June they received from Tokyo authorization to discuss battleships.⁵ Two days later the Japanese Minister of Marine was reported to have declared that his Government would agree in principle to limit battleships to 30,000 tons with guns of a calibre not exceeding 14

¹ See p. 38 above.

² See *The Times*, 25th June, 1927.

³ See *Le Temps*, 25th June, 1927.

⁴ Minutes of an informal meeting of the Executive Committee held on the 24th June (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, p. 82).

⁵ *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 28th June, 1927.

inches.¹ On the 28th June the American attitude was defined by an announcement from the State Department at Washington that the American Government would have no objection to the discussion of capital ships after the objects for which the Conference had been convened had been attained, on the understanding that such discussions could do no more than indicate the trend which negotiations would take at the 1931 Conference.² The Japanese delegates, who had not come to the Conference prepared to discuss capital ships, were also anxious that consideration of this part of the British plan should be postponed,³ and on the 8th July it was agreed in principle that a preliminary exchange of views on capital ships should take place at a later stage of the Conference.⁴

In the meantime the British proposals regarding capital ships, in conjunction with Mr. Bridgeman's statement at the opening meeting that the basis of negotiation must be each country's actual requirements, had given rise to suggestions in the United States that Great Britain aimed at reasserting her supremacy at sea and denying to the United States the parity which that country considered to have been established in principle at Washington with the adoption of the 5:5:3 ratio for capital ships. This suggestion seems to have been based partly on the fact that, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, Great Britain had not only retained one battle cruiser (the *Hood*, which had been completed in 1920) of 41,200 tons displacement, but had also almost completed two new battleships, the *Nelson* and the *Rodney*, of 35,000 tons each, which were larger than any ship possessed by the United States or under construction in that country. If, therefore, according to this argument, the United States could now be persuaded to agree to the British proposal that no battleship exceeding 30,000 tons should be built in future, Great Britain would in fact be in a superior position until the three vessels in question reached the replacement age. This argument would appear to be rebutted by the simple fact that, in the Washington Five-Power Treaty, Great Britain was specifically authorized to retain the *Hood* and to build the other two ships as part of the practical arrangements for bringing the capital ships of the three principal naval Powers into the 5:5:3 ratio. Even if it were true (and this was not demonstrated)

¹ *Le Temps*, 30th June, 1927.

² *The United States Daily*, 29th June, 1927.

³ See *The Times*, 29th June, 1927.

⁴ Minutes of the second session of the Executive Committee (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 83-5). Compare the statements by Mr. Bridgeman and other delegates at the second plenary session of the Conference (*Cmd.* 2964, p. 8; *The United States Daily*, 15th July, 1927).

that the effect was to give Great Britain a preponderance in capital ships during the lives of the three ships in question, that would prove that the experts at Washington had been guilty of an error in their calculations, not that the British Government had been trying to defeat the intentions of the Five-Power Treaty after its conclusion. Nor was it clear how the situation would be modified to the disadvantage of the United States by the British proposal to reduce the maximum tonnage of capital ships for the future. Nevertheless this suggestion, when brought into relation with the indications that Great Britain intended to insist on a large number of cruisers, tended to create the impression that the British Government was systematically attempting to secure a superiority of naval strength in all categories.¹ These suggestions were expressed with some vehemence in the American press. The trend of American public opinion was interpreted by the Washington correspondent of *The Times*² to mean that 'the United States cannot and will not accept anything short of parity with Great Britain in all classes of ships', and this interpretation was confirmed by Mr. Gibson at Geneva.³ On the 28th June the State Department at Washington, in the announcement regarding the discussion of capital ships which has been referred to above, expressed the view that the extension of life and reduction of tonnage of battleships would undoubtedly prolong the existing disparity in Great Britain's favour.⁴ On the 29th Mr. Bridgeman and Lord Cecil called on Mr. Gibson and assured him that there was no question in their minds or in those of other members of the British Government that the United States was not entitled to absolute parity with Great Britain. A statement was issued at the same time to American press representatives in Geneva emphasizing Great Britain's readiness to agree to parity in all classes and explaining that there were no dark designs underlying the British proposals;⁵ and on the following day Mr. Kellogg, the United States Secretary of State, expressed his satisfaction that the 'misapprehension had been cleared away'.⁶

It seemed at first as though these statements by the British delegation that the American right to parity was not contested would succeed in allaying the suspicions which had been aroused and would thus create an atmosphere more likely to conduce to successful

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th June and 1st July; *The Times*, 30th June, 1927. ² See the issue of the 27th June, 1927.

³ In an interview with the correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian* (issue of the 29th June, 1927).

⁴ See *The United States Daily*, 29th June, 1927.

⁵ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st July, 1927.

⁶ *The United States Daily* and *The Times*, 1st July, 1927.

negotiations.¹ With the shelving of the controversy over capital ships, however, the question of cruisers came to the front, and it soon appeared that this was the crux. As has been mentioned, the British delegation had indicated from the first that they could only discuss cruisers on the basis of the essential requirements of the British Empire, but the Americans had their own requirements to consider too. Like the British, they considered them in the light of the vexations to which their sea-borne trade had been exposed during the General War of 1914-18; and while, to British minds at this time, cruisers stood primarily for protection against commerce raiders when Great Britain was a belligerent, to American minds they stood for protection against the new methods of 'blockade' when the United States was a neutral.² Thus the American insistence that the principle of parity with Great Britain should apply to cruisers as well as to capital ships was not a mere matter of prestige; and as the negotiations proceeded it became increasingly clear that the American and British delegations were approaching the problem from standpoints which diverged so widely that they were almost incompatible. The American delegates were thinking of 'relative' needs in terms of total tonnage, the British were thinking of 'absolute' needs in terms of units; and attempts by either side to interpret the other's demands in its own terms only led to fresh misunderstandings.

The Technical Committee, which began to discuss cruisers on the 28th June,³ had before it the British proposal for the subdivision of cruisers into two classes.⁴ To the first class, consisting of cruisers of a maximum displacement of 10,000 tons, armed with 8-inch guns, it was proposed to apply the Washington ratio of 5:5:3. The second class, of a maximum displacement of 7,500 tons, armed with guns

¹ See *The Times*, 1st July; *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd and 4th July, 1927.

² See *The Manchester Guardian*, 5th July, 1927, for the report of a speech by Admiral Jones at the Independence Day celebrations on the 4th July, when he attempted to disprove Great Britain's greater need for cruisers by referring to the necessity for keeping open American lines of communication for vital supplies of rubber and other commodities. Admiral Jones also stated on this occasion that America's sea-borne cargo was 50 per cent. greater than Great Britain's foreign trade. At the meeting of the Technical Committee on the 28th June, Admiral Jones defended the American delegation's attitude to the British proposals regarding cruisers on the ground that 'the United States also had long lines of communication, depended on overseas communications, and also depended upon ships to guard her commerce and to deny the sea to enemy commerce and to control neutral commerce—questions which were inseparably interlocked' (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 124-5).

³ Minutes of the meeting in U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 120-31.

⁴ See *The Times*, *The Manchester Guardian* and *The United States Daily*, 29th June, 1927.

not exceeding 6-inch, might, it was suggested, be apportioned on the basis of each Power's needs. In the British view the 8-inch gun cruisers of 10,000 tons (the construction of which had been approved at Washington)¹ were unnecessarily large and expensive. For the protection of trade routes, smaller cruisers of 7,500 tons or less, armed with guns not exceeding 6-inch, were quite adequate, and the British Admiralty accordingly desired the gradual abolition of the 10,000-ton type of vessel in favour of the smaller class. To this proposal the American and Japanese delegations objected that the smaller cruisers were only useful to a Power like the British Empire, which possessed numerous naval bases. For the United States and for Japan the 10,000-ton cruisers were more valuable, on account of their greater radius.² Moreover, the American and Japanese delegates considered that the adoption of the 6-inch gun for the second class of cruisers would enable Great Britain, in case of need, to convert large numbers of merchant ships into fighting vessels.³ Accordingly, when the British plan for the division of cruisers into two classes was put forward at the meeting of the Technical Committee, the Japanese and American delegates asked for time to consider it.⁴

During the discussions in the Technical Committee on the 28th

¹ According to a statement by Mr. Bridgeman reported in *The Times* of the 9th July, 1927, the British consent to the 8-inch gun and 10,000-ton maxima for cruisers had been given somewhat reluctantly. In reply to this, American critics pointed out that, at the time of the Washington Conference, Great Britain had two ships of approximately this class built and two others building, and that before the end of 1923 she made arrangements for laying down eight more, whereas no cruisers of this class were authorized for the United States Navy until December 1924 (when five such cruisers had already been laid down for the British Navy), none appropriated for until 1925, and none laid down until 1926—when work was started on two out of the eight which had been authorized in 1924 (see Section (iii), p. 30 above). For the terms in which the then First Lord of the British Admiralty, Lord Lee of Fareham, supported the resolution in which, at the Washington Conference, the 8-inch gun and 10,000-ton maxima for auxiliary ships were specified, see *Proceedings of the Conference on Limitation of Armament held at Washington, 12th November, 1921–6th February, 1922* (Washington, 1922, Government Printing Office), p. 586.

² See *The Times*, 1st July; *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th July, 1927.

³ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 5th July, 1927. Under Article 14 of the Washington Treaty, the arming of merchant ships with 6-inch guns was permitted; and in practice this was the largest gun which could be mounted on merchant ships. The British naval experts, for technical reasons, discounted this argument against 6-inch guns, and held that no armed merchantman would ever be a match for the smallest cruiser. See, e.g., a statement by Lord Jellicoe reported in *The Times*, 22nd June, 1927. See also an article by a naval correspondent in *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th August, 1927.

⁴ See the minutes of the Third Session of the Technical Committee (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 120–31). See also *The United States Daily*, 29th June, 1927.

June, British requirements were formulated as 15 cruisers of the 10,000-ton type and 55 to 60 smaller vessels.¹ The British delegates stated their demand in numbers and not in terms of total tonnage, but the American naval expert, Admiral Jones, interpreted the numbers mentioned to mean a total tonnage of 600,000 tons, and this figure does not appear to have been actually contradicted on the British side.² In any case, it was clear, even in the absence of official confirmation, that on any computation the cruiser tonnage demanded by Great Britain was much in excess of the total originally suggested by the United States, and also in excess of the total tonnage of cruisers actually built or building in the British Navy, so that acceptance of this British demand would have meant not a reduction of armaments but an expansion.³ This demand, moreover, was presented as a statement of requirements based on an absolute, not on a relative, need.

During the next few days the question of cruisers was discussed at length and from many different points of view in the press, and the various aspects of the problem were considered in detail in numerous informal conversations among the different delegations; but the question did not come formally before the Technical Committee again until the 5th July.⁴ On that day Admiral Field, on behalf of the British delegation, suggested that the only hope of combining British requirements for numbers of cruisers with the reduction in total tonnage desired by the United States lay in the American and Japanese delegations agreeing to limit the total tonnage of large cruisers. Admiral Jones, the American naval expert, replied by reading a statement which, he declared, should be 'construed as our

¹ In the subsequent discussions 55 small cruisers seem to have been taken as the basis, making 70 in all.

² Minutes of the Third Session of the Technical Committee (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 120-31). The contrast between this figure of 600,000 tons and the maximum of 250,000-300,000 for the cruiser class proposed by Mr. Gibson on the 20th June was the subject of considerable comment in the press (see for instance *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th, 5th and 6th July; *The Times*, 4th July; *Le Temps*, 2nd July, 1927). It clearly caused consternation in Washington, and in some quarters it was taken as a proof that Great Britain was really arming against the United States.

³ If the 55 smaller cruisers were reckoned at 7,500 tons each, the total tonnage of the 70 would be 562,500 tons; and it would be 480,000 tons even if the 55 smaller cruisers were reckoned at the later reduced figure of 6,000 tons each. The total tonnage of cruisers actually built or building in the British navy at that time seems to have been not more than about 375,000 tons (including about 51,000 tons in respect of cruisers built or under construction for the Australian and New Zealand navies).

⁴ See the minutes of the eighth session of the Technical Committee (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 159-62).

maximum effort to meet the British viewpoint'. The position of the United States delegation, he said, 'is that we cannot discuss cruiser tonnages in excess of 400,000 tons for the period ending December 31st, 1936'. During that period, he added, 'we would require full liberty of action to build 10,000-ton cruisers up to a total of 250,000 tons,¹ recognizing at the same time the full right of other Powers to build cruisers of similar characteristics up to tonnages in accordance with the principles of the Washington Treaty'. In an effort to meet British wishes regarding the limitation of large cruisers, they were willing, for the period mentioned, and without prejudice to future action, 'to limit our further construction within a total tonnage limitation of 400,000 tons to vessels of a smaller tonnage, to be agreed upon'. They did not see any reason 'for limiting the calibre of gun in the smaller class of cruisers to anything different from that in the larger class'. The American delegation 'still ardently desire that the total tonnage limitation of cruisers to be agreed upon shall be very much lower than 400,000 tons. . . . Any limitation on the basis of a cruiser tonnage in excess of 400,000 tons we regard as so ineffective a limitation as not to justify the conclusion of a treaty at this time'. After listening to Admiral Jones's statement, the Technical Committee decided that it needed detailed examination, and that the discussion of the cruiser question had better be adjourned.

The experts, in fact, appeared to have reached an *impasse*, and the difficulties which had arisen now became the subject of direct negotiations between the principal delegates. At an informal meeting on the 6th July,² two new proposals were put forward: the first, by Viscount Saito, that the tonnage allotted for cruisers and destroyers might be pooled and that a maximum of 450,000–550,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain in these two classes together might be taken as the basis for further discussions; the second, by Mr. Bridgeman, that the total tonnage agreement for cruisers might be made to apply only to vessels under twenty years of age and that the British Empire might be allowed to retain, in addition, a certain number of vessels beyond the replacement age. There was also some discussion on the possibility of limiting building programmes for cruisers.

On the 8th July the Technical Committee met to draw up a report

¹ Mr. Gibson subsequently denied (see his remarks at the second plenary session of the Conference, referred to on p. 60 below) that the American delegation had intended to put forward a definite demand for 25 large cruisers, but this was the interpretation generally put upon Admiral Jones's statement.

² For the minutes of this meeting, see U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 165–7.

on the results which had so far been achieved. The report was approved by the Executive Committee and published on the same day.¹ Save for brief communiqués to the press, it was the first official statement regarding the activities of the Conference which had been made public since the opening session.

With regard to destroyers and submarines, the report stated, provisional agreement had been reached. The maximum individual displacement of destroyer flotilla leaders was to be 1,850 tons and of destroyers 1,500 tons, with 5-inch as the maximum calibre of gun. The age limit agreed upon was 16 years, and not more than 16 per cent. of the total tonnage was to be allotted to flotilla leaders. The British delegation had stated its requirements in the destroyer class as 221,600 tons, of which not more than 29,600 tons would be for flotilla leaders. The American and Japanese delegations had not made any proposals regarding the total tonnage for destroyers.

As to submarines, the British delegation had proposed two types—the larger from 1,000 to 1,600 tons and the smaller under 600 tons—with a maximum gun calibre for both classes of 5 inches and an age limit of 15 years.² Both the American and the Japanese delegation had opposed the division into two classes, and provisional agreement was reached only on maximum displacement, which was not to exceed 1,800 tons, and on a maximum gun calibre of 5 inches. It was also agreed that boats of less than 600 tons surface displacement should be excluded from limitation, provided that they carried no gun above 6-inch and not more than four guns above 3-inch, that they had no torpedo tubes and that their speed did not exceed 18 knots.

With regard to cruisers the report stated that no agreement had been reached. British requirements had been formulated as fifteen 8-inch gun cruisers nominally of 10,000 tons and fifty-five 6-inch gun cruisers of a smaller type (nominally 7,500 tons each) and these demands had called forth certain modifications of the original American proposal. The Japanese delegation had proposed that the large cruisers might be reduced to 8,000 tons, but they stipulated for the retention of 8-inch guns.

At the meeting of the Executive Committee on the 8th July at which the report of the Technical Committee was approved, the Japanese delegation formally submitted its proposal that the tonnage of cruisers and destroyers should be considered together, on a basis

¹ For a summary, see *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 9th July, 1927.

² The British delegation gave their requirements as 40 to 45 of the larger type and 15 to 20 of the smaller type, with a total in either case of 60, and a total tonnage of 76,000–81,000.

of 450,000 tons for the United States and the British Empire and about 300,000 tons for Japan. The Executive Committee also decided, at the expressed desire of the British delegates, that a plenary session of the Conference should be held on the 11th July, to 'give the British delegation an opportunity of stating their case, in order that it might not be misrepresented'.¹

The Executive Committee met again on the following day (the 9th July), and a long discussion took place on the cruiser question.² Little progress was made towards finding a solution of the fundamental problems involved, and the best hope of advance seemed to lie in a study of building programmes. A preliminary discussion on this possibility had already taken place at an informal meeting,³ and it was now suggested that each of the three Powers concerned should state its building programme for cruisers up to the year 1931. The idea underlying this suggestion was apparently that the British Government might consider suspending or delaying the construction of large cruisers in order to give the United States the opportunity to build up to parity.⁴ The American delegation showed some interest in this proposal, which was further discussed by the principal delegates in an informal meeting later in the same day,⁵ and on the 11th July it was arranged that the plenary session of the Conference, which had been announced for that day, should be postponed, in the hope, apparently, that further examination of the proposal regarding building programmes might provide a formula for agreement.⁶ On the 13th July, however, it was announced that a plenary session had been summoned, at Mr. Bridgeman's request, for the following day, the 14th July.

The second plenary session of the Conference duly took place on the afternoon of the 14th July. The proceedings⁷ consisted of a

¹ For the minutes of this meeting, see U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 83-92.

² Minutes of the meeting in U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 94-102.

³ See p. 55 above.

⁴ See *The Times*, 11th, 12th and 13th July, 1927.

⁵ For the minutes of this meeting, see U.S. Senate Document No. 55, p. 168.

⁶ It was reported that the British delegation had asked, on the 10th July, for the postponement of the meeting, but that the American delegation had been unwilling to take the responsibility. On the morning of the 11th July, however, news was received of the assassination in Dublin of Mr. Kevin O'Higgins, who had represented the Irish Free State at the Conference for a few days. It was thereupon decided to make his death the reason for postponing the meeting. (See *The Times*, 11th and 12th July; *Le Temps*, 12th July, 1927.)

⁷ See the verbatim record in U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 35-52.

statement of each delegation's position in the light of the discussions which had been in progress. Mr. Bridgeman,¹ who was called upon to speak first, began by explaining that he had asked for a plenary session because it had seemed to him that 'the atmosphere was being vitiated by gross misrepresentations of the British case in certain quarters'. He denied the allegations which had been made of serious ill-feeling among the delegates, and declared that he saw no reason to despair of finding a solution of the difficulties which had been encountered. The British proposals would mean a definite reduction in the offensive power of every type of vessel and a saving² of £1,000,000 on the initial cost of every battleship and of over £500,000 on every cruiser.³ Numbers of cruisers were more important to Great Britain than size, and she was prepared not to lay down any more 8-inch gun cruisers until the United States and Japan had built up to the Washington ratio. With regard to smaller cruisers, the right of the United States to parity was not contested, but the British delegation did desire to limit the size and the armament of this class of vessel, so that they might be 'defensive and not offensive weapons'. There was no intrinsic objection to accepting a limit of total tonnage, provided that other countries made it clear how they proposed to use their tonnage and what proportion they wanted of cruisers armed with 8-inch guns (the offensive strength of which was at least two and a half times as great as that of 6-inch gun cruisers). To agree in advance to a total tonnage of 400,000 for cruisers would put the British Empire in the position of accepting 'not parity, but definite inferiority in offensive power' unless they were prepared, which was not the case, to abandon the number of cruisers regarded as essential for the protection of Imperial communications. In conclusion Mr. Bridgeman referred to the possibility of an agreement on a maximum building programme for each country and remarked that 'a preliminary investigation had revealed a large measure of general consent' to this proposal. He hoped that on these lines a solution might be found.

Mr. Bridgeman was followed by Lord Jellicoe,⁴ who expounded in greater detail and in the light of his own experience the reasons for

¹ The text of his speech will be found in the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2964 of 1927 and in *The Times*, 15th July, 1927, as well as in U.S. Senate Document No. 55.

² At the Third Plenary Session Mr. Bridgeman claimed that his proposals would have saved 'over £50,000,000 to the British Empire during the period of replacement and proportionately larger savings for other countries'.

³ The British thesis presented in this sentence was not accepted by American critics.—A. J. T.

⁴ See *The Times*, 15th July, 1927, for extracts from his speech.

the British standpoint regarding cruisers. After a description of the lines of communication, 80,000 miles in length, which the British navy had to protect, Lord Jellicoe explained how the figure of 70 cruisers which had been put forward as the minimum had been arrived at.

It is a generally accepted view that in a fleet five cruisers are required for every three capital ships. With a British fleet of 15 capital ships the number of cruisers needed for fleet work, therefore, is 25, and 45 out of 70 are therefore left for direct trade protection. Of this number we must expect 12 to be refitting or fuelling at any given moment. With lines of communication 80,000 miles in length, this gives one cruiser for every 2,500 miles of communication.

He then went on to examine these figures in the light of British experience during the Great War. In 1914 Great Britain had possessed 114 cruisers, but the hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping sunk by German raiders during the War had proved that even this number was not sufficient to ensure protection for Great Britain's essential supplies. Moreover, during the War, Great Britain had been very favourably situated for preventing the exit of raiders from German ports, but

with the single exception of war with a Mediterranean Power, the difficulties of the British Navy in preventing the exit of raiders from a port of any other nation would be multiplied a thousandfold. Indeed, by no conceivable means could such an exit be prevented. The result must inevitably be that we should have to deal with raiders in far greater numbers than in the late war, and this fact alone makes it all the more imperative that the number of our cruisers should be adequate for work that would fall upon them.

The principal Japanese delegate, who followed the British, contributed two concrete suggestions.¹ After repeating the proposal already made² for a 'global tonnage' for cruisers and destroyers of 450,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain and about 300,000 for Japan, Viscount Saito suggested that the number of 10,000 ton cruisers armed with 8-inch guns might be fixed to allow ten or less to the United States and Great Britain and seven or less to Japan. Further, he proposed an arrangement by which each nation might be allowed under certain conditions and within certain limits to retain vessels in excess of the allotted tonnage when they were past the replacement age.³

¹ See the summary of his statement in *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th July, 1927. The full text is printed in U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 45-8.

² See pp. 55 and 56 above.

³ An arrangement on these lines had been suggested by Mr. Bridgeman on the 6th July (see p. 55 above).

In outlining the American position, Mr. Gibson¹ recalled his original suggestion for limiting the total tonnage of the United States and Great Britain, in cruisers and destroyers, to 450–550,000 tons and stated that the American delegation would agree to a higher tonnage level with the utmost reluctance and only if such a level furnished the sole possible meeting ground for the three Powers. With reference to Lord Jellicoe's statement regarding the strength needed to deal with commerce raiders, Mr. Gibson declared that he and his colleagues entertained 'very serious misgivings in regard to the effort to prepare in time of peace for all possible contingencies of this character in time of war . . . If in time of peace we are building up forces to perform this duty [of hunting down commerce raiders], it effectively closes the door to any real limitation of cruiser strength.' The American proposals were based on the belief that naval needs were relative, not absolute, and that the fairest method of limitation was that of total tonnage by classes, which left each country free, within limits, to build the numbers and types of vessels suited to its needs. On the subject of 10,000 ton cruisers, Mr. Gibson pointed out that if agreement could be reached on the tonnage level advocated by the American delegation it would obviously not be possible for the United States to add to their existing fleet the 25 cruisers of the largest size which they had been credited with demanding. The American delegation was willing to discuss the number of large cruisers once a tonnage limitation had been agreed upon. Finally, Mr. Gibson remarked that the American and the Japanese delegations were in practical agreement on the main issues, and that if some basis could be found mutually acceptable to the Japanese and British delegations he felt sure 'that it will be possible for the American delegation to make the agreement complete'.

The second plenary session of the Conference gave the delegations the opportunity of defining their positions and defending their respective cases, but it did not throw up a bridge over the gulf which separated the British and the Americans in the matter of cruisers. Mr. Bridgeman still refused to consider the problem in terms of total tonnage until he was sure of his 70 cruisers, while Mr. Gibson was determined not to discuss numbers until agreement had been reached on total tonnage. Mr. Gibson, moreover, had made no mention in his speech of the British delegation's proposal for agreement on a building programme, which Mr. Bridgeman had indicated as the most hopeful line of advance; and the proposal seems also to have been

¹ Text of his speech in U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 48–52, and also in *The United States Daily*, 15th July, 1927.

positively rejected, presumably at some date subsequent to the 14th July, by the Cabinet in London.¹ At any rate, the possible avenue towards agreement here opened by the British delegation remained unexplored until it was reopened by the Japanese delegation on the eve of the failure of the Conference.² Mr. Gibson had, however, clearly indicated that if the British and the Japanese could come to an agreement between themselves the Americans expected to have no difficulty in endorsing it, and it was along these lines that negotiations now proceeded. From the 15th to the 17th July a series of informal conversations took place between the British and Japanese experts and heads of delegations, and by the evening of the 17th agreement had been reached on a compromise.³

The result of the Anglo-Japanese discussions was officially summarized as follows:⁴

(1) Total tonnage of surface auxiliary combatant vessels:

(a) Figures suggested by Admiral Kobayashi:

For the British Empire.	484,000 tons
For Japan	315,000 tons

(b) Figures suggested by Admiral Field:

For the British Empire.	500,000 tons
For Japan	325,000 tons

(2) Retention of an additional 25 per cent. of total tonnage in old vessels.

¹ Statement by Lord Cecil in a letter published in *The Times* on the 19th March, 1928.

² See p. 69 below.

³ *The Times*, *The Manchester Guardian*, and *Le Temps*, 18th July, 1927. The French press interpreted the Anglo-Japanese negotiations as the first signs of a political *rapprochement* which might lead to a practical renewal of the alliance that had been terminated at Washington in 1921. See *Le Temps* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 19th July, 1927.

⁴ In a memorandum circulated by the Japanese delegation at the informal meeting of the principal delegates on the 18th July (see U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 170-2). Mr. Bridgeman agreed that the memorandum represented an accurate statement of the result of the conversations. It may be noted that in unofficial summaries of the Anglo-Japanese proposals which appeared in the press at the time (see *Le Temps*, 18th July; *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 19th July, 1927) emphasis was laid on the point that the Japanese had accepted 6-inch guns as the armament for the smaller type of cruiser. Lord Cecil, in a letter printed in *The Times* on the 19th March, 1928, also appeared to imply that the British proposal for limiting the second class of cruiser to a maximum tonnage of 6,000 tons (the original British proposal had been for a maximum tonnage of 7,500 tons—see pp. 46 and 52-3 above) with 6-inch guns was put forward as part of the Anglo-Japanese compromise. It will be seen, however, that the summary of the proposals reproduced above from the official American record of the Conference does not mention the smaller type of cruiser at all. The printed minutes of the informal meeting of the principal delegates on the 18th July contain an incidental reference to the British wishes regarding 6,000 ton cruisers, but not to their armament. The question of guns, however, was discussed at length on the following day (19th July).

- (3) 10,000 ton cruisers to be limited in number¹:

For the British Empire and U.S.A. (each)	12
For Japan	8
- (4) Retention of the under-mentioned vessels:
 - For the British Empire: the *York* and 4 cruisers of the *Hawkins* class.
 - For U.S.A.: 10 cruisers of the *Omaha* class.
 - For Japan: 4 cruisers of the *Furutaka* class.
- (5) Question of other 8-inch cruisers:
 - Japan has no intention of laying down any other 8-inch gun cruisers before December 31st, 1936.
- (6) Agreed maximum percentage to cruisers and destroyers.
- (7) Submarines:
 - (a) Admiral Kobayashi said Japan required about 70,000 tons of submarines.
 - (b) Admiral Field suggested 60,000 tons of submarines for each of the three Powers.²

With the announcement of this Anglo-Japanese compromise the prospects for the success of the Conference seemed to have improved. On the 18th July the proposals were considered at an informal meeting of the principal members of the three delegations, and the result of the preliminary examination by the Americans seemed to be satisfactory.³ On the following day, however, when the discussions were resumed,⁴ Mr. Gibson raised certain objections to the proposed retention of vessels beyond the replacement age; and he also gave an outline of his views on the armament of cruisers below 10,000 tons. He 'made it quite clear that, in his opinion, a treaty which deprived the United States of its liberty of action with respect to arming the proposed second class of cruisers as they saw fit would be unacceptable; that Great Britain had assured cruiser supremacy for many

¹ Lord Cecil's recollection of these proposals (see his letter in *The Times*, 19th March, 1928) was that the U.S. and the British Empire might have '15 or less' of these large cruisers and the Japanese a proportionate number. 'So far,' he added, 'the Americans said they saw no insuperable objection to agreement—which, in diplomatic language, meant that they would agree if they could get nothing better.'

² Admiral Field subsequently corrected paragraph 7 (b) to read: 'Admiral Field suggested that, if Japan would reduce to 60,000 tons, the other two Powers should make a corresponding reduction.' The Japanese were reported to have asked for the same total submarine tonnage as the U.S. and the British Empire in return for their concessions to the British point of view (see *The Manchester Guardian*, 19th July; *The Times*, 27th July, 1927).

³ At the conclusion of the informal meeting a *communiqué* was issued to the press which stated that 'the progress has been sufficiently encouraging to warrant the further examination of the matter in detail' (see *The Times*, 19th July, 1927).

⁴ See the minutes of the informal meeting of the principal delegates on the 19th July (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 172-4).

years to come, an overwhelming merchant fleet which could be armed; that the American delegation could not be expected to accept restrictions as to arming cruisers, and that an attempt to deny the United States their liberty of action would be the best method of arousing popular resentment and driving that country into a big building programme'. Mr. Gibson suggested that any misgivings regarding the use which the United States might make of liberty to arm their cruisers as they chose would be met by the inclusion in any agreement that might be concluded of a 'political clause' providing for a re-examination of the provisions in the event of the construction of 8-inch gun vessels becoming a cause of apprehension to any contracting Power.¹

On the afternoon of the 19th July it was announced that the principal British delegates had been summoned back to London to report to the British Government on the position of the negotiations,² and the news of Mr. Bridgeman's and Lord Cecil's departure³ once more dashed the hopes which had been raised by the announcement of the Anglo-Japanese compromise.

The summoning home of the two British delegates was certainly not a good augury for the success of the Conference, for it meant that a division of opinion which had been growing up in the Cabinet in London during the course of the negotiations at Geneva had now come to a head. This domestic difference was naturally not made public at the time, and it only came to light after the Conference had come to an end, when Lord Cecil resigned office and rendered an account in Parliament of the reasons which had led him to take that step. According to Lord Cecil,⁴ Mr. Bridgeman's assurance of the 29th June⁵ that Great Britain was ready to agree to parity in all classes had already 'caused great anxiety to some of our colleagues, though we had in fact received express authority from the Cabinet to agree to it'. Thereafter, the British delegates 'began to receive telegrams which seemed to indicate that the Cabinet were dissatisfied. At last they culminated in a request to us to return home for consultation. We pointed out that such a proceeding would be very bad for the success of the negotiations, and for the time being we were allowed to remain.' Thus the summons to which the British

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 173-4.

² *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 20th July, 1927.

³ Lord Jellicoe had already returned to London, though for private reasons, and Admiral Field had been taken ill.

⁴ The following quotations are taken from Lord Cecil's speech in the House of Lords on the 16th November, 1927.

⁵ See p. 51 above.

delegates responded on the 19th July was not the first which they had received.

The consultations which took place in London during the week that followed were evidently fateful for the destiny of the negotiations at Geneva. The course which they took can only be told in the words of those who took part in them from their respective points of view; and at the time of writing the only member of the Government of the day who had put his account of these transactions on public record was Lord Cecil, in a speech delivered, after his resignation, in the House of Lords on the 16th November, 1927. In default of parallel statements from Lord Cecil's colleagues, the following passage from Lord Cecil's speech cannot be supplemented by authoritative statements from the other side.

In Lord Cecil's speech, what happened when the British delegates at Geneva received a second summons to London on the 19th July is thus described:

I was very much disturbed. Agreement seemed to me to be in sight, and I felt that if there were to be an adjournment for some days it was only too likely that the opportunity would pass. However, the wording of the summons left us no alternative but to obey. When we got home we found, as I have already intimated, that certain members of the Cabinet strongly took the view afterwards expressed in public by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. They thought that it would be most dangerous to have stated in the Treaty that the Americans were entitled to mathematical parity in auxiliary vessels. These Ministers clearly intimated that they preferred no agreement to one embodying that principle. It was to meet these views that the Cabinet decided, against my opinion, to make the statement read in both Houses of Parliament reserving, in effect, full liberty of action to this country on the question of parity at the end of any period for which an agreement might be made. I objected to this on the ground that it was unnecessary and likely to increase the difficulties of negotiation. Beyond that, the Cabinet at its first meeting decided that we were to continue the negotiations broadly on the lines theretofore adopted.

There was a second meeting of the Cabinet to complete our instructions, and it was at this meeting that the question of whether we should insist on the 6-inch gun came up for decision. Between the two meetings of the Cabinet telegrams had come from America indicating that the United States attached vital importance to the retention of the right to put 8-inch guns in any cruiser. I confess that the American attitude on this question seemed to me to be entirely wrong and the reasons advanced for it quite unconvincing. But it also seemed to me madness to allow the negotiations to break down on such a point. It was therefore with amazement that I heard the majority of my colleagues decide to insist on a 6-inch gun, even if it meant the breakdown of the negotiations. It was evident to me that such a decision could only be come to by men who took a very different view of the importance of an agree-

ment with the United States on this matter from that which I did. Accordingly I immediately suggested to my colleagues that they should send some one else to Geneva in my place. When it was pointed out that such a change in the middle of negotiations would remove the last chance of success, I told them that I would return with Mr. Bridgeman, but that if the negotiations failed on this point about the guns, as I felt sure they would, I must reserve my full liberty to resign, or words to that effect.

In the course of these discussions the British Cabinet also decided that it was highly desirable, in the interests of future international relations, that steps should be taken to remove the popular suspicion of one another's motives and intentions which seemed to have arisen in each of the three countries concerned.¹ In view of the persistent misrepresentation to which they felt that the British case was being subjected, especially in the United States, the Cabinet were reported to have decided, on the evening of the 26th, that Mr. Bridgeman and Lord Cecil should not return to Geneva until an attempt had been made to improve the atmosphere by a full statement of British policy.² Such a statement was made by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons, and by Lord Salisbury, in identical terms, in the House of Lords, on the 27th July, and the British delegates left for Geneva on the same day.

The Government's exposition of the British case did not add much to that already given by Mr. Bridgeman at Geneva. It was prefaced by the explanation that it was intended only to remove misunderstandings which might imperil the success of the Conference. It declared once more that there was no foundation for the suspicion that His Majesty's Government wished to deny to the United States equality in sea-power. In the hope of 'diminishing still further naval expenditure while maintaining security', the British Government had proposed to decrease the size and the armament of battleships and to limit the number and armament of large fighting cruisers. The problem was far more complicated in the case of the small cruisers which were essential to the British Empire on account of its geographical and economic peculiarities. A simple formula like that adopted at Washington was quite inapplicable to vessels designed for purposes which must vary with the needs of the several Powers concerned. A nation possessing twenty cruisers of 5,000 tons would not be the equal of a nation possessing ten cruisers of 10,000 tons, though the

¹ Comment hostile to Great Britain was by this time appearing in the Japanese as well as the American press (see *The Times*, 23rd July, 1927). For English translations of Japanese press comments on the conference see *The Japan Advertiser* of Tokyo.

² See *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th July, 1927.

gross tonnage would be the same, and in the case of a country obliged to distribute its available tonnage among small units 'there would be a nominal parity, but real inequality'.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government [the statement concluded]¹ there need be no difficulty in arriving at a temporary arrangement about the immediate future of cruiser building. But the British Empire cannot be asked to give to any such temporary arrangement the appearance of an immutable principle which might be treated as a precedent. Any other course would inevitably be interpreted in the future as involving the formal surrender by the British Empire of maritime equality, a consummation which His Majesty's Government are well assured is no part of the President's policy.

Mr. Bridgeman and Lord Cecil arrived back in Geneva on the morning of the 28th July and discussions were resumed at the point where they had been broken off on the 19th. In the meantime, however, it had become known that the American delegation was not prepared to accept the arrangement agreed upon between the British and Japanese delegates. Not only was the proposed retention of certain vessels beyond the replacement age objected to (on the ground, apparently, that the ships which would fall into this category were more modern in the case of Great Britain and Japan than in that of the United States); the suggested proportion of 12:12:8 for 10,000-ton cruisers was also reported to be unacceptable, since it would involve the United States in a large building programme. On these points an understanding might perhaps have been reached if it had proved possible to surmount the obstacle presented by the question of the armament for the smaller type of cruiser. The American delegation seemed quite determined not to agree to the proposal for 6-inch guns, to which the Japanese had agreed reluctantly,² and on which the British delegation had been instructed not to yield.³ Lord Cecil afterwards put it on record⁴ that as soon as he and Mr. Bridgeman had arrived in Geneva again 'it became clear

¹ This concluding passage was the vital passage in the statement, for it was an attempt to convey to the Americans the British view that 'mathematical parity' meant in practice American superiority, with the corollary that mathematical parity did not correspond to the spirit of the understanding which had been arrived at during the Washington Conference. The assumption was that, at Washington, practical or 'equitable' parity had been contemplated. The view that mathematical parity meant practical American superiority seems to have been held by the whole British Cabinet. The division of opinion was over the question of expediency. One party thought that acceptance of mathematical parity was preferable to allowing the Conference to break down, the other (and, as it turned out, the stronger) party thought that a breakdown of the Conference was the lesser of the two evils from the British point of view.

² See *The Times*, 28th July, 1927.

³ See p. 64 above.

⁴ See his speech of the 16th November, 1927, in the House of Lords.

that without a compromise on the 8-inch gun question there was no hope of agreement, and I personally so informed the Cabinet. At the same time we suggested, as a possible way out of the difficulty, the adoption of a 7-inch gun. In reply we received a telegram rejecting this suggestion and telling us in so many words that we were not to offer any compromise on the 8-inch gun.¹

In these circumstances, the proposals put forward by the British delegates on the 28th, which contained only slight modifications of the Anglo-Japanese compromise plan, had little chance of acceptance. These proposals, which were published in full on the evening of the 28th, were on the following lines.¹

The combined total tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines (below an age limit for replacement of eighteen years for 10,000-ton cruisers, sixteen years for other cruisers and destroyers, and thirteen years for submarines) was not to exceed 590,000 tons for Great Britain and the United States and 385,000 tons for Japan. Of these totals, the tonnage allotted to submarines was not to exceed 90,000 tons for Great Britain and the United States and 60,000 tons for Japan. In addition, each Power might retain vessels beyond the replacement age up to a limit of 25 per cent. of its total tonnage.² Cruisers were to be divided into the two classes of 10,000-ton cruisers (of which Great Britain and the United States would be allowed twelve and Japan eight) and smaller cruisers of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons, armed with guns not exceeding 6 inches in calibre, but each Power would have the right to retain certain vessels which belonged to an intermediate class.³

The proposals also included provisions regarding destroyers which

¹ Communiqué printed as Appendix I to the minutes of the informal meeting of the principal delegates on the 28th July (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 177-8). See also *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th July, 1927.

² American critics remarked that the age limits suggested, in this proposal, for non-obsolete vessels in the several categories were considerably lower than the corresponding age-limits contemplated in earlier British proposals.

³ The vessels mentioned were those which had been marked for retention in the Anglo-Japanese compromise proposals (see above, p. 62), with the addition, in the case of the British Empire, of two of the *Emerald* class, carrying 6-inch guns. The *Hawkins* class carried 7.5-inch guns and the *York* 8-inch guns; the Japanese *Furutaka* class also carried 8-inch guns, but the American *Omaha* class had only 6-inch guns. For this reason, the British delegation offered to agree to the construction by the United States of vessels which, 'in the opinion of the naval advisers of the three delegations', would equalize British and American strength in this class of intermediate vessels. It was explained that the general intention of the proposal for the retention of these ships was to avoid scrapping ships which were still in full efficiency, but which did not fall into the class of 10,000-ton cruisers nor into the class of 6,000 tons or less.

were identical with those agreed upon by the Technical Committee and published in their report on the 8th July.¹ With regard to submarines, the British delegation had reverted to their original proposal, which had not been adopted by the Technical Committee, for a division into two classes, the first including vessels from 1,000 to 1,800 tons and the second those under 600 tons.

Since this British plan maintained all the points to which the Americans had previously taken exception, the announcement, which was made on the 28th July, after the meeting of the principal delegates, that a plenary session had been fixed for the 1st August,² was generally interpreted to mean that the last effort to reach agreement had failed and that nothing remained but to bring the Conference to an end. On the 29th July it was announced in the United States, on behalf of President Coolidge, that the American Government could not accept the latest British proposals, which would call for a much larger navy than the United States considered necessary, and that if a compromise was still possible it would have to be along other lines.³ On the 31st July Mr. Gibson took the initiative in proposing that the plenary session fixed for the 1st August should be postponed for a few days,⁴ but the only contribution which the American delegation had to offer towards an attempt to escape from the *impasse* was the elaboration of the proposal for a 'political clause' which Mr. Gibson had made on the 19th July.⁵ A draft clause was now published in the following form: ⁶

In the event that prior to December 31st, 1936, any one of the Contracting Powers shall consider that the tonnage allocation in the cruiser class has been utilised by any other of the Contracting Powers in a manner to call for an adjustment of the total tonnage allocation of that class, such High Contracting Party may, at any time subsequent to January 31st, 1931, and upon six months' prior notice, convoke a meeting of the Powers parties to the present treaty with a view to ascertaining whether such an adjustment can be made by mutual agreement.

In the event that no agreement is reached at such a conference, any of the High Contracting Parties may give notice of the desire to terminate the present convention, and this notification shall be effective within one year after the receipt thereof by the other parties to the treaty. In such an event the treaty shall terminate with respect to all the parties thereto.

¹ See above, p. 56.

² *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th July, 1927.

³ See *The Manchester Guardian* and *The United States Daily*, 30th July, 1927.

⁴ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st August, 1927.

⁵ See above, p. 63. See also *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st and 2nd August, 1927.

⁶ Text in U.S. Senate Document No. 55, p. 178.

Lord Cecil afterwards put it on record¹ that the British delegates 'were anxious to reply by giving to this suggestion a more specific reference to the 8-inch gun. The effect would have been to postpone the decision of the question until the Americans actually decided to arm the secondary cruisers with 8-inch guns. This also the Government rejected. The Conference in consequence broke down.'

In the interval before the adjourned plenary session (which was fixed, on the 1st August, for the 4th),² a last attempt was made by the Japanese delegates to effect some kind of compromise. They seem to have recognized that it was useless at this stage to try to reconcile British and American views on the main points at issue and they concentrated their efforts on devising some arrangement which might save the Conference from ending entirely without result. The proposal which they put forward on the 1st August was on the same lines as the proposal regarding building programmes which had seemed to offer some hopes of a solution during the days preceding the second plenary session of the Conference.³ The Japanese delegates now again suggested a 'naval holiday' agreement, by which Great Britain and Japan would undertake to confine themselves until 1931 to naval building programmes already authorized, and the United States would undertake not to exceed, during the same period, the British strength in auxiliary vessels.⁴ This proposal was submitted by the British delegates to their Government, who authorized them to discuss it if it were accepted by the Americans. It was rejected, however, by Mr. Gibson on the evening of the 3rd August.⁵ A suggestion made

¹ See his speech of the 16th November, 1927, in the House of Lords.

² *The Times*, 2nd August, 1927.

³ See above, p. 57.

⁴ See U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 180-1; *The Manchester Guardian*, 3rd August; *The Times*, 4th August, 1927.

⁵ See the informal meeting of delegates held on the 3rd August (U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 179-80). See also *The Times*, 5th August, 1927. It will be noted that this Japanese proposal was substantially identical with the proposal put forward earlier by the British delegation, which, according to Lord Cecil, the British Cabinet had rejected (see p. 61 above). The American attitude towards this proposal is explained by an American authority as follows:

'The reason for the rejection of the proposal with respect to a so-called "naval holiday" under which Great Britain would undertake to confine itself to the naval building programme already authorized, and which the United States would undertake not to exceed, was due to the fact that the British definition of "ships authorized" included ships "projected but not yet appropriated for", and involved a cruiser tonnage of approximately 458,000 tons or a very great increase over present cruiser tonnage. In connexion with this suggestion, the American delegation took the position that if "authorized" included only ships appropriated for, in addition to ships now building, the proposal would constitute a possible basis for further discussion. The crux of

by Mr. Bridgeman that the Conference should not separate without signing an agreement of some sort, 'even if it embodied only points on which provisional agreement had already been reached by the three delegations', also proved unacceptable.¹

Any slight hopes that might have remained that the Conference could yet be saved at the eleventh hour were dispelled by Mr. Gibson on the 4th August when, as President of the Conference, he announced the opening of 'the final plenary session, which was to give an opportunity to the delegates to make a final survey of the divergences that had rendered agreement impossible'.

The full recapitulation of each delegation's case which followed added little that was new.²

Mr. Bridgeman³ once more went over the ground which had already been covered by himself and by Sir Austen Chamberlain. Having re-expounded the principles on which the original British proposals had been drawn up and the reasons which made it impossible for Great Britain to yield in the matter of small cruisers, he referred to the scheme which had been worked out in conjunction with the Japanese delegation, in accordance with the hint given by Mr. Gibson at the last plenary session. The proposals which had been published on the 28th July had embodied the result of those negotiations, and he understood that they met with no opposition from Japan, but that the American delegation objected to the limitation of second-class cruisers to guns of 6-inch calibre and insisted on freedom to mount any gun up to 8-inch in these ships. Whilst unable fully to understand their objection, he assured them that the British attitude was 'not due to fear of any unfriendly action on their part'. In conclusion, Mr. Bridgeman deprecated the idea that failure to agree upon a formula acceptable to all parties would 'indicate a spirit of antagonism between the three Powers' or mean that they 'intended to enter upon competition in new construction'.

Viscount Saito,⁴ who followed Mr. Bridgeman, gave the Conference

the matter with respect to this and other British proposals was that the figure of 400,000 tons seemed to the American delegation an absolute maximum and much too high for the total cruiser limitation. Proposals which exceeded this figure could hardly be considered a limitation, involving, as they did, such a considerable increase in the cruiser strength of the strongest Power in this class of vessel.'

¹ Statement by Mr. Bridgeman at the final plenary session.

² See the verbatim record in U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 52-71.

³ Text of his speech in *Cmd.* 2964 of 1927 as well as in U.S. Senate Document No. 55.

⁴ For a summary of his speech, see *The Times*, 5th August, 1927. The full text is printed in U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 61-3.

a summary of the Anglo-Japanese compromise proposals, and described the concessions which he and his colleagues had made in order to meet the British view. They had adjusted their figure for submarine requirements and, while not assenting in principle to the British preference for 6-inch guns, they had consented not to let their own desire for the heavier gun stand in the way of a solution. The degree of agreement which had been reached between themselves and the British had seemed to warrant the hope that it might form the basis of a settlement which would include the United States, but the differences between the British and American standpoints had proved so fundamental as to baffle all efforts at conciliation.

Mr. Gibson's exposition of the American case struck a more controversial note than had yet been heard in public.¹ The Japanese delegation, he remarked, had indicated its willingness to negotiate on the basis of the minimum figures suggested by the United States, but a serious difficulty had been encountered from the first 'in the claim of the British Government that it needed a considerably larger number of cruisers than it now possesses'. The British claim for 70 cruisers was defended on the ground of the absolute naval needs of the Empire. The American delegation had 'never been able to reconcile the conception of absolute naval needs with the negotiation of a treaty to fix limitations on the basis of mutual concessions'. Nor had they been able to understand 'why, in a time of profound peace and at the moment that we are seeking to reduce the burdens of naval expenditure, the British Government considers a considerable programme of naval expansion as an absolute and even a vital necessity'. The American delegation, in an effort to meet the British, had agreed to 'discuss a tonnage in the cruiser class far in excess of what we had hoped might be fixed as a limitation for the future'. They had also agreed to 'discuss the number of 10,000-ton cruisers and to accept a secondary class of cruisers, provided that the secondary type of cruisers should not be of a maximum individual displacement which will preclude the mounting of 8-inch guns'. Any further concessions would have involved 'a complete surrender of the right to build ships responsive to our needs'. They had never contested the argument that British needs could best be met by numbers of vessels, but they felt that it should be recognized that America's geographical position and lack of bases 'resulting in part from the restrictions of the Washington Treaty' necessitated a larger type of cruiser with a longer cruising radius. The repeated expression of willingness to

¹ Full text of his speech in *The United States Daily*, 5th August, 1927. The full text is also printed in U.S. Senate Document No. 55, pp. 63-70.

reduce the total cruiser tonnage to the lowest level acceptable to Great Britain was felt to afford sufficient evidence that no American programme of a kind to cause apprehension was contemplated. Mr. Gibson went on to defend the 10,000-ton cruiser, which had been authorized by the Washington Conference, and to point out that while Great Britain had five of these large cruisers practically completed and six under construction (in addition to four in commission of 9,750 tons each) the United States had only two actually under construction and six recently contracted for. He rejected Mr. Bridgeman's distinction between the 6-inch gun cruiser as defensive and the 8-inch gun cruiser as offensive.¹ The 6-inch gun cruisers, it was said, were intended to protect British commerce. 'But in order to afford effective defence to British commerce upon the seas these cruisers must in time of war effectively deny the sea to others.' The suggestion that 8-inch guns should be abandoned in favour of 6-inch had to be considered in view of the fact 'that the British Government has at its disposal approximately 888,000 tons of fast merchant ships capable of being readily converted into cruisers and armed with many 6-inch guns. . . . We on the other hand have only 188,000 tons of such ships.' Mr. Gibson then recalled that at Washington the British delegation had thought 450,000 tons a reasonable figure for auxiliary surface craft, but they were now asking for 647,000 tons.² How could this increase be explained, especially now that the German fleet had disappeared? Mr. Gibson was unable to see why the political clause which he had suggested would not allay any possible concern of Great Britain as to the use which might be made by the United States of reasonable freedom of action in regard to cruisers. The American delegation found it difficult

to reconcile the British conviction that war is already outlawed between us with their present unwillingness to recognise our right to build a limited number of the type of ships we would desire or with their willingness to risk the success of this Conference because they fear the problematical possession by us during the life of this treaty of the small number of 8-inch gun cruisers.

¹ See Mr. Bridgeman's remarks at the second Plenary Session, referred to on p. 58 above.

² i. e. 500,000 tons for non-obsolete surface auxiliary craft plus 147,000 tons representing the obsolete vessels which, under the British proposals of the 28th July, 1927, each Power was to be allowed to retain beyond the replacement age up to a limit of 25 per cent. of its total tonnage. The proposed total tonnage quota of auxiliary craft for Great Britain (as for the United States) was 590,000; and Great Britain might, of course, elect to take out the whole of the 25 per cent. of this (i. e. approximately 147,000 tons) in obsolete cruisers and none of it in obsolete destroyers or submarines.

Mr. Gibson then read an agreed statement, which recapitulated, in a summarized form, the point of view of each of the three Powers represented at the Conference. While material progress had been made and the points of divergence had been reduced,

no mutually acceptable plan has been found to reconcile the claim of the British delegates for numbers of vessels, for the most part armed with 6-inch guns, with the desire of the American delegates for the lowest possible total tonnage limitation with freedom of armament within such limitation, subject to the restriction as to armament already set by the Washington Treaty.

Faced with this difficulty, the delegates have deemed it wise to adjourn the present Conference with this frank statement of their respective views, and to submit the problem for the further consideration of their Governments, in the hope that consultation between them may lead to an early solution.

Further, the delegates agree to recommend to their respective Governments the desirability of arranging between the signatories of the Washington Treaty that the Conference to be called pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 21 of that Treaty should be held earlier than August, 1931, the date contemplated under the terms of that instrument, in order that any decisions reached by such a Conference may come into force before the capital ship construction programme commences—namely, in November of that year.

Thus the Three-Power Naval Conference ended in a failure which had not been contemplated by any of the parties at the time when they entered into negotiation. When the history of this failure is examined, it can be seen to have been the common result of a number of distinct causes which were not of equal importance.

According to Lord Cecil, the immediate occasion of the breakdown was the intransigence of both the British and the American Government over the question whether the maximum calibre of the guns on cruisers of a class inferior to the 10,000-ton class should be 6 inches or 8. On the question of total tonnage, he seems to have held that agreement could almost certainly have been reached. Lord Cecil's view seems to have been challenged, however, by the officials of the State Department at Washington, who were reported¹ to have maintained that the specific question regarding gun-calibre above-mentioned was never fully discussed; that it would only have arisen if and when the problem of total cruiser strength had been settled; but that this problem was not only never settled but was the rock upon which the Conference split.

Among the causes, as distinguished from the occasions, of the breakdown must be numbered the failure of those responsible for the

¹ *The Times*, 18th November, 1927.

conduct of the Conference to deal successfully with the problem of publicity. The greater part of the business of the Conference was conducted in technical committees behind closed doors; but this did not prevent the proceedings from being reported in the press. The only effect was that the reports tended to be inaccurate and sensational, and consequently too large a part of the attention and energy of the delegates was taken up by efforts to overtake and contradict false and pernicious rumours. Moreover, these efforts were far from successful, and the result was an alarmingly rapid growth of suspicion and resentment in the public mind of all the countries concerned during the weeks while the Conference was in session—a state of public opinion which reacted upon the Governments and, through the Governments, upon the Conference itself.¹

Another reputed cause was the influence alleged to have been exerted upon the American press and, through the press, upon American public opinion by the Big Navy Group in the United States, who, in their turn, were alleged to have been encouraged and supported by the armament firms. In the nature of the case, the contribution made by this cause to the failure of the Conference is almost impossible to estimate. Yet it may reasonably be conjectured that this cause alone would not have sufficed to produce that result.²

A third cause was the influence of individual statesmen, and in this connexion the influence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the British Ministry of the day was referred to as follows by Lord Cecil:³

My right hon. friend is a very forceful personality and I have no doubt that from the moment that he realised that we had at Geneva agreed to what he calls the principle of mathematical parity—that is to say, that we had extended to cruisers the standard accepted for battleships—he began to press on his colleagues the necessity of avoiding the consequences of what he regarded as a disastrous concession.

This hypothesis was supported by the fact that on the 6th August, 1927, and again on the 4th September, 1927, Mr. Churchill had denounced 'the principle of mathematical parity in naval strength' publicly.⁴

¹ For the influence of this factor, see a leading article in *The Times* of the 23rd July, 1927.

² For references to this factor see *The Times*, 6th, 7th and 12th July, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th July, 1927; *The United States Daily*, 15th July, 1927; *The Times*, 18th July and 6th August, 1927; and a speech delivered by Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 22nd March, 1928.

³ Speech delivered in the House of Lords on the 16th November, 1927.

⁴ Reports of these two speeches in *The Times*, 8th August and 5th September, 1927.

A fourth and far more potent cause of failure than any of those yet cited was the absence of diplomatic preparation for the Conference—an omission to which attention has been drawn already at the close of the preceding section.

The gravity of this initial omission was increased by the further fact that it was never made good, even after the Conference had opened; for from first to last the attitudes of the British and the American delegation, at any rate, were governed by what might be called the 'combatant' as opposed to the 'diplomatic' or 'political' frame of mind. For example, at the second plenary session on the 14th July, Mr. Gibson, in commenting upon Lord Jellicoe's statement concerning the cruiser-strength needed to deal with commerce raiders, was moved to express 'very serious misgivings in regard to the effort to prepare in time of peace for all possible contingencies in time of war';¹ and he might well have gone on to make the point that the British delegation was thinking of war (no doubt rightly, from the technical standpoint) in terms of the offensive. This, after all, was the meaning of the view, held in the British delegation, that, for purposes of calculating parity, it was unfair that Great Britain should be required to include in her returns that part of her cruiser strength which was needed for a particular defensive service when that service happened, for geographical reasons, to make greater demands upon the British navy than upon the American navy. Indeed, at the same plenary session Mr. Bridgeman had just made the point that, unless the British Empire was prepared, which was not the case, to abandon the number of cruisers regarded as essential for the protection of Imperial communications, it could not agree in advance to a total tonnage of 400,000 for cruisers without accepting 'not parity, but definite inferiority in offensive power'. On the other hand, the American delegation does not appear ever to have rebutted the British contention that, in resisting the British demand that cruisers below the 10,000-ton and 8-inch gun class should be limited to maxima of 6,000–7,500 tons and 6-inch guns, they were seeking not parity but a definite superiority in offensive power for themselves.

The truth is that, for months or years before the Conference met, the naval experts in the several Admiralties had been engaged, in the ordinary course of their official duties, in working out—and this, *ex hypothesi*, without exchanging ideas²—exactly how the formula of

¹ See p. 60 above.

² There had, of course, been prolonged discussions, in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, between the naval experts of the participating states, among whom were included all three parties to the subsequent Naval Conference. The discussions in the Preparatory Commis-

'parity' might be applied so as to secure the greatest offensive power in war-time for their own respective navies that their respective financial resources would permit. The British experts, confronted with a special need for a large number of commerce-protecting cruisers, had arrived at the conclusion that it was desirable, if possible, to have such commerce-protecting cruisers excluded altogether from the count, and in any case to have the cruiser arm divided into two classes, of which the larger should be restricted as far as possible in numbers and the smaller in tonnage and calibre of guns, without considering how such a proposal would affect the United States. Further, as representatives of the financially weaker Power which found itself saddled with a special burden of requirements for defence from which the financially stronger rival Power was free, they were in favour of reducing the financial strain of competition by securing a thoroughgoing reduction in the standard of capital ships. Meanwhile, the American experts, whose burden of requirements for defence was relatively light, and who were conscious of the superior financial strength of their own country, were not particularly concerned to reduce the standard of capital ships and had reached the conviction that they could utilize their cruiser quota to best advantage by building relatively powerful vessels which were suited to the geographical situation of the United States, without considering how this construction of the principle of parity would affect Great Britain. It is true that both sets of experts had also to consider economy—the American experts out of deference to President Coolidge, the British out of deference to the British taxpayer; but they were each seeking respectively to combine economy not only with offensive power but with another and a different object. The Americans were aiming at economy and offensive power coupled with parity, the British at economy and offensive power coupled with security; and they were each bent upon effecting their economies in the form that would best serve their other aims, which were conflicting. The Three-Power Conference of 1927 consisted, in essence, of a tabling of these carefully thought out and therefore rigid expert plans,¹ and in these circum-

sion, however, had related to the procedure for the limitation of armaments, not to the respective programmes and policies of the Naval Staffs of the Governments concerned. *Ex hypothesi*, these programmes and policies were state secrets, because the Naval Staffs had never been instructed by their Governments to proceed on any political assumption other than the traditional political assumption that war was an instrument of national policy and that each country must be prepared for the contingency of this 'private' form of war with the other.

¹ A psychologically interesting illustration of this rigidity was the determination with which the British experts contended for the figure of 70 cruisers

stances an agreed interpretation of the formula of 'parity' was almost impossible *a priori*.

It was almost impossible because the elements of naval strength, when measured against one another in deadly earnest by experts with the contingency of war in their minds, could not be reduced completely to comparable numerical terms. When the British experts claimed that account should be taken of the special defensive requirements of the British Empire arising from the inordinate length of British Empire lines of communication by sea, the American experts objected that in other respects the British navy possessed special advantages—for instance, in the possession of first-rate naval bases and coaling-stations all over the world, and of a vast merchant-marine which could be called upon in war-time to furnish auxiliary cruisers. These special advantages, as well as the special handicaps, of the British navy, ought, the American experts maintained, to be brought into the account; and they went on to argue that the British superiority in number of naval bases would balance any superiority which the American navy might attain in 10,000-ton cruisers possessing a longer range of action than the small commerce-protecting cruisers in which the British experts felt themselves compelled to invest a large portion of their allotted cruiser strength. Again, the American experts justified their opposition to the British demand that, on cruisers inferior to the 10,000-ton class, the maximum gun-calibre should be something less than eight inches, by submitting that, if the maximum gun-calibre for this second class of cruisers were to be fixed as low as six inches, that would enable the British navy in war-time to convert merchantmen into auxiliary cruisers *ad libitum*. To this contention the British experts replied that, in the light of their experience, the combatant effectiveness of merchantmen converted into auxiliary cruisers was very small. Thus the argu-

as representing the 'absolute' requirements of the British Empire. When, at the second plenary session of the Conference on the 14th July, Lord Jellicoe explained how this figure had been arrived at, it became evident that, in the light of the experience of 1914-18, the figure was totally inadequate to fulfil the requirements contemplated. In other words, the British experts, whether in deference to the British taxpayer or to the United States Government, had put forward demands which, on their own showing, were so moderate as to be of little practical utility. Yet, when once their figure had been arrived at, they were prepared to sacrifice the success of the Conference rather than surrender it, without regard to the fact that it had little or no relation to the realities of the situation. On this point see speeches delivered by Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 24th November, 1927, and by Mr. Dalton on the 22nd March, 1928. See also P. J. N. Baker: *Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference* (London, 1927, Hogarth Press), pp. 29-41.

ment went on; and, with each new consideration that was introduced into it by either party, it became increasingly difficult to translate the upshot of it into those numerical terms which any agreement on 'mathematical parity' must demand.¹

The fact was that at Geneva in 1927 the British and American experts were attempting to achieve something which was technically much more difficult than what they had accomplished at Washington when they negotiated the Five-Power Naval Treaty of the 6th February, 1922. At Washington the experts had not only had the way prepared for them politically by the previous negotiation of the Four-Power Pacific Treaty of the 13th December, 1921, and by the inclusion of a political provision (Article 19) in the Five-Power Treaty itself;² through having the scope of their own technical negotiations confined to the domain of capital ships, they had also been spared the task—with which they found themselves at grips in 1927—of attempting to apply mathematical ratios to the marginal elements of naval strength; and this margin was a domain in which the mathematical method became difficult, because it was the domain of the imponderables. In other words, at Geneva the British and American experts were confronted for the first time—and on this occasion were discomfited—by the problem of 'the potentials of war', which had been raised, ultimately on French initiative, in the course of the work of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission.³ The French experts had put their finger on the fact that, under the social and economic conditions of the age, the fighting force of a nation could no longer be measured in terms of armaments and effectives without taking into account the totality of the national resources; and they had contended that if national armaments were to be limited or reduced on numerical ratios these general factors must somehow be included in the index-number. The British and Americans had shown themselves unfavourable to this thesis—partly because, as 'practical men', they shrank from the complexity of the calculations which it

¹ For these arguments see *The Times*, 29th July, 1927; *The United States Daily*, 30th July, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 3rd August, 1928.

² For this political preparation for the Five-Power Treaty of the 6th February, 1922, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 484-90.

³ See Section (ii), p. 13 above. The question of 'potentials of war' was discussed at length by both Sub-Commissions of the Preparatory Commission, but their reports indicated that, while the importance of factors such as geographical position and population was undeniably great, it would be a task of extreme difficulty to assess their value in precise terms for the purposes of a Disarmament Convention. See the Report of Sub-Commission A (League of Nations Document C. 739. M. 278. 1926. IX) and Report No. 1 of Sub-Commission B (League of Nations Document C.P.D. 29).

involved, and partly because they took alarm at the terminology in which the thesis was clothed by the 'Latin' mind. No British or American expert would have dreamed of placing 'the potentials of war' on the agenda of the Three-Power Conference; but perhaps just because, on this occasion, the problem was not faced and defined, it proved all the more baffling; and the French 'informateur' must have smiled to himself as he watched 'the Anglo-Saxons' falling out, without realizing it, over a difficulty which they had so lately dismissed as a figment of the French mind.

Meanwhile, the failure of the Three-Power Conference shook the credit of the 'Anglo-Saxon' formula of 'parity'; and in a public speech delivered on the 6th August, 1927,¹ one British statesman, Mr. Churchill, virtually proposed to transmute it into something very like the French formula of 'potentials' expressed in other words.

The fundamental cause which prevented agreement lay in the different views taken of what constitutes naval equality by the Americans and ourselves. . . . Therefore, we are not able now—and I hope at no future time—to embody in a solemn international agreement any words which would bind us to the principle of mathematical parity in naval strength. . . . The doctrine of naval equality, if it is to be accepted by us, must take into consideration the whole position of the two countries on the sea and their respective risks and vulnerability.

The same point was made by Mr. Churchill again in another speech delivered on the 4th September.²

A British statesman of great judgment and experience, Lord Grey of Fallodon, submitted, in a letter published on the 11th August in *The Times*, that the theory of 'parity' itself was 'the rock on which the Conference was wrecked at Geneva'; that it was working badly; and that there was every sign that it would cause friction and not harmony between the two countries, because, though designed to avoid competition, it did in fact imply rivalry.

The conclusion is that naval discussions between the two countries will prove neither wholesome nor profitable . . .

Another moral may be drawn from the Geneva Conference; it is that limitation of armaments should be preceded by agreements against war. Without these, discussion of armaments is apt to be sterile. The Japanese delegates at Geneva appeared at the outset to grasp this point.

On the 24th November, 1927, this last point was taken up in the House of Commons at Westminster by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.

The failure that was registered at Geneva I take as one of those things that I should call a natural failure, a failure in the nature of the case, and

¹ Reported in *The Times*, 8th August, 1927.

² Reprinted *ibid.*, 5th September, 1927.

I say in pursuing security through peace, security through agreement, we will get round that problem by trying to discover some means by which America and ourselves can come to an agreement, which means that we need not bother about Navies with regard to each other at all.

We have to attack the psychology of the people. In the beginning, and as a start, peace is a purely psychological problem.

This was, no doubt, the consideration in the mind of the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, when, on the 28th December, 1927, he took the opportunity of certain bilateral negotiations which were in progress between the United States and France, in order to launch the project of a general pact, unsupported by formal sanctions, for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.¹

In thus initiating a fresh attempt to solve the intractable problem of security and disarmament from a fresh angle, Mr. Kellogg was certainly anticipating the desires of the nations whose Governments had been represented at the Three-Power Naval Conference at Geneva; for the failure at Geneva had left the peoples uneasy and the politicians and experts beset, not only by uneasiness, but by chagrin.

The break-up of the Conference was, indeed, followed by certain disquieting portents. There was a story of an Anglo-Japanese secret naval pact, which had to be disposed of by the publication of official *démentis*.² There were rumours that the Big Navy Group in the United States was preparing to introduce into Congress a vast new naval construction programme.³ The question of changing the gun-elevation on certain existing American capital ships was re-opened in Congress;⁴ and on the 9th December, 1927, the House of Representatives voted in favour of the change in certain cases, provided that the President were of opinion that such a course would not constitute a violation of the Washington Five-Power Treaty.⁵

In the political life of the countries concerned, the most striking sequel to the failure of the Three-Power Conference was Lord Cecil's resignation from office on the 25th August, 1927.⁶

¹ The history of 'the Kellogg Pact' will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

² For the Japanese Government's *démenti* see *The Times*, 27th August, 1927. For a declaration of disbelief in the story which was published by the State Department at Washington, see *ibid.*, 26th August, 1927.

³ *The United States Daily*, 7th and 28th November, 1927; *The Times*, 7th November, 1927.

⁴ See p. 28 above.

⁵ *The United States Daily*, 7th December, 1927; *The Times*, 9th December, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th December, 1927.

⁶ Texts of Lord Cecil's minute of the 25th August, 1927, to the Prime Minister, and of the Prime Minister's reply of the 29th, in *The Times*, 30th August, 1927. See further Lord Cecil's speech in the House of Lords on the 16th November, 1927. From Lord Cecil's statements it would appear that

In the speeches of those statesmen who remained in office there was manifest a determination not to take, or suffer the public to take, the failure of the Conference tragically.¹ Evidently, however, that failure could not be retrieved by words alone.

In the sphere of action, the British Government decided to drop two out of the three cruisers which, under the existing British naval programme, were due to be laid down in the course of the year 1927. The three vessels in the programme included one of 10,000 tons and two of smaller tonnage; and the 10,000-ton vessel was one of the two which were abandoned. This decision was announced in the House of Commons at Westminster by Mr. Bridgeman in answer to parliamentary questions on the 16th and the 23rd November, 1927.

On the 18th November President Coolidge caused it to be announced that he did not expect, as a result of the failure of the Conference, either an increase or a diminution in the number of cruisers which were due to be built for the United States navy.² In a message read to Congress on the 6th December³ he emphasized the magnitude of the defensive purposes for which the United States navy was required; declared that, while the United States had 'put away the Old World policy of competitive armaments', it could 'never be relieved of the responsibility of adequate national defence'; submitted that 'we now know that no agreement can be reached which will be inconsistent with a considerable building programme on our part'; but went on to maintain, once again, with reference to the Three-Power Conference, that 'the failure to agree should not cause us to build either more or less than we otherwise should'.

On the 14th November, 1927, however, the following bill⁴ was submitted to Congress by the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Wilbur:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives that for the purpose of further increasing the naval establishment of the United

the course of events at the Three-Power Conference was not the sole cause of his resignation, but rather the last in a succession of causes which had produced his resignation as their cumulative effect. For a semi-official statement of President Coolidge's opinion on the international effect of Lord Cecil's resignation see *The United States Daily*, 7th September, 1927.

¹ See, for example, Mr. Kellogg's public statement of the 4th August, 1927 (*The United States Daily*, 5th August, 1927); Mr. Bridgeman's speeches of the 11th August, 1927 (*The Times*, 12th August, 1927), and the 9th December, 1927 (*The Manchester Guardian*, 10th December, 1927); and the speeches delivered on the 7th August, 1927, by General Dawes and Mr. Baldwin at the ceremonial opening of the 'peace bridge' at Buffalo between the United States and the Dominion of Canada.

² *The United States Daily*, 19th November, 1927.

³ Extracts from the text in *The Times*, 7th December, 1927.

⁴ Text in *The United States Daily*, 15th December, 1927.

States the President of the United States is hereby authorized to undertake the construction of the following vessels:

Twenty-five light cruisers; nine destroyer leaders; thirty-two submarines, and five aircraft carriers;

Section 2. The construction of light cruisers and aircraft carriers herein authorized shall be subject to the limitations prescribed by the treaty limiting naval armaments ratified August 17, 1923.

Section 3. In the event of an international conference for the limitation of naval armaments the President is hereby empowered, in his discretion, to suspend, in whole or in part, any construction authorized by this act.

This draft bill was accompanied by a letter from Mr. Wilbur¹ in which he estimated the aggregate cost of this new naval construction programme at \$725,000,000 and added that he was authorized to announce that the proposed legislation was not in conflict with the President's financial programme.

The effect of this bill upon public opinion in the United States and thence indirectly upon the history of the international problem of security and disarmament will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

¹ Text in *The United States Daily*, loc. cit.

PART II

EUROPE

A. NORTH-WESTERN EUROPE

The Military Control and Disarmament of Germany and the Situation in German Occupied Territory (1926-7)

(a) INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The disarmament of Germany¹ and the situation in German occupied territory,² which fill so large a space in the present section of this Survey, were—next to Reparation and Inter-Ally Debts—decidedly the most barren ground on which statesmen were condemned (or condemned themselves) to labour during the period following the termination of the General War of 1914-18.

The international transactions that fall under these two heads looked towards the past and not towards the future. They related to the War and to its military outcome, not to the new constructive order which, in other portions of the great field of international affairs, was already beginning to rise above the ruins. It was for this reason, no doubt, that the 'war spirit' haunted these transactions in its most perverse forms and succeeded in delaying the liquidation of vexatious questions which the better mind of Europe desired to put behind it. In Germany the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control was delayed by obstructions to the execution of the treaty provisions regarding German disarmament—obstructions which offered no prospect of enabling the German people (even had it wished) to try its fortune again in the field, but which did afford certain enemies of Germany abroad a specious ground for charging the German people as a whole with an unwillingness to keep faith and a determination to seek revenge which in reality were only chargeable to a 'die-hard' minority. Meanwhile, in France, the refusal of a like-minded minority to admit that the security of their country had been increased, in any appreciable measure, by the conclusion of the Locarno Pact and by the entry of Germany into the League of Nations made it possible for the German Conservatives to represent that Herr Stresemann's policy of conciliation was foredoomed to failure.

The persistence of this unconscionable temper among minorities in

¹ Sub-Section (c) below.

² Sub-Section (d) below.

both countries did not prevent the statesmen from insisting upon a settlement of the question of German disarmament in December 1926; and this marked an important stage in the return of Europe to normal conditions. On the other hand, the residue of the 'war atmosphere' was one cause of the failure to follow up the agreement which, on the 17th September, 1926, was reached provisionally by Monsieur Briand and Herr Stresemann at Thoiry.¹ The other cause was the interlocking of the Thoiry Scheme, on its financial side, with the transactions, in regard to Inter-Ally Debts, which had been taking place between France and the United States.² This unexpected complication obscured a brief gleam of sunshine in the Rhineland by re-importing the 'war atmosphere'—this time from beyond the Atlantic—but incidentally it illustrated the fact that, since the General War, the field of international affairs was rapidly becoming one and indivisible; and in this significant fact lay a hope of better things.

Indeed, even on the unpromising ground of German Disarmament, the year 1927 at last saw accomplished that transfer of control from the hands of the Principal Allied Powers into the hands of the League Council which the Versailles Treaty itself had prescribed; and it was evident that under this new régime the penal disarmament of four European States could not long be dealt with in a 'watertight compartment', in isolation from the general question of voluntary and proportional disarmament on the part of all States Members of the League. The solution of this general problem of disarmament was one of the original purposes of the League as laid down in the Covenant; the League had been wrestling with it ever since its foundation in 1920;³ and another chapter of the Versailles Treaty had put on record, as a justification for the forcible, one-sided and immediate disarmament of Germany, a declaration of intention that this should serve as a step towards the general disarmament which was afterwards to be ensued by the League. This point was recalled by Herr Stresemann at Geneva, on the 10th September, 1926, in his speech to the League Assembly on the occasion when a German delegation took its seat for the first time.

The efforts made [by the League] towards disarmament [Herr Stresemann then declared] are of particular importance for the consolidation of organized international peace. The complete disarmament of Germany was stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles as a preliminary to

¹ See Sub-Section (e) below.

² See *Survey for 1926*, Part II B.

³ See *Survey for 1924*, Part I A; *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part I A, Section (iv).

general disarmament. It is to be hoped that practical steps will be taken to further this general disarmament and thereby furnish evidence that the lofty ideals of the League of Nations already contain within them the seeds of a great positive force.

(b) THE RIGHT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(1920-1925).

The right of investigating the armament position of ex-enemy countries was conferred on the Council of the League of Nations by Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles, Article 159 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, Article 143 of the Treaty of Trianon and Article 104 of the Treaty of Neuilly.. These articles, the terms of which were identical, provided that 'so long as the present treaty remains in force, Germany [Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria] undertakes to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary'. The question of the organization to be placed at the disposal of the Council with a view to the exercise of its right of investigation had been under examination since 1920 by the Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval and Air Questions, and in September 1924 the Council proceeded to draft a constitution for the organization to be set up on the basis of plans drawn up by the Permanent Advisory Commission. A scheme was adopted by the Council on the 27th September and was modified by subsequent decisions on the 28th October and the 9th, 10th and 11th December, 1924.¹

According to this scheme, every Government Member of the League of Nations was to be entitled to communicate to the Secretary-General of the League, for consideration by the Council, any reports or information which, in the opinion of that Government, called for exercise by the Council of the right of investigation (Chapter II). The Permanent Advisory Commission of the League for Military, Naval and Air Questions was to be responsible to the Council for preparing the organization for any investigations upon which the Council might decide; and for this purpose any state, not being a Member of the Council, neighbour of a state which had given to the former state undertakings by one of the Treaties of Peace to submit to investigations, was to be represented on the Permanent Advisory Commission (Chapter III). Commissions of Investigation were to be composed of individuals to be chosen by the Council—deciding by a majority vote, on the recommendation of the Permanent Advisory Commission—from a list of experts who were to be

¹ The final text of this scheme constituted Part I of the rules adopted by the Council for the exercise of the Right of Investigation.

appointed by Governments. The states represented on the Council at the time when an investigation was decided upon were always to be represented on the Commission of Investigation. Should the Council not contain any representative of a state which was a signatory of the Treaties of Peace and at the same time bordering on the state under investigation, or any representative of a state non-signatory of the Peace Treaties, the Council was to select a state from each of these categories and the experts of these selected states were to be added to those of the states represented on the Council. The nationals of states subjected to the right of investigation were not to form part of any of the Commissions of Investigation (Chapter IV). Within the period fixed by the Council and with its approval, the President of a Commission of Investigation was to be at liberty to detach groups to remain at points in the demilitarized zones where continuity of investigation was required (Chapter V).

On the 11th December, 1924, the Council took a number of further decisions regarding the appointment of experts to serve on the Commissions of Investigation and agreed that a majority vote only would be necessary when the Council had to decide on the composition of Commissions of Investigation.

The Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval and Air Questions was asked to submit proposals for the application of Chapters I and V of the scheme adopted in September to the demilitarized Rhine Zone and to prepare a report on ways and means of ensuring the free and complete execution of the duties entrusted to the Commissions of Investigation.

The discussions in the Permanent Advisory Commission revealed a sharp difference of opinion as to the Council's powers under Article 213 of the Versailles Treaty and the functions of the Commission of Investigation. The French Government had taken throughout the view that under Article 213 some kind of permanent control of German armaments was possible and that in any case a permanent commission could be established in the Rhineland. In Germany the view was taken that under Article 213 occasional investigations could be carried out by the League in the demilitarized zone as in the rest of Germany, but only on receipt of definite complaints that the disarmament provisions of the Treaty were being infringed. Certain members of the Council, particularly the British and Swedish representatives, seem to have supported the German view. The dispute turned in particular on the application of Chapter V of the scheme adopted in September 1924. The British delegate on the Council had voted for the adoption of Chapter V on the understanding that it

came within the general rule that the Peace Treaty allowed for occasional *ad hoc* investigations only,¹ taking the view that the Rhineland zone should be treated in the same way as the rest of Germany except that the subjects of investigation might be enumerated in greater detail.² When the discussions in the Permanent Advisory Commission during February 1925 showed that the French Government had not abandoned their intentions as regarded the Rhineland, the British and Swedish delegates formally protested that a permanent organ of investigation went beyond the provisions of the Treaty, and thenceforth took no further part in the Commission's discussions on the question.³

When the matter came before the Council again in March 1925, it was clear that the two opposing theses regarding the organization in the Rhineland could not easily be reconciled, and on the proposal of Monsieur Briand consideration of the matter was adjourned, nominally until the June session.⁴ The Council, however, adopted on the 14th March, 1925, the report⁵ of a Mixed Committee of jurists and members of the Permanent Advisory Commission on the powers of the Commissions of Investigation and the facilities to be granted to them by countries subject to investigation. In the meantime, during February 1925, the Acting President of the Council, in accordance with instructions given by the Council at its December (1924) session, had appointed the Presidents of the four Commissions of Investigation for the period of one year.⁶

The application of the scheme of investigation by the League, as adopted by the Council in 1924, became a question of practical politics in the year 1926, when the negotiations relating to the disarmament of Germany turned principally upon the question of transferring control from organs responsible to the Governments of the Allied Powers to organs responsible to the Council of the League, in execution of the Peace Treaties. In the following section of this part, which deals with the history of the disarmament of Germany during the years 1926 and 1927, an account is given of the proceedings at the forty-third session of the League Council at Geneva in December 1926, when a reconciliation between the opposing theses was effected—partly by a legal interpretation, in a sense acceptable

¹ *The Times*, 30th November, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 25th November, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 25th and 30th November, 1926.

⁴ In point of fact, the question does not seem to have come before the Council again until December 1926.

⁵ This report was thenceforward incorporated as Part II of the Rules adopted by the Council for the exercise of the Right of Investigation.

⁶ *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 16th February, 1925.

to Germany, of certain of the provisions in the 1924 scheme, and partly by the abandonment, or at least deferment, of the French demand for a separate treatment of the Rhineland in the matter of investigation.

(c) THE DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY (1926-7)

By the beginning of 1926 the points still outstanding in the programme for the disarmament of Germany were comparatively few in number. At the end of January 1926 the Inter-Allied Commission of Control submitted to the Inter-Allied Military Committee (the 'Versailles Committee', over which Marshal Foch presided) a report summarizing the position at that date.¹ The report took as its basis the four lists annexed to the note of the 23rd October, 1925, from the German Government to the Allied Governments,² the first of which had enumerated obligations which Germany had fulfilled; the second, obligations which, in the ordinary course, would be executed by the 15th November, 1925; the third, obligations which Germany had been taking steps to execute, though the execution had been delayed; and the fourth, questions which presented special difficulties. The Control Commission declared itself almost entirely satisfied so far as the points mentioned in the first two lists were concerned, but considered that the progress made with regard to the points in the third list was insufficient for it to be said that Germany had fulfilled her promises. As for the points of special difficulty in the fourth list—police, the High Command, the use of certain arms for training, fortresses on the eastern frontier and patriotic associations—it was reported that no progress at all had been made towards a settlement.

In Germany there seems to have been a general feeling at this time that the points still outstanding were purely technical and not of sufficient importance to warrant the maintenance of a permanent control organization, and this view was evidently taken by the statesmen of all the nations concerned who dealt with the question in the Council of the League of Nations at the end of the year.³ Germany does, in fact, appear to have fulfilled by this time all but a negligibly small proportion of her disarmament obligations under the Versailles Treaty; and such obstructions as the Inter-Allied Commission of Control continued to encounter were usually either the work of perverse individuals who had neither public opinion nor high official approval behind them, or else the consequence of Germany's com-

¹ See *Le Temps*, 27th January, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 26th and 27th January, 1926.

² See *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 190.

³ See pp. 95-7 below.

plicated constitution, under which the control of police and other matters involved in disarmament was divided between the *Reich* and the *Länder*.

In these circumstances it was hoped that the admission of Germany into the League of Nations, which was expected to take place in March 1926, would soon be followed by the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Commission. The month of March passed, however, without the admission of Germany into the League being accomplished;¹ and during the next six months the points in the disarmament programme which still remained to be settled continued to form the subject of negotiations between the Conference of Ambassadors and the Commission of Control on the one hand and the German authorities on the other—the negotiations on the German side being conducted for the most part by General von Pawels, who acted as representative of the German Government for the settlement of these points with the Allied Commission of Control.

At the beginning of the year, the questions on which most resistance was expected from Germany had been those relating to the High Command, to police formations and to war material. The exact status of General von Seeckt, the 'Chef der Heeresleitung', had long been in dispute. He had been appointed to his post in 1920 by a decree of the President, the constitutional head of the army; but the demand of the Allies was that he should be made definitely subordinate to the civilian head of the Reichswehr Ministry, Herr Gessler, and that the general officers commanding groups should be directly under the orders of the Reichswehr Ministry and independent of the Chef der Heeresleitung. At the time of the evacuation of Cologne the German Government had agreed to make the desired change in the status of General von Seeckt, but on the 14th April, 1926, the Conference of Ambassadors reached the conclusion that their demands in this respect had not been complied with,² and General Walch, the president of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, made fresh representations on the subject early in July.³

With regard to the police, the chief points in dispute were the numbers to be allowed to Germany and the question of length of service. The German Government claimed that certain employees with special duties should not be included in the total of 150,000

¹ See *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, Section (i).

² *Le Temps*, 31st July, 1926.

³ General Walch's note attracted considerable public interest, and this was stimulated, for party ends, by the Nationalist press, which published a version of the contents of the note before the competent German authorities had taken cognizance of it (see the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *The Times*, 14th July, 1926).

fixed by the Allies, and other questions such as the number of police in occupied territory also remained to be settled. German policemen had been enlisted for periods of twelve years, and the Allies held that under this arrangement successive contingents of recruits were receiving a semi-military training. They therefore demanded the introduction of a system of life-careers for policemen. The German Government was willing to agree to this in principle, but proposed to observe existing contracts until they expired, whereas the Conference of Ambassadors held that men already under contract should be brought within the framework of the new system.¹

The question of patriotic associations, so far as the Allies were concerned, raised the same danger as the short-term contracts for police—that of providing semi-trained ‘man power’ which could be used to supplement the regular army in the event of war. Military activities on the part of political, athletic and other associations had been prohibited by a law of March 1921, but the Allies had grounds for belief, both from the reports of the Commission of Control and from information published in the press,² that such activities had by no means ceased. On the German side, equal anxiety as to the nature of these patriotic societies was displayed by the Republican parties; and, as the German Government pointed out, it was to their interest as well as to that of the Allies that semi-military associations should be dissolved, since as long as they existed there was a constant danger of civil-war.³

The other points mentioned in the correspondence of October 1925 as presenting special difficulties were the use of certain arms for training⁴ and the question of fortifications in Eastern Germany, especially at Königsberg. Reports had been received that new fortifications were under construction at Königsberg, Glogau, Lötzen and Küstrin, and the Allied Governments held that this was contrary to Article 180 of the Versailles Treaty, which provided that ‘the system of fortified works of the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany shall be maintained in their existing state’. The German contention was that in order to maintain these fortifications in their existing

¹ See *Le Temps*, 28th January, 1926; *The Times*, 11th November, 1926.

² See, for instance, the accounts of military displays at Whitsuntide by the Communist ‘Red Fighting Front’ and by the Nationalist ‘Steel Helmet’ organization in *The Times* of the 25th and 27th May, 1926, and *The Manchester Guardian* of the 25th May.

³ See *Le Temps*, 23rd October, 1926.

⁴ The Allies’ objections under this head were apparently mainly directed against the use of counterfeit tanks in army manœuvres (see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 14th July, 1926), the use of light machine guns by the cavalry, and the training of officers for flying.

state—that is, in a similar state of efficiency—a certain amount of new construction was necessary from time to time; to retain them literally in their existing state, without modernization, would be to allow them to grow obsolete and useless for military purposes. The dispute on this point, therefore, turned on a question of interpretation.¹

Towards the end of August 1926² three notes were addressed by the Conference of Ambassadors to the German Government. The first was reported to ask that definite steps should be taken to curb the activities of patriotic associations; the second that the enlistment of recruits in the Reichswehr for short terms should cease; and the third that immediate satisfaction should be given to all those Allied demands which had not yet been fulfilled. These notes were officially explained in Berlin as part of the ordinary correspondence regarding disarmament which was constantly being exchanged; but at the same time some anxiety was felt lest their arrival at a time when the question of Germany's entry into the League was once more occupying public attention should give new material to the Nationalists for their campaign against the Government's foreign policy.³

On the 8th September Germany was admitted to membership in the League of Nations and two days later the German delegates took their seats in the Assembly.⁴ On the 17th a conversation took place between Monsieur Briand and Herr Stresemann at Thoiry⁵ in the course of which the two statesmen discussed the alleviations desired by Germany in the situation created by the Versailles Treaty—evacuation of the Rhineland, immediate re-transfer of the Saar to Germany, &c.,—and possible compensations which might be given to France if she agreed to such alleviations; but the question of military control and disarmament did not apparently form one of the subjects of discussion, the German view being that the withdrawal of the Control Commission was due in any case and should not form part of a bargain.⁶

During October a partial solution of one of the outstanding difficulties—that of the High Command—was afforded by the resignation of General von Seeckt, the Chef der Heeresleitung, though his retire-

¹ See *The Times*, 10th December, 1926.

² The *Frankfurter Zeitung* (28th and 31st August) gave the date of the Ambassadors' notes as the 17th August; *Le Temps* (29th August and 7th September) as the 27th August, 1926.

³ See *Le Temps*, 29th and 30th August, 1926.

⁴ See *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, Section (i).

⁵ See further pp. 109–10 below.

⁶ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 22nd September, 1926.

ment was not a direct consequence of the demands made by the Allies. General von Seeckt had permitted Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, the eldest son of the ex-Crown Prince Wilhelm, to serve in a company which conserved the traditions of the former Prussian Guard during the September field exercises of the Reichswehr. On the publication of this fact in the press Herr Gessler, the Reichswehr Minister (who apparently had not been informed of the circumstances), had refused to defend General von Seeckt in the Reichstag; and on the 6th October the General had therefore offered his resignation to President von Hindenburg, who accepted it on the 8th.¹ On the 10th October a successor was appointed in the person of Lieutenant-General Heye. The selection of this officer—who was not the general officer next in seniority to General von Seeckt—was interpreted to mean that the German Government really intended to transform the post of Chef der Heeresleitung into that of military adviser to the Reichswehr Ministry, without disciplinary control over the Reichswehr;² but some doubt as to their intentions reappeared when it was announced, on the 28th October, that General Heye had been promoted to be General of Infantry, a step which made him the senior active officer of the Reichswehr, superior in rank, as General von Seeckt had been, to the General Officers commanding groups.³

Before the announcement of General Heye's promotion was made, the Conference of Ambassadors had met, on the 20th October, to consider the latest of the periodical reports of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control on the position of German disarmament. The Conference of Ambassadors concluded that the question of the High Command might be considered settled, but that Germany was still in default on a number of points—police, patriotic associations, eastern fortifications, the enlistment of recruits for short terms, and the export of war material.⁴

At the beginning of November a sub-committee of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Reichstag was appointed to examine all the documents relating to military control with a view to the presentation of a formal demand for the settlement of outstanding questions before the date of the December session of the League

¹ For this incident see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 28th and 29th September, 2nd, 7th and 9th October; *Le Temps*, 3rd, 5th, 6th and 8th October; *The Times*, 8th, 9th, 12th and 19th October; *The New York Times*, 8th October, 1926. The Allies were directly interested in the question of Prince Wilhelm only in so far as his appointment to the Reichswehr fell under the head of illegal short-term enlistment.

² See *The Times*, 11th October, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 30th October, 1926.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 22nd and 23rd October, 1926.

Council, so that the transfer of supervision to the League might be discussed at Geneva before the end of the year.¹ A few days later diplomatic negotiations on the subject began in earnest. On the 9th November Monsieur Briand had interviews with General Walch, the head of the Commission of Control, and with the British Ambassador in Paris;² on the 10th he saw Herr von Hoesch, the German Ambassador in Paris;³ and on the 12th Monsieur Vandervelde, the Belgian Foreign Minister, who paid a special visit to Paris in order to discuss the question of German disarmament.⁴ This exchange of views apparently established the fact that the French, British and Belgian Governments, like the German Government, were anxious that the Allied Commission of Control should be withdrawn as soon as possible; but the French Government, while recognizing the good will that had recently been shown by the German Government, held that it was essential for a thoroughly satisfactory position to be assured before the new régime was introduced, and considered that on certain points—such as police formations and the activities of patriotic societies—the German Government had not yet been able to master the internal resistance which they had encountered. As regarded the other outstanding difficulties, most importance was attached to the question of the eastern fortifications (in which France's ally, Poland, was specially interested) and to the export of war material.⁵ On the last-named point the British Government were believed to feel more anxiety than the French.

During the second half of November diplomatic negotiations proceeded between the Allied Governments (including Belgium and Italy) and Germany.⁶ The basis of the discussions was a memorandum prepared by the British military experts and communicated on the 10th November⁷ to Paris, Rome and Brussels, which contained the following 'minimum programme' of points on which satisfaction must be obtained before control could be withdrawn:⁸

- (1) Subordination of the Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr to the authority of the Minister for Defence.
- (2) Regularization of the question of recruiting and of military associations.
- (3) Control of the export of arms and munitions.
- (4) Destruction of new fortifications on the eastern frontier of Germany.

¹ *Ibid.*, 6th November, 1926.

³ *Le Temps*, 12th November, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 11th November, 1926.

⁷ *Le Temps*, 1st December, 1926.

² *The Times*, 11th November, 1926.

⁴ *The Times*, 15th November, 1926.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 29th November, 1926.

⁸ *The Times*, 29th November, 1926.

With regard to the first two points, the British view was understood to be that Germany had already done much towards a satisfactory settlement, and that the growing national support for Herr Stresemann's policy would do the rest; but in France there was still some anxiety regarding the activities of patriotic societies, and satisfactory assurances were desired regarding the alleged relations between officers of the Reichswehr and members of military associations.¹ The British suggestion regarding the fourth point—the eastern fortifications—was that it might suitably be submitted to arbitration, since the question was one of interpretation; and the third point—the export of war material—was the only one which was considered of vital importance.² By the beginning of December 1926 the German Government was understood to have agreed to the Allied demands regarding the restriction of manufacture and export of finished war material; and the question at issue was whether machinery for the manufacture of munitions and semi-finished articles which might be used in the production of armaments abroad also fell within the provisions of the Versailles Treaty.³ The German Government, under pressure, no doubt, from German industrialists,⁴ contended that it did not. A bill dealing with the question was drafted by the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and approved by the Cabinet, but its provisions were judged to be inadequate by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.⁵

The negotiations which took place during November dealt in the first place, as was natural, with concrete questions, such as those mentioned in the British memorandum, on which the Allies required satisfaction before they could agree to withdraw the Commission of Control; but as the date fixed for the opening of the session of the League Council (6th December) drew nearer, another aspect of the problem came more and more to the front. The German Government was known to have certain objections to the scheme for the organization of the Council's right of investigation into armaments which had been worked out in 1924;⁶ and in January 1926 Herr Stresemann, in

¹ See *The Times*, *loc. cit.* and 8th December, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 29th November, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 3rd and 8th December, 1926.

⁴ See *ibid.*, 10th December, 1926. The point was of real importance, for, as was pointed out in *The Economist* (quoted in *Le Temps*, 19th December, 1926), if Germany were permitted to continue the manufacture and export of half finished articles she could supply munitions in embryo to any nation with aggressive aims and would possess an organization for armament production that could easily be expanded for her own purposes if she so desired.

⁵ See *Le Temps*, 5th December; *The Times*, 3rd and 11th December, 1926.

⁶ On the basis of decisions taken by the Council on the 27th September, 28th October, and 9th, 10th, and 11th December, 1924. See above, pp. 85-6.

a letter to the Secretary-General of the League, had mentioned certain points, the carrying out of which would, he declared, be contrary to the Weimar Constitution, and had raised definite objections to Chapter V of the scheme, under the terms of which it might be possible to establish a permanent or semi-permanent organ of investigation in the Rhineland.¹ It has been mentioned above² that when the scheme had been under discussion in 1924 the French delegates had pressed for the establishment of a permanent organization in the Rhineland, and although the idea had met with opposition it does not seem to have been abandoned, even when the admission of Germany into the League Council in September 1926 gave her a voice which would certainly be used to oppose the French thesis in any discussions on the procedure for applying Article 213 of the Versailles Treaty. This was the issue on which the negotiations of December 1926 were most in danger of breaking down; and Monsieur Briand's decision, in the course of these negotiations, to waive the French contention on this point perhaps contributed more than any other single step towards the settlement, which followed, of the whole problem of the disarmament of Germany.

The opening of the forty-third session of the League Council at Geneva on the 6th December, 1926, was preceded by conversations in Paris in which Monsieur Briand, Monsieur Poincaré, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Monsieur Zaleski (the Polish Foreign Minister, who was specially concerned in the question of fortifications in Eastern Germany), and Monsieur Vandervelde took part.³ On the 5th December Herr Stresemann had preliminary conversations at Geneva with both Sir Austen Chamberlain and Monsieur Briand,⁴ and on the following day an unofficial conference took place, under the presidency of Sir Austen Chamberlain, between the representatives on the Council of the five Locarno Powers: France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and Germany.⁵ The exact scope of the discussions was not made known, but an official communication to the press stated that satisfactory progress had been made, and it was reported that the German objections to the League of Nations scheme of investigation had been found to rest largely on questions of interpretation. At the request of the German delegation, a committee of legal experts proceeded during the next two days to examine the text of the scheme of investigation, and by the 9th December they had succeeded in 'inter-

¹ *The Times*, 25th November, 1926.

² See p. 86.

³ *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 4th December, 1926; *Le Temps*, 6th December.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 7th December, 1926.

⁵ *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 8th December, 1926.

preting' certain disputed points in such a way as to meet the German objections. Thus, ostensibly, the gesture which opened the door to agreement was a qualified acceptance of the League scheme by Germany; but actually this form of procedure veiled (no doubt designedly) a more substantial concession on Monsieur Briand's part. Monsieur Briand now accepted the view—which had always been held by the British Government,¹ as well as by the Germans—that no special form of investigation in the demilitarized zone was contemplated by the Versailles Treaty, and that anything in the way of permanent control could only be set up in agreement with Germany. Accordingly, it was agreed to waive, at any rate temporarily, the question of separate treatment for the Rhineland in the matter of investigation, though it was anticipated that this point might form the subject of direct negotiations between the French and German Governments at a later stage.² So far as the statesmen at Geneva were concerned, therefore, there were no further obstacles to be overcome and all that was necessary for the introduction of the new régime was a report from the Conference of Ambassadors that the Allied demands regarding disarmament had been fulfilled. This report was not easily or quickly obtained; but it was no longer possible that a settlement should be delayed indefinitely by technical controversies between experts now that the statesmen were of one mind in feeling that the time for a settlement had come and were also in agreement over the broad lines of their political bargain.

In the meantime the disputed points in the disarmament programme had been under constant discussion in Paris between the Conference of Ambassadors and a German expert, Herr Forster, who was assisted by General von Pawels, the German liaison officer with the Inter-Allied Commission.³ Agreement was reached without great difficulty on the questions of military associations, police and enlistment of recruits for short terms;⁴ but when the Conference of Ambassadors met on the 9th December to decide whether Germany could now be declared to have fulfilled the Allies' demands they reported that, in spite of numerous proofs of good will in the general execution of the disarmament obligations, the assurances given by Herr Forster and General von Pawels had not proved satisfactory so far as the two questions of export of semi-finished war material and

¹ See pp. 86–7 above.

² *Le Temps*, 9th December; *The Times*, 9th and 10th December, 1926.

³ *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 5th December; *The Times*, 8th December, 1926.

⁴ Notes formally recording the settlement on these points were exchanged during the next few weeks (*the Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29th December, 1926).

fortifications in Eastern Germany were concerned.¹ In spite of this adverse report from the Ambassadors, the delegates at Geneva of the Powers represented on the Conference of Ambassadors announced at the close of a meeting on the 10th December that they had been 'able to note a general progress', but had postponed a definite decision until a further report had been received—the Ambassadors having arranged to hold a further meeting on the 10th.² The 'interpretation' of the League scheme of investigation drawn up by the jurists (which appeared in fact to modify the scheme on one or two points) had in the meantime been approved by the Powers, and its acceptance by the Council was expected to be a mere matter of form.³

The determination of the statesmen at Geneva to achieve a settlement was not shaken by the news that the Conference of Ambassadors, at their meeting on the 10th, had decided that the additional explanations given by General von Pawels on the two points in dispute were still not satisfactory and that they could not declare Germany to have fulfilled all her obligations.⁴ On the 11th the representatives of the interested Powers at Geneva agreed, notwithstanding the Ambassadors' decision, that the Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be withdrawn from Germany by the 31st January, 1927; that the two outstanding questions should continue in the meantime to be dealt with between the Conference of Ambassadors and the German Government; and that even if they had not been settled by the end of January the Commission of Control should still be withdrawn and the questions should then be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. No formal instrument was signed, but a document recording the agreement reached was drawn up, in the form of a preamble and five clauses, and a copy of this document was signed by Sir Austen Chamberlain and accepted by the representatives of the other interested Powers.⁵

On the same day, the 11th December, the Council approved the jurists' interpretations of the scheme of investigation drawn up in 1924, by adopting a report from Monsieur Beneš⁶ in which the interpretations had been embodied in the following terms:

1. The Council of the League of Nations, acting by a majority vote, shall decide, in conformity with Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles,

¹ *Le Temps*, 11th December, 1926.

² *The Times*, 11th December, and *Le Temps*, 12th December, 1926.

³ *The Times*, 11th December, 1926.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 12th December, 1926; *The Times*, 14th December, 1926.

⁵ See *The Times*, 13th December, 1926.

⁶ This report was thenceforward incorporated as Part III of the Rules adopted by the Council for the exercise of the Right of Investigation.

whether it is necessary, in any particular case, to hold an investigation, and it shall then specify the object and the limits of such investigation. The Commissions of Investigation shall act under the authority and on the instructions of the Council. The Council's decision shall be taken by a majority vote.

2. To render an effective investigation possible the Commission shall apply to the representative appointed by the German Government or to his delegates, who will procure without delay the assistance of the administrative, judicial or military authority competent under German law. Such investigation shall then be carried out and findings reached as the Commission, acting within the limits of its instructions, may consider advisable, the interested party being given a hearing (*contradictoirement*).

3. The prohibition laid down that the nationals of a State subjected to the right of investigation shall not form part of commissions of investigation shall be understood in the sense that the nationals of the state in the territory of which an investigation is undertaken shall never form part of a Commission holding such investigation.

4. It is understood that the provisions of Article 213 of the Peace Treaty with Germany relating to investigations shall be applicable to the demilitarized Rhine zone as to other parts of Germany. These provisions do not provide in this zone, any more than elsewhere, for any special control by local standing and permanent groups. In the demilitarized Rhine zone such special groups, not provided for in Article 213, shall not be set up except by convention between the Governments concerned.

5. The explanations given in Articles 1, 2 and 3 above naturally apply to cases under Articles 159 of the Treaty of St. Germain, Article 143 of the Treaty of Trianon, and Article 104 of the Treaty of Neuilly.

The Council's adoption of this report on the 11th December, 1926, together with its decision on the same day to make the date of withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control independent of the proceedings of the Conference of Ambassadors, virtually ensured a definitive settlement of the whole question.

During the next six weeks negotiations on the outstanding points continued between the German delegates, General von Pawels and Herr Forster, and the Versailles Committee.¹ On the 31st January the Conference of Ambassadors met to consider whether the withdrawal of the Control Commission could be accompanied by the decision that Germany had now fulfilled all her disarmament obligations, but while it was announced at the conclusion of the meeting that the question of the German trade in war material might be regarded as settled, there still remained certain differences in connexion with the eastern fortifications.² On the following day, how-

¹ i.e. the Inter-Allied Military Committee of which Marshal Foch was chairman. It was on the advice of this committee that the Ambassadors had taken their decision of the 10th December.

² *The Times*, 1st February, 1927.

ever, the Ambassadors met again to consider a report from the Versailles Committee on modifications in the German proposals put forward on the 31st January, and after a further hearing of the German delegates they were able to agree on the terms of a settlement of the question of fortifications and to approve a provisional agreement relating to the trade in war material which had been drafted by Allied and German experts in Berlin.¹

Under the agreement regarding fortifications Germany was to be allowed to retain the new works at Lötzen and part of those at Glogau and Königsberg; the remaining new constructions at Glogau and Königsberg and all those at Küstrin were to be destroyed within four months from the 25th February, 1927.² With regard to the German trade in war material, the settlement provided for the introduction into the Reichstag of a bill defining the articles the import or export of which, as well as their manufacture for export or for utilization in Germany, were prohibited.³

On the 5th February notes formally recording the settlement reached on the 1st February with regard to the fortifications on Germany's eastern and southern frontiers were exchanged between Monsieur Briand, on behalf of the Powers represented on the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and Herr von Hoesch, the German Ambassador in Paris.⁴ On the 26th and 28th February further notes were exchanged recording the agreement on the draft bill prohibiting the import and export of war material.⁵ The bill passed its final reading in the Reichstag on the 7th July.⁶

At the beginning of March the German Government was notified of the appointment by France, Great Britain, Italy and Belgium (the Japanese Government decided to make no appointment) of technical experts who were to be attached to the Embassies of the Powers in Berlin, in accordance with arrangements made at Geneva on the 12th December, 1926, in order to keep in touch with the competent German authorities until such time as they could report that

¹ *Ibid.*, 2nd February, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 3rd February, 1927.

³ For a summary of the bill, see *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ The text of the actual agreement signed on the 31st January by General von Pawels and by General Baratier (a member of the Inter-Allied Military Committee and the new President of the League of Nations Commission of Investigation for Germany) was attached to the note in which Herr von Hoesch communicated to Monsieur Briand the German Government's approval of the terms of settlement (see *Le Temps*, 7th February; *The Times*, 8th February, 1927). For the text of Monsieur Briand's note and of the agreement, see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 8th February, 1927.

⁵ *Le Temps*, 2nd March, 1927.

⁶ *The Times*, 8th July, 1927.

the last of the measures agreed upon had been carried out.¹ The German Government recognized that the experts must in some way satisfy themselves that the works marked out for destruction had actually been demolished, but they gave it to be understood that they would oppose any suggestion that the experts, in a body, should visit the fortifications, on the ground that such a visit would be a continuation of 'military control'.² On the 13th June notes were addressed by the German Foreign Office to the Embassies and Legations of the countries formerly represented on the Inter-Allied Commission of Control notifying them that the works marked for destruction in the agreement of the 31st January had now been completely demolished. The notes were accompanied by plans and photographic evidence of the work of destruction, but it had been understood throughout that the Conference of Ambassadors would not be satisfied with documentary proof.³ As the result of informal discussions between the Foreign Ministers assembled at Geneva in June for the forty-fifth session of the League Council, a solution was found for this last problem. The German Government agreed to a compromise by which a personal inspection should be carried out by one or two of the military experts of the Powers but not by all the experts in a body,⁴ and by the 3rd July the Conference of Ambassadors had given their assent to an arrangement by which the French and Belgian experts would visit Königsberg, Glogau and Küstrin, under the guidance of General von Pawels, in order to verify the completion of the work of destruction.⁵ The experts began their inspection immediately and had completed it by the 10th July. They found that the demolition had been satisfactorily carried out, and since by this time the War Materials Bill had passed the Reichstag, the two points in the disarmament programme which had most occupied public attention since the autumn of 1926 could at last be dismissed as settled. There remained a few minor questions—demolitions in occupied territory, the putting into force of new police laws for the Federal States, the conversion or transfer of scheduled barracks and the placing of certain guns—which called for certain formalities before Germany could be said to have carried out her disarmament obligations to the letter.⁶

On the 22nd July, 1927, the Conference of Ambassadors formally notified⁷ the Council of the League that the Inter-Allied Commission

¹ *The Times*, 3rd February and 5th March, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 14th and 20th May, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th June, 1927.

³ See *The Times*, 14th June, 1927.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 26th June, 1927.

⁵ *The Times*, 4th July, 1927.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 11th July, 1927.

⁷ The text of the note is printed in the *League of Nations Official Journal*, September 1927.

of Control had been dissolved on the previous 31st January, and that the powers conferred by Article 203 and the following articles of the Versailles Treaty on the Governments of the Principal Allied Powers were at an end.

(d) THE SITUATION IN GERMAN OCCUPIED TERRITORY (1926-7)

The evacuation by the Allied troops of the first Rhineland zone, which began on the 1st December, 1925, and was completed during the course of the next two months,¹ reduced the total Allied forces in Germany by some 25-30,000 men.² The note³ of the 14th November, 1925, from the Conference of Ambassadors, in which the German Ambassador in Paris had been informed of the alleviations that were to be introduced into the régime of occupation as a result of the Locarno Conference, had contained the promise that the total number of the occupying forces should be 'considerably reduced' to 'a figure approaching the normal'; and the communiqué of the 18th November in which the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission had announced the changes that were to be made in the administration of the Rhineland had again declared that 'the strength of the occupying troops will be appreciably reduced.'⁴ The German interpretation of these promises was that the occupying troops were to be reduced to the 'normal'⁵ pre-war German garrison—that is, to between 40,000 and 50,000 men.⁶ Dismay was therefore caused in Germany by the report, which was circulated in the middle of January 1926, that a sub-committee of the Conference of Ambassadors had recommended the maintenance in the second and third zones of occupation of 75,000 troops, of whom 60,000 were to be French.⁷ *Démarches* made by the German Ambassadors in London and Brussels on the 17th January⁸

¹ See *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part II B, Section (ii).

² *The Times*, 21st January, 1926.

³ Text *ibid.*, 15th November, 1925.

⁴ See *ibid.*, 19th November, 1925, and 30th January, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 16th January, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, 9th April, 1926.

⁵ This interpretation of the word 'normal' was given by Herr Stresemann in a public speech, and was also apparently mentioned, without being challenged, by the German Ambassador in Paris in negotiations with the French Government (see *Le Temps*, 24th January, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, *loc. cit.*).

⁶ For estimates of the pre-war garrison, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th January; *The Times*, 23rd and 30th January; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 16th January, 1926. For varying estimates of the strength of the occupying troops in the autumn of 1925, see *The Times*, 23rd and 30th January, 1st June and 13th August, 1926; *Le Temps*, 21st January, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 30th May, 1926, and 16th January, 1927.

⁷ *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th and 15th January; *The Times*, 16th January; *Le Temps*, 17th January, 1926.

⁸ *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 18th and 19th January; *Le Temps*, 19th and 21st January, 1926. According to *The Daily Telegraph* (quoted in *Le Temps*,

and in Paris on the 19th¹ seem to have resulted only in the confirmation of the rumours, and although the German representations were among the subjects discussed by Monsieur Briand with Sir Austen Chamberlain, when the latter visited Paris on the 27th–29th January, the two statesmen apparently decided that no immediate modification of the previous Allied decision was necessary.

The prevailing pessimism in Germany was somewhat lightened when the Conference of Ambassadors announced on the 29th January that the Cologne zone would be officially evacuated by midnight of the 31st January,² since it had been feared that the process of withdrawal might be prolonged for some weeks.³ The general feeling in Germany was that the signature of the London Reparation Agreement in August 1924 (by which the Dawes Plan was brought into operation)⁴ and the conclusion of the Locarno Pact in October 1925 had constituted guarantees on Germany's part of the kind envisaged in the declaration regarding the occupation of the Rhine Provinces signed on the 16th June, 1919, by MM. Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George.⁵ In this declaration a prospect had been held out that the occupied territory might be liberated at an earlier date than that fixed in the Versailles Treaty (as was contemplated in Article 431 of the Treaty) provided that Germany showed goodwill and gave satisfactory guarantees for the fulfilment of her treaty obligations.⁶ The natural corollary of Locarno, it was felt, was the complete evacuation of the Rhineland,⁷ and the failure of Germany, through no fault of her own, to obtain admission into the League during the special session of the Assembly in March 1926 did not, in the German view, affect the moral obligation of the Allies to implement the promises made at Locarno without further delay.⁸

The disappointment in Germany was accordingly great as the weeks

19th January, 1926) British diplomacy had for some time been endeavouring, but in vain, to persuade the French Government that the introduction of 15,000 British and Belgian troops into the second and third zones on the evacuation of the first zone ought to be accompanied by the withdrawal of a corresponding number of French troops.

¹ *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 21st January, 1926.

² *Le Temps*, 30th January, 1926.

³ *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 27th January, 1926.

⁴ See *Survey for 1924*, Part II A, Section (vi).

⁵ Published in the British Parliamentary Paper, *Cmd.* 240 of 1919.

⁶ The German views on this point were forcibly put in a debate in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag on the 26th June, 1926 (see *The Times*, 28th June).

⁷ See, for instance, a speech by Herr Stresemann at Cologne on the 20th February, 1926 (*The Times*, 22nd February, 1926).

⁸ See *The Times*, 1st June, 1926.

and months passed without any marked alleviation in the situation in the occupied territory. In some respects, indeed, the position in the Mainz and Coblenz zones was worse than it had been before the Locarno Conference, since by the middle of 1926 the total force of the army of occupation in these districts was still higher than it had been in the autumn of 1925.¹ In the Wiesbaden district, to which the British troops had been transferred on the evacuation of Cologne, the housing shortage was accentuated by the action of the British authorities, who commandeered more buildings than had been required by their French predecessors;² and the hardships suffered by the smaller towns such as Königstein,³ where the total accommodation available was strictly limited, were the subject of much comment in the German press.⁴

On the 24th July the position was reviewed in a statement to the press by Herr Bell, who had recently been appointed Minister for the Occupied Territories.⁵ Herr Bell pointed out that in some respects alleviations had been granted. For instance, the delegates of the Rhineland High Commission, who had been stationed at various posts throughout the occupied territory, had been withdrawn at the end of 1925,⁶ and early in January permission to instal wireless apparatus had been given.⁷ The promises of reduction in the strength of the armies of occupation had, however, still not been fulfilled and there were at least 35,000 more troops in the Rhineland than Germany had a right to expect. A reduction in the number of troops would automatically relieve the hardships from which the population was still suffering—the burden of billeting, the requisitioning of schools and public buildings, the damage done to agriculture by the exercise grounds, aerodromes, shooting ranges, and manœuvres of the armies of occupation. The gendarmerie of the Occupying Powers still far exceeded the necessary number, and was located in some places where there were no troops. The great mass of the coloured troops had indeed been removed, but there still remained about 2,000

¹ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 30th May; *The Times*, 1st June and 21st July, 1926.

² The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 17th June, 1926.

³ The situation in Königstein was the subject of a question in the House of Commons in April 1926 (*The Times*, 21st April).

⁴ See *The Times*, 19th June, on the artificiality of the complaints ventilated in the press. For the situation in the Wiesbaden district during the early months of 1926 see *Le Temps*, 23rd January; *The Manchester Guardian*, 9th and 12th April; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 17th June, 1926.

⁵ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 25th July; *The Times*, 26th July, 1926.

⁶ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 5th January, 1926.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 21st January, 1926.

of them. The administration of justice by the military authorities and the system of ordinances issued by the Rhineland High Commission both called for reform. Some of the Rhineland High Commission's ordinances, particularly those affecting freedom of movement, had been rescinded in 1925, but since then none had been abolished, in spite of numerous requests.

Detailed questions regarding the reduction in the strength of the troops and changes in the régime of the occupation were under constant discussion between the Rhineland High Commission and Freiherr Langwerth von Simmern, who had been appointed in November 1925 to the post of Reichskommissar for the occupied territory.¹ The chief aim of the German Government, apart from the question of reducing the number of troops to 45-50,000,² was to obtain a redistribution of the forces, so that they might be concentrated in a few large centres, where they would interfere less than in the small towns with the ordinary life of the inhabitants. They desired, in fact, that the occupation should be made as 'invisible' as possible.³

On the 10th September, two days after Germany was admitted to membership in the League of Nations, the negotiations for an amnesty in the occupied territories which had opened in 1924 after the conclusion of the London Reparation Agreement and which had continued, with interruptions, ever since, at length resulted in the signature of an agreement by Freiherr Langwerth von Simmern and the Rhineland High Commission.⁴ By this agreement the German Government undertook to employ all the means at their disposal to prevent reprisals against any person for having obeyed the orders of the occupation authorities or for having rendered them services, and the Governments represented on the Rhineland High Commission undertook to grant an amnesty for all offences committed in occupied territory up to the 1st February, 1926, except offences against the common law or espionage. In notes exchanged at the

¹ *The Times*, 19th June, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7th August, 1926.

² At the beginning of August Herr von Hoesch had an interview with Monsieur Briand, at which he apparently received assurances that a beginning would be made with the withdrawal of the French troops (the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 6th August, 1926). Between the 15th June and the 15th September, 1926, 4,700 French troops were withdrawn, according to the German estimates (see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 14th October, 1926), and the transport of troops was still continuing at the end of September (*ibid.*, 23rd September; *The Times*, 2nd October, 1926).

³ *Le Temps*, 8th August, 1926.

⁴ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 11th and 12th September. For a summary of the agreement see *The Times*, 13th September, 1926. For the full text see *Europäische Gespräche*, October 1926.

same time, the German Government declared that they would try to bring about more peaceful conditions in occupied territory in the spirit of the London Agreement and the Locarno Pact, and the Rhineland High Commission gave notice of the immediate cancellation of the so-called 'protection ordinances', which gave the High Commission wide powers to interfere with German judicial proceedings in the interests of persons who had assisted the occupying authorities—such persons being, under the new agreement, guaranteed immunity from reprisals.¹ An ordinance (No. 310) withdrawing the protection ordinances was immediately promulgated and was accompanied by another (No. 311) which dealt with the execution of the measures to be taken by the occupying authorities under the amnesty.²

During the autumn of 1926 and the early months of 1927 hopes were cherished in Germany that it might be possible to secure, in the near future, not merely a reduction in the occupying forces, but the liberation of the whole of the Rhineland from foreign occupation. In the course of the conversation between Monsieur Briand and Herr Stresemann which took place at Thoiry on the 17th September, 1926,³ the two statesmen were believed to have discussed the possibility of withdrawing the troops from the second and third zones in advance of the period fixed in the Versailles Treaty; and even after it had become clear that the arrangement outlined at Thoiry was not likely to be carried through, reports were circulated at intervals that the

¹ See *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

² *Le Temps*, 15th September; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 18th September, 1926. It had been hoped that this amnesty agreement would be followed by improved relations between the occupying authorities and the German population, but in the autumn of 1926 there was a renewal of 'incidents'. The most serious of these occurred at Germersheim, in the Palatinate, at the end of September, when a French officer, Lieut. Rouzier, killed one German civilian and wounded two others. Lieut. Rouzier was tried before a French military court at Landau in December but was acquitted on the ground of legitimate self-defence, and a number of Germans concerned in the affair were sentenced to periods of imprisonment. This incident, and still more the judgement of the Court, aroused great indignation in Germany, and as a result of a formal protest from the German Government the sentences on the Germans were rescinded by a French Presidential decree at the end of December. For the Germersheim incident see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 28th and 29th September, *The Times*, 29th and 30th September, 18th, 22nd, 23rd and 28th December, 1926; *Le Temps*, 29th September, 1st October, 15th, 25th and 26th December, 1926. For accounts of other incidents in which Frenchmen as well as Germans suffered, see *The Times*, 1st October; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 5th October; *Le Temps*, 7th October, 1926. For a joint appeal for the prevention of future incidents issued by the Rhineland High Commission and the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Territories at the beginning of October, see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 6th October, 1926.

³ For the Thoiry meeting see sub-section (e), below.

German Government were about to make formal proposals for the withdrawal of all the Allied forces from the Rhineland.

At the end of January 1927, Herr Marx formed a new Government, which included some Nationalist Ministers, and in the middle of February it was officially announced that the liberation of the Rhineland would be the cardinal point of the new Government's policy.¹ Nevertheless, in spite of Nationalist pressure,² the German case for evacuation does not seem to have been formally presented during 1927. At one time, indeed, it seemed as though France—where public opinion was then certainly not prepared to contemplate the liberation of the Rhineland without some substantial *quid pro quo*—might be induced to strike a bargain. It was argued that, under the Versailles Treaty, the occupied territory must be evacuated without compensation in the course of the next few years, and that France therefore stood to gain, in the long run, if Germany would pay a price for immediate evacuation. The price suggested was the establishment of a permanent organization for the control of armaments in the Rhineland.³ This proposed bargain was discussed in the press,⁴ but it does not seem ever to have been the subject of formal negotiations.

The prospects for Germany of securing the complete evacuation of the Rhineland appeared to diminish as the year 1927 went on, and at the same time the grievance regarding the number of occupying troops remained unabated. In the spring a number of alleviations⁵ were introduced in the occupied territory, but it was still maintained in Germany that the small reductions effected hitherto in the forces of occupation did not correspond with the promises of the Conference of Ambassadors. The German view on this point was apparently shared by the British Government,⁶ and during the summer negotiations took place between the Occupying Powers regarding the strength of the armies of occupation.

The problem was, indeed, complicated, and the working out of a provisional solution more or less acceptable to all parties was delayed by the fact that there were two distinct considerations to be adjusted: first, the total strength of the inter-Allied armies of occupation on German soil, and, second, the proportional strengths of the French,

¹ *Le Temps*, 15th February, 1927.

² See *Le Temps*, 22nd February; *The Manchester Guardian*, 5th May, 1927.

³ See above, pp. 95–6.

⁴ See *The Times*, 6th and 7th January and 6th May, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 6th January, 1927.

⁵ For a list of these see *Le Temps*, 27th May, 1927.

⁶ See a statement made in the House of Commons by Mr. G. Locker-Lampson on the 28th July, 1927.

British and Belgian contingents. While the first consideration raised an issue between the Allied Powers collectively and Germany, it was not found possible, at this stage, to deal with it apart from the second consideration; and this was primarily an issue between the Allies themselves. Yet, though it concerned Germany only indirectly, it was by no means a matter of indifference to her, in view of the marked divergence between the attitudes of the three Occupying Powers (or, at any rate, between the attitudes of France and Great Britain) towards both the purpose of the occupation and the term for which it was to run.

This divergence of attitudes arose naturally out of the difference in the geographical situations of France and Great Britain in respect of the Rhineland, and the further difference in the relative incidence of the various military commitments of the French and British armies. For France, the Rhineland constituted an ideal *glacis* for the most vulnerable of the French frontiers; and therefore any French troops posted in the Rhineland, so far from being thereby seconded from the main duties of the French army, were placed in a peculiarly advantageous position for performing those duties. For Great Britain, on the other hand, the Rhineland, as an inland district of the European Continent, was out of geographical relation to the general scheme of Imperial Defence, which was based on the sea; and therefore any British troops posted in the Rhineland were virtually put out of commission for the main duties which the British army had to perform in distant parts of the world. This was inconvenient for the British War Office at a time when, for financial and other reasons, the strength of the British army was being kept down to a minimum; and if technical military considerations had excluded others of a different order, the British Government would have found it to their interest to withdraw their contingent from the Rhineland completely and immediately. The British Government, however, were unable to ignore the political consideration that, if they allowed the inter-Allied occupation of the Rhineland to reduce itself virtually to a French occupation, they might no longer be able to hold their own against the French Government in matters relating to Germany which were of vital interest to Great Britain not only because they arose out of the Versailles Treaty, but also because they affected the future of Europe as a whole. Accordingly, the British Government were in favour of reducing the total strength of the inter-Allied armies of occupation without changing the proportional strength of the several contingents, whereas the French Government were unwilling to assent to a reduction of the total strength unless on condi-

tion that the proportional strengths of the various contingents were altered simultaneously to the French contingent's advantage.

On the existing footing (as estimated by the Allied Governments), the total inter-Allied strength in the Rhineland at this time appears to have been about 69,000, constituted by French, British, and Belgian contingents of 56,000, 7,000, and 6,000 respectively.¹ The British Government² appear to have held that, in order to implement the promise contained in the Ambassadors' note of the 14th November, 1925,³ the existing total strength ought to be reduced by about 14,000 men; and this raised in an acute form the question of the proportional contributions to the proposed total reduction. On the British side it was pointed out that on the present footing—on which the French contingent was eight times as strong as the British and outnumbered the combined strength of the British and Belgian contingents by more than 4 to 1—the preponderance of the French contingent was on the verge of being overwhelming, and that any further shift in the balance to the disadvantage of the British and Belgian contingents would reduce these to negligible quantities. On the French side (on which the thesis that the armies of occupation were an instrument of security had not been abandoned) it was pointed out that the bulk of the French contingent was accounted for by a self-contained unit, the Army of the Rhine, which was organized with a view to its being able to act as a covering force in the event of France having to mobilize against an attack from the unoccupied German territories, and which could not be reduced by more than 5,500 men without impairing its efficiency.⁴ The Franco-British exchanges of views threatened to fall into an *impasse*; but the common desire of the two Governments to reach an agreement on this matter before the opening of the eighth session of the Assembly of the League of Nations stimulated them, before the end of August 1927, to arrive at a compromise.⁵ The British Government agreed that the total reduction should be cut down from 14,000 to 10,000 (the effect being to reduce the total inter-Allied strength in the Rhineland from just under 70,000 to just under 60,000), while the French Government agreed to contribute a contingent of 8,000 towards this total reduction.

The announcement of this Franco-British compromise, which was formally communicated to Herr Stresemann at Geneva on the 5th September, was ill received in Germany on two grounds: first, that

¹ *The Times*, 22nd August, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 27th August, 1927.

³ See p. 101 above and *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 192.

⁴ *The Times*, 27th August, 1927.

⁵ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

the reduced total of 60,000 was still unwarrantably in excess of the 'pre-war' strength of the former German garrison in the same area on a peace footing; and, second, that the French Government had not formally abandoned its contention that, in virtue of Article 429 of the Versailles Treaty, the occupation of the Third Rhineland Zone might still be continued, even after the expiry in 1935 of the treaty term of fifteen years, if it could then be shown that there were not yet sufficient guarantees against unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany.

Thus the long-delayed reduction in inter-Allied strength, when at last agreed upon, did not remove the irritation and friction which the occupation had never ceased to cause. Probably this ill feeling was inherent in the situation and could only be expected to vanish with the occupation itself. All that could be said was that the irritant had now been reduced to a compass within which (if further local incidents in the occupied territory were avoided) it was less likely than before to hinder the restoration of mutual confidence and goodwill in other and less unpromising fields.

(e) THE MEETING BETWEEN MONSIEUR BRIAND AND
HERR STRESEMAN AT THOIRY ON THE 17TH SEPTEMBER, 1926

On the 17th September, 1926, Monsieur Briand and Herr Stresemann—being then both in Geneva as the principal delegates of their respective Governments at the sessions of the League Council and Assembly at which Germany had just been admitted to membership in the League with a permanent seat on the Council¹—took occasion to have lunch together in the village of Thoiry, on the French side of the Franco-Swiss frontier. Measures were taken by the French authorities to prevent any journalists who might be on the two statesmen's trails from arriving on the spot until the conversation—which lasted four and a half hours—was over; but, after the two Foreign Ministers' return to Geneva that evening, the following joint *communiqué*² was vouchsafed to the press:

Monsieur Briand, the Foreign Minister of France, and Herr Stresemann, the Foreign Minister of Germany, met for lunch at Thoiry. They had there a conversation of a most cordial character which lasted several hours. In the course of this conversation they examined successively all the problems of possible common interest to the two countries and investigated together the means best calculated to assure the solution of these problems in the interests of France and Germany and in the spirit

¹ See *Survey for 1926*, Part I A.

² Text in *Le Temps*, 19th September, 1926.

of the agreements that have been signed by the two parties. The two ministers have brought their points of view into accord in regard to the general solution, with the mutual reservation that the matter shall be referred by each to his own Government. Should their point of view obtain the approval of their respective Governments, they would then resume their collaboration in order to arrive at the desired results.

Beyond this *communiqué* no official information concerning the topics of discussion and heads of provisional agreement in this conversation at Thoiry appears to have been given out on either side; but during the following days and weeks an approximately consistent version of what had been said and done at this private meeting was ventilated, without eliciting *démentis*, in the press. For example, in an article, published in the *Berliner Tageblatt*,¹ from the hand of Professor Julius Hirsch, the concessions proposed on either side were tabulated as follows: ²

On the French side:

1. Evacuation, in 1927, of the Second and Third Zones of Occupation [in the Rhineland]; before that date, rapid reduction in the number of effectives, whose presence was also to be made invisible as far as possible.

2. Return to Germany of the Territory of the Saar in the course of the coming year.

3. Abandonment of the resistance so far offered by France to the return to Germany of the Eupen and Malmédy districts (to which Belgium then would doubtless consent).

On the German side:

1. Rapid payment of 370 to 420 millions of gold marks, that is, 120 millions to Belgium for the repurchase of Eupen and Malmédy and 250 to 300 millions to France for the repurchase of the Saar mines.

2. Active support for the marketing of about one and a half milliard gold marks' (that is, 12½ milliards of francs at the existing rate of exchange) worth of German Railway Bonds.

3. Renunciation of the transfer clause [in the London Agreement of 1924] in respect of the interest and amortization of the loan thus marketed.

It was further stated that the initiative in the formulation of these proposals had come from Herr Stresemann, and that the conversation between the German and French Foreign Ministers had been held with the assent of Sir Austen Chamberlain, who was being kept informed of the proceedings.³

¹ Discussed in *Le Temps*, 1st October, 1926.

² See further *ibid.*, 19th September, 1926; *The New York Times* and *The Times* (London) 20th September; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 22nd September, 1926; and a review of the German press in *Le Temps*, 27th September, 1926.

³ For these statements in regard to the British Secretary of State, see *The Times*, 25th September, 1926. It was reported from another source that Sir Austen Chamberlain not only took note of the proceedings at Thoiry, but

If the provisional agreement which Herr Stresemann and Monsieur Briand reached at Thoiry did follow the lines suggested above, it was evidently in harmony not only with the spirit of the Versailles Treaty, which had contemplated the evacuation of German occupied territory *pari passu* with the discharge of Germany's financial obligations towards the Allies, but also with common sense, having regard to the respective interests of the two countries at this time. For Germany, whose national economy and national self-esteem alike called for the liberation of the Second and Third Zones of the Rhineland and the restoration of the Saar Basin at the earliest possible date, it was worth while to make great financial efforts and sacrifices if by so doing she could materially hasten the hour of relief. For France, who had now no hope that the eventual plebiscite in the Saar Basin, for which the Versailles Treaty provided, would result in her favour, and whose craving for security might be expected to have been appreciably appeased by the conclusion of the Pact of Locarno and the entry of Germany into the League which had been its corollary, an immediate relief from her now pressing financial embarrassments might seem worth the price of the proposed political concessions.¹

In fact, the Thoiry Agreement offered, on the face of it, such imposing mutual advantages that the first receptions of it, in both Paris and Berlin, were distinctly favourable. On the 21st September the French Council of Ministers, after hearing Monsieur Briand's report, announced that the French Government 'was unanimous in regard

entered a reservation to the effect that any financial arrangement contemplated should not in any way prejudice the established order of priority in regard to Reparation payments.

¹ Apart from the national interests involved, the party interests of the two statesmen in the home politics of their respective countries were evidently likely to benefit if their agreement were completed and ratified. Monsieur Briand—balanced, in a Coalition Ministry, in precarious equilibrium with Monsieur Poincaré—might secure himself against being overthrown again (as he had been overthrown in 1922) by his formidable counterweight if he were able, at one brilliant stroke, to rehabilitate the franc, which Monsieur Poincaré had been striving to resuscitate by such laborious and painful measures. Herr Stresemann, on his side, would take the wind out of the sails of his captious Nationalist critics and his grudging Nationalist supporters if he were able, likewise at one brilliant stroke, to liberate by his conciliatory diplomacy those German territories which the Nationalists had signally failed to liberate by their violent language and their illicit military organizations during the last six years. These bearings of the Thoiry agreement upon the home politics of France and Germany may have had something to do with its eventual failure to take definitive form. In France, for example, when Monsieur Poincaré found himself able to stabilize the franc without the aid of a foreign loan, he could not be expected to lend his support to an alternative solution which would not only prolong the financial dependence of France upon foreign countries but would transfer laurels to Monsieur Briand's brow from his own.

to the interest of these conversations and the utility of pursuing them';¹ and, in a leading article published on the 23rd, *Le Temps* drew the moral:

Whether one likes it or not, this bears testimony to such a change in the international situation, to such a profound modification of the moral conditions under which European politics have evolved, that one cannot avoid taking account of it or seeing in it a sign of the times.

In the same context, however, *Le Temps* was careful to note that the French Government's freedom of action had been completely safeguarded and that so far no specific commitment had been made; and next day it was being rumoured that, on the financial and economic side of the anticipated negotiations between the two Governments, Monsieur Poincaré, as French Minister of Finance, was likely to insist upon being master in his own departmental domain.²

On the 24th September the German Cabinet issued a *communiqué* in much the same terms as the French Cabinet's *communiqué* of the 22nd, after receiving a report from Herr Stresemann. Whereas Monsieur Briand had left Geneva for Paris on the evening of the 18th, a few hours after parting from Herr Stresemann, the latter—out of courtesy to the League of Nations on this his first mission to Geneva as German delegate to a League Assembly—had stayed on until the termination of the official proceedings; and this courtesy had unfortunate results, since it gave the German Foreign Minister leisure to deliver an address to the German colony in Geneva in which he took up the controversial question of 'War Guilt' and publicly expressed that view of the merits of the controversy which was commonly held in Germany. Possibly this was a calculated indiscretion, since (in view of the references to 'War Guilt' in the text of the Versailles Treaty) the question was taken to heart by the Germans more keenly than by their late opponents, and any German statesman who pursued a policy of reconciliation was exposed to attack if it could be represented that he was letting the German case in the 'War Guilt' controversy go by default in order to avoid giving offence to the Governments with which he was dealing. Yet, whatever the cause of Herr Stresemann's indiscretion, it had an effect upon French public opinion which militated against the completion of his provisional agreement with Monsieur Briand.³

Thus, within a week of the Thoiry conversation, the prospects

¹ *The Times*, 22nd September, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 25th September, 1926.

³ See *Le Temps*, 27th September, 1926.

which it had momentarily opened up were beginning to be clouded over.¹ It is possible, nevertheless, that neither party manoeuvres nor national susceptibilities in the two countries which stood to benefit would have availed to frustrate the joint endeavours of the two Foreign Ministers if the financial aspect of the scheme had conspicuously stood the test of closer examination. This admittedly depended, in the last resort, upon the policy of the United States Government; for the greater part of the vast financial operations which were contemplated would evidently have to be effected, if at all, on the American money market;² and, in an international transaction of that magnitude, American bankers would almost certainly ask for and follow their Government's lead.³ Since the scheme amounted to a proposal for raising credits in the United States for the French Government through the German Government's agency, it seemed probable that it would be viewed by the United States Government in the light of Franco-American relations in the matter of Inter-Ally Debts,⁴ and it was perhaps the report⁵ that the United States Government would refuse to give its approval to any financial operation of the kind until the French ratification of the Washington Debt Funding Agreement had been deposited, which gave the Thoiry Project its *coup de grâce*.⁶ Hopes of further progress were kept alive by two calls which the German Ambassador in Paris, Herr von Hoesch, paid on Monsieur Briand on the 22nd and the 28th October;⁷ but Monsieur Briand's prospects of carrying the Thoiry project through receded as his colleague Monsieur Poincairé's endeavours to stabilize the franc without the aid of a foreign loan made progress; and the last doubts of the project's demise were removed when, in the French Chamber on the 30th November, 1926, Monsieur Briand paid it the honour of an elegant funeral oration.⁸ The Thoiry conversation, he declared, was merely one conversation after many others. Herr Stresemann and he had found it natural, as fellow delegates to the League of Nations, to endeavour in their conversa-

¹ See cables from Paris and Berlin in *The New York Times*, 25th September, 1926.

² *The New York Times*, 20th September, 1926.

³ For the policy of the State Department in regard to operations abroad by American bankers, see Part IV A, Section (i), pp. 412-3, below.

⁴ See *Survey for 1926*, Part I B.

⁵ *The Times*, 30th September, 1926.

⁶ It may be conjectured that in this matter of Inter-Ally Debts the United States Government and the British Government saw eye to eye. See also footnote 3 on p. 110, above, for Sir Austen Chamberlain's reported reservation in regard to Reparation priorities.

⁷ *Le Temps*, 23rd and 30th October, 1926.

⁸ *The Times*, 1st December, 1926.

tion to settle the difficulties which might arise between the two countries.

We are not in the Rhineland for the purpose of bullying Germany. We occupy it as a pledge devoted to a certain object. If both parties agree, the stipulations of a treaty can be humanized, an occupation can be lightened.

In these disarming phrases Monsieur Briand admitted that the Thoiry conversation had been premature and contrived in the same breath to confirm the foreboding of *Le Temps* that it had been 'a sign of the times'.

PART II

EUROPE

B. SOUTH-WESTERN EUROPE

(i) The Foreign Policy of Italy under the Fascist Régime.

DURING the first five years of the Fascist Régime in Italy, Signor Mussolini was playing on the European stage a role which in some ways recalled that played by the German Emperor William II during the twenty years preceding the War of 1914-18, and by the French Emperor Napoleon III during the twenty years preceding the War of 1870-1. Signor Mussolini's intentions (if he had formed definite intentions) were sufficiently obscure to provide a perpetual topic for discussion and conjecture; while the gestures in which he intimated (or disguised) his policy were often so flamboyant as to cause general alarms and excursions. In some of these cases his neighbours had good reason to take alarm: for instance, when he occupied Corfù in the autumn of 1923,¹ or when he concluded his treaty with Albania in November 1926,² or when he negotiated his agreement with Great Britain over (and also over the head of) Abyssinia in December 1925,³ or when, in November 1926, Colonel Ricciotti Garibaldi was proved to have been acting in France, under the guise of a political refugee, as an *agent provocateur* of the Italian Ministry of the Interior.⁴ There were other cases in which the alarm was sounded without its ever becoming clear whether there had been good reason or not: for example, when Signor Mussolini sent an Italian naval squadron to visit Tangier in the autumn of 1926,⁵ or when the Turks, in the summer of 1926, were persuaded that he intended to intervene if the Mosul controversy were to lead to war between Turkey and Great Britain.⁶ Finally, there were occasions on which Signor Mussolini's policy almost certainly received a more sinister interpretation than it deserved: for example, when he had a meeting with Sir Austen Chamberlain at Leghorn in September 1926, or when he concluded

¹ See *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 348-56.

² See the present volume, Part II C, Section (ii), below.

³ The Italo-British agreement regarding Abyssinia will be dealt with in a future volume.

⁴ See the present part, Section (iii), below.

⁵ The Tangier Question will be dealt with in a future volume.

⁶ See *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 526.

treaties of arbitration and amity with Spain in the August and with Germany in the December of that year.¹

A detached observer might smile at the disproportion between the psychological and the practical effects of Signor Mussolini's policy—between the energy expended and the results achieved—but the peoples of the contemporary world, or at any rate the peoples of Europe, were bound to feel concern, in view of the fact that Italy had a genuine need for expansion in some form.

Italy's problem at this time resembled that of Japan:² It was the problem of a nation with a great past, great abilities, great fecundity and a great dearth of mineral resources, which had happened to lie under a temporary eclipse during those centuries when the peoples of the Atlantic sea-board of Europe had been taking possession of the under-populated and under-developed regions of the overseas world. Like Japan, Italy had hoped to make up for lost opportunities in the past when she found herself on the victorious side at the termination of the General War of 1914–18; but, like Japan, again, she had been disappointed; for though the peace settlement had left her with relatively enhanced power and prestige, it had brought her no corresponding satisfaction of her material needs. Indeed, the post-war tendency of the United States and other overseas countries of immigration to introduce restrictive measures had aggravated Italy's difficulties. Like the contemporary rulers of Japan,³ Signor Mussolini felt it undignified to beat on closed doors when he was not prepared to attempt to break them open by force; and his response to the new restrictive and assimilative policies of the countries of immigration was to discourage emigration from Italy to territories under a foreign flag.⁴ He, too, turned to internal colonization and industrialization as alternatives to emigration; but it was evident that such means of providing subsistence at home for a rapidly growing population were inadequate. The Italian field for internal colonization in the south—even if utilized to the utmost by a state-aided intensive cultivation—was as narrowly limited as the Japanese field in the Northern Island of Hokkaido; and the Italian colonies in Africa were of no more account from this point of view than the Japanese possessions and mandated territories in the Pacific. Nor were the prospects for an expansion of industry very favourable in a country poor in mineral resources and in an age when all the countries of the world were

¹ See pp. 123–4, below.

² See *The World after the Peace Conference*, pp. 30–2.

³ See *Survey for 1926*, Part III B, Section (i).

⁴ See the present part, Section (ii), below.

aspiring to industrial self-sufficiency. Thus Signor Mussolini's policy of discouraging emigration yet at the same time encouraging the maintenance of a high birth-rate seemed to be leading towards some kind of explosion within a measurable time. 'Fascist Italy must expand or suffocate', her 'Duce' was reported to have declared on the 23rd July, 1926, to an American press correspondent;¹ and on his own premises it was certainly difficult to escape his conclusion.

How, then, did Signor Mussolini envisage the future? A clear answer to this important question does not emerge from a study of his public utterances during the first five years of his régime. His perpetual insistence upon Italy's imperative need for expansion was offset by studied assurances that he hoped to secure this expansion by pacific means; and while he allowed himself to bring his demands to the notice of the world in a language which was much more peremptory than the prevailing *lingua franca* of Western diplomacy, the extravagance of his words was often belied, at the last moment, by an unexpected soberness of action. A few quotations will illustrate these unresolved contradictions.²

For example, on the 7th April, 1926, in Rome, at the inauguration of the new head-quarters of the Fascist Directory, Signor Mussolini said:

We have won our battle in the interior . . . but the battle is not won abroad. Our battle abroad has become hard and is every day becoming more difficult, both for objective reasons and through circumstances brought about by our own will.³

On the 8th April, 1926, when he went on board the battleship *Cavour* in order to start on his state visit to Tripoli, he said:

It was my deliberate wish that this ceremony should take place on board a warship. . . . We are a Mediterranean people, and our destiny (this is no mere imitation of others) has been and always will be on the sea.⁴

At Tripoli on the 11th April, 1926 (speaking from horseback into an amplifier), he said:

Italy has been great in the Mediterranean, and I want her to become so again;⁵

¹ *The New York Times*, 24th July, 1926.

² Where the texts given in the daily press and in the collected volume of Signor Mussolini's speeches in 1926 disagree, the latter text is preferred in the translations that follow.

³ *The Corriere della Sera*, 8th April, 1926; *Discorsi del 1926* (Milan, 1927, 'Alpes'), p. 121.

⁴ *The Corriere della Sera*, 9th April, 1926; *Discorsi del 1926*, pp. 131-2.

⁵ *The Corriere della Sera*, 13th April, 1926; *Discorsi del 1926*, p. 136.

and later on the same day:

My visit is not to be interpreted as an ordinary administrative act. I intend it to be, as it is in fact, an affirmation of the might of the Italian people, a manifestation of the power of the people which traces its own origins to Rome and bears the triumphal and immortal insignia of the Roman lictors on the shores of the African sea. It is Destiny that is bringing us back to this land. No one can arrest Destiny and, above all, no one can break our impregnable will.¹

On the 15th April, 1926, on the point of departure from Tripoli, he said:

We are hungry for land because we are prolific and intend to remain so. . . . My visit is destined to have many profound repercussions on the spirit of the Italian people.²

When these pronouncements at Tripoli were followed by a war-scare in the European press, the Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Signor Grandi, gave those rumours an indignant *démenti* at a special reception of foreign newspaper correspondents at Rome;³ and in the Italian Chamber, next month, a reasoned and conciliatory explanation of Italy's eagerness for expansion was given by the President of the Budget Commission, Signor Andrea Torre.⁴

On the 24th May, 1926, however, at Genoa, Signor Mussolini said:

Yours is a powerful city, but that is not enough; more than that is needed. To stop still is bad. Stopping still means losing ground. The struggle between the nations is becoming more and more severe, notwithstanding certain hypocritical and cowardly pacifist creeds. Every people is erecting its own barriers of egoism and leaving no room any longer to the fictitious tie of international brotherhood. So we—O Genoese! O Italians—must set our teeth in this struggle, which to-day is merely economic and moral. We must make one block of all our wills, one chain of all our efforts; we must struggle day by day, and above all we must keep our courage even in the grey hours. . . .

I will tell you something more. Your trans-Atlantic vessels plough the ocean, but soon your airships must plough the skies.⁵ I want Genoa to fling herself toward the future with the impetus with which Balilla cast his stone. I want there to be a single heart, a single soul, a single will, straining, in the name of Fascismo, towards the future.⁶

In a speech delivered four days later, on the 28th, before the Senate

¹ The *Corriere della Sera*, 13th April, 1926; *Discorsi del 1926*, p. 137.

² The *Times*, 17th April, 1926; *Discorsi del 1926*, pp. 144-5.

³ See *Le Temps*, 24th and 25th April, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 25th April, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, 26th April, 1926.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 15th May, 1926.

⁵ It would appear from the context that Signor Mussolini was alluding here to commercial and not to military aviation.—A.J.T.

⁶ The *Corriere della Sera*, 25th May, 1926; *Discorsi del 1926*, pp. 182-4.

in Rome, the gist of certain passages of the Genoa speech was repeated, but this time with certain pacific qualifications:

I want here to make a very explicit declaration of a general character. The Honourable Barzilai was right in saying that one is always a Jacobin for somebody and likewise always an Imperialist for somebody else. And Italian policy has been suspected of Imperialism. . . . Italian Imperialism is primarily an expression of the dignity of the Italian people—moral dignity, I mean—as well as of the need for economic and mental expansion in the case of a nation which has arrived a little late. . . . Our Imperialism is non-existent in the sense of an aggressive, explosive Imperialism that is preparing for war. I must declare (not for your benefit, Honourable Senators, who follow the Government's foreign policy so closely, but for the benefit of the world, the whole world) that the Fascist Government follows, and can only follow, a policy of peace. It does not want to disturb peace, and it has proved this by deeds. . . . But to want peace does not mean to disarm. We must have an understanding on disarmament. Disarmament must be universal; otherwise it becomes a ridiculous comedy.¹

On the 23rd July, 1926, in the interview, already mentioned, with an American press correspondent, he was reported to have said:

We are thirsty for the power, for the riches and the prosperity so long denied us; but our Imperialism presents no threat to the world's peace. . . .

Our colonial aspirations do not constitute a menace for anyone. Italy asks only what is indispensable to her and what it is just that she have. It is certain that she will obtain fulfilment of these desires by a policy of peace and friendly agreements, since no nations would want to assume the grave responsibility of obstructing the achievement of such legitimate and, in reality, such unexcessive aspirations.²

On the 5th October, 1926, at Perugia, he gave a learned address on Ancient History³—upon the theme that the development of a sea power culminating in the naval command of the Mediterranean had been an indispensable factor in the establishment of the Roman Empire.

On the 11th October, 1926, he was reported to have said (in another interview with an American press correspondent):

Italy and Germany are the only two great countries in Europe which were left by the Peace Treaties without a place in the colonial sun; yet 'it was with the utmost emphasis that Mussolini insisted', in this interview, 'that all Italy's requirements, and even all her ambitions, could be fully satisfied by the methods of peace.'⁴

In a further interview given to an American correspondent in

¹ *The Corriere della Sera*, 28th May, 1926.

² *The New York Times*, 24th July, 1926.

³ Reported in the *Corriere della Sera*, 6th October, 1926; *Discorsi del 1926*, pp. 307-14.

⁴ *The New York Times*, 11th October, 1926.

December 1926, the pacific note was struck with studied emphasis once again.¹

In an interview given to a representative of the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna in January 1927, Signor Mussolini was reported to have given his blessing to the Austrian aspiration for union with the German *Reich* and at the same time to have spoken of Italian policy as follows:

We have to reckon with an international situation which has nothing poetic about it. By that I do not mean to say that Italy is going to attack any of her neighbours. Growth is a matter of evolution. We must have patience, as the English did. Nothing can be improvised in a hurry. Italy will expand by virtue of the slow and logical force of History. We must make the most of our natural tendencies to expansion—an expansion which will, I am convinced, be a peaceful one.²

Yet barely three months later, on the 26th May, 1927, in a solemn oration on 'the New Italian Unitary State' delivered before the Chamber, Signor Mussolini uttered words which suggested that both his patience and his peacefulness might be subject to a time limit of from eight to thirteen years:

The precise, fundamental and paramount duty of Fascist Italy is that of putting in a state of preparedness all her armed forces on land, on sea and in the air [*repeated and prolonged applause*]. We must be in a position, at a certain moment, to mobilise five million men, and we must be in a position to arm them. Our Navy must be reinforced and our Air Force—in which I have more and more faith—must be so numerous and so powerful that the roar of its engines should drown any other noise in the Peninsula and the span of its wings should hide the sun from our country.³ We shall be in a position then—to-morrow—when, between 1935 and 1940, we shall find ourselves at a point which I should call a crucial point in European history⁴—we shall be in a position to

¹ *Le Temps*, 19th December, 1926, quoting the Associated Press.

² The *Neue Freie Presse*, quoted in *Le Temps*, 31st January, 1927; see further *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st February, 1927.

³ This figure of speech was perhaps an unconscious reminiscence of a celebrated anecdote in Herodotus' account of the Battle of Thermopylae:

'Among the heroic Lacedaemonians and Thespians the greatest hero of all is said to have been the Spartan Dianeces. Before they came into action with the Medes, Dianeces is reported to have made a *mot* upon being informed by a Trachinian that when the Orientals discharged their artillery they hid the sun with the quantity of their arrows—so great were their numbers. Far from being dismayed at this intelligence, Dianeces (so the story goes) showed his contempt for the numbers of the Medes by remarking that the gentleman from Trachis was bringing them excellent news if the Orientals were going to be so obliging as to hide the sun in order that the Hellenes might be able to fight them in the shade and not in the glare.'

⁴ In French comments on this passage, it was noted that 1935 was the year in which, according to the Versailles Treaty, the evacuation of the Rhineland was to be completed, and further that from 1935 to 1940 the annual contin-

make our voice felt and to see, at last, our rights recognized [*vehement, repeated applause*].¹

The foregoing quotations, which are fairly representative of Signor Mussolini's public utterances, are sufficient to demonstrate that his intentions could not be inferred from his words. Not only did he speak with several tongues, but the same phrase was sometimes made to do different duties—for example, the catchword 'Latinity'. In an interview given to the representative of a French newspaper in February 1926,² shortly after his public controversy with the German Government over the treatment of the German population in the South Tirol,³ Signor Mussolini was reported to have said that—

the possibility of a common danger should increasingly bring together France and Italy, who were not divided by any serious question and who between them represented 80,000,000 inhabitants—as many as the German *bloc*. . . . If the Latin mass weakened or split, the balance disappeared.

Yet in April 1927 an Italian Ambassador, newly accredited to the Court of Madrid, declared in a statement to the press that Italy and Spain were 'the representatives of true Latinity' and that their fraternity was not a mere formula but was based upon realities—a statement which appeared to imply that the same things could not be said of Italian or Spanish relations with France. Finally, Signor Mussolini, on the 12th and 15th December, 1927, in his not unfriendly response to Monsieur Briand's overture of the 30th November, 1927, for a Franco-Italian understanding, deprecated any attempt to base such an understanding upon the common 'Latinity' of the two countries—and this on the common-sense ground that international understandings depended not upon sentimental appeals to kinship but upon a practical adjustment of conflicting interests.⁴

Leaving 'Latinity' and other phrases out of account, could Signor Mussolini's intentions be inferred from his actions, to which he himself repeatedly appealed? It was certainly true that during the five years that had elapsed between the march on Rome and the autumn of 1927 Signor Mussolini, whatever language he might have used, had always refrained, in the last resort, from breaking the peace of Europe ;

gents of conscripts to the French Army would be exceptionally low owing to the great falling off of the French birthrate during the General War of 1914-18 (*The Manchester Guardian*, 30th May, 1927, quoting *La Volonté* of Paris).

¹ The *Corriere della Sera*, 27th May, 1927.

² The *Petit Parisien*, as reported in *The Times*, 27th February, 1926.

³ For this question see Part II C, Section (iii), below.

⁴ Monsieur Briand's overture of the 30th November, 1927, and its sequel will be dealt with in a later volume.

and that he had even co-operated in the constructive work on behalf of European peace which was accomplished in 1925 at Locarno, without in return demanding for Italy any benefits of the kind which the Locarno Pact secured to France.¹ On the other hand, in any attempt to estimate whether Fascist Italy was likely to keep the peace in the future, it was impossible to ignore the existence of two danger zones—one in the western basin of the Mediterranean and the other in the south-eastern quarter of the Continent of Europe.

In the Western Mediterranean the cause of tension could be formulated briefly as follows: The Italians, a nation with a high rate of natural increase, had to subsist on a home territory which was almost destitute of mineral resources and on a colonial empire in Africa which offered neither an appreciable opening for Italian colonization nor an appreciable supply of tropical raw materials for Italian industry. At the same time the French, a nation which was already smaller in numbers than the Italian nation, and which had a low rate of natural increase, possessed a home territory which (since the 'dis-annexation' of Alsace-Lorraine) was one of the richest in Europe in mineral as well as agricultural resources² and a colonial empire in Africa which comprised not only an important part of the tropical belt of the continent but almost all the territory in North-West Africa which was suitable for colonization by Europeans. The difference between the pressures of population in France and in Italy respectively could be measured by the flow of migration from Italy to France during the years 1919-24.³ The difference between the openings for colonization in French and Italian North Africa could be measured by the fact that in 1921 there were 125,901 Italians living under the French flag in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (excluding the Spanish Zone) as against only 27,495 in the Italian colony of Libya.

The local effects of this Franco-Italian tension—in Tunisia, at Tangier, and in Europe (over the problem of Italian immigrants and Italian exiles in France)—are dealt with separately elsewhere;⁴ but

¹ See Signor Mussolini's speech of the 28th May, 1926, before the Italian Senate, in which he expounded his Locarno policy and explained why he had not sought to include in the Locarno Pact a guarantee for the Italian frontier on the Brenner. According to Herr Stresemann, in a speech delivered in the Reichstag on the 9th February, 1926 (see Part II C, Section (iii), below), Italy had tried at Locarno to secure a guarantee for the Brenner frontier, but had failed.

² The cultivable area of France was estimated at 97,130,068 acres as against a figure of 65,995,000 acres for Italy.

³ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 115-23, and the present part, Section (ii), below.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part II, Sections (ix) (Tangier) and (xi) (Tunisia); and the present part, Sections (ii) and (iii), below.

this Franco-Italian rivalry in the Western Mediterranean had wider political consequences. In the wider field Italy attempted to strengthen her position as against France both by entering into more intimate relations with Spain and Great Britain—the two other Powers represented in the Western Mediterranean—and also by entering into competition with France for influence among the states of South-Eastern Europe. This extension of Franco-Italian rivalry from the Western Mediterranean into South-Eastern Europe and its local effect there in increasing the tension between Italy and Jugoslavia over Albania are dealt with below.¹ In this place it may be convenient to notice the policy of Italy towards Spain and Great Britain.

On the 7th August, 1926, there was signed at Madrid—after negotiations which had been kept a secret from other countries—a 'treaty of friendship, conciliation and judicial settlement of the questions which might arise between the two countries'.² In general form this instrument resembled the bilateral treaties which Italy had already concluded with Switzerland and Czechoslovakia on the 20th September, 1924, and the 5th July, 1924, respectively, as well as the treaty which she was to conclude on the 29th December, 1926, with Germany; but these other instruments contained no provision corresponding to Article 13 of the Italo-Spanish treaty, which laid down that—

If one of the contracting parties, in spite of its [pacific]³ attitude, were to be attacked by a third Power, the other contracting party will observe neutrality during the whole duration of the conflict.⁴

Although the Italian Government declared officially that this treaty in no way prejudiced previous and higher obligations,⁵ the announcement of its signature excited a certain nervousness in France⁶—partly because it was sprung upon the world without warning, and partly because the announcement was preceded and followed by two declarations from the Marquis de Estella in which he reopened the question of Tangier (a question which, from the Italian point of view, had never been closed).⁷ Meanwhile, the new

¹ See Part II C, Sections (i) and (ii).

² Text in the *Corriere della Sera*, 17th August, 1926.

³ This word, which was absent from the Italian text, appeared in the Spanish text.

⁴ Compare the similar provisions in the Russo-Turkish treaty of the 17th December, 1925 (see *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 525), and in the Russo-German treaty of the 24th April, 1926 (see the present volume, Part II E, Section (iv)).

⁵ *The Times*, 11th August, 1926.

⁶ See the leading article in *Le Temps*, 11th August, 1926.

⁷ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 163 and 172-3.

treaty had no immediately perceptible effect upon the course of international relations in the Western Mediterranean; and within a year of its signature the feeling in Spain towards Italy was reported to be growing cool.¹

As for the relations between Italy and Great Britain, the meeting between Sir Austen Chamberlain and Signor Mussolini at Leghorn on the 30th September, 1926,² had much the same sequel as that between Sir Austen Chamberlain and the Marquis de Estella at Palma in Majorca on the 30th September, 1927. In both cases there was a tendency to minimize the political importance of the occasion on the British side and to magnify it on the other side. At Paris, on his way home, and again upon his arrival in London, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was at pains to have it stated³ that his meeting with Signor Mussolini had in no sense been a counter-move to the meeting between Monsieur Briand and Herr Stresemann at Thoiry;⁴ and on the 1st June, 1927, in the House of Commons at Westminster, in answer to a parliamentary question, he declared that there was 'no tacit or explicit understanding to support Italian claims except in respect of agreements regarding which papers' had 'been laid before the House'.

(ii) Italy, France and the Migration Problem (1925-7).⁵

In the *Survey for 1924* some account has been given of emigration from Italy and immigration into France between the peace settlement and the close of that year, and also of Italian and French policy in regard to the migration problem. In both countries there were notable changes of policy in the course of the next three years; and these changes affected not only the statistics of migration but the political situation. The effect on the political relations between Italy and France might be gauged by the fact that on the 1st January, 1925, nearly-one third of the foreigners then resident in France were

¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th June, 1927.

² For the meeting between Sir Austen Chamberlain and Signor Mussolini on the 30th September, 1926 (the fourth meeting between these two statesmen), see *The Times*, 1st October, 1926, and the Italian official *communiqué* in the *Corriere della Sera*, 1st October, 1926.

³ See *The Times*, 2nd October, and the *Corriere della Sera*, 5th October, 1926.

⁴ For the Thoiry conversation of the 17th September, 1926, see Part II A, pp. 109-14, above.

⁵ An interesting and objective review of the points for and against Italian migration into France, from the Italian and the French standpoint respectively, is given in an article entitled 'L'Emigrazione Italiana in Francia' by 'Fabiano' in *Caffaro* (Genoa), 10th August, 1926 (summary in International Labour Office, *Monthly Record of Migration*, November 1926, pp. 453-4).

estimated to be Italians,¹ and that this Italian colony in France accounted for about one-tenth of the estimated total of Italians resident abroad.²

By the date of the International Emigration Conference held at Rome, on the initiative of the Italian Government, in 1924,³ Italian emigration policy was entering on its third phase, which may be described as the 'political phase' in distinction from the 'negative phase' which had come to an end with the establishment of the Emigration Commissariat in 1901 and the 'social phase' represented by the work of the Commissariat during the twenty-six years of its existence before its abolition on the 6th May, 1927.⁴

The idea animating the Emigration Commissariat had been that, at any rate in a country from which the rate of emigration was as high as it was from Italy during the first quarter of the twentieth century, it was incumbent upon the state—not least, in its own interest—to do everything in its power on behalf of nationals who, whether temporarily or permanently, were led by economic pressure at home to seek a livelihood abroad; and the Italian Emigration Commissariat was in its day the greatest and most efficient national institution in the world for the discharge of this public obligation. In a quarter of a century it had done much for the Italian emigrant; and in benefiting him it incidentally benefited the countries of immigration by raising the standard of the Italian immigrants whom they received. Under this régime, emigration had become, by the eve of the General War of 1914–18, one of the major factors in the economic life of Italy; and Italians who, under existing economic conditions at home, might have been an incubus upon the national resources even at the lowest standard of living then prevailing in Italy, had been

¹ 807,659 Italians out of a total of 2,845,214 foreigners (see table on p. 210 of M. Paon, *L'Immigration en France* (Paris, 1926, Payot)).

² The Italian Commissariato Generale dell' Emigrazione estimated that total at more than eight millions (see *L'Emigrazione Italiana*, Pamphlet No. 2, Rome 1925).

³ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 123–7, especially p. 126.

⁴ For a record of the Commissariat's work during these years, see the following eleven publications:

La Legge e il Regolamento dell' Emigrazione (Il Testo Unico della Legge); La Legge e il Regolamento dell' Emigrazione (Il Regolamento); Il Commissariato Generale dell' Emigrazione (Origini-Funzioni-Attività); Il Fondo per l'Emigrazione (Costituzione e Gestione); L'Assistenza Igienico-Sanitaria agli Emigranti da parte dello Stato Italiano; La Preparazione Culturale e Professionale dell' Emigrante in Patria; La Valorizzazione dell' Emigrante per mezzo dei Contratti di Lavoro; Le Statistiche dell' Emigrazione Italiana; Accordi e Trattati di Lavoro dell' Italia con Altri Paesi; La Tutela giurisdizionale degli Emigranti; Il Contributo dell' Italia nella Discussione internazionale dei Problemi dell' Emigrazione.

able, by exporting their labour, not only to live on a higher standard themselves but to contribute materially towards balancing the foreign trade of Italy by their remittances. In this way the Italian emigrants had repaid the Italian State economically for the social work for their welfare which the state performed through the Emigration Commissariat.¹

Under the Fascist régime, however, the Italian Government began to look at the emigration problem more distinctly from a political point of view; and from this angle of vision the problem wore a rather different aspect. The previous policy of Italy had been to concentrate public effort first and foremost upon promoting the welfare of the individual emigrant by securing for him all possible openings abroad in which he could be assured of certain carefully safeguarded conditions. At the same time the consideration of the national interest in the matter had never been absent from the Italian Government's mind. After the revolution of 1923 the Italian Government became inclined to think first of the Fascist State and to regard the Italian emigrant who eventually became denationalized as a political loss to Italy, however much he might have improved his personal position or even have contributed, by remittances, to the general well-being of his country of origin. From this political point of view the Italian Government came to feel that, in the matter of emigration, there were only two tolerable alternatives. Either emigration must be carried on under conditions which would obviate denationalization, or it must be reduced to the smallest possible volume by enabling an increasing population to earn its livelihood at home. The former alternative depended almost entirely upon the attitude of the countries of immigration; and some of these countries had already begun to show a certain restiveness towards the emigration policy of the Italian Government, even before the establishment of the Fascist régime. Moreover, their peoples had mostly succumbed in some measure, since the General War, to that intensification of national consciousness of which Fascism itself was one manifestation, and therefore it was hardly likely that they would welcome Italian immigration on the Fascist Government's terms. The tentative suggestions in this direction which had been made by the Italian representatives at the Rome Conference in 1924 had met with an unfavourable response;² and there appears to have been only one recorded case,

¹ It should be noted that financially the Commissariat was not a charge upon the ordinary Italian budget but was paid for by special funds which came ultimately from the emigrants' pockets (the 'Fondo per l'Emigrazione').

² See *Survey for 1924*, p. 126.

between the dates of the Rome Conference and of the new departure in policy in 1927, in which the conjunction of political and economic conditions necessary for 'group colonization' was obtained.¹ Since the scheme in question (the Rio Negro settlement organized by the Italo-Argentine Colonization Company) only provided for a few hundred colonists, in spite of financial backing from a new organization called the Istituto Nazionale di Credito per il Lavoro Italiano all'Estero,² it was natural that the Italian Government should turn to its other alternative of keeping prospective emigrants at home.

The first step was the launching, in the autumn of 1925, of a 'Wheat Campaign' (*Battaglia del Grano*) with the declared objective of ultimately making Italy independent of the foreign wheat market by the intensification of production at home.³ The second step was the establishment, by a decree of the 10th March, 1926, of a Permanent Committee for Internal Migration, in order to encourage a flow of population from certain congested districts of the north to under-developed districts in the south and in the islands.⁴ Signor Mussolini, in a letter⁵ evoked from him in May 1927 by the presentation of reports from five sub-committees of this Internal Migration Committee, remarked that since 1921 Italy had lost, by excess of emigration over repatriation, a million souls; that 'urbanism' in Italy was assuming a more and more alarming aspect; that the birth-rate had fallen from 32 to 27 per thousand and in some provinces was

¹ See International Labour Office, *Monthly Record of Migration*, September 1926, pp. 353-4; and July 1927, p. 292. It should be noted that 'group colonization' was not in itself a new idea in Italy. Attempts of a similar kind had been made as far back as 1906-7.

² See *L'Emigrazione Italiana*, Pamphlet No. 2, pp. 39-41; International Labour Office, *Monthly Record of Migration*, May 1926, pp. 172-3, and September 1926, pp. 335-7.

³ Emphasis was laid on the idea that the increase in home production was to be obtained by intensive methods (use of artificial manures and of agricultural machinery, scientific education of the agricultural population, and emulation stimulated by public competitions) and not by an extension of the area of cultivation. The campaign was in the hands of a Technical Committee for Agriculture and a Permanent Grain Committee. For details see *The Times*, 23rd December, 1926, and a speech delivered by Signor Mussolini at Rome on the 10th October, 1926, when he gave away the prizes for the Second National Grain Competition (text in the *Corriere della Sera*, 12th October, 1926).

⁴ See International Labour Office, *Monthly Record of Migration*, May 1926, p. 173. These districts in the south were under-developed rather than under-populated. Indeed, at its existing level of development, the south was perhaps not much less over-populated than the north, as was indicated by the increasing quota contributed by the southern provinces to the annual contingent of Italian emigration during the decades immediately preceding the United States Immigration (Restriction) Act of 1924.

⁵ Text in the *Corriere della Sera*, 3rd May, 1927.

already inferior to that of France; and that 'Italy must be ruralized even if it cost milliards and took half a century'.

The third step was heralded by a debate in the Chamber on the 30th and 31st March, 1927,¹ in which the Emigration Commissariat was attacked on the two fold ground that its work had been ineffective and that it had had too free a hand.² 'In the course of this debate, Mr. Grandi, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, announced, in the name of the Prime Minister, that important changes would be made in the General Emigration Department [Commissariat] to bring it into harmony with the new Fascist principles in the matter of emigration. Emigration was no longer to be regarded as merely a fact of a technical and administrative nature, but as a problem of an essentially political character. Emigrants must no longer be regarded as a special class of persons as they had been in the past. In future, the term emigrant must be avoided and replaced by the expression "Italian citizen abroad". The General Emigration Department was to become a political organization, the work of which would be an integral part of the foreign policy of the Government. This reform was associated with the reorganization of the Italian diplomatic and consular services.' 'The speaker held that emigration should be regarded as an evil, when, as at present, it was directed towards foreign countries. The Prime Minister interrupted to remark that during the last five years Italy had lost 1,000,000 citizens by emigration. Mr. Grandi pointed out that isolated persons or small groups, particularly those belonging to social classes with slight resistance who set out to live in the midst of a foreign race, were bound to be assimilated by the latter. The Italian Government would therefore cease to encourage emigration in order to conserve the strength of the Italian nation. It was intolerable that the Italian race should continue to form a human reservoir for the replenishment of other nations with small or declining populations. Italy must look to the development of her own resources and energies, and since emigration was necessary, it must be directed permanently to Italian territories.'³ This announcement of policy was followed up on the 6th May, 1927,

¹ See International Labour Office, *Monthly Record of Migration*, May 1927, pp. 200-3.

² Under the old system the Emigration Commissariat had been practically a Ministry without responsibility; and since its own funds had been derived from the taxes on passports and on shipping companies and their agents' licences, it had been almost exempt from control of any sort. This had been felt to be undesirable in many respects; and it was said that one of the drawbacks had been a habit of extravagance.

³ Speech summarized in *Monthly Record of Migration*, loc. cit.

by the publication of a decree abolishing the Emigration Commissariat and placing all the organizations hitherto controlled by it under the authority of a new Directorate-General for Italians abroad which was to be attached to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and administered by an official of the Diplomatic and Consular Service.¹ The new policy was elaborated by Signor Mussolini himself in a speech delivered in the Chamber on the 26th May, 1927, and in a circular addressed to prefects of provinces, in which he said 'that, as manpower was one of the essential factors of the political, economic and moral power of nations, Italy must increase its population and endeavour to bring it up to 60 million souls during the second half of the present century. To achieve this object it was necessary not only to increase the birth-rate and reduce mortality, but also to restrict emigration, which impoverished the nation from the point of view both of quantity and of quality. When an Italian emigrant left his country, Italy, in exchange for a little gold subsequently sent by him from abroad, suffered the material loss of all that she had spent to nourish him, to educate him, and to make him a producer; from a military point of view she lost a soldier, while, from the point of view of population, she lost a youthful and strong element which would fertilize foreign lands and give his children to foreign countries.'² This speech, again, was followed up on the 20th June, 1927, by the issue of three official circulars announcing amendments to the regulations governing Italian emigration. These amendments, which came into force on the 1st September, 1927, provided that no Italian subject might be authorized to go abroad in order to work in any capacity whatever, to engage in retail commerce, or to join relatives, unless he had previously obtained a contract of service from his future employer or a letter from his relatives asking him to join them.³

The effects of this policy of the Italian Government⁴ are visible

¹ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

² *Op. cit.*, September 1927, p. 356.

³ See *op. cit.*, September 1927, p. 354. These documents had to be carefully examined and visaed by the Italian consuls in the country of destination, and they had also to be approved by the central and local authorities in Italy. An exception was made in the case of Italian emigration to the United States, since there immigration under contract was illegal.

⁴ The Italian Government's policy was not, of course, the exclusive cause of the tendency towards a diminution in the volume of Italian emigration during those years which these figures reveal. That tendency was also due in large measure to policies and events in other countries over which the Italian Government had no control: e.g. to the United States Immigration (Restriction) Act of 1924 and to the slackening of the special demand for labour in France as the work of reconstruction was gradually accomplished.

in the following statistics,¹ relating to the years 1924 to 1926 inclusive:²

	1924.	1925.	<i>Difference 1924-5.</i>	1926.	<i>Difference 1925-6.</i>
Emigration to oversea countries	137,517	114,301	— 23,216	119,055	+ 4,754
Emigration to non-over-sea countries	271,089	207,617	— 63,472	164,387	— 43,230
Total Emigration	408,606	321,918	— 86,688	283,442	— 38,476
Repatriation from over-sea countries	65,390	66,911	+ 1,521	64,104	— 2,807
Repatriation from non-oversea countries	107,421	122,160	+ 14,739	106,099	— 16,061
Total Repatriation	172,811	189,071	+ 16,260	170,203	— 18,868
Net emigration to over-sea countries	72,127	47,390	— 24,737	54,951	+ 7,561
Net emigration to non-oversea countries	163,668	85,457	— 78,211	58,288	— 27,169
Total net Emigration	235,795	132,847	— 102,948	113,239	— 19,608

The tendency of Italian emigration during those years to diminish, as shown by these figures, was noteworthy; but it was by no means certain either that the tendency could be maintained permanently or that, even if this were achieved, it would ease the political tension between Italy and France.

In regard to the first point, it was to be noted that the new Italian restriction of emigration policy, together with the scheme for internal colonization and the 'Wheat Campaign', had the appearance of a comprehensive attempt to turn Italy as far as possible into an isolated economic unit living in self-sufficiency on a closed system. Similar measures were indeed being taken by many countries besides Italy, and in so far as they aimed at developing the national resources to the greatest possible extent, they were not unsound economically. On the other hand, in so far as they aimed at setting up closed national systems, they flew in the face of the general economic tendency of the time, which was setting strongly and rapidly towards the replacement of local units by the world unit in most of the more important

¹ Taken from the *Monthly Record of Migration*, April 1926, pp. 142-6; and June 1927, pp. 264-8.

² For figures relating to Italian emigration in earlier years see *Survey for 1924*, pp. 84, 89, 107-8, 115.

branches of economic activity.¹ It seemed doubtful whether this general tendency could be resisted in the long run by any single country, even by a country with such vast economic resources as the United States—not to speak of Italy, with her dearth of minerals at home and her lack of a colonial empire which could provide her to any appreciable extent either with a field for emigration under the Italian flag or with supplies of tropical raw materials for her home manufactures.

In regard to the second point, it might have seemed at first sight as though the political tension between Italy and France could hardly fail to be eased by the Italian Government's decision to discourage Italian emigration to territories under the French flag. It must be noted, however, that the ground of this decision was not resignation to the existing territorial *status quo* but a determination to keep the whole increment of the Italian population Italian at any cost; and it is probable that the inauguration of the new policy was precipitated by the efforts which France had by then begun to make for the assimilation of the immigrants who had been pouring into her home territory since the termination of the General War of 1914–18. At any rate, the measures taken by the French Government to this end, which are recorded below, evoked hostile criticism in Italy in view of their possible effect upon the future of the 800,000 Italians who had already established themselves in France before the flow of Italian emigration to France began to slacken.²

Meanwhile, during these same three years 1925–7, French immigration policy had been undergoing a change corresponding to the change in Italian emigration policy—in the sense that, here too, economic and social considerations tended to give place to political.

Immediately after the termination of the General War of 1914–18, France had experienced an acute shortage of labour owing to two causes, one permanent and the other temporary. The permanent cause was, of course, the destruction of life in the General War which had reduced the population of France by two millions³—a loss which

¹ This general economic tendency was recognized in the economic and financial work of the League of Nations, and it is only fair to note that Italy took her share in this work, for example, in the Geneva Economic Conference of 1927.

² It was not altogether easy in this matter to ascertain what was cause and what was effect. The French maintained that their measures for the assimilation of immigrants were largely evoked by what was regarded as an interference on Italy's part with the sovereign rights of France, particularly by attempts made to assert the control of the Italian Government over Italians living in France.

³ The 'legal population' of France was 39,604,992 according to the census

could not be made good by natural increase in a population in which the excess of births over deaths was an almost negligible quantity.¹ The temporary cause was the post-war expansion of French industry owing to a cumulation of factors: the development of water-power, the re-incorporation in the French economic system of the 'dis-annexed' departments, with their minerals and textiles, the impulse given by the work of reconstruction in the devastated areas, and finally the fall of the French franc which stimulated the French export trade.² In these circumstances French employers of labour had first drawn upon the rural population of France and then, when this supply failed them,³ had supplemented it from abroad. The economic motive had been paramount; and the French Government had assisted the French employers to attain their economic ends by collaborating with the countries of emigration in safeguarding the immigrants' social welfare;⁴ but, in France as in Italy, the political aspect of the migration problem eventually came to the fore. The change of attitude was already discernible in the latter part of the year 1924⁵ and asserted itself decisively during the three following years. The reasons for this change were partly negative and partly positive. The negative reason was the falling off in the economic demand for labour resulting from the substantial completion of the work of reconstruction and from the virtual stabilization of the French franc with the consequent restriction of the foreign market for French manufactures. The positive reason was the formidable numerical strength which the foreign elements in France had by that time attained, the tendency of certain foreign nationalities in certain districts of France, both urban and rural, to settle in compact communities, and the prospect that certain vital economic activities might pass to a large extent into these foreign hands.

of 1911 and 37,499,769 (excluding the 'dis-annexed' departments) according to the census of 1921.

¹ On this whole question see Paon, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-75.

² See *The Times*, 10th December, 1925.

³ See Paon, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-8. In 1921 the urban population of France was 18,205,492 (an advance of nearly ten million on the urban population of 1846) and the rural population 21,004,026 (a decrease of nearly six million on the rural population of 1846). The rural population was estimated to have fallen to less than 50 per cent. of the total by the end of 1925 (*The Times*, 10th December, 1925).

⁴ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 117-22, for the Franco-Polish and Franco-Italian Conventions of 1919 and the Franco-Czechoslovak Convention of 1920. In 1926 the Spanish Minister of Labour expressed a desire for a Franco-Spanish Convention on the same pattern (*Le Temps*, 17th August, 1926).

⁵ *Survey for 1924*, p. 122.

The following figures and facts speak for themselves:

*Foreigners resident in France on the 1st January, 1925, arranged according to nationality.*¹

Americans (North) . . .	49,414	Luxembourgers . . .	36,798
Americans (South) . . .	11,394	Ottomans . . .	20,108
Austrians . . .	5,384	Poles . . .	310,265
Belgians . . .	460,352	Portuguese . . .	35,386
British . . .	84,116	Rumanians . . .	24,381
Bulgarians . . .	2,874	Russians . . .	91,461
Czechoslovaks . . .	39,591	Scandinavians . . .	11,908
Dutch . . .	14,727	Serbs, Croats and	
Germans . . .	64,597	Slovenes . . .	20,555
Greeks . . .	25,073	Spanish . . .	467,156
Hungarians . . .	15,577	Swiss . . .	146,273
Italians . . .	807,659	Various . . .	102,165
			2,845,214

The impression made upon the French mind by this great influx of foreigners was heightened by the fact that it was unevenly distributed. In 1921 no less than 803,759 foreigners out of the 1,500,000 then resident in France were concentrated in eight departments and two-thirds of the total in nineteen. The chief areas of foreign settlement were the Mediterranean littoral, the industrial districts of the north and north-east, the neighbourhood of the two chief routes across the Pyrenees, and the two industrial districts of which Paris and Lyons were the foci.² The greatest alarm was caused by the formation of compact groups of foreigners, under the influence of their respective Governments, in various districts and in various occupations, and especially by the settlement of foreign agriculturists—Swiss, Belgians and above all North Italians³—in five rural departments of the South-West⁴ where the local French population had diminished by more than half a million in less than a hundred years.⁵

¹ Information supplied by the Ministry of the Interior (*Journal Officiel* of the 4th December, 1925). These figures are probably not exact, but they give a general idea of the facts.

² Paon, *op. cit.*, pp. 180–1. See also *The Times*, 10th December, 1925.

³ Particularly the so-called Colonia Bergamasca, consisting of a group of families from the district of Bergamo. There were complaints from this group that the French authorities had refused permission for the opening of Italian schools, even in certain villages where the Italian school children were actually more numerous than the French.

⁴ Dordogne, Gers, Lot-et-Garonne, Tarn-et-Garonne, Lot.

⁵ Paon, pp. 183–7. This foreign influx had been preceded by a movement for the internal colonization of these departments from Brittany which had been encouraged by the French Government since 1921. By 1926 the number of foreigners established in these departments does not appear to have exceeded 40,000 and it was doubtful whether French public opinion was right in feeling that foreigners settled on the land would be less easy to assimilate than

Nationals of Other Countries working in France who entered France between 1921 and 1925 arranged according to Nationality.

	1921		1922		1923		1924		1925		TOTAL 1921 to 1925.
	Agricul- ture.	Industry and Com- merce.	Agricul- ture.	Industry and Com- merce.	Agricul- ture.	Industry and Com- merce.	Agricul- ture.	Industry and Com- merce.	Agricul- ture.	Industry and Com- merce.	
Italians	4,682	7,160	7,704	49,495	10,542	103,013	15,274	83,881	13,263	41,768	336,782
Poles	2,241	9,345	9,097	28,370	25,797	31,447	17,749	23,265	13,080	17,554	177,945
Spanish	27,166	1,537	39,773	6,652	23,319	7,517	24,762	6,695	15,514	3,787	156,722
Belgians	20,737	5,947	13,293	11,533	9,190	25,107	15,732	23,779	21,354	25,433	172,105
Portuguese	996	45	2,078	6,671	4,067	7,976	7,503	6,715	2,227	3,781	42,059
Czechoslovaks	—	—	—	886	3,224	1,265	5,939	4,401	3,313	2,814	21,842
Russians	—	256	—	2,780	—	3,344	—	3,592	260	1,655	11,887
Various	—	1,672	1,051	16,008	932	14,824	968	21,939	2,773	7,685	67,852
	55,822	25,962	72,996	122,395	77,071	194,493	87,927	174,267	71,784	104,477	987,194

The change of attitude towards the migration problem which these various factors produced in France was well formulated in the following sentences written in 1926 by Monsieur Albert Thomas:

All the action which was taken before the War and during the War aimed essentially at supplementing the industrial labour supply; and to-day there are many people who still believe that this ought to be the objective of an immigration policy. . . . Now it does not seem that from the standpoint of French [national] interests at this time the problem can be stated in such terms. . . . The real issue is 'the maintenance of the numerical value of our population and the safeguarding of the position of France in the world'.¹ The French birth-rate is low. It will be able only very slowly to fill the enormous gap which has been made in the population of France by the slaughter of the War. Any effort for an increase in the birth-rate—assuming that it is really possible to take effective action in this sphere—can only have distant results. Certain and rapid results can only be secured by systematic immigration. Therefore the increase of the population of the country as a whole rather than a temporary reinforcement of the labour supply is the purpose for which foreign elements ought to be systematically introduced. . . . [And] the three proper principles for a French immigration policy are clear. Immigration must be controlled and organised; it must tend to reinforce the population of France; and it must be, above all, rural.²

In the field of public affairs, the first indication of this new attitude was the passage through the French Chamber and Senate of an Act for the protection of the French labour market, which was promulgated on the 11th August, 1926. The purpose of this Act was to regulate the employment of foreign workers in France by restraining them from being employed at all unless they had obtained a special identity card, or from being employed in any occupation other than that for which they had been originally engaged, or from being engaged by a second employer before the contract of employment in respect of which they had obtained permission to enter France had actually expired.³ It should be noted that the rigour of the Act was mitigated by far-reaching exceptions. For example, it did not apply to foreign workers who had been resident in France for more than a year.⁴

The next step was the passage through the Senate (on the 3rd those concentrated in industrial areas. For the public interest which these foreign agricultural settlements in the South-West actually excited, see *The Times*, 13th October, 1925, and the *Corriere della Sera*, 1st December, 1925.

¹ Quoted from an article in *La Revue des Sciences Politiques*, July–September 1925, by Monsieur Morellet.

² Quoted from Monsieur Albert Thomas's preface to Paon, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–13.

³ International Labour Office, *Monthly Record of Migration*, September 1926, p. 335.

⁴ For an Italian criticism of this Act, see a series of articles by Signor Francesco Coletti in the *Corriere della Sera*, 11th, 21st and 30th July, 1926.

December, 1925) and the Chamber (on the 7th April, 1927) of a new Nationality Bill which eventually became law on the 10th August, 1927, and was promulgated on the 14th.¹ The most significant clauses in this Law were Article 6, which enabled foreigners of 18 years and upwards to become naturalized as French citizens if they could prove that they had been continuously resident in France for three years (instead of ten years, as under the previous legislation which the new law replaced), or for one year in the case of foreigners with certain specified qualifications; and Article 9, which made naturalized French citizens subject to the loss of their citizenship if convicted of having evaded their obligations of military service or performed acts contrary to the security and the interests of the French State.² The new law was interpreted in a circular addressed to prefects of departments by the Minister of Justice.³ This third step in the action taken by the French Government for coping with the immigration problem on its political side aroused fresh protests in the Italian press.

(iii) Italy, France and the Italian Exiles.

In a previous section of this part⁴ some account has been given of the foreign policy of Italy under the Fascist régime and of the feeling towards France which it appeared to imply. The root of this feeling was a belief that the French Empire in North-West Africa and the French system of alliances in Eastern Europe were the principal obstacles that stood in the way of Italy finding her 'place in the sun'.

This belief was already rankling in the minds of the Italian people before Signor Mussolini marched on Rome in October 1922. That this was so is proved by the fact that the series of demonstrations and incidents in which the anti-French feeling in Italy found vent had started more than a year before the date of the Fascist Revolution.⁵ At the same time there is no doubt that the change of régime in Italy was followed by a heightening of the tension between Italy and France; and for this there were two reasons: first the militant temper which Fascism deliberately cultivated, and second the flight or ex-

¹ For the passage of this Act see *Le Temps*, 14th August, 1927; for the text see *ibid.*, 15th August, 1927.

² There were further features in the Act which evoked protests abroad, particularly in Italy, for example, the provisions regarding the nationality of French women married to foreigners and of their children, and the lowering of the fees exacted from foreigners who wished to become naturalized.

³ *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 13th August, 1927.

⁴ Section (i), above.

⁵ It was averred, however, that the Fascisti were the organizers of the outbreak of the 23rd September, 1921, at Venice, which is recorded below.

pulsion from Italy of considerable numbers of Italians who had not reconciled themselves to the new order. These Italian exiles, like the contemporary Spanish and Catalan exiles,¹ tended to settle in France as the nearest foreign country with liberal institutions and with a tradition of hospitality to political refugees;² and on this question French public opinion was unanimous (irrespective of the different attitudes towards Fascism of the different political parties). It was felt that France was in honour bound not to deviate from her tradition to the detriment of foreign exiles who, on the strength of it, had sought asylum in French territory—especially when any new departure of the kind might be interpreted as being the result of pressure exerted upon the French Government from abroad. The Fascisti were not disposed to accept this explanation of French policy, and were inclined to suspect private French political organizations, and sometimes the French authorities, of using the Italian exiles in France as political tools. Thus the French attitude in regard to the Italian exiles gave a further stimulus to anti-French feeling among the Fascisti; and that feeling rose to a dangerous pitch of intensity when it appeared that some exiles had been abusing their asylum in France by making it a base for underground operations against the security of the Fascist régime in Italy and against the life of the ‘Duce’. On the other side, indignation was aroused in France by the revelation of underground machinations conducted by the Italian police on French soil which came to light through the sensational exposure of Colonel Ricciotti Garibaldi. The situation became critical during the four months between the attempt on Signor Mussolini’s life which was made by Lucetti—an Italian who had been resident in France—on the 11th September, 1926, and the Maciá-Garibaldi trial of the 20th January, 1927.³ Thereafter the tension gradually diminished until, on the 30th November, 1927, Monsieur Briand (who throughout had shown a statesmanlike determination to prevent a breach) felt that the time was ripe for taking a positive step towards a Franco-Italian understanding.

The first incident which gave serious warning of the dangers latent in Franco-Italian relations was a hostile demonstration on the 23rd

¹ See Section (iv), below.

² Some of the Italian exiles found their way to Great Britain; but there the cost of living was higher for them than it was in France and the way of life more alien. The same barriers tended to prevent the Italian exiles from finding their way to the United States, and here there was the additional obstacle of the Quota System. The French authorities seem also to have been less exacting than their *confrères* in Great Britain and the United States in the matter of passport formalities.

³ See Section (iv), below.

September, 1921, in the Piazza di San Marco at Venice, against the members of a French mission (including Monsieur Barrère, at that time French Ambassador in Rome, and Marshal Fayolle) which was visiting Italy, on the invitation of the Italian Government, in order to celebrate the companionship-in-arms of French and Italian troops on Italian soil during the General War.¹ The Italian Government dismissed the local inspector of police and the Italian press expressed regret and indignation; but, hardly two months later, on the 25th November, 1921, the French consulate at Naples was assailed by a mob, and the consulate at Turin sacked, on the strength of a false report that, at the Washington Conference, Monsieur Briand had made an insulting reference to the Italian Army.² The Italian Ambassador in Paris apologized next day,³ and a conciliatory reference to the incident was made by Monsieur Briand himself in the French Chamber on the 12th December.⁴ A year later, in December 1922, there occurred the first frontier incident, which appears to have arisen over the pursuit of certain Italian Communists into French territory by a band of Fascisti.⁵ There was a respite from incidents during the next three years; and it was hoped that the improvement in Franco-Italian relations might be consolidated by Italy's participation in the conference and Pact of Locarno;⁶ but Locarno failed to produce this effect, for by the close of 1925 the tension was increasing again. The French public was disquieted by alleged claims, on the part of Fascist demonstrators and Fascist newspapers, to Nice, Savoy and Corsica;⁷ and on the other side an Italian animus against France was revealed when the French were held to account in Italy for a demonstration of journalists against Signor Mussolini at Locarno in which representatives of all nations were concerned.⁸

Owing to the disproportionate size of the Italian community in

¹ For this incident see *The Times*, 26th September, 1921.

² *Ibid.*, 26th November, 1921. The report appears to have figured in an article by a French journalist ('Pertinax') in a French newspaper (the *Echo de Paris*), though of course this may not have been the ultimate source of it.

³ *The Times*, 28th November, 1921.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 13th December, 1921.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 30th December, 1922.

⁶ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part I A, Sections (ii) and (iii).

⁷ *The Corriere della Sera*, 16th September, 1925; the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24th December, 1925.

⁸ *Le Temps*, 23rd October, 1925. The journalists had rejected an invitation from Signor Mussolini, as a protest against the suppression of the liberty of the press in Italy. There seems to have been no evidence that, in this protest, French journalists took the lead, for a number of French journalists, representing the Press of the Right, attended Signor Mussolini's reception, whereas all the English journalists present, with one exception, absented themselves.

France, the French Government and people had more cause than others to be disturbed by the terms of the following Italian 'Anti-Émigré-Act' which received the royal assent on the 29th January, 1926:

Citizenship is lost by a citizen who commits or takes part in the commission abroad of an act intended to disturb the public order of the kingdom, or from which harm to Italian interests, the good name and prestige of Italy may accrue, even if that act be not a crime. . . . Together with loss of citizenship, sequestration of property may be ordered, and in more grave cases its confiscation. The decree which orders the sequestration of property will also determine its duration as well as the destination of the income derived from such property. In the event of the owner of such property becoming a citizen of a foreign country at a later date, he loses his right to such property, whether it be confiscated or sequestered. The loss of citizenship also implies loss of titles, salaries or other dignities due to the former citizenship. The loss of citizenship declared according to the terms of this law does not in any way prejudice the status of the husband or wife or son of a former citizen.¹

This law was put into force against fifteen Italian émigrés² by a royal decree of the 1st October, 1926.

Meanwhile, in the spring of 1926, attempts to encourage a better state of feeling were made by statesmen in both countries. In the French Chamber, on the 23rd April, Monsieur Briand—replying to an interpellation from a Socialist deputy regarding certain recent utterances of Signor Mussolini's—expressed a discerning sympathy for the special difficulties of the Italians as a growing nation and a lively desire for collaboration between Italy and France;³ and on the 27th April speeches of friendship were exchanged at Rome between Monsieur Barthou and Signor Tittoni⁴ (who announced, in Signor Mussolini's name, a formula of Italian aspirations⁵ which approximated closely to that interpretation of them which had been given by Monsieur Briand a few days before); but on the 11th September these efforts were undone by an attempt on Signor Mussolini's life at the hands of an Italian named Lucetti, who had made his way across the frontier from France, where he had been living since 1923.⁶ Though there was no evidence that the French police had been remiss in their surveillance of Lucetti or that the French public felt any sympathy for his criminal design, there were hostile demonstrations

¹ *The Times*, 29th January, 1926.

² List in the *Corriere della Sera*, 2nd October, 1926.

³ See report and comments *ibid.*, 24th April, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 28th April, 1926.

⁵ *The Times*, 28th April, 1926.

⁶ For details of Lucetti's life in France, see *Le Temps*, 16th September, 1926.

against the French consulates at Leghorn, Venice and Trieste,¹ while an unfounded report of a further insult at Leghorn to the French flag evoked a hostile demonstration against the Italian consulate at Bastia in Corsica.² After each of these incidents, the French and Italian Governments, by turns, duly protested and duly apologized to one another;³ and on the 13th September Monsieur Briand tried to save the situation by a consultation at Geneva with the Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Signor Grandi;⁴ but the position had already been prejudiced by a somewhat violent public reference, on Signor Mussolini's part, to the asylum accorded to the Italian exiles in France;⁵ and a campaign in the Italian press⁶ for the expulsion of the exiles by the French Government led to an elaborate and unfriendly debate on the right of asylum in principle.⁷ On the 19th September, however, Signor Mussolini received the French Ambassador in Rome;⁸ and on the 26th October Monsieur Briand had another conversation—this time with Baron Avezzana, the Italian Ambassador in Paris.⁹ Thereafter the idea of a Franco-Italian *entente*, as the basis for a 'Latin bloc' in international politics, was thrown out in the French and taken up with a certain interest in the Italian press.¹⁰ At the beginning of October the French Government had, in fact, given proof of goodwill in the shape of a circular¹¹ to prefects of departments from the Minister of the Interior instructing them to take more stringent measures to restrain foreigners resident in France from indulging in political agitation; but these various endeavours to bring about a *détente* were frustrated by another series of incidents which followed a fresh attempt on the life of Signor Mussolini—on the 31st October, 1926, at Bologna.

On the 1st November at Ventimiglia—a town on the Riviera, on the Italian side of the Franco-Italian frontier—a band of Fascisti broke into a hostel occupied by employees of the French P.L.M.

¹ *Le Temps*, 16th, 17th and 22nd September, 1926.

² *The Corriere della Sera*, 21st September, 1926.

³ *Le Temps*, 16th, 17th and 22nd September, 1926; the *Corriere della Sera*, 29th September, 1926.

⁴ *The Corriere della Sera*, 14th September, 1926.

⁵ See *The Times*, 13th September, 1926.

⁶ See, for example, the *Corriere della Sera*, 16th September, 1926.

⁷ See, for example, an article in *Le Temps* of the 4th November, 1926, and a rejoinder in the *Corriere della Sera* of the 6th November, 1926.

⁸ *The Times*, 20th September, 1926.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 28th October, 1926.

¹⁰ See, for example, the *Corriere della Sera*, 29th, 30th and 31st October, and 19th November, 1926; *The New York Times*, 6th November, 1926; *Le Temps*, 14th November, 1926.

¹¹ Text in *Le Temps*, 7th October, 1926.

Railway Company and mishandled the inmates in reprisal for discourtesy alleged to have been shown by French railwaymen towards a Fascist demonstration which had been taking place in the piazza in front of the railway station. This assault on the nationals of a friendly country was aggravated by the fact that the place in which it occurred possessed an extra-territorial status (in virtue of a Franco-Italian Convention of 1879, which had conferred an identical status upon the two railway stations of Ventimiglia, on the Riviera line, in Italian territory, and Modane, on the Mont Cénis line, in French territory).¹ To add insult to injury a Fascista (bearing the French name of Cauvin) forced his way into the French consulate at Ventimiglia and succeeded in waving an Italian flag and shouting a Fascist war-cry from the balcony before he was arrested by the Italian police.² On the French side of the frontier, at Beausoleil, blows were exchanged between processions of French and Italian ex-service men on their way to perform ceremonies at the local cemetery.³ On the other hand, the ex-service men of the two nationalities fraternized at Nice.⁴ At the same time, the news of the attempt on Signor Mussolini's life at Bologna had been the signal, in the Italian colony of Libya, for violent demonstrations against the French consulates at Tripoli and Benghazi.⁵ This time French public feeling was aroused; and prompt but informal French protests and Italian apologies for these incidents did not absolve the French Ambassador in Rome from the duty of presenting his protest a second time in formal terms.⁶ This *démarche* elicited not only a second apology from Signor Grandi⁷ but two written replies from Signor Mussolini.⁸ Further, on the 8th November, 1926, Monsieur Briand received the Italian Ambassador in Paris and spoke to him in strong terms on the subject of the Ventimiglia, Tripoli and Benghazi incidents and also of the Garibaldi affair, which is dealt with below.⁹ Thereafter, at Ventimiglia, the over-zealous Cauvin was duly arrested and put on trial;¹⁰ and at

¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th November, 1926.

² For a neutral version of this incident see *The Times*, 3rd November, 1926; for a French version, *Le Temps*, 3rd and 4th November, 1926; for an Italian version, the *Corriere della Sera*, 4th November, 1926.

³ *The Times*, 4th November, 1926.

⁴ *The Times*, *loc. cit.* These Italian ex-service men at Nice were anti-Fascists.

⁵ *Le Temps*, 4th November, 1926; *The Times*, 10th November, 1926.

⁶ *Le Temps*, 6th and 7th November, 1926.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 8th November, 1926.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 10th November, 1926.

⁹ See the French and Italian *communiqués* on this interview in *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 11th November, 1926. The difference between these two *communiqués* is entertaining as well as instructive.

¹⁰ *Le Temps*, 13th November, 1926.

Rome Signor Mussolini made a conciliatory statement in an interview with Monsieur Sauerwein of *Le Matin*:

I may say that these anti-French demonstrations are on the decrease. Those which took place on the occasion of the last attempt [on my life] were much less serious than those which occurred at Leghorn on the occasion of the preceding attempt. On this [last] occasion the only demonstrations that amounted to a real violation of a French consulate were those at Tripoli.

I do not say this in order to minimise the gravity of this kind of incident. Whatever the circumstances may be, I consider this kind of incident absolutely scandalous and intolerable and am filled with personal disgust by it. I have not only taken measures of extreme severity but I have given orders of such a nature as to rule out the repetition of anything of the kind. This I can guarantee. . . . Such aberrations are to be accounted for by the immense emotion which is produced throughout the country by serious attempts against my person.

Why, you will ask, is popular indignation directed especially against France? On this matter I have already formed my own opinion. It is because France appears in the light of the Promised Land of all conspirators against the Fascist régime. I know very well that the right of asylum is a weighty argument, and I myself accord this right . . . but the right of asylum must not be confused with the abuse of it. . . .

I do not doubt that, after these painful but really by no means irreparable incidents, we can enter upon a period of excellent relations with France. . . . Briand's policy has been consistently inspired by an intelligent and sympathetic comprehension of Italy's needs and aspirations.¹

In this statement, however, Signor Mussolini made no reference to the other affair which had created a more painful impression in France than the incidents at Ventimiglia, Tripoli and Benghazi.

About the 21st October, the French Sûreté Générale (at the instance, apparently, of the Italian police) had examined in Paris an Italian resident named Scivoli, who was an employee in the business house of another Italian *émigré*, Signor Santo Garibaldi (a grandson of the famous Giuseppe Garibaldi). Scivoli apparently admitted that he had just returned from Nice, where he had been visiting his employer's brother, Colonel Ricciotti Garibaldi—a leading figure among the Italian *émigrés* in France, who during the General War had served in the Garibaldian Legion in the Argonne and had been made a Commandant of the Legion of Honour. It appeared that Scivoli had intended to cross the Italian frontier with letters from Colonel Garibaldi to persons in Italy (supposed by Scivoli to be opponents of the Fascist régime, as Scivoli was himself and as he and his fellow exiles in France believed Colonel Garibaldi to be likewise); but his

¹ Quoted from the *Corriere della Sera*, 16th November, 1926.

passport had not been in order and he had therefore temporarily returned to Paris, leaving the passport in Colonel Garibaldi's hands. At Nice, on the 24th, the French police examined another Italian who had just arrived from the other side of the frontier and who purported to be a Florentine business-man. This person proved to be a high official of the Italian police, Commendatore La Polla, travelling with a false passport. The French police granted a request from La Polla that he might be allowed to stay in Nice a few hours longer, and observed with surprise that he employed the time in meeting Colonel Garibaldi, who was supposed to be one of the leading opponents of the Government which La Polla served. When they searched La Polla's luggage, they were still more surprised to find in it Scivoli's passport together with six additional photographs.¹ Suspicion thus fell upon Colonel Garibaldi on two separate accounts, and this at the very moment when Italian exiles known to have been in relations with Colonel Garibaldi were arrested among Colonel Maciá's followers in the abortive raid into Catalonia.² Accordingly, on the 5th November, Colonel Garibaldi was conducted by French police officers from Nice to Paris; and the indignation against him among the Italian *émigrés* had already risen to such a pitch that it was found advisable for him to leave the train at a suburban station and complete the journey by car. Thereafter, he was cross-examined and confronted with Colonel Maciá and with Scivoli, and his papers were searched. Among them were discovered Scivoli's passport (which had thus found its way back, though without the additional photographs, into Garibaldi's hands from La Polla's) and also, so it was reported, certain documents which proved Garibaldi to have been in relations not only with Colonel Maciá, the organizer of the Catalan plot,³ but with Lucetti, the Italian *émigré* who had returned from France to Italy and made an attempt on Signor Mussolini's life in September. In fact, Garibaldi was exposed as having acted, among the *émigrés* in

¹ According to an Italian version of the story it would appear that the obtaining of a photograph of Scivoli was the object of La Polla's visit to France—the Italian police having been informed that Scivoli intended to cross the frontier in order to make an attempt on the life of Signor Mussolini, and therefore desiring to identify and arrest Scivoli at the frontier. This version leaves certain points unexplained. For example, if Scivoli was proposing to have his passport put in order, he presumably proposed to present it at the frontier in the ordinary way and thus declare his identity to the Italian frontier authorities. Again, there is no explanation of why La Polla entered France without the knowledge of the French police and under false colours; for it was evident that the French police as well as the Italian police were concerned to prevent Italian *émigrés* from using French territory as a base of operations for criminal activities?

² See Section (iv), below.

³ See Section (iv), below.

France, the part of an *agent provocateur*. He apparently confessed to having received 400,000 lire from La Polla from first to last—the latest instalment of 100,000 on the 24th October.¹

The trial, conviction and expulsion of Ricciotti Garibaldi from France—nominally on the charge of having been unlawfully in the possession of arms—are recorded below in connexion with the history of the Catalan plot. Meanwhile, in the interview between Monsieur Briand and Baron Avezzana on the 8th November, 1926, which has been mentioned above, Monsieur Briand, 'in the matter of the Garibaldi affair, [had] felt it his duty to call Baron Romano Avezzana's earnest attention to the dangers which may result from police operations conducted in this fashion.'²

On the 30th November a sedative speech³ was delivered by Monsieur Briand in the French Chamber; and in the course of December an equally conciliatory and pacific statement was made by Signor Mussolini to a representative of the American Associated Press.⁴ An increase in the French garrisons in the neighbourhood of the Italian frontier was explained by the French Minister of War as being largely due to reorganization necessitated by the recent return of troops in large numbers from Morocco.⁵ Several mysterious crimes of violence which occurred during the same month, partly in Italian and partly in French territory, and in which it was supposed that Italian exiles were concerned, passed off without political consequences.⁶

The year 1927 was happily distinguished from its predecessor by an abatement of Franco-Italian incidents, though not by a complete absence of them.⁷ In January, for example, the activities of another

¹ For the Ricciotti Garibaldi affair see *The New York Times*, 5th and 6th November, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, 6th November, 1926; *The Times*, 6th November 1926; *Le Temps*, 6th November, 1926; the *Corriere della Sera*, 7th November, 1926.

² French *communiqué* in *Le Temps*, 11th November, 1926. According to the Italian *communiqué* the two statesmen 'arrived at the conclusion that it [the Garibaldi affair] reduces itself to a simple police affair to which it would be a mistake to attribute an exaggerated importance'.

³ Well reported in the *Corriere della Sera*, 1st December, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 18th December, 1926.

⁵ *The Times*, 9th and 14th December, 1926. A hostile interpretation of French troop movements may be found in the *Corriere della Sera*, 6th May, 1927.

⁶ For these crimes see *The Times*, *Le Temps* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 9th December, 1926; the *Corriere della Sera*, 10th, 11th and 14th December, 1926; *The Times*, 11th and 14th December, 1926; the *Corriere della Sera*, 16th December, 1926; *The Times*, 18th December, 1926.

⁷ There were indications that false or exaggerated reports of incidents were sometimes deliberately spread by agencies which desired that Franco-Italian

Italian *agent provocateur* at Nice were brought to the attention of the French police by an Italian exile whom he was attempting to inveigle into Italy. The investigation resulted in the expulsion from France not only of the *agent provocateur*, Signor Newton Canovi, himself, but of the editor of an Italian Fascist newspaper published at Nice, Signor Torre, who was found to have been Canovi's paymaster.¹ There were also several incidents on the Franco-Italian frontier. For example, in July, the French Ambassador in Rome had occasion to present two official protests. The first was on behalf of certain inhabitants of the French canton of Lanslebourg who owned chalets and rights of pasturage on the Italian side of the frontier—in territory which had formed part of their commune before the Franco-Italian frontier was drawn along the watershed of the Mont Cénis Range by the treaty of 1861, after Savoy had been ceded by Sardinia to France. The people of Lanslebourg, after becoming French citizens, had retained their property in this territory which had not passed to France, and were in the habit of spending the summer months there. In the year 1927, however, from the 27th June onwards for upwards of a fortnight, they were ordered by the Italian military authorities to evacuate their chalets and remain in the open, with their children and cattle, out of range of the fire of the Italian artillery, which was practising in this territory with live shell. This infliction of hardship on French citizens was regarded as an unfriendly act, even though the Italian authorities might be acting within their rights.² The second protest was evoked by the trespass (apparently inadvertent) of an Italian officer and thirty soldiers on French soil.³ In July likewise, an Italian carabinieri was reported to have fired at two Italian workmen who were walking within range of him on the French side of the frontier;⁴ and some person unknown was found to have painted all over, with the Italian colours, a frontier-post near Briançon.⁵ In August a person attempting illegally to pass the frontier from the French side was reported to have been shot dead by a Fascist militiaman whose challenge he had ignored.⁶ These frontier incidents were as childish, and as fraught with dangerous possibilities, as those

relations should not improve. For an instance, see a letter from Commendatore L. Villari in *The Morning Post*, 21st February, 1927.

¹ For this incident see *The Times*, 24th January, 1927; *Le Temps*, 24th January, 1927; *The Times*, 25th and 26th January, 1927.

² For this incident see *The Times*, 5th July, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 6th July, 1927; *Le Temps*, 7th July, 1927.

³ *Le Temps* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 9th July, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 5th July, 1927.

⁵ *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th July, 1927.

⁶ *The Times*, 18th August, 1927.

which had occurred on the Italo-Swiss frontier in 1924¹ and on the Italo-Yugoslav frontier during the period preceding the temporary *détente* of that year.²

It must be added that in both France and Italy legislation was passed in 1927 which was unwelcome to the other country. The French Nationality Bill became law on the 10th August, 1927.³ On that very date an Italian decree extended to Italian citizens resident abroad the benefit of an Italian law of the 24th December, 1925, for compensating Italian citizens injured or killed in the national cause (or their relatives, as the case might be); and in October 1927 Signor Mussolini himself presented a bill to the Italian Parliament for converting this decree into a law.⁴ Again, not only France but all countries belonging to the League of Nations were startled by the enactment, in April 1927, of an Italian law which not only prohibited Italian subjects from taking service with a foreign Government or with an international public institution of a political character without the previous consent of the Italian Government but empowered that Government to withdraw such consent at any time without giving its reasons and made all these provisions applicable retrospectively.⁵ Nevertheless, the relations between France and Italy improved during this year to such an extent that at the end of November 1927 Monsieur Briand felt that the time was ripe for an attempt at a positive understanding. The history of this overture and its consequences will be dealt with in a future volume.

(iv) France, Spain and the Catalan Conspiracy.

The friction between Italy and France and the symptoms of a *rapprochement* between Italy and Spain, which have been recorded above, imported into Franco-Spanish relations an element of anxiety to which these would hardly have given rise in themselves if Italian policy in the Western Mediterranean had not entered into the situation. Towards the end of the year 1926 the possible bearing of Franco-Italian and Franco-Spanish relations upon each other was illustrated in a rather sensational way by the simultaneous trial, on the same charge and before the same French court, of an Italian and

¹ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 405-7.

² See *op. cit.*, p. 422.

³ See p. 136, above.

⁴ The *Corriere della Sera*, 22nd October, 1927. Presumably this legislation was meant to cover such cases as that of Signor Nicola Bonservizi, the Paris correspondent of the *Popolo d'Italia*, who was shot in Paris on the 20th February, 1924, and died of his wounds some days later. The assassin appears to have been condemned to eight years' imprisonment.

⁵ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th April, 1927.

a Spanish subject, both of whom had left their own countries for political reasons and had taken up their residence in France. The Spanish subject was the Catalan Separatist, Colonel Maciá, who had been arrested in the act of attempting to start a Catalan rising against the Spanish Government from a base of operations on the French side of the Franco-Spanish frontier. The Italian subject was Colonel Ricciotti Garibaldi (a grandson of the famous Giuseppe), who had admittedly been in relations with Colonel Maciá. Though eventually cleared of active participation in (as distinct from cognizance of) the Catalan plot, Colonel Garibaldi was proved to have acted towards his fellow exiles from Italy who had found asylum in France as an *agent provocateur* of the Italian Ministry of the Interior.¹

Franco-Spanish relations had been dominated since 1904 by the question of Morocco; and in a previous volume² it has been recorded how in 1925 the two Powers had been driven, by the military prowess and diplomatic maladroitness of 'Abdu'l-Karīm, into overcoming a local estrangement which by that time had lasted, off and on, for twenty years, in order to co-operate for the joint defence of their vital interests. Within less than a year after the Franco-Spanish Morocco Agreement of July 1925,³ this co-operation had borne fruit in the overthrow and elimination of the common enemy; but the very completeness of that joint success weakened the incentive for the repression of those mutual jealousies and discontents which in twenty years had become habitual on both sides. It has been mentioned already⁴ that when the Marquis de Estella came to Paris in July 1926 in order to set his signature to a further Franco-Spanish agreement concerning matters that had arisen out of the common victory, he took this occasion to make a public statement foreshadowing an intention to reopen the question of Tangier, and that a month later, in another public statement delivered at Madrid, he put forward an explicit, and almost peremptory, claim that Tangier should be incorporated in the Spanish Zone. The history of the stubborn and dilatory Franco-Spanish negotiations which eventually followed from this reopening of the Tangier question on the Spanish Government's part will be recorded in a later volume, together with the steps taken by the Italian Government to emphasize its own claim that the Tangier question should not be settled without Italy being taken into consultation.

This revival of the controversy over Tangier in large measure undid

¹ For the Garibaldi affair see Section (iii), above.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part II, Section (vii).

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 140-5.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

that improvement in Franco-Spanish relations which had been brought about temporarily by the concerted action against the Rifis; and the Moroccan question was not the only source of friction. On his visit to Paris in July 1926 the Marquis de Estella had met with an ostentatiously hostile reception from the people of that city, who viewed him not as the representative of an associated Power who had come to set the seal upon a common victory over a redoubtable opponent, but as the embodiment of a reactionary régime whose presence in the capital of the French Republic and official participation in the national fête which commemorated the taking of the Bastille was almost an insult to French democracy.¹ Furthermore, even before the collapse of the Rifi resistance, another possibility of friction had been introduced into the relations between the two associated Powers in quite a different field. On the 16th April, 1926, on the eve of the Wajdā Conference,² the Franco-Spanish commercial convention of the 8th July, 1922, had been denounced, as from the coming 15th July, by the Spanish Government³ in protest against a temporary increase in the French customs tariff of which the French Government had given notice in the preceding February as a measure necessitated by the depreciation of the franc.⁴ It is true that negotiations for a fresh agreement were immediately put in train and that the term of the existing convention was prolonged for a month⁵ in order to give time for a conference of experts to meet in Paris and negotiate a fresh agreement, which was duly signed, on the 14th August, by Monsieur Briand and Señor Quiñones de León.⁶ Nevertheless, there remained outstanding a controversy over a point of interpretation which disturbed Franco-Spanish diplomatic relations and hampered Franco-Spanish trade until the close of that year.⁷ In May 1927 an attempt to establish more cordial relations on the economic plane was made on the French side. A French trade exhibition was organized at Madrid, and this gave the French Minister of Commerce, Monsieur Bokanowski, an opportunity to visit Madrid and Barcelona.⁸ Meanwhile, the political relations between France and Spain had been complicated by a fresh incident—in this case arising not over Morocco but over Catalonia.

This Franco-Spanish incident, like several of the Franco-Italian incidents which have been recorded in the preceding section, arose

¹ *Le Temps* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th July, 1926.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 157–60.

³ *Le Temps*, 21st April, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 22nd April, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 29th June, 1926.

⁶ *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 17th August, 1926.

⁷ *Le Temps*, 25th and 31st December, 1926.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 23rd, 25th and 27th May, 1927.

out of the presence in France of political refugees. In Spain, as in Italy, the establishment of a dictatorial Government had been followed by the flight or banishment of the opponents of the new régime in considerable numbers; and the exiles from Spain included Catalan nationalists as well as Castilian liberals. A republican and democratic France could hardly be expected to renounce an honourable tradition in deference to Governments recently set up in neighbouring countries on bases of which French opinion disapproved.¹ On the other hand it was evidently the international duty of the French authorities to take reasonable precautions in order to prevent foreign refugees to whom they had given asylum from using French territory as a base of operations against Governments with which the French Government was officially on a friendly footing. The efficiency with which such precautions had in fact been taken by the French police was demonstrated in November 1926 when an attempt to raid Spain from the French side of the frontier was made by an organization of Catalan separatists resident in France.

The head of this organization was an ex-member of the Spanish Parliament, Colonel Francisco Maciá, who had been expelled from Spain by the Directory and had established himself first at Perpignan. At the time of the Vera and Barcelona 'shooting incidents' of the 6th November, 1924,² Colonel Maciá was already alleged to be preparing a force of *émigrés* for an armed descent upon Catalonia, and twenty-three armed Spaniards were then reported to have been arrested by the French authorities at Perpignan in the act of making

¹ The right of France to grant asylum to foreign refugees was frankly recognized by the Marquis de Estella in an open letter published in September 1926 in reply to complaints, made by Spanish refugees, regarding alleged activities of Spanish police agents on French soil. The Marquis denied the truth of this accusation and at the same time paid a tribute to the French police for their loyal endeavours to prevent French territory from being made a base of operations for conspiracies against the Spanish Directory (*The Times*, 18th September, 1926; *Le Temps*, 19th September, 1926). In addition to the Catalan nationalist refugees in France there was also a colony of Spanish liberal refugees, among them being Señor Blasco Ibañez (see *Le Temps*, 3rd December, 1924).

² On the 6th November, 1924, one 'shooting incident' took place at Barcelona between the police and a party of syndicalists and another at Vera—a Navarrese village on the Spanish side of the Franco-Spanish frontier—between the Spanish civil guards and a party of armed men who had crossed the frontier from France. Two of the Barcelona rioters and two of the Vera raiders were eventually put to death (see *The Times*, 10th, 11th and 15th November, 5th and 9th December, 1924; *Le Temps*, 12th November, 1924). On the 10th November a member of the Spanish Directory, Admiral Magaz, declared publicly that the Vera raid had been organized by Catalan separatists (*The Times*, 11th November, 1924).

their way towards the frontier.¹ Thereafter Colonel Maciá left the frontier zone at the request of the French authorities and took up his quarters in Paris; ² but he did not abandon his design of precipitating a national insurrection in Catalonia by a raid of *émigrés* from the French side of the frontier.³ In the earlier part of the year 1926 he visited Russia, but apparently he declined assistance on the Russian terms, which were that he should promote communist propaganda. He had no objection, he was said to have declared, to communist propaganda in Spain, but Catalonia was another matter.⁴ In September 1926 he decided to shoot his bolt and set about recruiting his force; and over this he came into relations with Colonel Ricciotti Garibaldi.⁵ An Italian *émigré*, Signor Arturo Rizzoli, had spontaneously offered his services to Colonel Maciá for raising an Italian contingent, and had referred him to Colonel Garibaldi, under whom he (Rizzoli) had served in the Garibaldian Legion during the War of 1914-18. Garibaldi had replied to a letter from Maciá, inquiring into Rizzoli's character, by paying Maciá a personal visit in Paris about the middle of October; and on this occasion Maciá appears to have taken him into his confidence, so that Garibaldi was at any rate privy to, if not an accomplice in, the Catalan plot.⁶

The procedure was first to secrete stores of arms and munitions in

¹ See two reports to this effect, one from Madrid and the other from Barcelona, in *The Times*, 10th November, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 4th March, 1926.

³ For the history of Colonel Maciá's conspiracy see especially *The Times*, 4th November, 1926; *Le Temps*, 4th, 5th and 6th November, 1926, and 21st January, 1927. Such tactics—which seemed naïve in 1926, when political conspirators had been placed at an almost hopeless disadvantage owing to the command which the police then possessed over modern means of communication—were part of the nineteenth-century revolutionary tradition of the Latin peoples, both in the Old World and in the New. For example, the Kingdom of the two Sicilies had been won for Italian nationalism by a series of forlorn hopes culminating in the victorious raid of Giuseppe Garibaldi and his Thousand; and probably this tradition exercised an influence over Colonel Maciá's mind, particularly in his relations with his fellow *émigré*, Ricciotti Garibaldi, the great guerrilla's grandson.

⁴ *The Times*, 9th November, 1926; *Le Temps*, 10th November, 1926.

⁵ This point was brought out during the subsequent trial (*Le Temps*, 21st January, 1927).

⁶ On this point see the cross-examination of Garibaldi in the subsequent trial, as reported in *Le Temps*, 4th December, 1926. There seems to have been no evidence that any part of the large sums which were accepted by Colonel Garibaldi from the Italian Ministry of the Interior (see Section (iii), above) ever found its way into Colonel Maciá's pocket (see *The Times*, 8th November, 1926). According to his own statement to the French authorities, as reported in a *communiqué* from the French *Sûreté Générale* (*Le Temps*, 6th November, 1926), his funds had come partly from Catalans in America and partly from his own private means.

out-of-the-way places just on the French side of the Franco-Spanish frontier and then to bring the raiders down from Paris in small parties to the neighbourhood under the guise of tourists. The party was to be concentrated, armed and led across the frontier under cover of night; but the proceedings never went that far, for the French police were cognizant of the plot at an earlier date than Colonel Garibaldi. On the 2nd November, 93 conspicuous and self-conscious 'tourists' were peaceably arrested as they detrained at various points between Perpignan and Bordeaux; Colonel Maciá himself and his 'staff' were taken next day in a lonely farm at Prats-de-Mollo; by the 6th November there had been arrested in all, in the Department of Les Pyrénées Orientales, 102 Catalans and 21 Italians;¹ and, one by one, the secreted stores of arms and munitions were brought to light.

This sensational frustration of the Catalan plot was immediately followed by those still more sensational revelations regarding the relations of Colonel Garibaldi with the Italian Ministry of the Interior which have been recorded above.² Garibaldi was arrested on the 4th November,³ brought to Paris next day,⁴ and confronted with Maciá on the 13th November.⁵ On the same day the French Government decided to prosecute; and on the 14th the *Procureur de la République* drew up a *réquisitoire* in which Maciá, Garibaldi and 27 others were charged with having been unlawfully in possession of arms and explosives.⁶ It is to be noted that, although Garibaldi was thus placed on his trial, this was done ostensibly on the ground of his possible implication in the Catalan plot and not on the ground of his activities (of which he stood self-confessed) as an *agent provocateur* of the Italian Ministry of the Interior.⁷ Eventually 18 persons were brought to trial; and the proceedings, which opened on the 20th January, 1927,⁸ ended on the 22nd in the conviction of all the accused.⁹ Maciá and Garibaldi were each sentenced to two months' imprisonment and 100 francs fine, the others to one month's imprisonment and 50 francs fine. The period of detention before trial being reckoned into the term of imprisonment, the latter was regarded in all cases as having already been served; and immediately

¹ *Communiqué* from the French *Sûreté Générale*, cited above.

² See Section (iii), above.

³ *The Corriere della Sera*, 5th November, 1926.

⁴ *The New York Times*, 6th November, 1926.

⁵ *The Times*, 15th November, 1926.

⁶ *Le Temps*, 14th November, 1926.

⁷ *The Times*, 15th November, 1926.

⁸ See *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 21st January, 1927.

⁹ *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 24th January, 1927.

after the sentence was passed the Minister of the Interior issued an order for the prisoners' deportation. The trial gave an opportunity to Colonel Maciá for making an appeal to the world on behalf of the Catalan cause and to the French Government for publicly unmasking those relations between Garibaldi and the Italian Ministry of the Interior which had been omitted from the formal charge. Since Garibaldi was acquitted of complicity with the Catalans—the arms and explosives that gave the formal ground for his conviction were not Colonel Maciá's stores in the Pyrenees but certain weapons found in Garibaldi's own villa at Nice which according to his own account were 'war mementoes'—his activities as an *agent provocateur* were in fact, though not in law, the ground on which he was condemned. The French public did not conceal either its detestation of Garibaldi or its sympathy for Colonel Maciá and his Catalan followers; and the French Government intimated that it drew a similar moral distinction by allowing Garibaldi only three days to remove himself from France, whereas the Catalans were given a month to put their affairs in order.

The Maciá-Garibaldi affair apparently did not have any untoward effect upon Franco-Spanish relations. The action of the French police had been so efficient and the attitude of the French Government so correct that the Spanish Directory could entertain no sense of grievance, while Spanish public opinion did not seem to resent the French expressions of sympathy for the hero of the Catalan plot. On the other hand, the affair distinctly deepened the shadow which had overcast the relations between France and Italy; for when Garibaldi's cognizance of the Catalan plot became known simultaneously with his role as an *agent provocateur*, a conjecture became current that he had not only instigated Maciá but had done so at the instance of his employers—not because they either desired or expected the Catalan plot to succeed, but because they would have liked to see France and Spain embroiled with one another by an abortive incursion into Spain of raiders from French territory.¹ The acquittal of Garibaldi on the charge of active complicity in the Catalan plot seemed to indicate that this interpretation of his dealings with Maciá was too sinister. Nevertheless, the incident left a painful impression on French minds.

¹ See, for example, an article in *Le Temps*, 8th November, 1926, from its Spanish correspondent at Madrid, and a statement given to an interviewer by Señor Ibañez (*ibid.*, 6th November, 1926).

PART II

EUROPE

C. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

(i) Italian and French Policy in South-Eastern Europe

IN the preceding part of this volume some account has been given of the tension between Italy and France which manifested itself during the years 1926 and 1927, and of the local causes of this tension which were to be found in South-Western Europe and in North-West Africa. In passing on to the affairs of South-Eastern Europe during the year 1927, with which the present part is concerned, it may be convenient at the outset to indicate how an estrangement between two Great Powers which had arisen in another field extended its range into South-Eastern Europe and threatened there to translate itself into a competition for political hegemony.

The introduction of this extraneous political factor into South-East European affairs had unfortunate effects. It tended in the first place to arrest the process of consolidation, appeasement and reconstruction which on the whole had been going forward in this distracted region—in spite of perpetual checks and relapses—since the termination of the General War of 1914–18. It also tended once again to turn the local troubles of South-Eastern Europe into a danger to the peace of Europe in general. Indeed, one of the most disquieting features in the situation thus created was its outward resemblance to the situation during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1914. Italy and France seemed to be assuming in South-Eastern Europe the roles which Russia and Austria-Hungary had played there in a previous act; and if, under these rival influences, the states of South-Eastern Europe were to align themselves once again into two hostile camps (an alignment which answered only too well to their own local feuds), it was to be feared that the schism might spread over other parts of the Continent and eventually produce another disaster like that of July 1914.

The most striking change for the worse in South-Eastern Europe was to be observed in the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. When an agreement between these two Powers regarding Fiume had been concluded on the 27th January, 1924, and had been reinforced by the simultaneous signature of a pact of friendship

and cordial co-operation,¹ there had seemed to be no reason why Italo-Yugoslav relations should not be maintained thenceforward on a permanent basis of mutual confidence and goodwill; and a marked improvement was, on the whole, apparent during the next three years.² On the Yugoslav side the leading advocate of a good understanding between the two countries was Monsieur Ninčić, who had been Minister for Foreign Affairs since the 24th December, 1921, and Monsieur Ninčić showed his sincerity by doing everything in his power to prevent the older and firmer friendship between Yugoslavia and France from compromising the more recent and more precarious relations between Yugoslavia and Italy. Monsieur Ninčić's policy in this matter was made possible by the concurrence of the French Government itself, which took a statesmanlike view of the situation. For example, the signature of a Franco-Yugoslav treaty of amity and arbitration, upon which agreement had been reached as a result of negotiations during the winter of 1925-6, was postponed by the common consent of the two parties pending a definite settlement between Yugoslavia and Italy;³ and thereafter Monsieur Ninčić took the opportunity of his visit to Rome in February 1926⁴ in order to propose to Signor Mussolini the conclusion of a tripartite pact in which the existing Italo-Yugoslav pact and the prospective Franco-Yugoslav pact would be crowned and consolidated.⁵ Had such a pact been achieved, it might have done as much to assure peace in the Adriatic as the Pact of Locarno had done to assure it in the Rhineland; and, in addition to that, it might have checked in good time the incipient competition between Italy and France for hegemony in the South-East European area. Unhappily, 'the suggestion was not favourably received at Rome'.⁶ 'For obvious reasons', as Signor Mussolini afterwards declared,⁷ 'the proposal could not be accepted,' and this rebuff marked a turning-point in South-East European affairs.

On the one side, the first consequence was the definitive drafting and initialling of the text of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty during Monsieur Ninčić's visit to Paris after the extraordinary session of the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva in March

¹ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 440, 442, 447-9, 451-2.

² See *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 250, and *Survey for 1926*, pp. 161-3.

³ Statement by Monsieur Ninčić on the 9th November, 1927 (*Le Temps*, 10th November, 1927). See also *The Times*, 8th and 12th November, 1927, for the history of this treaty.

⁴ See *Survey for 1926*, p. 162.

⁵ Statement by Monsieur Ninčić cited above.

⁶ Monsieur Ninčić, *loc. cit.*

⁷ Statement made by Signor Mussolini on the 15th December, 1927, to the Council of Ministers (*The Manchester Guardian*, 16th December, 1927).

1926.¹ It may be noted in anticipation that this instrument (as appeared when it was eventually signed and published more than a year and a half later)² was distinguished from earlier French treaties of the kind (for example, from the Franco-Czech treaty of the 25th January, 1924)³ by the almost ostentatious care with which its terms were fitted into the framework of the League of Nations. Moreover, even after the text had been initialled, 'the act of signature was still postponed, since the idea of achieving a tripartite agreement or an Italo-Yugoslav agreement in completion of the agreement which had now been made between Yugoslavia and France had not been abandoned.' It was merely agreed between the Yugoslav and French Governments 'that the treaty should be signed whenever one of the two parties expressed the desire'.⁴ Meanwhile, on the Italian side, a 'forward policy' in South-Eastern Europe was pursued energetically during the remainder of the year 1926 and during the whole of the year 1927.

The first steps in that policy have been recorded in the preceding volume: for example, the *rapprochement* between Italy and Greece which was signalized in March 1926 by the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister to Rome;⁵ the financial alleviations and facilities which were accorded, from May 1926 onwards, by Italy to Rumania;⁶ the signature of an Italo-Rumanian pact of friendship and cordial collaboration on the 16th September, 1926;⁷ the reception of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister in Rome in October 1926;⁸ and the opening, in the same month, of Italo-Hungarian negotiations regarding an outlet for Hungary on the Adriatic.⁹ On the French side, the only fresh political move, before the long-delayed signature of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty (which eventually took place on the 11th November, 1927) was the conclusion of a Franco-Rumanian treaty of guarantee on the 10th June, 1926;¹⁰ and this treaty was drawn, on the same pattern as the Franco-Yugoslav treaty, with meticulous regard for the Covenant of the League of Nations.¹¹

¹ Monsieur Ninčić, *loc. cit.*

² The text is reprinted in the appendix to the present volume.

³ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 441-6, 448-9, 451-2.

⁴ Monsieur Ninčić, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Survey for 1926*, p. 160.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 157-8.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 158-9.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 161.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 156.

¹¹ The text of the Franco-Rumanian treaty of the 10th June, 1926 (reprinted in the appendix to the *Survey for 1926*), was published in January 1927. The text of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty signed on the 11th November, 1927 (reprinted in the appendix to the present volume), was published in November 1927.

The second stage in Signor Mussolini's 'forward policy' in South-Eastern Europe was opened by the signature at Tirana, on the 27th November, 1926, of a treaty between Italy and Albania—a step which made the Italian rejection of Monsieur Ninčić's conciliatory policy so patent that Monsieur Ninčić replied to it by resigning the conduct of Yugoslav foreign policy into other hands. The antecedents and the sequel of the Italo-Albanian treaty of the 27th November, 1926, are dealt with in a separate section below.¹

Meanwhile Italy, while directing her main efforts towards Albania, did not neglect opportunities to improve her footing in other South-East European countries. On the 26th January, 1927, for example, an Italo-Rumanian conference with a view to the conclusion of a commercial treaty was opened in Rome;² and on the 18th July, 1927, ratifications of the Italo-Rumanian Pact of the 16th September, 1926, were exchanged.³ On the 3rd October, 1927, King Boris of Bulgaria, who was travelling incognito in Western Europe, had a conversation in Rome with Signor Mussolini⁴—a meeting which was invested in both the Italian and the foreign press with more significance than appeared warrantable in view of the fact that King Boris had also been visiting Paris and London in the course of the same tour.⁵ On the other hand, there was undoubtedly considerable political significance in the visit which the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Bethlen, paid to Rome on the 4th April, 1927.

This visit was officially declared to have arisen out of those Italo-Hungarian conversations regarding a Hungarian outlet on the Adriatic which had been opened in October 1926. In the preceding volume it has been suggested⁶ that, on the Italian side, this move had been determined by a previous offer of a free port to Hungary on the part of Yugoslavia. Since the termination of the General War of 1914–18 the port of Spalato—which in the peace settlement had passed into the undisputed possession of Yugoslavia—had been linked up by a standard-gauge railway with both Zagreb and Belgrade; and after the settlement of the Fiume question in January 1924 the Yugoslav Government had concentrated its energies upon developing Spalato to the relative neglect of Šušak (the extreme south-eastern corner of the

¹ Section (ii) of this part.

² The *Corriere della Sera*, 27th January, 1927. The negotiations seem to have been subsequently interrupted pending the working out of a new Rumanian tariff (*ibid.*, 5th May, 1927).

³ *Ibid.*, 19th July, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 4th October, 1927.

⁵ A rumour that negotiations were on foot for the betrothal of King Boris to Princess Giovanna of Savoy received an official *démenti* (*Le Temps*, 10th October, 1927).

⁶ See *Survey for 1926*, p. 161.

port of Fiume, which the final settlement had left on the Yugoslav side of the frontier).¹ On economic grounds Jugoslavia was naturally anxious to secure for the favoured port of Spalato the transit trade from the Hungarian hinterland;² and the political relations between Hungary and Jugoslavia—which had improved more rapidly than those between Hungary and the other two members of the Little Entente³—were not unfavourable to an economic agreement. Indeed, the Yugoslav offer to Hungary of an outlet at Spalato seems to have been followed up in September 1926 by conversations between Monsieur Ninčić and Count Bethlen with a view to the conclusion of an arbitration treaty between their respective countries;⁴ and a Hungaro-Yugoslav treaty of this kind seems to have been already drawn and initialled⁵ before the 5th April, 1927, when (on the occasion of Count Bethlen's visit to Rome) a Hungaro-Italian treaty of amity and arbitration was signed simultaneously with an exchange of notes regarding an economic outlet for Hungary at Fiume.

The Italian victory in this competition between Italian and Yugoslav diplomacy for the goodwill of Hungary was not surprising, since all the advantages were on the Italian side. In the first place Fiume was more attractive than Spalato to Hungary as an outlet on the Adriatic—partly because it was nearer to Budapest, partly because it was a better equipped port, and partly for the reason (which had its practical as well as its sentimental side) that the port of Fiume and the railway linking it to Budapest had been constructed during the pre-war period by the Hungarian State.⁶ In the second place, if an economic agreement over an outlet for Hungary on the Adriatic was to lead on to a general political understanding with the country in whose territory the Hungarian economic outlet lay, then, on political grounds, an understanding with Italy was preferable to an understanding with Jugoslavia from the Magyar point of view. On the sentimental plane, the fact that Jugoslavia was less obnoxious to the Magyars than were the other members of the Little Entente did not

¹ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 410 *seqq.*

² See *The Times*, 10th January, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th January, 1927; the *Corriere della Sera*, 16th January and 9th February, 1927.

³ This relatively rapid improvement in Hungaro-Yugoslav relations was due to the fact that the frontier established by the Treaty of Trianon between Hungary and Jugoslavia was a comparatively 'natural' frontier except in the former 'Banat of Temesvar'; and even in this sector the Magyar minority on the Yugoslav side of the line was comparatively small.

⁴ The *Corriere della Sera*, 16th January, 1927.

⁵ *The Times*, 6th April, 1927.

⁶ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 6th April, 1927, for the considerations in the mind of the Hungarian Government.

mean that the Magyars had come to feel any positive affection for her, whereas they had had no quarrel with Italy either before or during the General War and could recall (if it suited the policy of the moment) the fraternization of the Magyar and Italian peoples in 1848-9. On the practical plane, again, a friendship with Italy seemed more likely to conduce towards the attainment of an object which the majority of the Magyar people had not ceased to cherish in their hearts when the Hungarian Government had been compelled solemnly to renounce it on paper, namely, the eventual restoration of the pre-war frontiers of Hungary, or at least the reunion with Hungary of the Magyar populations subjected by the peace treaties to the rule of the 'successor states' in districts immediately adjoining the new frontiers. This aim could never be countenanced by Yugoslavia, even if the Magyars were to go the length of renouncing it so far as Yugoslav territory was concerned, owing to the political solidarity between Yugoslavia and the other members of the Little Entente—a solidarity which was the foundation of Yugoslav foreign policy. On the other hand, Italy, in her opportunist pursuit of a policy of hegemony in South-Eastern Europe, appeared, to the somewhat sanguine vision of the Magyars, to be more likely to open a door for the realization of Magyar 'irredentist' ambitions, without regard to the fact that Italy was bidding for the friendship of Rumania simultaneously.

Italian diplomacy made the most of the opportunity presented by this state of mind in Hungary; and when it was announced in January 1927 that Count Bethlen was likely to visit Rome in connexion with the negotiations regarding Fiume, speculations on the possibility that the visit might have more important results of a political character immediately began to appear in the press.¹ On the 15th March the Hungarian Minister of Public Instruction arrived in Rome and was entertained at an official banquet next day.² A few days later the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs officially announced that Count Bethlen was shortly to visit Signor Mussolini in Rome and declared that the opportunity would probably be taken for concluding not only an agreement regarding Fiume but a Hungaro-Italian pact of amity and arbitration.³ On the 29th March Count Bethlen himself was reported to have made the following statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Chamber:

The development of the situation in Central Europe depends now no longer solely upon France but also upon the influence of various other

¹ See, for example, *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th January, 1927.

² *The Corriere della Sera*, 16th and 17th March, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 25th March, 1927.

states. Hungary must seize every opportunity for establishing sincere relations of friendship with those neighbouring countries that are disposed to do the same with her, and with those Great Powers, Italy first and foremost, whose interests are identical with hers. But friendship between Hungary and her neighbours can only come into existence on condition that on their side there is a fundamental change in their policy towards minorities. From the conclusion of peace onwards a more and more friendly atmosphere for Hungary has been in process of creation abroad; and for this we recognize how much we owe to England.¹

Count Bethlen arrived in Rome on the 4th April, 1927.² A Hungaro-Italian treaty of amity and arbitration³ was signed by the two Prime Ministers next day;⁴ and simultaneously notes⁵ were exchanged confirming the terms of a *procès-verbal* regarding Hungarian trade through the port of Fiume which had been signed (likewise at Rome) on the 17th March. In this exchange of notes it was agreed that the points of detail envisaged in this *procès-verbal* should be settled in the near future by a conference of technical experts. This conference duly met, and the resulting agreements were signed on the 25th July.⁶ On the 25th November, 1927, further Hungaro-Italian negotiations were opened at Rome for the improvement and completion of the existing commercial conventions,⁷ and on the 10th December a convention was signed providing for the amicable settlement of various questions still outstanding between the two countries.

The ceremony at Rome on the 4th April, 1927, was evidently staged with an eye to effect.

To-day [Signor Mussolini declared in a speech delivered at a state banquet that evening]⁸ the new Italy feels herself spiritually akin to a people which has preserved intact the antique virtues and has given proof of such a tenacious vitality. To-day, more than ever, Italy is watching, with satisfaction and with faith, the progress of Hungary towards that better future which she so well deserves.

Count Bethlen replied with an enthusiastic eulogy of Fascism and all its works.

In an interview given to the *Giornale d'Italia* on the same day,⁹

¹ *Ibid.*, 30th March, 1927. For a further statement by Count Bethlen on the eve of his departure for Rome, see *ibid.*, 2nd April, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, and *The Times*, 5th April, 1927.

³ The text is reprinted in the appendix to the present volume.

⁴ *The Corriere della Sera* and *The Times*, 6th April, 1927.

⁵ The texts are reprinted in the appendix to the present volume.

⁶ *The Corriere della Sera*, 26th July, 1927; *The Times*, 27th July, 1927.

⁷ *The Corriere della Sera*, 26th November, 1927.

⁸ Texts of Signor Mussolini's speech and Count Bethlen's reply in the *Corriere della Sera*, 6th April, 1927.

⁹ Reprinted *ibid.*, 6th April, 1927.

Count Bethlen was careful to declare that the treaty could give no ground for anxiety to any other country; and it is true that, contrary to the rumours current in the preceding January,¹ there was no Italian pronouncement in favour of the restoration in Hungary of the Hapsburg Dynasty. On the other hand, the significance attached to the treaty in Hungary was revealed in the enthusiasm with which the news of its signature was greeted at Budapest.² In the Hungarian Chamber Signor Mussolini was cheered; and the *rapporteur* on the Budget, after acclaiming Italy as the powerful protectress and true friend of Hungary, was reported to have concluded:

With the neighbouring peoples it will be possible to enter into true and genuine collaboration when they have accepted the fact that the injustices of the Treaty of Trianon have to be removed.³

Count Bethlen himself, in a statement issued to the press on the 16th April upon his return to Budapest, reaffirmed that the Hungaro-Italian treaty was not directed against any third party. He added, however, that Hungary was ready to conclude an arbitration treaty, but not a pact of amity, with Jugoslavia, and that there did not yet exist the necessary bases for a *rapprochement* with Rumania.⁴ The *rapprochement* between Hungary and Italy seems to have been received with stoicism in Jugoslavia but with some surprise and even dismay in Rumania, where there was a tendency to regard it as incompatible with the Rumano-Italian *rapprochement* of the preceding year.⁵

This feeling in Rumania appears to have been aroused not so much by the actual terms of the Hungaro-Italian treaty of amity as by the tone of the speeches delivered, on the occasion of signature, at Rome and Budapest. The text of the treaty was unexceptionable, and an endeavour to open up a field of economic activity in Hungary and other countries of South-Eastern Europe was a perfectly reasonable and legitimate object of Italian policy. The peace settlement had brought within the Italian frontier the two principal Adriatic ports of South-Eastern Europe—Trieste and Fiume—and had thereby severed these ports politically from their economic hinterland. It was reason-

¹ See *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th January, 1927, cited above.

² *The Corriere della Sera*, 6th and 7th April, 1927.

³ Report of proceedings in the Hungarian Chamber on the 7th April, 1927, *ibid.*, 8th April, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 17th April, 1927.

⁵ For the reception of the news in Rumania see *Le Temps*, 10th and 13th April, 1927. For an Italian attempt to soothe Rumanian susceptibilities, see *ibid.*, 14th April, 1927, quoting the *Giornale d'Italia*.

able that Italy should attempt to restore their prosperity¹ by entering into economic agreements with those 'successor states' of the Hapsburg Monarchy to whom the hinterland had fallen; and it was not only legitimate but statesmanlike to set these economic agreements in a framework of broad political understandings. Had this been the sole object of Italian policy, it would have given no occasion for disquietude in other countries; and Signor Mussolini repeatedly averred that he had no ulterior object in view. In the autumn of 1926, for example, a few weeks before the signature of the Treaty of Tirana, he was reported to have declared, in an interview with a Yugoslav journalist, that the *rapprochement* between Italy and other Balkan countries—whether these belonged to the Little Entente, like Rumania, or were outside it, like Bulgaria—was a purely pacific policy which was pursued with the object of economic collaboration.² Such declarations failed, however, to carry conviction because Italian efforts at economic expansion were interspersed with pronouncements such as Signor Mussolini's speech on the Hungaro-Italian treaty, and with acts such as the conclusion of the Treaty of Tirana and its sequels; and these aroused the suspicion that, in Signor Mussolini's mind, economic expansion in South-Eastern Europe might be, not an end in itself, but a means towards the establishment of a political hegemony.

In this connexion it was perhaps significant that when Monsieur Jean Bratianu took office, as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs in a new Rumanian Cabinet, in June 1927, he addressed warmly worded telegrams³ to Monsieur Poincaré and Monsieur Briand in which he expressed 'his happiness in being able to collaborate in drawing closer the indestructible links' that united Rumania and France, and 'his lively satisfaction at being able to continue to work for the development of the links of unalterable friendship between the two countries' which corresponded 'with both the sentiments and the interests of the Rumanian people'. The French statesmen promptly replied in similar language, and there was a further exchange of telegrams⁴ between Monsieur Titulescu and Monsieur Briand when the former took charge of the Rumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs a few weeks later. In the light of the Rumanian reaction to the Italo-Hungarian treaty of the 5th April, this public homage to the Franco-Rumanian alliance might be inter-

¹ For the problem of Trieste see *The Times*, 24th May, 1927; the *Corriere della Sera*, 5th June, 1927.

² The *Corriere della Sera*, 19th October, 1926.

³ Texts in *Le Temps*, 25th June, 1927.

⁴ Texts *ibid.*, 11th and 27th July, 1927.

preted as an intimation that the new Rumanian Ministry looked askance at General Averescu's policy of a *rapprochement* with Italy—the policy which had been embodied in the Italo-Rumanian treaty of the 16th September, 1926—and that they were resolved not to allow a new friendship of uncertain value to jeopardize an old friendship on which they were confident that they could rely with safety.

This Rumanian gesture of friendliness towards France does not appear to have been overtly resented in Italy. On the other hand, a storm was raised when the Franco-Yugoslav treaty of amity and arbitration, which had been drawn and initialled in March 1926, was at last signed in Paris, by Monsieur Briand and by Monsieur Ninčić's successor Monsieur Marinković, on the 11th November, 1927. The initiative seems to have been taken by Yugoslavia; and while France could not hesitate to implement, on demand, an instrument to which she had committed herself morally more than a year and a half before, the step seems to have aroused certain misgivings on the French side.¹ The speech delivered by Monsieur Briand on the occasion of signature was couched in studiously conciliatory language which contrasted in a striking way with the rather flamboyant rhetoric of Signor Mussolini's speech after the signature of the treaty between Italy and Hungary.

In exchanging signatures [Monsieur Briand said] Monsieur Marinković and I have done something that is very simple and quite normal. We have set the seal upon an actual fact which has long existed. The new agreement is founded upon an old friendship. . . . This treaty of amity and arbitration between our two countries contains, of course, no spear-point directed against any third party whatsoever. It is oriented entirely towards peace. . . . It will cause no surprise to anybody, because it is well known already to all interested parties. If its signature has been postponed until to-day, that is because we have looked forward to concluding it in a wider form. We had ventured to hope that other nations would associate themselves with it. Circumstances have not been propitious for this; but there is no obstacle in the way of the attainment of this goal in the nearer or the remoter future. At any rate, we shall exert ourselves to the uttermost in order to attain it.²

Unfortunately, Monsieur Briand's statesmanlike efforts to prevent the signature of this treaty from increasing the tension between Italy and France, and to keep open a door for the eventual attainment of a tripartite understanding between Yugoslavia, France and Italy, were counteracted by the manner in which the news was received at Belgrade and in Rome. At Belgrade the signature of the Yugoslav treaty

¹ See quotations from the French press in *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th, 9th, and 10th November, 1927.

² *Le Temps*, 13th November, 1927.

with France evoked demonstrations of enthusiasm like those which, seven months before, had been evoked at Budapest by the signature of the Hungarian treaty with Italy.¹ In Rome the news was received with equally extravagant indignation. The French Embassy and the Yugoslav Legation had to be guarded by the police from hostile demonstrations by university students;² the official bulletin of the Fascist Party published a manifesto couched in childish abusive language;³ and one organ of the Fascist Press declared that—

The way of Balkan and Danubian peace passes and will pass through Rome. Whoever tries to ignore this reality will be frequently and profoundly deluded.⁴

The signature of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty of amity and arbitration at Paris on the 11th November, 1927, was followed on the 22nd November by the signature at Tirana of a defensive alliance between Italy and Albania.⁵ On the matter of dates Signor Mussolini declared that—

The offensive and defensive alliance between Italy and Albania was signed in Tirana eleven days later. The two pacts have no relation one to the other, either as cause or as effect, notwithstanding the belief to the contrary of some people who judge events only by their chronological sequence. But the Franco-Yugoslav pact was already sixteen months old, and the Italo-Albanian pact was not drafted between November 11 and 22.⁶

Nevertheless, the effect of this 'chronological sequence' upon the temper of all parties was unfortunate.

¹ It may be noted that these demonstrations at Belgrade were deprecated in France (see *The Times*, 16th November, 1927), whereas the demonstrations at Budapest had been hailed with satisfaction and been given great publicity in Italy. On this matter, Signor Mussolini afterwards made the following observations (in a statement to the Italian Council of Ministers on the 15th December, 1927):

'This Franco-Yugoslav pact is in perfect order from the international standpoint, but certain responsible and irresponsible quarters in Belgrade attempted to attribute to it a character which caused considerable emotion throughout the world with the exception of Italy, which did not lose either *sang-froid* or discipline.'

While the first two of these observations were in full correspondence with the facts, the same could hardly be said of the reference to the temper displayed in Italy.

² *The Times*, 17th and 19th November, 1927.

³ For a specimen see *ibid.*, 19th November, 1927.

⁴ The *Lavoro d'Italia*, quoted in *The Times*, 9th November, 1927. These sentences were perhaps an echo of a celebrated passage in an article published by a Russian publicist shortly before the outbreak of the War of 1914-18, to the effect that 'Russia's road to Constantinople passes through Berlin and Vienna'.

⁵ See section (ii), below.

⁶ The *Corriere della Sera*, 16th December, 1927.

In the situation as it stood at this date, the most ominous feature was that either party was proclaiming itself the victim, and the other party the perpetrator, of a policy of 'encirclement'. According to the Jugoslavs, Italy was attempting to drive in a wedge between Jugoslavia and her ally Rumania and to hem Jugoslavia in between Italy herself on the one side and a cordon of Jugoslavia's local enemies and Italy's local satellites—Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania—on the other. According to the Italians, it was France who was attempting to encircle Italy by entering into a nefarious conspiracy with Jugoslavia.

It was against this gloomy background of mutual fear and mutual hostility in South-Eastern Europe—a gloom barely relieved by the patience and good sense of the public, the press, and the Government in France—that the events in Albania, recorded in the following section, took their course.

(ii) Italy, Jugoslavia and Albania (1926–7)

In distant ages and in widely different international situations, the coastlands of South-Eastern Europe which faced the 'heel' of Italy across the 'bottle-neck' of the Adriatic Sea had been the scene of fatal collisions between Great Powers. In the course of Ancient History, international complications at Corfù and Durazzo had drawn Athens and Sparta into a war which started Hellenic civilization on its downward course; while two centuries later other international complications in the neighbourhoods of Skodra and Valona had drawn Rome and Macedonia into a series of wars which ended in the destruction of the Macedonian State, the irretrievable overthrow of the Balance of Power in the Levant and the substitution for it of the Roman Empire. In the Middle Ages, again, on the eve of the First Crusade, the same coastlands had been the theatre of a war between Normans and Byzantines which was the beginning of the end of the Byzantine Empire (though it gave an opportunity to English exiles in the Emperor's service to avenge the defeat at Hastings by a victory over other Normans on the plains of Monastir). These were bad omens for the outcome of the diplomatic conflict over Albania which arose between Italy and Jugoslavia in A.D. 1926.

On the political map of modern Europe, Albania had been a danger-spot since the break-up of European Turkey in the Balkan War of 1912. Yet at the moment when the prospects of peace in Europe were clouded by the signature of the Treaty of Tirana on the 27th November, 1926, this Albanian danger had seemed to be distinctly on the wane. Since the termination of the General War of

1914–18, two great steps had been taken towards the stabilization of the international position of Albania: her admission to membership in the League of Nations on the 17th December, 1920,¹ and the delimitation of her frontiers in a final act signed on the 30th July, 1926 (in tardy completion of a task for which the Great Powers of Europe had originally taken responsibility on the 17th May, 1913).² It was true that internal conditions in Albania were still unstable, and seemed likely to remain so for a considerable time to come—until, in fact, the mass of the Albanian people had transferred to the new national state the loyalty which had been given hitherto to tribal chiefs or feudal superiors. Yet by the summer of 1926 it seemed reasonable to hope that any future disturbances of the internal peace of Albania might be confined strictly to the sphere of ‘internal affairs’ and might be prevented from leading, as previous disturbances of the kind had led, to international complications. The prospect seemed all the more reassuring in view of the *détente* between Albania’s immediate neighbours—Italy and Yugoslavia—which had been signalized by the two Italo-Yugoslav agreements of the 27th January, 1924; for in 1924 this *détente* had appeared to exercise a sedative effect upon the policy of these two Powers in regard to the Albanian internal disturbances of that year. In June 1924, on the eve of the overthrow of the ‘Party of the Beys’ (i.e. the Muslim feudal landholders of the central lowlands), there was published a joint Italo-Yugoslav declaration of non-intervention; and this arrangement was reported to have been confirmed in perpetuity in the following October.³ Almost simultaneously, however, the misunderstanding over Albania between Italy and Yugoslavia was started by a false step taken in Yugoslavia.

The leader of the Albanian Beys—Ahmed Bey Zogu of Mati—repaired to Belgrade and made himself master of Albania again before the end of the year 1924 by breaking into the country with an armed force from the Yugoslav side of the frontier.⁴ It was hardly conceivable that he could have carried out this operation without the connivance of the Yugoslav Government, and it was averred that he had actually received Yugoslav aid—not, perhaps, from the Government itself but from unofficial organizations. This fault on the Yugoslav side, whatever its exact extent may have been, met with swift ‘poetic justice’. For early in 1925 Ahmed Zogu, after paying something on account of his embarrassing obligations to his late hosts at

¹ See *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. iv, Ch. V, Part 2.

² For the history of the delimitation of the frontiers of Albania see *Survey for 1920–3*, pp. 343–8; *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 282–8. See also D. Nikolitch, *Les Différends de Frontières de l’Albanie* (Paris, 1927, Pédone).

³ *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 285.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 285–7.

Belgrade,¹ proceeded to extricate himself from an awkward predicament by courting the favour of Italy.

It may be noted in passing that there was no evidence that Ahmed Zogu intended to sacrifice the independence of Albania either to Yugoslav ambitions in 1924 or to Italian ambitions in 1925 and the following years. Indeed, there were indications (which are mentioned in their place below) that he was genuinely desirous of safeguarding Albanian independence to the greatest extent compatible with the exigencies of his own political career. When, however, he was asked, not to betray outright but to compromise Albanian independence as the price of his own restoration to, or retention in, power at Tirana, he repeatedly elected to place his country's interests in jeopardy rather than his own.

If Italy had been content with the ironical revenge of seeing Yugoslav machinations for stealing a march on her in Albania turn to the discomfiture of Yugoslavia owing to Ahmed Zogu's *volte-face* of 1925, the false step which had been taken on the Yugoslav side in 1924 might have been retrieved. Unfortunately in 1926 Italy, as has been recorded above,² rejected the idea of a local 'Pact of Locarno' between herself, Yugoslavia, and France, and apparently embarked upon a policy of hegemony in South-Eastern Europe. For an Italian manoeuvre of this kind, Albania was a key position, and Signor Mussolini did not resist the temptation to play the cards in his hand. The third of these cards was Ahmed Zogu's *volte-face* in 1925; the second was the false step on the Yugoslav side in 1924; the first and strongest (which he had hitherto been holding in reserve) was a declaration in regard to Albania on the part of the Governments of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, which had been signed at Paris on the 9th November, 1921 (simultaneously with the decision in regard to the frontiers of Albania which was taken on that date by the Conference of Ambassadors),³ and had been registered at the Secretariat of the League of Nations at Geneva on the 22nd October, 1922.

The text of this declaration was as follows:

The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, recognizing that the independence of Albania, and the integrity and inalienability of her frontiers, as fixed by their decision of November 9, 1921, is a question of international importance;

Recognizing that the violation of these frontiers, or of the indepen-

¹ For his accommodating attitude on the question of the monastery of Sveti Naum—an attitude which facilitated the final delimitation of the Albanian-Yugoslav frontier—see *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 287. ² See section (i), above.

³ For this decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, see *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 345.

dence of Albania, might constitute a danger for the strategic safety of Italy, have agreed as follows:

- (1) If Albania should at any time find it impossible to maintain intact her territorial integrity, she shall be free to address a request to the Council of the League of Nations for foreign assistance.
- (2) The Governments of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan decide that, in the above-mentioned event, they will instruct their representatives on the Council of the League of Nations to recommend that the restoration of the territorial frontiers of Albania should be entrusted to Italy.
- (3) In case of a threat to Albania's integrity or independence, whether territorial or economic, owing to foreign aggression or to any other event, and in case Albania has not availed herself within a reasonable time of the right provided for in Article 1, the above-mentioned Governments will bring the situation before the Council of the League of Nations.
If the Council considers intervention necessary, the above-mentioned Governments will give their representatives the instructions stipulated in Article 2.
- (4) If the Council of the League of Nations decides, by a majority, that intervention is not expedient, the above-mentioned Governments shall reconsider the question in conformity with the principle enunciated in the preamble to this Declaration, namely that any modification in the frontiers of Albania constitutes a danger for the strategic safety of Italy.

Done in Paris, on November the ninth, nineteen hundred and twenty-one.¹

It will be seen that, in this declaration, the four Powers possessing permanent seats on the Council of the League agreed together in advance to do their best to guide the action of the Council along certain lines in certain contingencies. It was a subject of controversy whether such an agreement was 'correct', and whether—short of being 'incorrect'—it was compatible in spirit with the intention of the Covenant.² However that may be, the fact that this agreement had been in existence for five years placed Italy in a strong position, *vis-à-vis* other Powers, for concluding with Albania the treaty of the 27th November, 1926.

The latter treaty, in spite of the stir which it made, appears to have been something less than what Italy had at first attempted to obtain from Albania. As early as September 1926 it was alleged³

¹ English translation by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, published in the *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. xii (1922), p. 383.

² For an acute discussion of the history and significance of the declaration of the 9th November, 1921, see a paper on 'Italy, Yugoslavia and Albania' by Mr. H. Wickham Steed in the *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, May 1927. See also a letter by Mr. D. Mitrany in *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th January, 1927.

³ See *Survey for 1926*, p. 163. See also *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th

that, in the last week of June, the Italian Minister at Tirana, Baron Aloisi, had laid before Ahmed Zogu a draft Italo-Albanian treaty with a request that he should sign it by a certain hour under pain of seeing the Italian Government break off diplomatic relations with him and settle the fate of Albania with Yugoslavia over the Albanian Government's head. According to the story, the draft treaty was tantamount to a full Italian protectorate over Albania, inasmuch as it would have placed her public finance and economy, her armed forces and her foreign relations entirely under Italian control. According to one version of the story,¹ this Italian move was frustrated through being communicated by Ahmed Zogu to the then British Minister at Tirana, Mr. O'Reilly, who passed on the information to his Government. At any rate, nothing came of this alleged Italian *démarche* at the time.

Another indication that Ahmed Zogu was unwilling to place his country completely in Italy's hands is afforded by the fact that the actual treaty of the 27th November, 1926—the terms of which went less far than the supposed terms of the abortive treaty of June—was signed at a moment when the President of the Albanian Republic was in difficulties at home. A succession of *démentis* from Albanian Legations abroad during the summer and autumn of 1926 advertised² the growth of unrest against the Zogu régime among the Catholic mountain clans of the north; and on the 23rd November there was published in Belgrade the news that an armed revolt had broken out under the leadership of a Catholic priest, Don Loro Tzaka.³ It was added that the enterprise had been planned by Albanian exiles of Archbishop Fan Noli's faction in the Italian enclave of Zara in Dalmatia,⁴ and that the Yugoslav Government had closed the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier—statements which seemed to imply that the outbreak was expected to serve the interests of Yugoslavia less than those of Italy. After initial successes which threatened the Tirana Government with the loss of Skodra, the insurgents were defeated by the Government troops on the 26th November⁵ and had dispersed

September, 1926, as supported by *The Times*, 8th December, 1926, and by *The Manchester Guardian*, 19th October, 1927 (the last being the most circumstantial of the three versions of the story).

¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, 19th October, 1927.

² See *Le Temps*, 11th June, 15th August, 19th and 30th September, 1926.

³ See telegrams from Belgrade in *The Times*, the *Corriere della Sera*, and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 24th November, 1926.

⁴ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29th November, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd December, 1926.

⁵ For the course of operations see the *Corriere della Sera*, 25th and 28th November, 1926; *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 26th November, 1926.

into the hills by the 1st December; ¹ but the Tirana Government had been seriously alarmed—as it showed by calling up all the fighting men at its disposal.² It was in these circumstances that, on the 27th November, 1926, there was signed at Tirana, by Baron Aloisi and by the Albanian Foreign Minister Iliyas Bey Vrioni, an Italo-Albanian treaty in the following terms: ³

Italy and Albania, with the object of strengthening the ties of mutual friendship and security, having regard to their geographical position, and in order to promote the consolidation of peace, animated by the desire to maintain the political, legal and territorial *status quo* of Albania, within the scope of the treaties to which they both are signatories, and of the Covenant of the League of Nations, have agreed to conclude the present pact of friendship and security, and have for that purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries [names omitted], who, having examined their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Art. 1. Italy and Albania recognize that any disturbance threatening the political, legal and territorial *status quo* of Albania is contrary to their common political interests.

Art. 2. In order to safeguard the above-mentioned interests the High Contracting Parties undertake to afford each other mutual support and cordial co-operation; they also undertake not to conclude with other Powers any political or military agreements prejudicial to the interests of the other Party, including those defined (*anche definiti*) in the present pact.

Art. 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to submit to special conciliation and arbitration procedure any questions which may give rise to dispute between them and which it may not have been possible to settle by ordinary diplomatic procedure. The details of this procedure of peaceful settlement shall form the subject of a special convention to be concluded as soon as possible.

Art. 4. The present pact shall remain in force for five years, and may be denounced or renewed one year before its expiration.

Art. 5. The present pact shall be ratified and subsequently registered with the League of Nations. The ratifications shall be exchanged at Rome.

In elucidation of this text the following letter ⁴ was addressed by Baron Aloisi to Iliyas Bey on the 5th December:

Your Excellency,

You were good enough to ask me, for the enlightenment of certain persons in Albania, to let you have the views of the Italian Government regarding the implications of certain passages in the text of the Pact of

¹ The *Corriere della Sera*, 2nd December, 1926.

² The *Times* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 30th November, 1926.

³ The text, as translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, is reprinted here from *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. lx.

⁴ The text, as translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, is reprinted here from *League of Nations Treaty Series*, *loc. cit.*

Friendship and Security—an instrument essentially conducive to peace—which was signed by us on November 27th last.

You asked me, in particular, whether the Italian Government considered that, as was understood by the Albanian Government, the phrase 'i trattati di cui ambedue sono firmatarie' applied only to treaties legally concluded and published since the admission of Albania to the League of Nations.

Following the verbal assurances which I have already given you, I desire to confirm that this was also the view taken by the Royal Government.

You further drew my attention to the phrase occurring in the second part of the first sentence of Article 2 of the text, which reads as follows: 'il loro mutuo appoggio e la loro collaborazione cordiale'. In the view of the Royal Government, there can be no doubt as to the meaning of this phrase. Mutual support and cordial co-operation can only be interpreted to mean co-operation as the result of proposals made by one of the parties and freely accepted by the other. Hence it is evident that the occasion for such support and co-operation can only arise at the request of one of the parties.

Finally, I have the honour, under instructions received from my Government, to assure you once more that I am at the immediate and entire disposal of the Albanian Government to begin negotiations with a view to framing the special conciliation and arbitration procedure contemplated in Article 3 of our Pact of Friendship and Security of November 27th last.

These explanations confirm the loyal intentions of the two contracting Governments; I am therefore confident that they will still further emphasize the goodwill and disinterested spirit with which the Royal Government, acting through me, has met all the wishes expressed by the Albanian Government at the time when this Pact was concluded.

On the 9th December the Treaty of Tirana was ratified by the Albanian Chamber of Deputies¹ and on the 10th by the Senate,² while on the Italian side it was put into execution by a *decreto-legge* of the 9th December. After exchange of ratifications it was registered at Geneva, together with Baron Aloisi's note of the 5th December, 1926, on the 8th February, 1927.³

The following declaration in regard to the Treaty of the 27th November, 1926, was reported to have been agreed upon by the Italian and Albanian Governments in an exchange of notes on the 26th April, 1927:

The Governments of Italy and Albania declare that, if requested either jointly or separately by one or more Powers to enter into negotia-

¹ The *Corriere della Sera*, 10th December, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 12th December, 1926.

³ The *Times*, 9th February, 1927. It had previously been reported that the Albanian Government had agreed, under pressure from the Italian Government, to leave the note unregistered (*The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd January, 1927).

tions which relate to the interpretation or application of the Treaty of Tirana, or the participation in it of third States, or which in any way affect the relations between Italy and Albania, neither of the two Governments will take part in such negotiations without previous consultation on the subject between Italy and Albania, or without a perfect agreement and a simultaneous participation of both countries in such negotiations.¹

Meanwhile, in public, both the Albanian and the Italian Governments had made haste to protest that their treaty was quite innocuous.

The Albanian Legation in Paris published on the 17th December a telegram from the Albanian Foreign Minister declaring that the treaty confirmed the sovereignty, independence and integrity of Albania, offered no opening for Italian interference in her affairs, increased the authority of the League of Nations and contained no secret annex.² On the 6th January the same Legation declared that Albania was ready to conclude analogous treaties with other states, and especially with her immediate neighbours;³ while Iliyas Bey Vrioni declared, explicitly, in an interview,⁴ that his Government was ready to conclude identical treaties with Greece and Yugoslavia.⁵ It was left to the refugee Albanian statesman Archbishop Fan Noli to protest, on the 10th March, to the League of Nations.⁶

On the Italian side, Signor Mussolini, in presenting the treaty to the Italian parliament in February 1927 (somewhat late in the day), represented it as an 'act of unequivocal clarity' which had been necessary in order to reassure the Albanian people, among whom 'suspicion of the real intentions of Italy' had sometimes been aroused because the 'geographical connexion' between Albania and Italy was 'so strong'.⁷ Before this, the semi-official *Agenzia Stefani* appears to have justified the treaty on the more controversial ground that 'it simply' confirmed 'the diplomatic engagements entered into in 1921'.⁸

At Belgrade the news of the signature of the Treaty of Tirana

¹ *The Times*, 16th May, 1927, quoting an official *communiqué* from the *Agenzia Stefani*. See also the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 15th May, 1927. The existence of this declaration appears to lack official confirmation on the part of the Italian Government.

² *Le Temps*, 17th December, 1926.

³ *The Corriere della Sera*, 7th January, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 9th January, 1927.

⁵ A proposal in this sense was reported to have been actually submitted to the Greek Government by the Albanian Minister at Athens on the 18th February, 1927 (*The Times*, 19th February, 1927).

⁶ *Le Temps*, 16th March, 1927.

⁷ *The Times*, 25th February, 1927.

⁸ Mr. D. Mitrany, in the letter cited above (*The Manchester Guardian*, 28th January, 1927).

excited lively emotion.¹ It was known that Italy had rejected the idea of a tripartite Italo-Franco-Yugoslav Pact and that she had embarked on a 'forward policy' in South-Eastern Europe, while in regard to Albania, in particular, the progress of Italian economic penetration in that country had been the subject of hostile comment in the Belgrade press as early as April 1926.² Nevertheless, Monsieur Ninčić had not despaired of his conciliatory policy, and in June 1926 he had induced the Yugoslav parliament to ratify the Italo-Yugoslav technical conventions which had been signed at Belgrade in August 1924, though parliament decided to postpone consideration of the second series of conventions which had been signed at Nettuno in July 1925.³ The closing of the Yugoslav frontier upon the outbreak of the rising in Northern Albania in November 1926 was represented as an earnest of goodwill; and on the 27th November—the very day on which the Italo-Albanian treaty was signed—it was mistakenly reported in the Yugoslav press that the Yugoslav and Italian Governments had exchanged views over the Albanian crisis and were acting in concert,⁴ as they had done in June 1924.⁵ The news from Tirana took not only the public but the Government by surprise. On the 6th December, as has been mentioned elsewhere,⁶ Monsieur Ninčić resigned and the Uzunović Government fell with its Foreign Minister.

On the other hand, at Athens—where, a few years earlier, any 'forward move' by Italy in Albania would have aroused much the same feeling as at Belgrade—the news was received 'with remarkable detachment and even benevolence',⁷ and the indignation at Belgrade was somewhat unkindly interpreted as the disappointment of one 'imperialism' forestalled by another.⁸ This reaction in Greece was a testimony either to the skill with which Italy had conciliated a former opponent or to the maladroitness with which Jugoslavia, in the Salonica negotiations,⁹ had alienated a former ally.

In France the news caused much concern. On the 4th December *Le Temps* described the Treaty of Tirana as 'establishing a sort of protectorate' and as 'assuring to Italy the absolute mastery of the

¹ *The Times*, 6th December, 1926; *Le Temps*, 9th December, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th December, 1926.

² See *Survey for 1926*, p. 163.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 164.

⁴ *The Times*, 27th November and 6th December, 1926.

⁵ See p. 165, above.

⁶ See *Survey for 1926*, p. 164, and the present volume, p. 156, above.

⁷ This belied the prognostications regarding the probable effect in Greece which were made in *Le Temps* on the 9th December, 1926; but here, no doubt, the wish was father to the thought.

⁸ *The Times*, 8th December, 1926.

⁹ See *Survey for 1926*, Part II B, Section (ii).

Adriatic', and on the 9th, in still stronger terms, as 'amounting, in effect, to nothing less than an Italian grasp (*mainmise*) upon Albania'—in view of the terms of Article 1. Nevertheless the French Government held to its settled policy of conciliation and used its diplomatic influence to incline the heart of the Yugoslav Government in the same direction.¹ This did not, however, save France from being taken to task by the Fascist press.²

As for the attitude of Great Britain, a rumour became current in Belgrade that between June and November there had been a change in British policy regarding Italian aspirations in Albania, and that the signature of the Treaty of Tirana was the first fruits of some new Anglo-Italian understanding.³ In regard to this the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Austen Chamberlain, stated on the 1st June, 1927, in the House of Commons at Westminster, in answer to a parliamentary question, that, on the occasion of his meeting with Signor Mussolini at Leghorn on the 30th September, 1926,⁴ 'the subject of Albania' had been 'mentioned in passing'; that Signor Mussolini had said to him then, as he had said to him both before and since, 'that the policy of Italy in no way menaced the integrity or independence of Albania, which it was intended to protect'; that he 'entirely approved of that statement that it was the object of the Italian Government to preserve the integrity of Albania'; and, finally, that he had not had notice of the terms of the Treaty of Tirana before that treaty had been signed.⁵

While the Italo-Albanian treaty of the 27th November, 1926, was causing this international stir, in Albania itself the Italians were continuing the process of economic penetration. The foundation of the predominantly Italian Banca d'Albania in 1925⁶ had been followed up by the organization of a 'Società per lo Sviluppo Economico dell'Albania;' and on the 1st September, 1926, the latter body financed a

¹ *The Times*, 16th December, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 6th and 9th December, 1926; the *Corriere della Sera*, 10th December, 1926.

³ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 8th December, 1926.

⁴ See *The Times*, 1st October, 1926.

⁵ On the 2nd May, 1927, in answer to another parliamentary question, Sir Austen Chamberlain added the information that 'on December 1, the day before publication', Signor Mussolini had caused him to be informed 'that he had signed a treaty of non-aggression and arbitration with Albania, comprising a guarantee of her independence, which would be registered with the League of Nations in due course'.

⁶ See *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 288, and *Survey for 1926*, p. 163. See also *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th September, 1926, and 27th April, 1927. For a summary of the Bank's report for the year 1926, see *The Times*, 18th November, 1927.

loan of 50,000,000 francs to the Albanian Government, the service of which was guaranteed by the Italian State in a royal decree of the 3rd March, 1927.¹ Italian concerns were active, again, in exploring the oil resources of Albania—though here the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Standard Oil Company were also in the field.² The Italian Government itself, under an agreement concluded in Rome on the 4th February, 1927,³ purchased from the 'Deutsche Luft-Hansa' a German concern called the 'Adria Aero Lloyd', which had been founded in the spring of 1924 and had been granted a monopoly of air routes in Albania by the Albanian Government.⁴ The financial burden of this transaction was justified by Signor Mussolini on political grounds in a report presented to the Italian parliament.⁵ As for the armed forces of the Albanian State, in April 1927 the British Inspector-General of the Albanian Gendarmerie, Sir Jocelyn Percy, was appointed to the supreme command in the Skodra area,⁶ and this appointment was not affected when, in the autumn of 1927, eleven Italian officers were seconded for service with the Albanian Army as technical instructors.⁷

Meanwhile, the internal unrest in Albania, though driven below the surface, had not been cured. The suppression of the rising of November 1926 had been followed by arrests, imprisonments and death sentences (though the majority of the insurgents seem to have escaped the arm of the law);⁸ but Ahmed Zogu appears to have felt it advisable to live in something like a permanent state of siege;⁹ and in April 1927 the Albanian Legation at Paris admitted that three classes of reservists had been called to the colours 'for police measures'.¹⁰ The President's position was not improved by a rumour, emanating from Albanian exiles at Belgrade in May 1927, that he intended to have himself proclaimed king.¹¹ The existence of these

¹ The *Corriere della Sera*, 22nd March and 28th April, 1927; *The Times*, 3rd June, 1927.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th April, 1927.

³ The *Corriere della Sera*, 27th July, 1927; this agreement was approved in a royal decree of the 7th July, 1927.

⁴ For the history of the 'Adria Aero Lloyd' see *The Times*, 15th June, 1927.

⁵ The *Corriere della Sera*, 3rd September, 1927.

⁶ *The Times*, 7th April, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 5th November, 1927.

⁸ *Le Temps*, 24th January, 1927.

⁹ *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th July, 1927.

¹⁰ *Le Temps*, 22nd April, 1927.

¹¹ See *Le Temps* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 14th May, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 19th May, 1927; *Le Temps*, 21st May, 1927. For a sketch of President Ahmed Zogu's character and career see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29th May, 1927. He afterwards did assume the crown—on the 1st September, 1928.

exiles abroad was a standing protest against his régime—a protest which was only emphasized when, early in 1927, the supporters of Archbishop Fan Noli who had repaired to Italy were interned by the Italian Government.¹ In the light of the first article of the Italo-Albanian treaty of the 27th November, 1926, this apparent insecurity of Ahmed Zogu's tenure of power became potentially a question of international importance. From the text of this article it was not clear whether 'the political *status quo*' in Albania, the disturbance of which had been agreed to be contrary to the political interests of both contracting parties, covered the internal politics of the country. If it did, the effect of the treaty would be to make the constant possibility of internal disorder in Albania a greater menace to international peace than it had been even before the admission of Albania to membership in the League and before the delimitation of her frontiers.

In these circumstances it was not surprising that the international tension created by the signature of the treaty of the 27th November, 1926, not only continued but became dangerously accentuated in the course of the year 1927, which was punctuated by an almost monotonous series of 'incidents' provoking 'crises'.

The first of these 'crises' was precipitated by a communication received from the Italian Government by the British, French, German and other Governments² on the 19th March, 1927, in which their 'attention was called to certain military preparations stated to be proceeding in Jugoslavia'.³ The accusation—at any rate as it was presented in the press—was that local Yugoslav officials, in districts adjoining the Albanian frontier from the Adriatic to Lake Okhrida, had been organizing the enrolment, payment and training of Albanian *komitajis* with a view to an incursion into Albania on the grand scale in the approaching spring.⁴ The Albanian Government

¹ *Le Temps*, 25th February, 1927. For the Albanian exiles at Belgrade see *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd April, 1927.

² Including, apparently, the Bulgarian Government (*The Times*, 25th March, 1927).

³ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 2nd May, 1927, in answer to a parliamentary question.

⁴ In this part of the world such accusations were a traditional prelude to the return of spring; but in this instance a circumstantial statement from a correspondent in Albania was published in *The Times*, on the 19th March, 1927 (the actual date of the Italian Government's communication). A series of detailed accounts of these alleged preparations was published in the *Giornale d'Italia* (see *The Times*, 21st March, 1927; the *Corriere della Sera*, 22nd and 23rd March, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th April, 1927; the *Corriere della Sera*, 15th April, 1927; *Le Temps*, 9th May, 1927). See also *The Times*, 26th March, 1927.

itself appears to have taken no diplomatic action. At any rate, on the 12th May, 1927, when the crisis had been surmounted, the British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs was 'not aware of any representations having been addressed by the Albanian Government either to the Yugoslav Government or [to] the League of Nations on this subject'.¹ In fact the Albanian Government appears to have contented itself with publicly repudiating certain declarations which had been made by the Albanian Ministers at London and Belgrade.² The Albanian Minister at Belgrade, Tsena Beg Kryeziu (who appears to have made a frank display of goodwill towards Yugoslavia without ceasing to serve the Zogu régime), was reported to have declared that he could 'give a categorical *démenti* to all the fantastic news which had been published on the subject' of alleged preparations for a revolution in Albania; to have added that 'the Balkan peoples will know how to co-operate for the protection of Balkan interests'; and to have expressed the hope that 'statesmen in Belgrade' would 'not allow third parties to profit by divergences between Yugoslavia and Albania'.³

The 'principle of the Balkans for the Balkan peoples' was also enunciated by the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Perić, in an interview which he gave on the 19th March to the correspondent of *The Times* at Belgrade; and while the Yugoslav Government issued a *démenti*,⁴ only less categorical than Tsena Beg's, of the reports in *The Times* and the *Giornale d'Italia*, Monsieur Perić, in the interview just mentioned, offered to submit the facts to an international inquiry:

Let military and other experts from the whole world come and see for themselves on the spot that the state of our national defence has not exceeded the normal position.⁵

This offer was reported⁶ to have been resented by the Yugoslav parliament, except on condition that a parallel inquiry should be conducted simultaneously on the other side of the Albano-Yugoslav frontier; and on the 2nd March Monsieur Perić withdrew his offer in its original form and substituted for it the offer of an inquiry—on both sides of the frontier—by the League of Nations.⁷

¹ Statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster in answer to a parliamentary question on the 12th May, 1927.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 26th March, 1927.

³ *Le Temps*, 23rd March, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 22nd March, 1927.

⁴ Text in *Le Temps*, 21st March, 1927.

⁵ Telegram from the correspondent of *The Times* at Belgrade, published on the 21st March, 1927.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 22nd March, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 24th March, 1927; the *Corriere della Sera*, 24th March, 1927.

The suggestion of an inquiry seems at first to have commended itself to the French, British and German Governments. From the moment when they received the Italian communication of the 19th March, these three Powers had been in active consultation¹ with a view to resolving the crisis in some peaceful manner. On the 21st March, at Paris, the Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Berthelot, conferred with the German Ambassador, Herr von Hoesch;² and the German Government was reported to have expressed its willingness, in principle, to take part in an international inquiry, in answer to a query from the British Ambassador on the 24th.³ Monsieur Perié's action in proposing an international inquiry was explicitly commended, as an act of frankness and good faith, by Monsieur Briand in a statement on the 22nd March to the French Chamber, in which he also mentioned that the French Government had been working for peace 'in complete agreement with the Governments of Great Britain and Germany'.⁴

The specific proposal for an inquiry by the League of Nations appears to have been supported by most organs of the French press,⁵ though it was deprecated by *Le Temps* on the ground that, if once the Council of the League were seised of the immediate question in hand, it would be difficult to avoid bringing up the Albanian question in its entirety as involved in the Treaty of Tirana.⁶ A preference for a direct settlement between the Italian and Yugoslav Governments, as opposed to any reference to the League, was publicly expressed by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster, in answer to parliamentary questions, on the 23rd March and again on the 6th April. The line taken by the British Secretary of State was presumably determined by the vehement opposition to the proposal for reference to the League which was advertised in Italy.⁷

¹ It was erroneously reported (e.g. in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 21st March, 1927) that the British Government had associated itself with the Italian Government's policy by instructing the British Minister at Belgrade to support his Italian colleague when the latter handed to the Yugoslav Government a copy of the Italian communication of the 19th March. The truth of this report was denied, and it was explained that the British Minister merely 'called at the Yugoslav Foreign Office to inform himself regarding the situation and took the opportunity of advising the Yugoslav Government to act with the greatest moderation' (*The Manchester Guardian*, 22nd March, 1927).

² *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 21st March, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 25th March, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 23rd March, 1927; compare the statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons on the 2nd May, 1927.

⁵ *The Manchester Guardian*, 25th March, 1927.

⁶ Leading article in *Le Temps*, 24th March, 1927.

⁷ *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Times*, 22nd March, 1927; the *Corriere della Sera*, 25th March, 1927.

Accordingly, the three disinterested Powers abandoned the proposal for an inquiry into the past either by the League of Nations or by any other authority,¹ and concentrated their efforts upon bringing about conversations between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government was reported to have signified its readiness for such conversations on the 1st April,² and contact with a view to conversations appears to have been established, at Rome and Belgrade simultaneously, on the 6th.³ Eventually, the whole suggestion for an inquiry resolved itself into an agreement⁴ on the part of the Yugoslav, Albanian and Italian Governments that the British and French military *attachés* and a representative of the German Legation⁵ at Belgrade should hold themselves in readiness to carry out an inquiry on the Albano-Yugoslav frontier should fresh occasion for inquiry arise while the conversations were in progress.

Meanwhile, the Italo-Yugoslav conversations hung fire, as either party intimated that its participation in them would be conditional on the fulfilment of conditions which the other party found unacceptable. On the Italian side, exception was taken to the postponement, apparently *sine die*, of the ratification by Yugoslavia of the Nettuno Conventions.⁶ At the beginning of April the British Government, in pressing the proposal for direct conversations with Yugoslavia upon the Italian Government, was reported⁷ to have suggested that, in consideration of some concession in regard to the ratification of the Nettuno Conventions on Yugoslavia's part, Italy on her part might consent to include in the scope of the proposed conversations the whole Albanian question, including the Treaty of Tirana. If a British suggestion in this sense was actually made, it met with a rebuff; for on the Yugoslav side there was apparently an unwillingness to ratify the Nettuno Conventions at this stage on any consideration whatever,⁸ while on the 14th April the Italian Government publicly declared that there was no question of opening negotiations about the Tirana Treaty, which did not concern Yugoslavia,

¹ In France, there was an inclination to ascribe this unwillingness to use the good offices of the League to the influence of the British Government, and to explain Sir Austen Chamberlain's attitude as the effect of an excessive partiality towards Italy (see *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th April, 1927).

² *The Times*, 2nd April, 1927.

³ *The Corriere della Sera*, 8th April, 1927.

⁴ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 3rd May, 1927. See also the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 10th April, 1927; *The Times*, 13th April, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th April, 1927.

⁵ Under the Versailles Treaty, Art. 179, Germany was forbidden to maintain military *attachés* at foreign capitals.

⁶ See p. 172, above.

⁷ *The Times*, 25th April, 1927.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 2nd April, 1927.

but merely a question of conversations with the object of clarifying the general relations between the two countries.¹ This Italian move was resented at Belgrade and was answered by a revival of the proposal to invoke the good offices of the League of Nations²—a retort which, in turn, aroused resentment in Italy. Thereafter, the British and French Governments were reported to have agreed upon a division of labour—British diplomacy to concentrate its efforts upon Rome and French diplomacy upon Belgrade—but, for all that the disinterested Powers could do, the deadlock in Italo-Jugoslav relations continued. Nevertheless, the disinterested Powers, in failing to bring about their immediate object, were substantially successful in achieving their ultimate aim; for the abortive Italo-Jugoslav conversations had been suggested in the first instance with the sole object of averting a threatened breach, and Signor Mussolini now took up the position that Italo-Jugoslav conversations, while unobjectionable so long as they were confined within the limits laid down by him, were also superfluous, since there did not at present exist any ‘incident’ which required discussion.³

Thus the ‘crisis’ of March 1927 was laboriously surmounted.⁴ The only feature of permanent historical interest was that on this occasion, for the first time since the outbreak of the General War of 1914, the German Government had been invited, in an affair of European importance, to co-operate with the other disinterested Powers on a footing of complete equality.

The next ‘crisis’ was provoked by an ‘incident’ that arose directly between Yugoslavia and Albania.⁵ On the 27th May, 1927, the Albanian authorities arrested at Durazzo a certain Monsieur Vuk Jurašković, as well as a local police agent and two Montenegrin chauffeurs, on suspicion of espionage, and at the same time seized Jurašković’s papers.⁶ On the 30th May the Yugoslav *chargé d’affaires* at Tirana, Monsieur Saković, followed up previous verbal representations by addressing a note to the Albanian Government in which he claimed that Jurašković had been employed as a dragoman of the

¹ *The Times*, 16th April, 1927.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 18th April, 1927; *The Times*, 19th April, 1927.

³ *The Times*, 25th April, 1927; compare the *Corriere della Sera*, 30th April, 1927.

⁴ The continued delay in the ratification of the Nettuno Conventions on Yugoslavia’s part was answered on the Italian side by the publication on the 19th May, 1927, of a royal decree regulating the question of the citizenship of inhabitants of Fiume (the *Corriere della Sera*, 21st May, 1927).

⁵ See the clear chronological summary of events from a special correspondent at Tirana, published in *The Times*, 8th June, 1927.

⁶ *The Times*, 1st June, 1927.

Jugoslav Legation since the 20th August, 1923; protested against his having been arrested by the Albanian authorities without previous warning to the Legation; characterized this action as an 'act of violence'; and demanded not only the immediate release of Jurašković but 'satisfaction' for 'this brutal act in contravention of international rights'. On the 31st May the Albanian Government telegraphed to its Minister at Belgrade announcing the discovery of documents 'of a compromising nature and of extreme gravity'; declaring that Jurašković was an Albanian subject;¹ denying that it had ever received any official notification of his appointment as dragoman to the Yugoslav Legation; and complaining of the language used in Monsieur Saković's note. On the 1st June the Albanian Government also asked Monsieur Saković himself for documentary proof of Jurašković's appointment, 'while reserving to itself the right to apply the laws of the country to one of its own subjects'.² On the same day President Ahmed Zogu apparently sent a personal message to the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Monsieur Marinković, informing him that he had already given orders for Jurašković's release when Monsieur Saković's note arrived, and adding that even now he was disposed to release the prisoner on condition that the language of the note were revised.³ Monsieur Marinković was reported to have replied by repeating the demand for the release of Jurašković without agreeing to President Ahmed Zogu's condition; and on the 3rd June Monsieur Saković, under instructions from Belgrade, presented a second note demanding either the instant release of Jurašković or the grant of passport *visas* for himself and his staff. The Albanian Government rather reluctantly chose the latter alternative, and Monsieur Saković, after refusing all compromise, left Albania with his entire staff on the 4th.⁴ The Albanian Government refrained for the moment from following suit by recalling its Minister Tsena Beg from Belgrade;⁵ but it telegraphed its own version of the affair, on the 5th, to the Secretariat of the League of Nations;⁶ and the

¹ He appears to have been of Montenegrin origin.

² The Yugoslavs appear to have maintained, first, that the proper documents did exist, though they were lodged at Belgrade and not at Tirana; second, that notification had been duly given to the Albanian Government at the time of Jurašković's appointment; and third that, a few days before the Albanian authorities arrested him, they had ascertained his position from the Yugoslav Legation at Tirana unofficially (*The Times*, 6th June, 1927; *Le Temps*, 11th June, 1927).

³ *The Times*, 6th and 8th June, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 6th and 8th June, 1927; the *Corriere della Sera*, 7th June, 1927.

⁵ *The Times* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 7th June, 1927.

⁶ Italian translation of this telegram in the *Corriere della Sera*, 7th June, 1927.

Secretary-General duly communicated this note to the Members of the Council for their information.¹ The Yugoslav Government, in reply, presented a note² in which it set forth its own version of the affair and expressed a willingness, though not a desire, for a League inquiry. On the 14th June Tsena Beg eventually asked for his *visa*—under pressure, it was alleged, from Tirana and not from Belgrade³—and thereupon the Yugoslav Government instructed its consuls in Albania to leave their posts.⁴ Tsena Beg actually left Belgrade on the 15th;⁵ and therewith the diplomatic rupture was complete.

Meanwhile, the Powers had been bestirring themselves again. The French Government, which seems to have been perturbed at the Yugoslav Government's precipitancy,⁶ had entered into communication with the British Government as soon as the crisis had arisen;⁷ and the two Powers apparently agreed to the same division of labour as in March: France was to concentrate her efforts upon Belgrade and Great Britain upon Rome. In this instance Sir Austen Chamberlain's task was not so difficult as before, since this time Signor Mussolini himself elected to be on the side of the angels. Indeed, throughout the crisis of June 1927, the Italian Government appears to have preached moderation at Tirana and practised it at Belgrade.⁸

Thanks to this unity of purpose among the Powers, the Albano-Yugoslav crisis was quickly resolved. After the rupture of relations, the situation had threatened to be brought to an *impasse* over a point of punctilio. Albania was afraid of 'losing face' if she released Jurašković before Yugoslavia had revised the language of Monsieur Saković's note, while Yugoslavia was afraid of the very same calamity if she revised the note before Jurašković had been released by Albania.⁹ In an identic note presented at both Belgrade and Tirana on the 23rd June, the British, French, German and Italian Governments propounded a simple means of saving both faces by proposing that the two delicate steps should be taken simultaneously.¹⁰ This

¹ *Le Temps*, 9th June, 1927.

² English translation in *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th June, 1927.

³ *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th June, 1927; *The Times*, 15th June, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 16th June, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 17th June, 1927.

⁶ *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th June, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 7th June, 1927.

⁸ See, for example, the *Corriere della Sera*, 7th June, 1927. The fact that the Italian Government consented, after Tsena Beg's departure from Belgrade, to take charge of Albanian interests in Yugoslavia (the *Corriere della Sera*, 22nd June, 1927) could hardly be interpreted as a departure from an attitude of impartiality.

⁹ *The Times*, 15th June, 1927.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 24th June, 1927; the *Corriere della Sera*, 24th June, 1927.

proposal was accepted by Yugoslavia on the 25th¹ and by Albania the next day;² and on the 2nd July the simultaneous withdrawal of Monsieur Saković's note and the release of Jurašković were duly carried out.³ Diplomatic relations between the Yugoslav and Albanian Governments were resumed in the course of August.⁴

The next 'incident' was the assassination of Tsena Beg Kryeziu, the Albanian Minister at Belgrade. Tsena Beg had been accredited to the Czechoslovak as well as to the Yugoslav Government, and shortly after his return to Belgrade he travelled to Prague in order to present his credentials to President Masaryk. At Prague, on the 14th October, 1927, he was shot at and mortally wounded by a young Albanian named Algiviadh (Alcibiades) Bebi. The assassin, who did not attempt to escape arrest, declared that he had come to Prague expressly in order to kill Tsena Beg because Tsena Beg was a Serbophil. Of Tsena Beg's Serbophilism (if that were a crime worthy of death) there could be little doubt. He had displayed it during the crises of March and June 1927, and also in an interview⁵ which he had given to a Belgrade newspaper on the eve of his departure for Czechoslovakia. It was unfortunate that his assassin had been educated in Italy and had travelled at Tsena Beg's heels from Belgrade to Prague with an Italian and not an Albanian *visa*.⁶

The next 'incident' was the signature of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty of amity and arbitration at Paris on the 11th November, 1927. The history of this treaty, and the emotion which the news of its signature aroused in Italy, have been recorded above.⁷

The next 'incident' was the signature, on the 22nd November, 1927, at Tirana, of a second Italo-Albanian treaty—this time a treaty of defensive alliance.⁸ This instrument was to run for a term of twenty years in the first instance, and then for a second term of equal length unless denounced, in the course of the eighteenth year, by one or other party (Art. 2). If and when either party were menaced or attacked, the other party was to assist it, upon request, with all

¹ *The Times*, 24th and 25th June, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 27th June, 1927.

³ *The Corriere della Sera*, 3rd July, 1927; *The Times*, 4th July, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th July, 1927.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 6th, 7th and 11th August, 1927; *The Times*, 9th and 17th August, 1927.

⁵ Extracts in *The Manchester Guardian*, 25th October, 1927.

⁶ For the assassination of Tsena Beg see *The Times*, 3rd October, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 15th October, 1927; *the Corriere della Sera*, 16th October, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Times*, 17th October, 1927.

⁷ See pp. 154–5 and 162–3.

⁸ The text is reprinted in the appendix to the present volume.

its might (Arts. 3 and 4). If it came to war, neither party was to conclude a separate peace (Art. 5). After exchange of ratifications at Rome, the treaty was to be registered at Geneva (Art. 6).

There were certain indications that the Tirana Treaty of November 1927, like that of November 1926, was not signed by the Albanian Government without misgiving. The Italian plenipotentiary found it necessary again to supplement the text of the treaty, as his predecessor had done a year before, by addressing to the Albanian Foreign Minister, Iliyas Bey Vrioni, an explanatory letter,¹ the gist of which was that, in the event of war, the commandship-in-chief of the Italo-Albanian forces would be given in Albania to the Albanian Commander-in-Chief and in Italy to the Italian, and that the repatriation of troops belonging to one country who were serving in the territory of the other would be carried out after the restoration of peace at the expense of their own Government but within a term to be fixed by the Commander-in-Chief of the other army, under whom, *ex hypothesi*, they would be serving.

It was also rumoured ² that President Ahmed Zogu had previously informed the Yugoslav Minister at Tirana that he was being pressed to conclude this new treaty with Italy, and that he had only concluded it when it became apparent that Yugoslavia was not inclined to offer him more favourable terms. This rumour was not contradicted by the statement, which appeared in a *communiqué* issued at Belgrade on the 25th November, that the Yugoslav Government had unsuccessfully attempted beforehand to dissuade the Albanian Government from concluding the new treaty with Italy and that the Yugoslav Minister at Tirana had been the channel through which this attempt had been made.³

However that might be, on the 26th November the new treaty was ratified by the Albanian Chamber unanimously,⁴ and on the 30th November by the Senate;⁵ while on the 3rd December the Italo-Albanian treaties of the 27th November, 1926, and the 22nd November, 1927, were ratified in the Italian Chamber by acclamation.⁶

In the Yugoslav Government's *communiqué* of the 25th November aforementioned, it was intimated ⁷ that Yugoslavia would protest to the League of Nations against the terms of this treaty when it was

¹ The text of Signor Sola's letter of the 22nd November, 1927, is reprinted in the appendix to the present volume.

² *The Times*, 25th November, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 26th November, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 28th November, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1st December, 1927.

⁶ *The Corriere della Sera*, 4th December, 1927; *The Times*, 5th December, 1927.

⁷ See *The Times*, 28th November, 1927.

presented at Geneva for registration; and this threat, after duly evoking an expostulation in the *Foglio d'Ordini* of the Fascist Party,¹ was actually carried out on the 2nd December in the form of a statement made to the League of Nations Special Committee on Security by the Chief Delegate of Yugoslavia, Monsieur Marković—a statement in which the Yugoslav spokesman drew attention to the conformity between the Franco-Yugoslav Pact of the 11th November, 1927, and the Covenant of the League; expressed regret that Italy had not seen her way to turn this pact from a bipartite into a tripartite instrument by the addition of her signature; and commented on the lack of faith in the League which must be the presupposition of the Italo-Albanian Treaty of the 22nd November, 1927.

In the covering letter² with which he introduced the latter instrument into the Italian Chamber, Signor Mussolini declared that, in it,

Italy looks to find the conditions of a natural equilibrium for the freedom of her communications and the security of her shores; and this is also the condition for attaining more effectively the objects of equilibrium, liberty and security in the other seas.

In this sentence the connexion in the mind of the Italian Government between their policy in South-Eastern Europe and their policy in the Western Mediterranean was indirectly but not obscurely asserted; and the same train of thought was revealed by the *Giornale d'Italia* in an open reference to a balance of forces between France and Yugoslavia on one side and Italy and Albania on the other.³ Indeed, by this time, the tension between Italy and France had become so acute and was making its untoward influence felt over so wide an area that it had become a matter of European concern.⁴

At this moment a new chapter in Franco-Italian relations was opened by Monsieur Briand's gesture of the 30th November, 1927.

¹ *The Times*, 30th November, 1927.

² Text in the *Corriere della Sera*, 3rd December, 1927.

³ Quotations in *Le Temps*, 28th November, 1927.

⁴ There could have been no more impressive testimony to this concern than the leading article which appeared on the 2nd December, 1927, in *The Times*, under the heading 'France and Italy', and which opened with the unconvincing sentence: 'The idea that two Great Powers like France and Italy could ever seriously quarrel over such an insignificant strip of territory as Albania is, of course, entirely ridiculous.'

(iii) The Treatment of the German Population in the Territory transferred from Austria to Italy under the Treaty of St. Germain, and the Effect upon Italian Relations with Austria and Germany.¹

In the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* an account has been given² of the events that resulted in the cession to Italy, under the Treaty of St. Germain (Arts. 36 and 37), of all that portion of the former Austrian Crownland of Tirol which lay within the basin of the river known in its upper course as the Etsch and in its lower as the Adige. In regard to this, it is only necessary here to note the fact—publicly stated on the best authority³—that President Wilson's concurrence in the Italian demand for the Brenner frontier had been, on the President's own subsequent confession, a mistake committed by him before he had studied the question carefully.⁴

The German population thus placed under Italian rule amounted to 234,568 according to an Austrian census of 1910 and to 195,650⁵ according to an Italian census of 1921; and the inclusion of this alien

¹ For fuller information, the reader may be referred to the following general works:

1. *Die Wahrheit über Südtirol, 1918–1926*, nach verbürgtem Tatsachenstoff zusammengestellt von Hans Fingeller, Südtirol (Diessen vor München, no date, Hüber); plus I. *Ergänzung über die Jahre 1926–7* (Innsbruck, 1928, printed by R. and M. Jenny).

2. English translation of No. 1 by C. H. Herford, *The Case of German South Tyrol against Italy* (London, 1927, Allen & Unwin).

3. P. Herre, *Die Südtiroler Frage* (Munich, 1927, Beck).

4. H. Margreiter, *Die Literatur über Südtirol seit der Lostrennung von Oesterreich* (Innsbruck, 1926, Wagner).

5. Articles from a special correspondent, published in *The Manchester Guardian* on the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 22nd January, 1928.

6. *The Situation in South Tyrol, 1918–1925*: Memorandum drawn up by the leaders of the German Political Parties (printed as manuscript).

7. 'Athanasius': *Die Seelennot eines bedrängten Volkes: Von der nationalen zur religiösen Unterdrückung in Südtirol* (Innsbruck, 1927, Marianische Vereinsbuchhandlung).

A version of the Fascist reply to criticisms of Fascist policy in the German South Tirol will be found in a series of articles published in *The Morning Post* in May 1928.

² *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. iv, pp. 278–87.

³ See Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (London, 1923, Heinemann), vol. ii, p. 146.

⁴ This fact is all the more strange inasmuch as the ninth of the Fourteen Points specifically referred to the frontiers of Italy—and this in terms with which a Brenner frontier could not be reconciled. A Brenner frontier had, of course, been promised to Italy by France, Great Britain and Russia in the London Treaty of the 26th April, 1915 (Art. 4).

⁵ This diminution is mainly to be accounted for by the fact that a certain number of Austrian citizens in the ceded territory did not opt for Italian nationality. This explanation is supported by the fact that, in the portion of the ceded territory inhabited by a German population, the figure for resident aliens rose from 9,140 in 1910 to 24,495 in 1921.

minority within the limits of the Italian state was open to criticism on several grounds. In the first place it was not a geographical necessity; for the upper basin of the Etsch-Adige was one of those regions (unhappily rare in the Europe of 1918-20) in which 'clearly recognisable lines of nationality'¹ were to be found. Owing to the mountainous character of the country and the configuration of the valleys, the German population of the upper basin could have been separated from the Italian population by a 'clean cut'² which would have enabled 357,335 ex-Austrian subjects of Italian and Ladin nationality³ (according to the Austrian census of 1910) to join Italy without subjecting more than 13,082 Germans to Italian rule, and conversely would have enabled 221,486 German Tirolese to remain citizens of the Austrian Republic without carrying with them more than 16,532 Italians and Ladins.⁴ The second point against the peace settlement in this region was that the Tirolese Germans were a highly civilized people who valued their freedom intensely—as they had shown in their struggle to recover it when Napoleon I had placed them under Bavarian rule in 1809. The third point was that the Tirolese of South Tirol had made it clear during the Peace Conference that they were unanimously and vehemently opposed to being separated from the rest of the Tirol and subjected to Italy.⁵

These inherent objections to the territorial settlement were strengthened by the fact that, at the Peace Conference, the Italian Government had not signed any treaty for the protection of minorities such as were signed, at the instance of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, by enlarged or newly created states of lesser calibre than Italy; for Signor Mussolini took his stand on this fact on the 10th February, 1926, when the Germans of the South Tirol had been suffering for more than three years under a Fascist campaign of denationalization conducted with a steadily increasing intensity.

I declare [he said] explicitly that the alien population of the Upper Adige is absolutely excluded from the category of those minorities which

¹ This was the criterion laid down in the ninth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points for the 'rectification' of the frontiers of Italy.

² For the following figures see a study by W. Winckler in *Deutsch Südtirol: Drei Vorträge* (Leipzig and Vienna, 1926, Deuticke).

³ The 28,507 non-Germans in the Ampezzo and Cavalese districts were mostly Ladins and not Italians.

⁴ The great majority of these 16,532 persons were Ladins, and in February 1919, when the country was under Italian military occupation, the Ladin parishes in the Etsch Basin joined the German parishes in protesting to President Wilson against annexation to Italy (see Nos. 1 and 2 (Ch. III in No. 2)).

⁵ See Nos. 1 and 2 (Ch. III in No. 2).

were the object of special agreements in the peace treaties. Italy will not agree to any discussion of this matter in any Assembly or Council.¹

This declaration illustrated the danger in international affairs of accepting on behalf of a sovereign state, in lieu of an enduring treaty obligation, unilateral undertakings from Ministers whose words, however sincerely uttered at the time, would not necessarily be considered binding by their successors in office; for, before the advent of the Fascist régime in Italy, undertakings of this kind in regard to the German population in the Upper Etsch Basin had been given by successive Italian ministries in emphatic terms. While successive Italian ministries had insisted, from 1915 onwards, upon the annexation of the Tirol up to the Etsch-Inn watershed, the most authoritative representatives of the Italian state had given the Germans of South Tirol explicit and repeated assurances that they would be well treated under Italian rule. For example, on the 18th November, 1918, General Pecori-Giraldi, the commander of the Italian forces which had then just occupied the Upper Etsch-Adige Basin under the Armistice, published a proclamation² in which he promised the German population that the German language should be used, in districts where it was current, side by side with Italian in the administration, and also that the use of German as the language of instruction should be continued in all German public schools and in existing private and church schools on the reasonable condition that school books and study courses should not offend against the dignity and the rights of the Italian state. Again, on the 27th September, 1919, one of the Italian delegates to the Peace Conference, Signor Tittoni, declared in the Chamber at Rome that while Italy was not legally bound to treat her minorities according to the prescriptions of the minorities treaties signed by other states, her liberal tradition made it her moral duty to act in the same way, and that the thought of oppression and denationalization was utterly alien to the Italian people.³ Further, 'the free enjoyment of their autonomous institutions' was promised to the German population of the annexed territory by Signor Luzzatti in the Chamber, by Prince Colonna in the Senate, in a speech from the throne on the 1st December, 1919, and by two Italian Prime Ministers, Signor Giolitti and Signor Bonomi.⁴

¹ Speech in the Senate at Rome on the 10th February, 1926, as reported in the *Corriere della Sera*, 11th February, 1926. (For the circumstances of this speech see p. 197, below.)

² German translation in No. 3. pp. 60-1; English translation in No. 2, pp. 81-2.

³ Text of this declaration in No. 1, p. 7, and No. 2, pp. 36-7.

⁴ Texts of these declarations in No. 1, p. 7, and No. 2, pp. 37-9.

The two Prime Ministers went so far as to suggest that the autonomous institutions in the annexed territories might serve as a pattern for devolution in Italy as a whole. It may be added that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in replying on the 2nd September, 1919, to the Austrian observations on the draft of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, declined to alter the territorial terms on the ground that the Italian Government proposed 'to adopt a broadly liberal policy towards its new subjects of German race in what' concerned 'their language, culture and economic interests', as resulted 'from the very clear declarations made by the President of the Council of Italian Ministers to the Parliament at Rome'.¹

The spirit of these declarations did, on the whole, animate the Italian régime in the Upper Etsch-Adige Basin during the first three years after the Armistice—particularly during the first period of civil administration from the 21st July, 1919, to the 8th October, 1922, when Professor Luigi Credaro was Commissioner-General Extraordinary in this annexed territory, with his seat of administration at Trent, while a Central Bureau under Signor Francesco Salata provided the channel of communication between Trent and Rome. Professor Credaro, who was a Liberal and a Germanophil, exerted himself to prevent any unnecessary disturbance of existing local institutions pending some definitive settlement of the relations of the annexed territories and their non-Italian minorities with the Italian state. The German minority, on their part, appear to have refrained from any attempt to upset or undermine the peace settlement, and indeed from any active form of irredentism. At the same time they did not seek to hide the fact that they regarded the treaty as unjust, that they had only accepted it under *force majeure*, and that they expected the Italian Government's promises of toleration and devolution to be implemented to the full. They interpreted these promises as implying not merely cultural but administrative autonomy, and the programme presented on the 17th October, 1918, to Signor Nitti by a deputation of the Deutscher Verband (that is, the union of all German political parties in the annexed territory except the Social Democrats) had included a demand for a local Landtag and a local militia, with exemption from Italian military service as its corollary.² Possibly the Verband would have gone less far in formulating their claims if they had been able to foresee the rise of the Fascist movement in Italy; but that seems to have come as a surprise even to the majority of Italians. The truth seems to be that the parade of

¹ Text quoted in the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. iv, p. 284.

² No. 3, p. 135.

liberalism which was made by successive Italian Governments between the dates of the Armistice and of the March on Rome, while not insincere, was at the same time partly a cloak for weakness—a weakness which shrank from the odium of rejecting the German minority's demands, but also shrank from giving even partial effect to them in a definitive settlement of the status of the annexed territory on liberal lines, since that would have exasperated the advocates of a policy of repression. The persistent advocates of such a policy were, first, the liberated Italian population of the Trentino (who were eager to turn the tables on their German neighbours now that these had exchanged with them the role of a minority under alien rule)¹ and, secondly, the fanatical nationalists in other parts of Italy; and these two elements, between them, were strong enough to keep the fate of the German minority in suspense until Governmental weakness ended in collapse and the Fascist régime which arose on the ruins of Italian liberalism made the policy of repression its own.

¹ It is important to note that the policy of denationalization, which the Italian Government was urged by the newly liberated Italians of the Trentino to pursue towards the newly subjected Germans of the South Tirol, had not been pursued towards the Trentini themselves under the Austrian régime. The Hapsburg Monarchy had been a dynastic and not a national state; and the policy of the denationalization of minorities, which had been inaugurated in Hungary by the Magyar Government after the *Ausgleich* of 1867; had never been taken up by the 'Government of the Kingdoms and Lands represented in the Reichsrat at Vienna'. During the century between 1814 and 1918, when the Italians of the Trentino had been included, as a non-German minority, in the predominantly German Crownland of the Tirol, they had not been the victims of any campaign against their nationality or their national language. For example, it was taken for granted that they should have facilities for education in Italian in all grades up to the university standard. The chief point of controversy was whether Italian courses should be provided at the existing Tirolese university of Innsbruck or whether a special Italian university should be founded at Trent. Under the Austrian régime the grievance of the Trentini was not that their national life was being suppressed but that they did not enjoy local administrative autonomy and, *a fortiori*, were not at liberty to unite with the Italian national state, from which they were separated by an artificial frontier. It will be seen that these hardships were slight compared with those inflicted upon the Germans of South Tirol by the Fascist Government of Italy from the close of the year 1922 onwards. The artificial frontier of 1866–1919 constituted, of course, a grievance not only for the Italian minority in the Trentino but for the Kingdom of Italy, whose strategic security was gravely impaired by the salient of Austrian territory which extended down the Adige to within nineteen miles of Verona. It may be noted, as a curiosity or an irony of history, that both the national aspirations of the Trentini and the strategic desiderata of the Kingdom of Italy would have been substantially fulfilled if Italy had accepted the offer of a rectification of frontier in the Adige Basin which was made by Austria in 1915 before Italy intervened in the General War on the side of the Entente (for this Austrian offer see the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. iv, pp. 281–2, and the map facing p. 282).

The Fascisti were already operating in the German South Tirol by the spring of 1921. At Botzen, on the 24th April of that year, they bombed a peaceful procession of Tirolese in costume on the occasion of the Botzen Fair, wounding nearly fifty people and killing a school-master who was trying to shelter a child.¹ By the summer of 1922 they were putting pressure on the local authorities in the annexed territory to enforce measures of Italianization.² Towards the end of August pressure in the same direction was successfully brought to bear by the Secretary-General of the Fascist Party upon Signor Facta's Government at Rome; and Signor Mussolini's March on Rome of the 28th October, 1922, was preceded on the 2nd October by a local March on Botzen. In the interval Signori Salata and Credaro were forced to resign, and the policy of toleration for which they had stood fell with them.

The new policy of Italianization was unfolded on the 15th July, 1923, in a speech at Botzen by Senator Tolomei, who had long been the protagonist of this policy, and had found at last, under the Fascist régime, the necessary support for carrying it through. Since Senator Tolomei's Thirty-one Points were at once explicitly adopted by the Sub-Prefect of Botzen on behalf of the Fascist Government as a statement of its own policy, and since most of them were actually embodied in subsequent legislation, it may be well to give a list of them here:³

1. Union of the annexed portion of Tirol in a single province [including the Italian as well as the German part].*
2. Appointment of Italian secretaries (town clerks) to the communes.**
3. Revision of the options [for Italian citizenship].**
4. Restrictions upon travel and residence for German foreigners; prevention of German immigration.
5. Revision of the census.*
6. Introduction of Italian as the official language.*
7. Dismissal of the German officials or their transfer to the old Provinces [of the Italian kingdom].*
8. Dissolution of the German League [Deutscher Verband].
9. Dissolution of the Alpine Unions.*
10. Prohibition of the name 'South Tirol'.*
11. Suppression of the newspaper *Der Tiroler*.*
12. Italianization of German place-names.*

¹ See No. 1, p. 12; No. 2, p. 67; No. 3, p. 187.

² See No. 3, Chapters IX and X.

³ This list is taken from No. 1, p. 9, and No. 2, pp. 48-9. In the list the points marked * were embodied in subsequent legislation and put into force; those marked ** had been embodied in legislation by the end of the year 1927, but had not yet been put into force.

13. Italianization of public inscriptions.*
14. Italianization of street- and road-names.*
15. Italianization of 'Germanized' family-names.*
16. Removal of the Monument to Walther von der Vogelweide (Botzen).
17. Strengthening of the Carabinieri and exclusion of German personnel.*
18. Encouragement of immigration and land-purchase by Italians.*
19. Discouragement of foreign sympathy with South Tirol.*
20. Dissolution of German banks; foundation of an Italian Land Credit Bank.*
21. Establishment of customs stations at Sterzing and Toblach.
22. Energetic promotion of the Italian language and culture.*
23. Establishment of Italian kindergartens and elementary schools.*
24. Establishment of Italian secondary schools.*
25. Strict control of foreign university diplomas.*
26. Development of the Institute of Studies for South Tirol.*
27. Alteration of the boundaries of the See of Brixen.*
28. Introduction of Italian as the language of the Courts.*
29. Surveillance of the Chambers of Commerce and Agricultural Associations.* [These bodies were duly placed under surveillance so far as they were not dissolved.]
30. Railway projects (Milan-Mals, &c.).
31. Increase of the military establishment in South Tirol.*

This list indicates how comprehensive and how drastic the policy of Italianization was, and to what a large extent it was actually carried out during the next three years. In this Survey it is impossible to give any systematic account of the mass of legislation, administrative action, and extra-legal activity on the part of Fascist organizations which exerted a cumulative and crushing pressure upon the minority which was the victim of this campaign of repression. A few illustrations must suffice.¹ It should be noted that while some of the laws in question—in particular those enforcing the employment, in schools and law courts, of the Italian language—were applicable to the kingdom as a whole, there were other laws and ordinances—for example, those relating to private schools and to the Italianization of names—which applied exclusively to the territory inhabited by the German minority.² It should also be noted that the local application to a linguistic minority of general laws prescribing the employment of the language of the state was not tantamount to granting the members of that minority equal treatment with other citizens who spoke the language of the state as their mother tongue.

¹ For details the reader is referred to the works cited at the beginning of this section.

² For a fuller, though still incomplete, list of measures applying exclusively to this area, down to the year 1927, see No. 2, p. 17, and No. 3, pp. 93-4.

The only sign of grace that can be discerned in the Fascist policy is that this campaign of repression which was carried on against the German people of South Tirol on the cultural and political planes does not seem to have been extended to the economic plane except in so far as that seemed necessary in order to promote the Fascisti's cultural and political aims.

The first point of Senator Tolomei's programme was carried out by the erection of the whole annexed territory in the Upper Etsch-Adige Basin—including the German South Tirol as well as the Italian Trentino—into a single province called 'Venezia Tridentina' with its seat of administration at Trent: a measure which put an end to the German minority's hopes of local administrative autonomy. The administration of this province was centralized on the regular pattern of the Italian Kingdom, which was ultimately derived from the Napoleonic Empire, and which was not compatible with the medieval traditions of local self-government which had survived in the Hapsburg Monarchy. Under the Fascist régime, the extinction of local self-government in the annexed territory was completed in 1926 by a decree which terminated it in Eppan, the last commune in which it still survived at that date.¹

The application of the principle of the exclusive use of Italian as the official language of Italy was extended, in Venezia Tridentina, from affairs of state to the affairs of local authorities and semi-public bodies by Prefectorial Decree No. 1796 of the 23rd October, 1923. Still more oppressive was a Royal Decree of the 15th October, 1925, enforcing the exclusive use of the Italian language in courts of law and in legal procedure, which was strengthened, in its application to the Circuit of Bolzano (Botzen), in a ministerial decree of the 23rd December of the same year. The compulsory Italianization of public inscriptions (by Prefectorial Decree No. 14718 of the 28th October, 1923) and of family names and titles of nobility (by a Royal Decree of the 10th January, 1926), as well as the prohibition of the employment of all or any of the components of the place-name 'German South Tirol' (by Prefectorial Decree No. 12637 of the 8th August, 1923), might be dismissed as petty vexations which were likely to lower the prestige of the Government inflicting them more than the morale of the population on whom they were inflicted. On the other hand, the campaign against education in the German language was a heavier and a more cruel stroke even than the prohibition of the use of German in the courts of law.

The Italianization of education was carried out remorselessly by

¹ See No. 1, *Ergänzung*, p. 13.

stages. In Royal Decree No. 2185 of the 1st October, 1923, it was provided that, in all elementary schools of the Kingdom of Italy, Italian should be the language of instruction—this provision to be brought into force by stages, over a period of five years, in communes where other languages were habitually spoken. Such other languages, however, were to be taught in supplementary classes, and attendances of these classes were to be obligatory upon children at their parents' desire. All these provisions were afterwards carried over into Royal Decree No. 432 of the 22nd January, 1925. Meanwhile, in May 1924, the Education Office at Trent had published two ordinances, one prohibiting the use of German spelling books and Gothic characters¹ and another laying down that, from the 1st October, 1924, onwards, instruction in all kindergartens should be only in Italian and that such instruction should be given only by teachers approved by the Education Office.² Moreover, on the 10th August, 1924, the Italian Minister of Education, Signor Casati, was reported to have informed the Tirolese deputies in the Italian Chamber, Herren Tinzl and Sternbach, that the school reforms had the definite political aim of denationalizing linguistic minorities. Thereafter, so far as Venezia Tridentina was concerned, the facilities for German instruction in supplementary classes were cut down by an ordinance issued by the Education Office at Trent on the 24th May, 1925; and soon permission to give such instruction at all was withdrawn by Royal Decree Law No. 432 of the 22nd November, 1925 (rescinding the relevant paragraphs in the decree of the 22nd January, 1925), which was supplemented by an Ordinance of the Education Office at Trent dated the 18th January, 1926.

The immediate effect of this policy appears to have been, not that German children in the South Tirol were effectively educated in Italian, but that they were left almost without education of any kind. The compulsory change in the language of instruction in the primary schools of German South Tirol was accompanied by the importation of teachers from other provinces of the Kingdom who had no knowledge of the German language. It was said that the more conscientious of these teachers found their task impossible and had themselves transferred elsewhere, while the less conscientious found it impossible and treated it as a sinecure. In consequence, a province which had inherited so high a standard of education from the Austrian régime

¹ See No. 6, pp. 45–6.

² Text in No. 7, p. 50. In kindergartens attended by children whose mother tongue was not Italian, the teachers were to exercise a certain discretion in the application of the ordinance (Art. 3).

that in 1926 it headed a list of the Italian provinces as ranged in descending order of illiteracy,¹ was threatened with the loss of this precious heritage; and it was on this point that the Fascist régime met with the most obstinate resistance from the German minority. A Royal Decree No. 3126 of the 31st December, 1923, had given parents the right to have their children educated privately, so long as they could show that they had the means of providing for this effectively:² and German parents in the South Tirol would naturally have availed themselves of this right on a larger scale as the insistence upon the use of the Italian language in the state schools became more stringent. On the 21st August, 1926, however, the School Inspector at Meran announced that the simultaneous teaching of more than three children from different families constituted a private school, and that no teaching that came within this category was to be carried on without his express permission;³ and by withholding such permission the Italian authorities were able to make it virtually impossible for German parents to have their children given a German education in a private school without breaking the law. In these circumstances illegal German 'catacomb schools' came into being all over the South Tirol, and were no sooner discovered and broken up in one place than they sprang to life again in another. On the 27th November, 1925, testimony was borne to the vitality of these 'catacomb schools' by an urgent and secret circular⁴ in which the Prefect of Trent exhorted the sub-Prefects of Botzen, Meran, Brixen, Bruneck, and Cavalese to exert their utmost diligence and to employ every means in their power in order to suppress them. In this contest of wills, the spirit of the German minority had not yet been broken by fines, deportations, and extra-legal acts of violence before the end of the year 1927.⁵

These were some of the lines on which the denationalization campaign in the South Tirol was carried on—not to speak of measures such as the suppression of the local German press⁶ which, in the

¹ See No. 1, p. 15; No. 2, p. 84.

² See No. 1, *Ergänzung*, p. 56.

³ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Text of this Decree No. 11471 of the 27th November, 1925, in No. 1, p. 5, and No. 2, pp. 85–6.

⁵ For Italian measures of repression, legal and extra-legal, see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 22nd January and 9th July, 1926. For the cases of Dr. Nöldin, Herr Riedl and Dr. Rent-Nicolussi, see an article by Professor C. H. Herford in *The Nation*, 11th February, 1928.

⁶ The *Botzener Nachrichten* was driven to suspend publication on the 21st October, 1925 (the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24th October and 26th November, 1925), the *Meraner Zeitung* on the 27th February, 1926 (the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 1st March, 1926). This left the German minority in the South Tirol without any daily newspaper in their own language except the *Alpenzeitung*,

tactics of the persecution of minorities, as practised in the Europe of this age, were almost common form. When the particularly harsh treatment of this German minority began to arouse the public opinion of the civilized world, the Italians were able to point out more than one inaccuracy in the reports of what they had been doing. For example, it was not true that they had forbidden the German minority to have Christmas trees at Christmas 1925,¹ and it was not true that the application to tombstones of the prohibition of public inscriptions in the German language² was officially made retrospective. The occasional defacement of existing German inscriptions on tombstones appears to have been an unauthorized demonstration of excessive zeal on the part of individual Italian officials.³ For dealing with existing graves, the Italian authorities appear to have adopted the less expensive and less obtrusive policy of refusing to renew the leases when they fell in.⁴ The prohibition only applied officially to inscriptions on the tombstones of persons who had neglected to die before the date on which the decree came into force.⁵

In 1926 the process was described by Herr Stresemann in the following terms:

I speak of the exclusive currency which has been given to Italian as the official language; the dissolution of all Alpine associations not affiliated to the Italian Alpine Club; the confiscation of their property and their huts; the prohibition of the name 'South Tirol'; the introduction of new place-names; the attempt to Italianize all German family-names; and, above all, what is happening in the sphere of education, in which the gradual disappearance of teaching in German is the goal in view. The prohibition of the employment of Gothic letters has already been carried out. This deliberate de-Germanisation of the South Tirol is an undisputed fact.

This passage occurred in a speech delivered in the Reichstag on

published at Meran under the auspices of the Italian Government by a former director of the press department in the Foreign Office at Rome (see No. 1, p. 11; No. 2, pp. 61-2).

¹ For this story and the Italian *démenti* see the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20th December, 1925; *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th January, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 11th February, 1926.

² For the prefectorial decree of the 28th October, 1923, see p. 192, above.

³ On this point see *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th November, 1927; *The Times*, 15th November, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th November, 1927.

⁴ For evidence of this see No. 2, p. 57.

⁵ According to No. 1, *Ergänzung*, p. 18, inscriptions on tombstones were privileged by a prefectorial decree of the 11th October, 1927, but this was contradicted by prefectorial decree No. 7622 of the 16th November, 1927, which ordered the removal of non-Italian inscriptions placed on tombstones at any date subsequent to the 30th September, 1927.

the 9th February, 1926, when the treatment of the German minority in the South Tirol had created a state of international tension between Italy on the one side and Austria and Germany on the other.

Until about the beginning of the year 1925, both the German and the Austrian peoples had been so fully occupied with urgent troubles of their own that they had had little energy to spare for sympathizing with the sufferings of German populations which had been placed by the peace settlement under non-German rule. In the course of the year 1925, however, conditions in Germany and Austria improved, while at the same time conditions in the South Tirol grew worse; and the result was that the public disapprobation of the Italian Government's policy—a disapprobation which was being widely felt and expressed in many countries—was expressed with special vigour in Germany and Austria, where the bond of common humanity was reinforced by the closer bond of common German nationality between the German and Austrian peoples and the Southern Tirolese. In October 1925 the Italian Government exacted a public apology from the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs on account of certain uncomplimentary references to the Italian Government and to Signor Mussolini which had been made by a Socialist deputy in the Austrian Parliament.¹ In Germany it was suggested that, in reprisal for the Italian treatment of the German minority, German tourists should boycott Italian resorts, and German consumers Italian goods; but this suggestion was deprecated by the responsible leaders of the Southern Tirolese people, on the ground that, so far from bringing them relief, it would only make their position, both economic and political, even harder than it was already.² Even so, the criticisms of Italian policy which were published in the German press evoked an anti-German demonstration at Naples on the 27th January, 1926,³ and another at Rome on the 29th,⁴ while Signor Mussolini's retort was to elicit from a number of foreign consuls, vice-consuls, and consular agents stationed at Venice a declaration, addressed to himself, to the effect that the assertions of the German press regarding the situation in 'Venezia Tridentina' were untrue.⁵ If this public testimonial to the Italian Government on the part of official representatives of foreign Powers was a departure from the usual diplomatic conventions, so likewise was a speech delivered by the Prime

¹ *The Times*, 6th October, 1925; the *Corriere della Sera*, 7th and 15th October, 1925.

² The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 20th, 21st and 30th January, 1926.

³ *The Times*, 28th January, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 30th January, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 26th January, 1926. Signor Mussolini referred to this declaration in his speech of the 6th February, 1926.

Minister of Bavaria, Herr Held, in the Bavarian Landtag on the 4th February, 1926.

We all feel [Herr Held declared on this occasion] with the German population of the South Tirol. . . . There is only one thing that we can do, and that is to make every sacrifice calculated to relieve the position of our South Tirolese brethren and to lead them back on to the path of freedom. But we must also, from this House, deliver the sharpest protest against the brutal suppression by violence of German nationality (*Deutschtum*) which, in despite of solemn promises, is taking place before our eyes in the South Tirol to-day.

The irregularity of this utterance was heightened by the fact that Herr Held, as Prime Minister of one of the *Länder* of the German Reich, had no title to make a pronouncement on a question of foreign affairs.

Signor Mussolini's reply, which he delivered on the 6th February in the Chamber at Rome, was more unconventional still. After a recital of Italy's kindness towards Germany since the close of the General War and some sallies—not in very good taste—against the medieval poetry of Walther von der Vogelweide¹ and the modern clothes of German tourists, he declared:

We shall reply to a boycott with a boycott squared, and to reprisals with reprisals cubed. . . . To make a slight alteration in the old formula, we declare that people sometimes have to pay with two eyes for the destruction of one eye, and with all the teeth in their head for the destruction of one tooth. . . .

The Germans in the Alto Adige are not a national minority, they are an ethnical relic. There are 180,000 of them . . . [and] of these 180,000 Germans, I declare that 80,000 are Germanized Italians. We shall seek to rescue them, to enable them to recover the old Italian names which are established [by the cemeteries and]² by all the public documents, and to make them proud of being citizens of the great Italian fatherland. The rest are the residuum of the barbarian invasions, when Italy, not being able to be a Power on her own account, was the battlefield of the other Powers. Yet even towards these we shall adopt the Roman policy of severe equity. . . .

The other day a Fascist newspaper printed, six columns broad, the following headline: 'Fascist Italy will never haul down the flag on the Brenner.' I have sent a copy to the editor with this amendment:

¹ It had been rumoured that the Italians intended to demolish the monument to the medieval Tirolese poet, Walther von der Vogelweide, which stood in one of the squares of Botzen. This rumour was denied by Signor Mussolini; but he took the opportunity to announce that in another square in Botzen a monument was to be erected to Cesare Battisti, an Italian nationalist from the Trentino who had served in the Italian Army during the General War of 1914–18 and had been taken prisoner and shot as a deserter by the Austrians.

² The words here bracketed are omitted in the text as it appears in the collection of Signor Mussolini's speeches entitled *Discorsi del 1926*.

'Fascist Italy can, if necessary, carry her tricolour further: lower it, never!'¹

To this challenge from Signor Mussolini Herr Stresemann made a dignified reply on the 9th February, 1926, in the Reichstag. After reciting those undertakings on the part of pre-Fascist ministries in Italy which have been recorded above, and drawing the contrast between them and the Fascist policy of Italianization, he declared that the German Government had not only held aloof from all movements in favour of a boycott but was actively opposed to them.

As regards the attitude of the Government of the Reich to what is going on [in the South Tirol], the situation is as follows: Juridically, Germany has no status for intervening in the affairs of the South Tirol. Mussolini is perfectly correct in saying that this is primarily an internal concern of Italy. Moreover, Italy has not taken upon herself any special obligations for the special protection of minorities, such as have been undertaken by the Successor States. This, however, makes no difference to the solidarity of German cultural sympathy for states of German culture, for a land and a people which has been German for centuries and which to this hour belongs to the German cultural group. . . . The right of the German people to sympathize with and feel for people of the same blood who live in other states is a right which we permit no one to take from us or to call in question.

In the same speech Herr Stresemann made the following observations regarding Signor Mussolini's allusions to the Brenner frontier:

In the negotiations for the Locarno Pact, Italy made the attempt to obtain for the Brenner frontier, too, a security based on international agreements. We too, in the course of the negotiations, were asked the question what attitude Germany would take up towards a possible inclusion of the Brenner frontier [in the scope of the pact]. The answer which we had to give to this question is, I think, self-evident. In the first place, the question was addressed to the wrong quarter. The Brenner frontier is a matter about which Austria must decide, since it is Austria that marches with Italy. . . .

Mussolini's speech not only demands the Italianisation of the South Tirol. It has been interpreted all over the world as a threat of war directed either against Austria or against Germany and Austria together. Such threats are absolutely incompatible with the spirit of the League of Nations. . . .

The utterance of such threats is either a crime or an absurdity.²

Herr Stresemann added that if Germany had already been a Member of the League of Nations she would have brought these threats to the League's notice.

¹ Translated from the text in the *Corriere della Sera*, 7th February, 1926, and checked by the text in *Discorsi del 1926* (Venice, 1927, 'Alpes'), pp. 25-38.

² Translated from the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 10th February, 1926.

To this speech from Herr Stresemann at Berlin Signor Mussolini delivered, at Rome on the following day (the 10th February, 1926), a counter-reply in which the essential passage was the following:

It is hardly necessary for me to say that I confirm my previous speech both in the spirit and in the letter—not excluding the final reference to the tricolour on the Brenner, which Mr. Stresemann may interpret as he will, but which Italians interpret in the sense that Italy will never submit to violations of those peace treaties which guarantee to her the frontiers that have been won at so heavy a cost in blood.¹

Thus, under a characteristic parade of truculence, Signor Mussolini converted a startling threat to take the offensive into an inoffensive intimation that he would defend himself if attacked by others. In the meantime, in a sitting of the Tirolese Diet at Innsbruck on the 9th February, Herr Stumpf, the Governor of the Austrian province of Tirol, had announced his intention of requesting the Federal Government at Vienna to consider whether it should not draw the attention of the League to Signor Mussolini's original pronouncement of the 6th February. As a result of this *démarche*, the Italian Minister at Vienna called on the Federal Chancellor on the 12th February in order to assure him that Italy harboured no aggressive designs at Austria's expense;² and on the 17th February the Chancellor made public³ certain statements which had been addressed by Signor Mussolini himself to the Austrian Minister at Rome in answer to a request, which the Minister had been instructed to make, for explanations of Signor Mussolini's language. On this occasion Signor Mussolini declared that not a single [Italian] combatant would ever cross the Brenner; and in these circumstances the Chancellor announced that the Austrian Government had decided not to refer the matter to Geneva. Dr. Ramek's statement gave Signor Mussolini an opening for demanding explanations in his turn;⁴ but happily it proved possible to give these to the Italian Government's satisfaction.⁵ On the other side, the Bavarian Prime Minister, Herr Held, who had received a reproof from Herr Stresemann—in the course of his speech on the 9th February—for having exceeded his province, announced that he had not intended to advocate the political liberation of the South Tirolese, but only that they should be assured

¹ Translated from the *Corriere della Sera*, 11th February, 1926, and checked by the text in *Discorsi del 1926*.

² The *Corriere della Sera*, 10th and 16th February, 1926; *The Times*, 10th February, 1926; *Le Temps*, 16th February, 1926. For the excitement aroused in the Austrian Tirol, see *The Times*, 23rd February, 1926.

³ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 18th February, 1926.

⁴ The *Corriere della Sera*, 20th February, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 23rd February, 1926.

of those cultural rights which were the common patrimony of all minorities.¹ With this interchange of explanations the incident closed.

This incident did not retard for more than a year the improvement in Italo-German relations which had been in progress since the termination of the General War and had been marked by the signature of a commercial treaty on the 31st October, 1925, ratifications of which were exchanged on the 15th December, 1925, on the eve of the public controversy between the two Prime Ministers. On the 9th December, 1926, an additional protocol to this commercial treaty was signed.² An Italo-German treaty of conciliation and arbitration (without an amity clause) was signed at Rome on the 29th December, 1926.³ A month later, in an interview accorded to the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, Signor Mussolini even gave his blessing to the prospect of an eventual 'Anschluss' of Austria to Germany⁴—an eventuality which he had emphatically ruled out of court in his conversation with the Austrian Minister in Rome in the preceding February.⁵ In both Italy and Germany unsentimental but energetic endeavours to improve the commercial relations between the two countries were made during the year 1927.⁶

For a moment it seemed as though this *rapprochement* of Italy towards Germany and Austria might favourably affect the treatment of the German minority under Italian rule. In December 1926 the German South Tirol was separated administratively from the Trentino and created into a new province of Bolzano (Botzen),⁷ and it was rumoured that this territorial change portended an abatement of the Fascist policy of Italianization. A separate administrative unit had been one of the points in the Deutscher Verband's programme of autonomy,⁸ and the two Tirolese deputies in the Italian Chamber sent a telegram to Signor Mussolini in which they expressed the hope that the formation of the Province of Bolzano would provide a basis for friendly co-operation between the German minority and the Italian State.⁹ Unhappily the rift in the clouds soon closed again.

¹ *The Times*, 12th February, 1926.

² *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7th December, 1926.

³ Text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 8th January, 1927.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 31st January, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st February, 1927.

⁵ *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 18th February, 1926.

⁶ See, for example, *Le Temps*, 3rd March and 18th April, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 30th June and 1st September, 1927; *The Times*, 23rd September, 1927; the *Corriere della Sera*, 20th November, 1927.

⁷ *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7th and 11th December, 1926.

⁸ See p. 188, above.

⁹ *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 11th December, 1926.

The new Italian prefect at Botzen was kept up to the mark by a local special commissioner of the Fascist Party who in turn was kept up to the mark by the General Secretary of the Party at Rome. The campaign against the German minority did not cease; and at the beginning of 1928 it looked as though the policy of Italianizing the Southern Tirolese would be superseded, if at all, by the still more ruthless policy of expatriating them in order to fill their places with Italian settlers.¹ The 'severe equity' which Rome had once practised towards the Apuani and the Boii in order to create a Greater Italy was indeed in evidence now in the German South Tirol—a land which had not been included in the definitive boundaries assigned to Ancient Italy by Augustus.

The only quarter to which the German people of the South Tirol could still look for protection was the Vatican; for the Tirolese were among the most devoted sons of the Roman Church, so that the Vatican could hardly abandon them altogether to their fate without a perceptible loss of influence and prestige, while the Fascisti, who paid little heed to international public opinion, had so far shown a disposition to avoid falling out with the Pope. This issue was raised by the death of the reigning Prince Bishop of Brixen on the 15th July, 1927. The Fascisti pressed the Vatican to fill the vacancy with a candidate agreeable to them, while the Vatican apparently felt that the appointment of an Italian to this see would be regarded as a betrayal of the Tirolese people. By the time of writing, a year had passed since Prince Bishop Raffl's death without the vacancy being filled.²

(iv) The Little Entente and its Neighbours (1927).

In previous sections of this part of the present volume³ an account has been given of Italy's 'forward policy' in South-Eastern Europe and of the difficulties which arose in 1927 as a result of that policy. The tension between Italy and Yugoslavia created by the signature of the Italo-Albanian Treaty on the 27th November, 1926,⁴ was the most important factor in the international politics of South-Eastern Europe during 1927, and the relations of the various South-East European states with Italy governed to a large extent their attitude towards one another in the course of the year.

The change for the worse in Italo-Yugoslav relations which set in towards the end of 1926 contrasted with a growing friendliness be-

¹ For the situation in the South Tirol at this time see the article by Professor Herford in *The Nation*, 11th February, 1928, which has been cited above.

² See No. I, *Ergänzung*, p. 49.

³ Sections (i) and (ii), above.

⁴ See p. 169, above.

tween Italy and Yugoslavia's ally Rumania, and in the circumstances it was not surprising that there were rumours of a change in the general trend of Rumania's foreign policy and of a forthcoming dissolution of the Little Entente—the alliance between Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia which had been inaugurated in 1920 and formally renewed in the summer of 1926.¹ Rumours to this effect were officially denied in Rumania,² and the Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia³ and of Yugoslavia⁴ both took occasion in January 1927 to contradict reports that the Little Entente was going into dissolution.⁵ The continued solidarity between the three states and the complete unanimity of their views were proclaimed with even more than the usual emphasis at the formal Conference of Little Entente Foreign Ministers which was held at Jachymov (Joachimstal) in Czechoslovakia on the 13th–15th May, 1927.

According to the official communiqués issued during the Conference⁶ and to the declarations to the press made by the delegates at the close of the proceedings,⁷ the discussions ranged over all the matters which were of common interest to the three states. On the burning question of Albania and Italo-Yugoslav relations, the Foreign Ministers were reported to have noted that each of their three Governments was united to Italy by a treaty of friendship—a statement of the case which was interpreted to mean that they had agreed on the desirability of settling Italo-Yugoslav differences in a friendly spirit. The outstanding feature of the Conference seems to have been the discussion of economic problems. The Foreign Ministers apparently reached the conclusion that definite measures must be taken to develop close economic collaboration between them, as a first step towards a general reconstruction of economic relations in Central and South-Eastern Europe. They were even reported to have agreed that it might be necessary, for the general good, to sacrifice certain national interests the protection of which had hitherto impeded commercial intercourse between the 'successor states' of the Hapsburg Empire. Although no immediate steps seem to have been taken to carry these resolutions into effect,⁸ it was perhaps

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, p. 150.

² See the *Corriere della Sera*, 9th February, 1927.

³ See *The Times*, 27th January, 1927.

⁴ See *Le Temps*, 6th January, 1927.

⁵ Reports of this kind were nothing new. Compare the *Survey for 1926*, p. 150.

⁶ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 15th and 16th May, 1927; *The Times*, 16th May; *Le Temps* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 17th May.

⁷ See *Le Temps*, 17th May, 1927.

⁸ Negotiations for a commercial treaty seem to have been taking place

significant that the Little Entente statesmen should have publicly recognized the need for a change of economic policy.

On the political plane the Foreign Ministers were reported to have reaffirmed their intention of permitting no modification of the *status quo* in South-Eastern Europe. This declaration was understood to apply particularly to possible attempts to replace a Hapsburg on the throne of Hungary.¹ During the first few months of 1927 the possibility of a Hapsburg restoration had been much discussed in Hungary and a feeling of anxiety on the subject had reappeared in neighbouring countries. The Hungarian Monarchists seem to have hoped that the new Parliament which assembled in January 1927, after elections in December 1926, might be induced to raise the question in a formal way,² but their hopes were damped by the Prime Minister, Count Bethlen, who made it clear in February that he did not consider the discussion of a Hapsburg restoration opportune.³ Formal *démentis* were also given⁴ to reports that the Hapsburg Question had been discussed between Signor Mussolini and Count Bethlen during the latter's visit to Rome in April 1927;⁵ but the renewal of Monarchist propaganda in Hungary, in conjunction with the Italo-Hungarian *rapprochement*, seems to have convinced the Little Entente statesmen that a definite movement against the *status quo* was on foot, and they apparently decided at Jachymov to remind the Hungarian Government once more of Hungary's obligations.⁶

A few months earlier, the Little Entente statesmen had also

between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia at the time of the Jachymov Conference, and in July it was reported that they had reached a satisfactory conclusion (see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 28th February and 31st July, 1927). No agreement seems to have been signed, however, and at the end of the year it was admitted that not much progress had been made in putting the projects for economic collaboration into effect—largely, it was explained, owing to the uncertainty of the political situation in Rumania (see the *Corriere della Sera*, 30th December, 1927).

¹ It would also cover attempts on the part of Austria to bring about her *Anschluss* to Germany, but this question does not seem to have been discussed specifically at Jachymov (see *Le Temps*, 17th May, 1927).

² See *The Manchester Guardian*, 31st January, 1927.

³ *Le Temps*, 15th February; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 16th February, 1927.

⁴ See *Le Temps*, 11th, 21st and 28th April, 1927.

⁵ See Section (i), pp. 158–60, above.

⁶ See *Le Temps*, 16th May, 1927. The Hungarian Government appears to have adopted a studiously correct attitude in the matter. At the end of the year inflammatory speeches by certain enthusiastic Monarchists elicited from Count Bethlen the formal declaration that his Government would take energetic measures if the agitators showed signs of passing from words to deeds (see the *Corriere della Sera*, 2nd December, 1927).

shown some concern at the prospect of the early withdrawal of the control over Hungarian armaments which was exercised by an Inter-Allied Military Commission in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty. The agreement which was reached in December 1926 for the withdrawal of the Military Control Commission from Germany¹ aroused in the other ex-enemy countries the hope of securing a similar alleviation. On the 10th January, 1927, the Hungarian Government informed the Conference of Ambassadors that it had taken steps to fulfil certain demands made by the Ambassadors in a note of the 15th December, 1925, especially in regard to recruiting regulations and to the reorganization of the single munitions factory allowed to Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon.² The Hungarian Government asked that the Military Control Commission might be withdrawn on the 31st January, 1927—the date which was to mark the termination of military control over Germany. The Conference of Ambassadors postponed their decision on this request until they had received a report from the Control Commission on the progress of Hungarian disarmament, and, in the meantime, on the 10th February, the representatives of the Little Entente Powers in Paris asked the Conference of Ambassadors to discuss the matter with them before replying to the Hungarian note.³ Their request was granted, and in a series of conversations with the Secretary-General of the Conference of Ambassadors they were able to satisfy themselves that the withdrawal of the Hungarian Control Commission would not endanger the security of South-Eastern Europe. In a note of the 26th March,⁴ the Conference of Ambassadors informed the Hungarian Government that the Commission of Control would cease to function on the 31st March, 1927, although its members would remain in Hungary until the 15th May in order to liquidate their work and would continue until that date to supervise the reorganization of the State munitions factory. Should the reorganization of the factory not be finished by the 15th May, the Conference of Ambassadors reserved the right to take such steps as might seem necessary. Moreover, the delay of the Hungarian Government in conforming with the requirements of the Peace Treaty, especially in

¹ See the present volume, Part II A, above.

² *Le Temps*, 22nd January and 3rd April, 1927.

³ Monsieur Beneš was careful to explain in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Czechoslovak Senate that this *démarche* was not due to any hostility to Hungary but was undertaken in order to ensure that the question should be settled on its merits (see *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 5th February, 1927).

⁴ For the text, see *European Economic and Political Survey*, vol. 2, No. 16, 30th April, 1927.

the matter of recruiting, had caused some concern, and in informing the Council of the League of Nations of the cessation of Allied control,¹ the Conference of Ambassadors would draw attention to this point. The terms of this note to the Hungarian Government were communicated to the Little Entente Powers on the same day (26th March).² The formal notification of the withdrawal of the Control Commission was not sent to the Secretary-General of the League until the 16th August, 1927.³ In their note the Conference of Ambassadors drew attention to the reservations put on record by the Commission of Control (in an attached report) regarding the application of the recruiting laws in Hungary, and added that 'it rests with the Council to draw such conclusions as may seem advisable in the interests of general good feeling'.

In the summer of 1927 the Little Entente states found further cause for anxiety in a campaign for revising the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon. Resentment against the terms imposed by the Peace Settlement had always been especially strong in Hungary and the active form which this resentment took in the first years after the War had been the direct cause of the formation of the Little Entente.⁴ Of recent years, however, Hungary's official policy had shown a more conciliatory trend, and if certain Magyar Nationalists had not ceased to agitate for a restoration of Hungary's pre-war frontiers, irredentist activities had been officially discouraged by the Government. Count Bethlen, who had held the position of Prime Minister since 1921, had frequently declared in public that any revision of the Peace Treaty could only be brought about by peaceful means,⁵ but a certain doubt of his sincerity had arisen in the minds of neighbouring statesmen during 1926, when he had appeared for a time to be implicated in a plot for forging French francs.⁶ The *démarche* made by the Little Entente Powers to the Conference of Ambassadors in February 1927 and the discussions at Jachymov in May were indications that distrust of Hungary's intentions had by no means disappeared in neighbouring countries. In June 1927 the situation took a new turn, when certain organs of the British press launched a campaign for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. The

¹ For the arrangements made by the Council of the League of Nations for exercising the right of supervision over ex-enemy armaments which had been conferred upon it by the Peace Treaties, see Part II A, above.

² Text of the note in *European Economic and Political Survey*, *loc. cit.*

³ Text of the note in *League of Nations Official Journal*, September 1927.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part III, Section (iii) (2).

⁵ For an interesting discussion of Count Bethlen's policy and its results see an article in *Le Temps*, 4th April, 1927.

⁶ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part II B, section (iii).

campaign was opened by an article over the signature of Lord Rothermere, published in the *Daily Mail* of the 21st June, in which the Trianon Treaty was criticized as the most ill-advised of the three treaties that had rearranged the map of Central Europe and the Powers were urged, 'as much on the ground of expediency as of justice', to revise the frontiers laid down in the treaty in the light of the experience of the last seven years. This support from a well-known British journal (the actual influence of which was perhaps not correctly gauged on the Continent) had the unfortunate effect of encouraging irresponsible elements in Hungary to hope that their dreams of integral or, short of that, substantial territorial rehabilitation might after all be translated into fact, and the excitement in Hungary¹ produced its inevitable reaction in neighbouring countries. The agitation against any revision of the Peace Treaty seems to have been particularly acute in Slovakia,² and Monsieur Beneš, in a statement to the Czechoslovak Senate in July, deplored the bad effect of the *Daily Mail's* campaign.³ The situation threatened to become strained, but at the beginning of August Count Bethlen poured oil on the troubled waters by making a public declaration that his Government did not support the campaign, that neither he nor any member of his Cabinet had had any relations with Lord Rothermere, and that in his view the moment had not yet arrived for any suggestion of treaty revision.⁴ Count Bethlen's state-

¹ On the effect of Lord Rothermere's article on Hungarian opinion, see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29th June and 4th August; *Le Temps*, 30th July, 1927. Actually, Lord Rothermere did not suggest the restoration of the pre-war frontiers of Hungary but a series of local rectifications of the frontier set up by the Treaty of Trianon which would have had the effect of restoring to their mother-country a certain portion of the Magyar minorities assigned by the treaty to Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia without replacing under Magyar rule the much larger non-Magyar populations which had formerly been subject to Hungary. Territorially, Lord Rothermere's proposed frontiers approximated much more closely to the new frontiers of Hungary than to the old; and rectification on some such lines, supposing that upon closer study it were found to be feasible geographically, might have promoted the cause of peace and stability in South-Eastern Europe if it had been put forward at a judiciously chosen moment, and in a judicially conceived form. As it was, the intransigent Magyar nationalists seem to have leapt to the conclusion that Lord Rothermere's campaign, by calling the Trianon frontiers in question, had opened the door not for a rectification of these new frontiers, but for an integral restoration of the old frontiers as they had stood before the collapse of the Dual Monarchy.

² See *Le Temps*, 17th September, 1927.

³ Monsieur Beneš's disapproving pronouncement led to an exchange of letters between him and Lord Rothermere (see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 21st July; the *Corriere della Sera*, 22nd and 24th July, 1927).

⁴ See the *Corriere della Sera*, 7th August; *Le Temps*, 8th August, 1927.

ment relieved the tension, but the Czechoslovak Government nevertheless thought it necessary to ask the British Government for an assurance that the campaign launched by Lord Rothermere had no official support.¹ The required assurance was given to the Czechoslovak Minister in London, and, in a conversation at Geneva in September, Sir Austen Chamberlain authorized Monsieur Beneš to declare that the British Government's policy remained the policy of the Peace Treaties. In communicating these assurances to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Czechoslovak Chamber on the 26th October, Monsieur Beneš expounded the view that the movement against the Trianon Treaty was connected with that against the agrarian reforms carried through by the Successor States,² and that both were the work of international groups which expected to profit if the *status quo* in Central Europe were overturned.³

If the events of 1927 showed that the Little Entente, as a body, was still unlikely to agree to any modification of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon in Hungary's favour, it did not follow from the unanimity of the three states on this fundamental question that the individual relations of each of the three with Hungary must necessarily pursue the same course, and, in point of fact, the policies of Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia diverged considerably on this point. Between Hungary and Rumania a long-standing dispute over the property of Hungarian optants in Transylvania⁴ came to a head during 1927, with the result that relations between the two countries were considerably strained. Between Hungary and Czechoslovakia a commercial treaty on the most-favoured-nation basis was signed on the 31st May, together with five conventions dealing with transit and customs matters.⁵ Ratifications of this treaty were exchanged on the 24th July and it came into force on the 8th August. On the 3rd June, also, an agreement was signed providing for the exchange of administrative documents between the two states. Between Hungary and Yugoslavia a marked tendency

¹ On the 8th September *The Daily Mail* published a letter from Mr. Lloyd George in which he laid stress on the fact that the Peace Treaties were not intended by their authors to be immutable. The appearance of this letter seems to have caused renewed anxiety in Central Europe (see *The Manchester Guardian* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 9th September, 1927).

² The particular application of this reference to agrarian reforms was presumably to the Hungaro-Rumanian dispute over the property of Hungarian optants to which the Rumanian agrarian laws had been applied. This dispute will be dealt with in a later volume.

³ See *Le Temps*, 28th October, 1927.

⁴ This dispute will be dealt with in a later volume.

⁵ See *The Times*, 2nd June, 1927.

to a *rapprochement* had shown itself before the end of 1926,¹ and negotiations had been opened for a treaty of arbitration. These negotiations, however, were broken off early in 1927, before they had reached a definite conclusion.² The breakdown was explained on the Hungarian side to be due to technical difficulties and to the resignation of Monsieur Ninčić, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister under whom the negotiations had begun,³ but the real reason may have been Yugoslav resentment at the success of Signor Mussolini's attempt to bring Hungary into close relations with Italy.⁴ Both Yugoslavia and Hungary, however, had reasons for not allowing the efforts of Italian diplomacy to interfere permanently with the *rapprochement* between them: Yugoslavia because the very success of Italy's 'forward policy' in South-Eastern Europe, which appeared to threaten her with isolation, made her anxious to improve her relations with her neighbours; Hungary because the facilities for her trade in the Port of Fiume which she had secured by her agreement with Italy⁵ would be of little practical value unless she could come to terms with Yugoslavia regarding traffic rates for goods in transit from Hungary to Fiume across Yugoslav territory.⁶

Just before the signature of the Italo-Hungarian treaty of friendship on the 5th April, 1927, a new Hungarian Minister had arrived at Belgrade, and it was announced that negotiations for economic and arbitration treaties would shortly be reopened.⁷ The negotiations do not seem actually to have begun until about the middle of September 1927,⁸ but when once they had opened they made satisfactory progress. It was apparently decided that an attempt should be made to solve outstanding technical problems before the question of an arbitration treaty was discussed,⁹ and by the end of September the delegates were reported to have agreed on the general provisions of a commercial treaty and of a veterinary convention.¹⁰ By the middle of December agreement seems to have been reached in principle on a number of conventions dealing with financial, juridical and administrative questions,¹¹ but none of these conventions had actually been signed by the end of the year.

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part II B, Section (i).

² See p. 157, above.

³ *Le Temps*, 25th March, 1927.

⁴ See Section (i), above.

⁵ See pp. 156-9, above.

⁶ See *Le Temps*, 1st June and 20th August, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1st April and 5th May, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd May.

⁸ *Le Temps*, 12th and 25th September, 1927.

⁹ *The Times*, 4th October, 1927.

¹⁰ *Le Temps*, 28th September, 1927.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 10th December, 1927. Compare a statement by Monsieur Walko, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, reported in *Le Temps*, 22nd December, 1927.

The desire of the Yugoslav Government to strengthen its position against possible encroachment by Italy, which led to these new attempts to settle outstanding questions with Hungary, seems to have been the governing principle of Yugoslav foreign policy during 1927. The most important result of this policy—the signature of a treaty of friendship with France on the 11th November, 1927—has been recorded elsewhere.¹ Other manifestations of the same policy were the negotiations with Germany which resulted on the 6th October, 1927, in the signature of a commercial treaty, to take the place of a provisional agreement concluded in 1921,² and the friendly reception given to a party of German journalists who visited Belgrade in the autumn; the offer made by Monsieur Marinković, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, to the Greek Foreign Minister at Geneva in September³ to negotiate a new agreement in place of the treaty of alliance and the conventions regarding Salonica which had been signed on the 17th August, 1926, and rejected by the Greek Chamber on the 25th August, 1927;⁴ and the announcement, also in September 1927, that the Yugoslav Government had decided in principle to raise the sequestration on Turkish goods.⁵ At the beginning of 1927, it even looked as though Yugoslavia's desire for powerful allies might lead to a *rapprochement* with Russia. A conference of economic organizations took place at Belgrade in February, to consider existing commercial relations with Russia and the advisability of concluding a commercial treaty. The project for a treaty appeared to have influential support, and there was a tendency for a time to recall with gratitude the part played by Russia in freeing the Slav races from Turkish rule and to make little of the danger of communist propaganda;⁶ but no definite steps seem to have been taken to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Government.

It was in Yugoslavia's relations with Bulgaria, however, that the tendency towards conciliation was most marked in 1927. In March 1927, in the Skupsčina at Belgrade, Monsieur Perić, who was then acting as Yugoslav Foreign Minister, referred to Bulgaria as Yugoslavia's 'blood relation'.⁷ This friendly reference was followed in

¹ See Section (i), above.

² See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 9th June, 11th September and 7th October, 1927; *The Times* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 7th October. The treaty was approved by the Skupsčina on the 26th November (the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 27th November, 1927).

³ See *The Times*, 24th November, 1927. Cf. *The Times*, 4th October, 1927.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part II B, Section (ii).

⁵ *Le Temps*, 5th September, 1927.

⁶ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th February, 1927.

⁷ See *The Times*, 22nd March and 4th October, 1927.

March by the appointment as Yugoslav Minister at Sofia of Monsieur Nešić, who was known to be strongly in favour of a *rapprochement* with Bulgaria.¹ In June Father Korošec, the leader of the Slovene Clerical Party, visited Sofia and had interviews with a number of political leaders and with King Boris. On his return to his own country Father Korošec seems to have declared that a *rapprochement* with Bulgaria ought to form the pivot of Yugoslavia's foreign policy.² In September friendly conversations took place at Geneva between the Foreign Ministers of the two states, Messieurs Marinković and Burov, and although rumours that a pact of friendship had been concluded were declared to be unfounded, the two statesmen were reported to have examined various questions of common interest and to have agreed on the desirability of establishing cordial relations.³

The improvement in Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations which had been taking place during the first eight months of 1927 had been facilitated by a decrease in frontier incidents, and it was noticeable that when incidents did occur⁴—either in the form of komitaji raids from the Bulgarian side of the frontier or of Agraro-Communist raids from the Yugoslav side—the Government whose nationals suffered no longer insisted that the other Government was directly responsible. This growing inclination to believe in each other's good faith augured well for the success of the movement for *rapprochement*, but, unfortunately, hostile influences now came into play. No sooner had the conversation taken place between Monsieur Marinković and Monsieur Burov at Geneva than the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization decided to take a hand in the game once more.⁵ Early in 1927 the Organization had appeared for a time to have abandoned violence for the more peaceful methods of political propaganda,⁶ but

¹ *The Times*, 19th March, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 18th, 20th and 22nd June, and 12th July, 1927.

³ See Monsieur Marinković's account of the interview, reported in *Le Temps*, 16th September, 1927. The subject of a commercial treaty had been broached through the ordinary diplomatic channels, and it had been arranged provisionally that formal negotiations should begin in the autumn (see the *Corriere della Sera*, 2nd September, 1927). The negotiations had not begun by the end of the year.

⁴ For reports of minor incidents on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier during the first eight months of 1927 see the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *The Times*, 13th April; *The Times*, 19th May and 25th June; *Le Temps*, 28th June; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 2nd September; *Le Temps*, 4th September, 1927.

⁵ For an account of the dissensions between Macedonian organizations and of the general position in Macedonia at this time, see a series of articles from 'a correspondent lately in the Near East' published in *The Times* on the 27th, 29th and 30th August, 1927.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 5th March, 1927.

for some months past the tension had been increasing between its members and the Bulgarian Government. Under Monsieur Liapchev's leadership¹ the Government had taken a firmer line on the subject of outrages likely to disturb international peace since August 1926, when a series of incidents had provoked Bulgaria's neighbours to send her a joint note of protest and had threatened to compromise the success of the scheme for the settlement of refugees in Bulgaria.² In the spring of 1927 the Graeco-Bulgarian Mixed Emigration Commission (which supervised the exchange of populations between Greece and Bulgaria in accordance with a convention signed at Neuilly on the 27th November, 1919)³ had decided to liquidate Bulgarian ecclesiastical and scholastic property in those villages of Greek Macedonia whence the majority of the Bulgarian population had emigrated. This decision was deeply resented by the Bulgarian emigrants concerned, and their cause was taken up by the Macedonian Organization.⁴ Macedonian opinion was further inflamed in the course of the summer by news of the arrest of a number of students at Yugoslav universities, whose only crime, according to the Macedonian version, was the dissemination of Bulgarian literature.⁵ Added to these grievances was the reluctance of certain Macedonian leaders to see any improvement in Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations which might lead eventually to a settlement of the Macedonian question over their heads.

The interview between Monsieur Marinković and Monsieur Burov at Geheva was apparently the spark which fired the train. At all events, it was followed almost immediately by a new and intensive campaign of violence launched by the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. The main feature of the campaign was that the guerrilla activities of komitaji bands across the Bulgaro-Yugoslav and Bulgaro-Greek frontiers were supplemented by bomb outrages. On the 16th September a bomb was exploded at Gevgeli, on the Graeco-Yugoslav frontier,⁶ and a few days later an unsuccessful attempt was made to blow up a train in Yugoslav Macedonia, close to the Greek frontier.⁷ On this occasion a document emanating from the Mace-

¹ In July 1927 Monsieur Liapchev seems to have told the Macedonian representatives in the Sobranje that the influence of secret and irresponsible organizations upon Bulgarian foreign policy had had a disastrous effect in the past and would not be tolerated by his Government (see *ibid.*, 10th October, 1927).

² See the *Survey for 1926*, Part II B, Section (vi).

³ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part II E, Section (vi).

⁴ *The Times*, 14th, 16th and 18th April, 1927; *Le Temps*, 20th June, 1927.

⁵ *The Times*, 30th September, 1927. ⁶ *Ibid.*, 19th September, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 21st September, 1927. A similar

donian Revolutionary Organization and threatening further outrages of the same kind was reported to have been found pinned to a tree.¹ On the 22nd September Monsieur Nešić, the Yugoslav Minister at Sofia, received instructions from his Government to point out to the Bulgarian Government that good relations were imperilled by such outrages.² It was significant that this *démarche* was made in a friendly way³ and that, in a conversation with Monsieur Liapchev on the 26th September, Monsieur Nešić explained that there was no question of a formal protest, since his Government realized that the Bulgarian Government could not be held responsible for the activities of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.⁴ A further bomb attempt at Kočani on the Yugoslav frontier on the 26th September⁵ was followed on the 28th by the arrest at Salonica of three komitajis, who appear to have acknowledged their intention of blowing up various public buildings in Salonica, including the Yugoslav consulate.⁶ Komitaji raids were also reported at the same time from the Greek frontier,⁷ and on the 30th September a Greek note of protest seems to have been presented to the Bulgarian Government.⁸ A conversation between Monsieur Liapchev and the Greek *chargé d'affaires* at Sofia was reported to have been conducted in a friendly manner,⁹ and the Greek Government apparently accepted the Bulgarian explanations as satisfactory.¹⁰

Both the Yugoslav and Greek Governments had shown a conciliatory spirit under this fresh provocation which contrasted favourably with their attitude in previous years; but this did not mean that resentment against the renewal of outrages in Macedonia was entirely absent. Accounts of further komitaji activities at Kratovo and Strumitza at the beginning of October were reported to have

attempt to wreck a train between Veles and Ištup appears to have been made as early as June (*The Manchester Guardian*, 24th September, 1927).

¹ *The Times*, 22nd September, 1927.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 24th September, 1927.

³ *The Corriere della Sera*, 23rd September; *Le Temps*, 24th September, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 27th September; *Le Temps*, 28th September, 1927.

⁵ *Le Temps* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 28th September, 1927.

⁶ *The Times* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 29th September; *The Manchester Guardian*, 30th September, 1927.

⁷ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 30th September; *The Times*, 1st October, 1927. For reports of earlier incidents on the Greek frontier during 1927 see *Le Temps*, 30th January; *The Times*, 31st January; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 6th May; *The Times*, 13th May; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 26th July and 1st August, 1927.

⁸ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 30th September; *Le Temps*, 1st October; *The Times*, 3rd October, 1927.

⁹ *The Corriere della Sera*, 2nd October, 1927.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 4th October, 1927.

caused great excitement at Belgrade,¹ and the excitement rose to fever heat when General Koračević—the officer in command of the Yugoslav forces at Ištup—was assassinated on the 5th October.² The Yugoslav Government promptly ordered the closing of the Bulgarian frontier and the reinforcement of Yugoslav frontier guards in Macedonia,³ but these measures did not prevent further incursions by raiding bands,⁴ and a large section of the Belgrade press called upon the Government to take stronger action.⁵ The Government, however, showed no intention of allowing its hand to be forced, and the representatives of the Great Powers used their influence in favour of moderation.⁶

On the 7th October Monsieur Nešić had an interview with Monsieur Burov, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister. The Yugoslav Minister was reported to have explained the measures taken by his Government, to have produced proof that the authors of recent outrages were agents of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, and to have asked to be informed without delay whether the Bulgarian Government was prepared to suppress the Organization. Monsieur Burov returned a conciliatory reply, and the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, meeting later on the same day, decided, after a lengthy discussion, to proclaim martial law in Bulgarian Macedonia.⁷ This decision was communicated to Monsieur Nešić on the 8th October;⁸ authority to proclaim martial law was obtained by telegraph from King Boris, who was absent from the country; and a state of siege came into existence in the districts of Petrich and Kustendil on the 10th

¹ See *The Times*, 3rd October, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 6th October; *The Manchester Guardian*, 7th October, 1927. For the suggestion that General Koračević had been selected as a victim by the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization because he had made himself popular in the district, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th October, 1927.

³ *The Times*, 7th October, 1927.

⁴ See the *Corriere della Sera*, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *The Times*, 8th October, 1927.

⁵ *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th October, 1927.

⁶ The French and British Ministers at Belgrade seem to have called on Monsieur Marinković on the 7th October (*Le Temps*, 9th October). The situation was also discussed between Monsieur Briand and Sir A. Chamberlain in Paris and the two statesmen were reported to have agreed that pressure should be exercised on Belgrade, if necessary, to restrain any tendency to intransigence, and that the Bulgarian Government should be advised at the same time to make every possible concession (see *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th October, 1927). The *démarche* of the Powers was apparently not made at Sofia until the 10th October, when the situation was already less strained (see *The Times*, 12th October, 1927).

⁷ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th October, 1927.

⁸ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

October. All public authority was taken over by military officers, and certain of the garrisons in which disaffection was suspected were replaced by troops less likely to be under the influence of Macedonian revolutionaries. In a further interview with Monsieur Burov on the 10th October, Monsieur Nešić intimated that his Government was satisfied with the measures taken, and with this intimation the crisis practically came to an end.¹

The declaration of martial law in the frontier districts—which was approved by the Sobranje at the end of October, though not without some hostile comment from Opposition deputies²—did not have the effect of putting an immediate end to frontier incidents. Minor affrays continued throughout October on both the Yugoslav and Greek frontiers,³ and towards the end of the month it was announced that a civilian armed force was to be maintained in Greek refugee colonies near the frontier in order to help the regular frontier guards if necessary and that the Greek and Yugoslav guards had arranged to keep each other posted as to the movements of komitajis in order to co-operate against them.⁴

In the middle of November the trial began at Skoplje of fifteen of the Macedonian students who had been arrested in the summer⁵ and who were charged with belonging to a secret society affiliated to the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and with espionage on behalf of the Organization. Eleven of the accused students were convicted in December and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from five to twenty years.⁶ The progress of the trial was accompanied by a fresh batch of outrages.⁷ The most serious of these occurred at Strumitza early in December, when the explosion of a bomb injured several people.⁸

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th October; *The Times*, 12th October, 1927.

² *The Times* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 25th October, 1927.

³ See the *Corriere della Sera*, 14th, 18th and 23rd October; *The Times*, 18th, 20th and 25th October; *Le Temps*, 23rd and 29th October; *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th October, 1927.

⁴ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 22nd October, 1927.

⁵ See above, p. 211.

⁶ See *The Times*, 17th November, 7th and 12th December; *The Manchester Guardian*, 6th December; the *Corriere della Sera*, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th December; *Le Temps*, 7th December, 1927. All but two of the fifteen were reported to have complained of maltreatment by the police (*The Times*, 9th December, 1927).

⁷ See *The Times*, *Le Temps*, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 22nd November; *Le Temps*, 24th November, 1927.

⁸ *The Times* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 6th December. Eighteen persons were reported to have been arrested in connexion with this affair (the *Corriere della Sera*, 10th December, 1927).

The frequency with which incidents continued to occur in spite of precautions on both sides of the frontier¹ was an indication of the difficulty of curbing the activities of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. The broken nature of the country in which the Organization had its head-quarters made military operations on any large scale almost impossible, and the Government could not rely on the military forces at its disposal, for a considerable proportion of the Bulgarian army was made up of Macedonian refugees, owing to the reluctance of peasants established on the land to enlist for the long periods of service for which the terms of the Peace Treaty stipulated.² The difficulties with which the Bulgarian Government had to contend seem to have been appreciated by the Yugoslav Government, and although a section of the Yugoslav press was inclined to criticize the Bulgarian Government's measures as inadequate and to suggest that the Yugoslav Government should make more stringent demands,³ it was noticeable that both the Governments concerned appeared determined not to let events in Macedonia interfere with the movement for a *rapprochement*.

When the disturbances in Yugoslav Macedonia were at their height at the beginning of October the Belgrade journal *Politika* published an interview with Monsieur Liapchev, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, in which this statesman declared that both his Government and that of Yugoslavia keenly desired to liquidate misunderstandings and to establish closer and more cordial relations.⁴ In a debate in the Skupsčina towards the end of November, Monsieur Marinković, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, expressed the hope that the Bulgarian Government would put an end to the incursions into Yugoslavia of Macedonian revolutionary agents, and refused to cast reflections on the Bulgarian Government's good faith by discussing the measures which Yugoslavia might take if this hope were not fulfilled.⁵ In December Monsieur Marković, a former Yugoslav Minister, addressing a 'League for the *Rapprochement* of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia' at Geneva, declared that incidents created by the action of individuals or of illegal organizations ought not to shake the faith of those in authority in the possibilities of collaboration, and hinted that Italian

¹ Towards the end of November the Bulgarian authorities were reported to have carried out a house-to-house search at Kustendil and to have made a number of arrests (*The Times*, 23rd November, 1927).

² On the difficulty of grappling with the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization see *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th October, 1927.

³ See *The Times*, 8th November, 1927.

⁴ See *ibid.*, 8th October, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 24th November, 1927.

influence was behind the efforts which were being made to keep the two states apart.¹

Jugoslav uneasiness in regard to Italy's intentions was no doubt largely responsible for the moderation shown by the Government at Belgrade on the subject of the Macedonian outrages; but the Jugoslav-Bulgarian *détente* was also a symptom of a general improvement in Bulgaria's international position. The scheme for the settlement of refugees in Bulgaria which was adopted by the League of Nations in 1926, with the consent of Bulgaria's neighbours, has been described elsewhere;² but it may be noted that the increased stability resulting from the knowledge that the refugee problem was on the way to a solution was one of the factors which made it possible for the crisis of October 1927 to be surmounted with comparative ease.

There were still certain questions outstanding between Bulgaria and Rumania in 1927, especially in regard to the sequestration of Bulgarian property in Rumania, but, although the Bulgarian Government declared that it was anxious to negotiate on this subject,³ no steps seem to have been taken by the end of 1927 to achieve a settlement. Between Bulgaria and Greece a provisional commercial agreement was signed on the 28th February, 1927, and a railway agreement on the 9th September, and although Greece, like Yugoslavia, suffered from the renewal of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization's activities, Graeco-Bulgarian relations do not appear to have become seriously strained on this account. On the 9th December an agreement was signed at Geneva, under the auspices of the Mixed Emigration Commission, regarding the financial obligations incumbent upon the Greek and Bulgarian Governments as a result of the exchange of populations under the Neuilly Convention.⁴ The liquidation of the property of emigrants had given rise to much dispute, and the conclusion of this agreement seemed likely to remove a serious cause of friction.

Perhaps the best test of the improvement in Bulgaria's position was afforded by the readiness with which the Governments of the Little Entente states agreed to the proposal for the final withdrawal of Allied control over Bulgaria's armaments. Since the 15th February,

¹ *Le Temps*, 18th December, 1927. After the assassination of General Koračević the suggestion had appeared in the Jugoslav press that the authors of this and other outrages were financed and encouraged by 'a certain Power' which feared a Bulgaro-Jugoslav *rapprochement*, and rumours were even current that munitions of Italian origin had been found at places where outrages had occurred. (See *The Times*, 10th October, 1927.)

² *Survey for 1926*, Part II B, Section (vi).

³ See *The Times*, 2nd September, 1927.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part II E, Section (vi).

1922, that control had been exercised by a Liquidation Commission, which had succeeded the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control. Towards the end of May 1927 the Bulgarian Government was informed¹ that the Conference of Ambassadors had decided, with the full approval of the Little Entente states, to dissolve the Liquidation Commission as from the 31st May, 1927, but that one member of the Commission would remain in Bulgaria a few weeks longer to liquidate various activities.²

Before the end of 1927 the decision was also taken to withdraw the Liquidation Commission which had superseded the Military Commission of Control in Austria in 1923. In the summer of 1927 this Liquidation Commission had drawn attention to its existence by protesting to the Austrian Federal Government against a proposal of the Vienna Municipal Council to establish a new armed police force. On the 15th and 16th July serious riots had taken place in Vienna, in the course of which about one hundred persons had lost their lives and considerable damage had been done to public property—the Law Courts, for instance, were burnt to the ground. The cause of the riots had been the acquittal of certain members of a Fascist organization—the ‘Frontkämpfer’—who had been accused of killing a Socialist ‘Kriegsinvalid’ and a child during an affray between ‘Frontkämpfer’ and members of the Socialist ‘Schutzbund’ which had occurred in the Burgenland at the end of January 1927.³ For the protection of the city during the emergency, the Socialist Municipality of Vienna had recruited special constabulary from among the members of Socialist semi-military organizations, and on the 30th July the Municipal Council had approved a proposal for maintaining this special force on a permanent basis, as an armed civil guard one thousand strong.⁴ This project had aroused strong opposition among non-Socialist elements in Vienna,⁵ and had also

¹ *The Times*, 30th May, 1927.

² *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 2nd June, 1927. For a general account of the supervision of Bulgarian disarmament, see *Le Temps*, 17th August, 1927.

³ This affair had taken place close to the Hungarian frontier, in territory the possession of which had formerly been in dispute between Austria and Hungary (see *Survey for 1920-3*, Part III, Section (iii) (3)). It was therefore significant of an improvement in Austro-Hungarian relations that the Austrian Federal Chancellor, Mgr. Seipel, should have taken occasion to declare that the disturbances had no connexion with any irredentist movement across the frontier (see *Le Temps*, 5th February, 1927). See *loc. cit.*, for the rumour that the ‘Schutzbund’ had been preparing an armed demonstration against Hungary.

⁴ See *The Times*, 29th July and 1st August; the *Corriere della Sera*, 31st July; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 31st July; *Le Temps*, 1st August, 1927.

⁵ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st August, 1927.

caused concern to the members of the Allied Liquidation Commission, who decided (apparently on their own initiative, after consultation with the diplomatic representatives of the Powers at Vienna, and not on instructions from the Conference of Ambassadors)¹ to point out to the Federal Government that the new force would contravene the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain, which prohibited the employment of local or municipal police in numbers exceeding those employed in a similar capacity in 1913, except in the case of an increase in population. The Liquidation Commission's *démarche* was made on the 29th July, before the Municipal Council formally approved the proposal for the maintenance of the special force.² On the 5th August, the Socialist Burgomaster of Vienna, in answer to an appeal from the Federal Chancellor, announced his decision to transform the new police force into an unarmed Communal Guard, charged solely with the duties of protecting public buildings and ensuring order.³ This change seems to have satisfied the Liquidation Commission. On the 2nd December, 1927, the Conference of Ambassadors decided that the Liquidation Commission should cease to function on the 31st January, 1928, on the sole condition, apparently,⁴ that a law should have been passed by that date for the control of the manufacture and export of war material.⁵ This decision of the Conference of Ambassadors freed the last of the ex-enemy countries from the inter-Allied control over their armaments which had been imposed by the Peace Settlement, and the responsibility for ensuring that the disarmament provisions of the Peace Treaties were not evaded rested henceforward in all four cases upon the League of Nations.

¹ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 3rd August, 1927.

² See *Le Temps*, 3rd August; *The Times*, 4th August; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 6th August, 1927.

³ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 6th August; *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th August, 1927.

⁴ A rumour that the Ambassadors' decision was contingent on the disbanding of the Communal Guard (see *The Times*, 3rd December, 1927) was subsequently contradicted (the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 13th December, 1927).

⁵ *The Times*, 3rd December, 1927. Compare the similar German law, agreement on which formed part of the final settlement of the German disarmament problem. (See p. 99, above.)

PART II

EUROPE

D. NORTH-EASTERN EUROPE (1926-7)

(i) Introduction.

THE general situation in North-Eastern Europe during the years 1926-7 remained what it had been in 1925.¹ The chief pre-occupations of all the states bordering on the U.S.S.R. were their relations with that Power; and of the two international affairs in North-Eastern Europe during these years which involved most danger to peace, one—the murder of the Russian Minister at Warsaw in June 1927²—directly concerned the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the leading North-East European state, Poland, while the other—namely, the crisis in Polono-Lithuanian relations which occurred at the end of the year³—might have been taken less seriously by the Council of the League of Nations but for the probability that the U.S.S.R. would have intervened if the crisis had ended in a conflict. Yet while the general situation had not changed, there was a distinct diminution in the tension as compared with previous years. The symptoms of tension—frontier incidents, espionage trials and the rest—did not indeed cease to show themselves; but they declined in frequency, they produced a less untoward effect when they did occur, and they were offset by a number of contrary symptoms portending a resumption of normal international intercourse. International relations in North-Eastern Europe were also affected during the years 1926 and 1927 by internal developments in the several countries. For example, the coming into office of a Social-Democratic Government in Latvia on the 18th December, 1926, was followed by a *rapprochement* between Latvia and Soviet Russia which gave umbrage to Estonia and caused a certain uneasiness in Finland and Poland.⁴ Again, the military *coup d'état* which brought Professor Voldemaras into power in Lithuania on the 17th December, 1926, was followed by a decided turn for the worse in Lithuanian relations not only with Poland but with Germany and Russia. On the other hand, the earlier military *coup* which, in May 1926, had brought Marshal Pilsudski into power in Poland does not appear to have

¹ See *Survey for 1925*, pp. 226-32.

³ See Section (iv), below.

See Section (iii), below.

⁴ See Section (ii), below.

introduced any additional element of instability into the relations between Poland and her neighbours; and Marshal Pilsudski cast his influence in favour of peace during the Polono-Lithuanian crisis of December 1927.¹ As for the split in the Russian Communist Party, which came to a head in November 1927,² and which was by far the most important internal development in any of the countries concerned during the years in question, it was still too early to tell what effect it would have upon the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the border states of North-Eastern Europe.

As between Poland and Russia, frontier incidents were reported on the 20th and 28th August and the 22nd September, 1927,³ though the situation along the Polish-Russian frontier was distinctly improved by the institution of local mixed commissions. There were also espionage cases on both sides. An espionage organization working in Poland on the Soviet Government's account was reported to have been discovered by the Polish political police at the beginning of March 1927;⁴ and at Vilna, at the beginning of June, ten persons were condemned on the same charge to various terms of imprisonment.⁵ On the other side, in June 1927 two alleged Polish spies in Soviet territory were condemned and executed at Kharkov,⁶ and two further executions at the same place were reported in the following month.⁷

As between Lithuania and Russia, frontier incidents were geographically impossible so long as the Vilna corridor remained in Polish hands; but, in spite of the bond of common hostility to Poland which seemed likely to link these two countries so long as the existing territorial status endured, a sensational espionage case occurred in 1927. In the May of that year General Kleshinski, a former Chief of the Lithuanian General Staff, was arrested, tried by court martial and condemned to death for having sold secret military information to the Soviet Government in consideration of a monthly allowance which he was alleged to have been receiving from the Russian Minister at Kovno since 1925. The sentence was executed on the 1st June.⁸

As between Latvia and Russia, there was a frontier incident on the

¹ See Section (iv), below.

² See the present volume, Part II E, Section (i), below.

³ *The Manchester Guardian*, 22nd August, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 1st September, 1927; *The Times*, 24th and 29th September, 1927.

⁴ *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 2nd March, 1927.

⁵ *The Times*, 3rd June, 1927.

⁶ *The Times* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 18th June, 1927; *Le Temps*, 19th June, 1927.

⁷ *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st July, 1927; *The Times*, 9th July, 1927.

⁸ *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 25th and 29th May, and 2nd June, 1927; *The Times*, 2nd June, 1927.

12th February, 1926.¹ In July 1926 the Latvian and the Soviet Governments were reported² to have signed an agreement for settling minor frontier incidents by mixed commissions on the spot instead of by exchanges of notes. On the 12th January, 1926, a trial at Riga of nineteen communists who were charged with plotting to overthrow the existing order in Latvia ended in the condemnation of all the accused to terms of imprisonment, in seven cases with hard labour—an event which recalled the Latvian and Estonian communist trials of the troubled year 1924.³ In July 1927 eight persons, and in October twenty-three others, were arrested in Latvia on the charge of being spies in the service of the U.S.S.R.;⁴ and in December seventeen persons, all of them Latvian citizens, were arrested on the charge of espionage, on behalf of the U.S.S.R., in the Latvian Army.⁵

In Estonia, on the 4th August, 1927, there was a 'shooting incident' at Reval over the attempted arrest by the Estonian police of a communist organizer from the U.S.S.R. The communist, who opened fire, wounded one policeman and was himself shot dead.⁶

A strange incident in 1927 was the arrest, trial and acquittal of Monsieur Birk, a former Foreign Minister of Estonia and ex-Estonian diplomatic representative in Moscow. On the 18th June, 1926, Monsieur Birk had been relieved of his post for having failed to comply with instructions from the Estonian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to return home and report. On the 9th March, 1927, he appeared in Estonia and gave himself up to the authorities. In the interval, articles hostile to Monsieur Piip's Government in Estonia had appeared over his name in the Soviet press. Accordingly he was put on trial not only for breach of official discipline but for high treason; but he was said to have convinced the court that his signature had in some cases been forged and in others extorted from him by terrorism. and that in July 1926 he had been on the point of leaving Russian territory for Finland when he had been stopped at the frontier by the Soviet authorities and kept under duress until he found the opportunity of evading his guards and taking sanctuary in the Norwegian legation in Moscow. Whatever the truth of this story—and it remained unconfirmed, since the court, for political reasons, decided

¹ *The Times*, 15th February, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 23rd February, 1926.

² *The Times*, 20th July, 1926.

³ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 198–202.

⁴ *The Times*, 7th July, 1927, and 15th October, 1927; *Le Temps* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 16th October, 1927.

⁵ *The Times* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 20th December, 1927.

⁶ *The Times*, 5th and 6th August, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 5th August, 1927.

not to publish details of the evidence or the ground of the verdict—Monsieur Birk was acquitted of high treason but dismissed from government service.¹

The frequency of incidents seems to have been lowest as between Finland and Russia; but in June 1927 there was an exchange of notes between the two Governments over the action of the Russian authorities in shooting at Moscow, among twenty persons put to death after the rupture with Great Britain, a certain Colonel Elvengren, whom the Finnish Government claimed as a Finnish citizen.² On the Finnish side, five persons were arrested in October 1927 on a charge of conducting propaganda and committing espionage in the Finnish Army.³

As for the Polono-Lithuanian incidents of the years 1926 and 1927, they are dealt with elsewhere⁴ in connexion with the crisis in which they culminated in December 1927.

The continuance of such incidents was offset by a tendency towards the attainment of normal economic and social relations—particularly as between Poland and the U.S.S.R., where this tendency was not permanently repressed even by such dangerous disturbing factors as the murder at Warsaw of the Russian Minister, Monsieur Voykov, in June 1927 or the 'shooting incident' at the Soviet Legation at Warsaw in the following September.⁵ In January 1926, for example, a visit was paid to the U.S.S.R. by nine members of the Polish Diet and two Polish Senators, including representatives of the non-Polish Slav minorities in Poland and one German.⁶ In February 1926, four Russian communists imprisoned in Poland were exchanged at the frontier against four Polish nationals imprisoned in Russia on various criminal and political charges.⁷ In February 1926, again, a Polono-Russian consular convention which was a corollary to the Peace Treaty of Riga⁸ was ratified by the Polish Diet and Senate.⁹ A Polono-

¹ See particularly the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 9th November, 1927. See also *The Times*, 11th March, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 11th March, 1927; *Le Temps*, 13th March, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 15th March, 1927; *The Times*, 3rd and 5th November, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 5th November 1927.

² See *The Times*, 22nd June, 1927; *Le Temps*, 23rd June, 1927.

³ *The Times*, 1st November, 1927.

⁴ See Section (iv), below.

⁵ For these two affairs see Section (iii), below.

⁶ *The Times*, 12th January, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 14th January, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian* and *Le Temps*, 15th January, 1926.

⁷ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 9th February, 1926; *Le Temps*, 10th February, 1926.

⁸ See *The History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, pp. 318–22.

⁹ *The Times*, 4th February, 1926; *Le Temps*, 25th February, 1926. In the Diet, objection was taken to the convention by the Ukrainian and White

Russian Chamber of Commerce was opened at Warsaw on the 31st January, 1926.¹ In April an agreement was concluded between the two Governments for increasing the facilities for obtaining Russian visas for Polish passports.² In March and August 1926 a Polono-Russian railway conference held two sessions, both resulting in the conclusion of agreements.³ In September 1926 another Polono-Russian railway agreement was concluded which made it possible to establish a direct overland passenger service between Western Europe and the Far East via Warsaw and Vladivostok.⁴ Through the agency of a Special Mixed Commission which had been set up under the Peace Treaty of Riga, Polish national heirlooms and archives were recovered from Russia; and on the 16th November, 1927, a so-called 'general agreement' on this matter was concluded. This agreement was in course of being executed during the year 1928. At the end of December 1927 an agreement was concluded for the exchange of prisoners, and this exchange duly took place at the beginning of January 1928.

This was the background against which the negotiations for non-aggression pacts and arbitration treaties between the states of North-Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. continued during the years 1926 and 1927.

(ii) Negotiations for Political and Economic Agreements between the Baltic States among themselves and between the Baltic States and the U.S.S.R.

In earlier volumes of this Survey an account has been given of the signature of a conciliation and arbitration convention between Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland on the 17th January, 1925; of the subsequent tendency of the three Baltic parties to this convention to revert to the policy of an exclusively Baltic *bloc*, even at the risk of offending Poland by omitting her and including Lithuania;⁵ and of the overtures for non-aggression pacts which were made in 1922 and 1923 by the Soviet Government to Poland and the several

Russian deputies on the ground that approval of it might imply approval of the Riga Treaty itself.

¹ *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 2nd February, 1926. This Chamber of Commerce appears to have entered upon an active career; and its establishment was followed up by the formation of a Polish-Russian trading organization, the 'Polros', by preparations for the negotiation of a commercial treaty, and by the attachment of a commercial counsellor to the Polish Legation at Moscow.

² *Le Temps*, 12th April, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 17th March and 14th August, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 30th September, 1926.

⁵ *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 226-32.

Baltic states individually.¹ During the years 1926 and 1927 the inclination of the Baltic States towards the formation of a Baltic *bloc* and the endeavour of the Soviet Government to induce the Baltic States to conclude non-aggression pacts with it on its own terms both still continued; and the divergence between these two tendencies set up a tension which had not yet been resolved by the close of the period under review. It will be convenient to deal first with the relations of the several Baltic states among themselves before considering the effect upon these of their respective relations with the U.S.S.R. It may be noted that Poland seems to have reconciled herself to the new orientation of policy in the Baltic States and to have discontinued those efforts to secure a united front against Russia which she had been making up to and during the year 1925.

As between Latvia and Lithuania, the discussion of commercial and arbitration treaties, which had been initiated a year earlier,² was resumed in July 1926, when the Latvian Foreign Minister held a Conference at Kovno with Monsieur Sleževičius; and the abolition of passport formalities—which, as between Latvia and Estonia, had been achieved already in November 1925—was also considered.³ In 1927 there was a further conference between representatives of the two Governments on the 6th March;⁴ Monsieur Voldemaras visited Riga on the 18th and 19th March; and the Latvian Foreign Minister in the Social-Democratic Ministry, Monsieur Cielens, visited Kovno on the 18th August.

As between Latvia, Estonia and Finland, a conference of Foreign Ministers was held at Reval on the 2nd and 3rd January, 1927.⁵

As between Latvia and Estonia, a definitive instrument to replace the preliminary customs union treaty of the 1st November, 1923,⁶ was negotiated at Riga on the 15th–17th January, 1927, and signed at the same place on the 5th February.⁷ Even this definitive treaty, however, could not bear fruit until it was completed by the working out of complicated technical arrangements,⁸ and meanwhile the relations of Latvia and Estonia with one another were disturbed by the divergent development of their respective relations with the U.S.S.R.

¹ *Survey for 1920–3*, pp. 242–3.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 230.

³ *The Times*, 28th and 29th July, 1926; 2nd August, 1926.

⁴ This conference appears to have been kept secret at the time.

⁵ *The Times*, 4th January, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 6th and 17th January, 1927.

⁶ See the *Survey for 1920–3*, p. 244.

⁷ Text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 19th March, 1927.

⁸ See a statement by the Latvian Foreign Minister, Monsieur Cielens (*Le Temps*, 23rd January, 1927).

On the 5th March, 1926, the Soviet Government made fresh overtures to Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland for the negotiation of pacts of non-aggression.¹ While still insisting that Poland should not be included in a collective pact with the Baltic States,² the Soviet Government appears for the moment to have waived its insistence that the negotiations with each of the latter should be conducted separately.³ Lithuania, however, was apparently not so far convinced of the value of Baltic solidarity as to resist the temptation of entering into separate negotiations with the U.S.S.R. if by so doing she might conceivably strengthen her hands in her feud with Poland. In April 1926 the report that Russo-Lithuanian negotiations were already on foot was officially confirmed at Kovno.⁴ A text was drafted before the end of May;⁵ and this new Russo-Lithuanian treaty was eventually signed at Moscow on the 28th September, 1926,⁶ and was ratified in both countries in the course of November.⁷

The texts of this instrument and of the notes exchanged between Monsieur Chicherin and Monsieur Sleževičius on the same date are printed in the appendix to the present volume and therefore need not be analysed here. The most striking provision was that:

The relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Lithuanian Republic shall continue to be based on the Treaty of Peace between Lithuania and Russia, concluded at Moscow on July 12, 1920, all the provisions of which shall retain their force and inviolability (Art. 1).

For this provision had to be read together with the declaration, in Monsieur Chicherin's accompanying note, that:

the *de facto* violation of the Lithuanian frontiers committed against the will of the Lithuanian nation has not shaken its [the Soviet Government's] attitude with regard to the territorial sovereignty defined in Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace, concluded between Russia and Lithuania on July 12, 1920, and in the note annexed to the said Article.

In other words, the Soviet Government put it on record that the U.S.S.R. had not ceased to recognize Lithuania's title to the possession of Vilna, which the Russo-Lithuanian Peace Treaty of the 12th July, 1920, had conceded.⁸ This public testimony was of some diplomatic value to Lithuania, since it might be argued that no

¹ *The Times*, 9th April, 1926.

² The possibility of a Polish hegemony in Eastern Europe was a matter of continual anxiety to Russia.

³ *The Times*, 29th April, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 29th May, 1926.

⁷ *Le Temps*, 7th and 11th November, 1926.

⁸ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 251.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 23rd April, 1926.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 29th September, 1926.

settlement of the Vilna question was valid without the assent of Russia, inasmuch as Russia was the last holder of an uncontested title to sovereignty over the Vilna territory. It is true that in the subsequent Russo-Polish Peace Treaty of Riga¹, signed on the 18th March, 1921, the Soviet Government had agreed (Art. 3) that, in so far as the territory situated to the west of the Russo-Polish frontier, as fixed in Article 2 of the Riga Treaty, included districts which formed the subject of a dispute between Poland and Lithuania, the question of the attribution of these districts to one of those two states was a matter which exclusively concerned Poland and Lithuania. Yet in regard to this admission it was perhaps open to the Russian Government to argue that unless and until Poland and Lithuania arrived at an agreement between themselves, it was not incumbent upon Russia to repudiate her previous agreement with Lithuania by recognizing a *de facto* frontier which had been established by force and which Lithuania had never accepted. This appears to have been the line actually taken by Monsieur Chicherin in replying on the 19th November, 1926, to a note received on the 28th October from Monsieur Zaleski, in which the Polish Foreign Minister had protested against the terms of the new Russo-Lithuanian treaty as being incompatible with those of the Treaty of Riga.²

It may be noted that the conciliation clause (Art. 5) in the Russo-Lithuanian treaty of the 28th September, 1926, was vague, the whole question of procedure being left over for subsequent settlement. It may also be noted that while Monsieur Sleževičius insisted, in his note to Monsieur Chicherin, that the neutrality clause in the treaty (Art. 2) was not to interfere with the fulfilment of Lithuania's obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations, he intimated in the same note that in practice Lithuania did not contemplate being compelled to interpret these obligations in such a way as to make the observance of the neutrality clause impossible.

After this political treaty had been negotiated between Lithuania and the U.S.S.R., negotiations for a commercial treaty were started, but these were broken off by the Lithuanian revolution of December 1926.³

Meanwhile, the Russian overtures had been treated more cauti-

¹ See *The History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, pp. 318-22, and the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 243-4. Text in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. vi, 1921, pp. 122-69.

² For this Russo-Polish exchange of notes see *The Times*, 25th October and 20th and 22nd November, 1926.

³ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 13th October and 25th December, 1926; *The Times*, 13th October and 22nd December, 1926.

ously in Latvia, Estonia and Finland. After close and prolonged consultation between the three Governments,¹ their replies were dispatched on the 5th May, 1926, simultaneously. All three notes agreed in substance, while the Latvian and Estonian notes were identical in terms. The Soviet Government appears to have proposed originally, 'first, a mutual guarantee of the existing frontiers; secondly, a mutual non-aggression pact; thirdly, a mutual agreement to maintain neutrality if the other party were involved in war; fourthly, an undertaking on the part of each State not to take part in any coalition hostile to the other.'² The three Baltic States, on their part, appear to have proposed, in their replies, first that the suggested treaty of guarantee should contain an undertaking not only not to attack the other contracting party but also to avoid anything calculated to disturb friendly relations; secondly, that a state should count as an 'aggressor' if it started a war against any of the contracting parties or assailed the independence of any of them with armed force, with or without a declaration of war; thirdly, that the suggested treaty should not conflict with the Covenant of the League of Nations; fourthly, that all disputes without exception should go before an arbitration and conciliation tribunal; fifthly, that the treaty should contain a pledge not to carry on propaganda of any kind against the other party on that party's territory; sixthly, that the signatory states should preserve the right to conclude treaties with other states so long as these were not directed against the other contracting party; seventhly, that the signatory states should recover their freedom of action in the event of one of them attacking the other in violation of the treaty; eighthly, that, with the consent of the signatory states, other states should be at liberty to adhere to the treaty.³ On the 24th July, 1926, after a conference on the 13th and 14th July between the Finnish, Estonian and Latvian Foreign Ministers at Tallinn, the three Governments followed up this first step⁴ by addressing to the Soviet Government identic notes⁵ sug-

¹ See *The Times*, 29th April, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 9th April, 1926. *The Times* adds: 'fifthly, the establishment of a peaceful method for the settlement of disputes; sixthly, a trade agreement;' but the report of these two proposals does not appear to have received corroboration.

³ *The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 13th May, 1926.

⁴ In the meantime, according to a semi-official statement made in Moscow, Poland was reported to have offered to the three Baltic States a Polono-Baltic Pact under which Poland would undertake to give them military assistance in the event of their being attacked by the U.S.S.R., without requiring a corresponding reciprocal undertaking from them (*The Times*, 26th May, 1926).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 26th July, 1926.

gesting the formation of a joint commission of representatives of the three Baltic States themselves and the U.S.S.R., with a view to working out a treaty based on the proposals cited above, which had been put forward on their side in May.

This proposal for a preliminary joint conference was rejected by Moscow; ¹ and in August 1926 the three Baltic States appear to have entered reluctantly into separate negotiations with the Soviet Government.² In these circumstances little progress was made; and the Russo-Finnish negotiations were broken off on the 24th November 1926, apparently because the Russians refused to agree to the appointment of a neutral president for the proposed conciliation commission and also refused to accept the principle of arbitration at all in a treaty with a bourgeois state, while on the other hand they asked for a clause empowering either contracting party to declare the treaty to be automatically cancelled in the event of the other party concluding an agreement with any other state.³

The Russo-Estonian and Russo-Latvian negotiations, without being formally broken off, appear to have come to a standstill which lasted until the beginning of March 1927, when the Soviet Government offered certain concessions to the Baltic point of view.⁴ While still rejecting the principle of arbitration, the Soviet Government now agreed to neutral chairmanship for the conciliation commission; and, in regard to the obligations of the Baltic States under the Covenant of the League of Nations, it further agreed to unilateral declarations on the subject being made by the parties concerned simultaneously with the signature of the treaties,⁵ though it did not agree to any reference to the Covenant being included in the texts of the treaties themselves.⁶ On the strength of this concession on the Russian side, the Russo-Estonian and Russo-Latvian negotiations were resumed,⁷ and this time they took different courses. The Russo-Estonian negotiations were suspended during the second half of 1927⁸—the stumbling-blocks being the same questions of the

¹ *The Times*, 11th August, 1926.

² For the opening of the Russo-Estonian and the Russo-Latvian negotiations see *ibid.*, 13th and 20th October, 1926, respectively.

³ *Ibid.*, 27th November and 4th December, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2nd and 5th March, 1927; *Le Temps*, 7th March, 1927.

⁵ This was the procedure which was actually followed at the signature of the Russo-Lithuanian treaty (see p. 226, above) and the Russo-German treaty (see p. 309, below).

⁶ The similar difficulty with regard to the obligations entailed in the League Covenant, which arose in the Franco-American negotiations of 1927-8 for the 'outlawry' of war, will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

⁷ *Le Temps*, 25th March, 1927; *The Times*, 10th March, 1927.

⁸ *Le Temps*, 16th June, 1927.

Covenant and the conciliation commission.¹ On the other hand, the text of a Russo-Latvian pact was initialled on the 9th March, 1927,² though the same two questions remained outstanding in this case likewise,³ and the Latvian Government declared that the signature of the pact would not follow without the simultaneous signature of a conciliation convention providing for neutral chairmanship of the commission and without an explicit unilateral declaration on the Latvian Government's part in regard to its obligations under the Covenant.⁴

The Latvian Government which took this step of initialling a Russo-Latvian pact was a Social-Democratic ministry which had come into office on the 18th December, 1926. The members of this Government were evidently anxious to come to an understanding with the U.S.S.R.; and it was arguable on economic grounds that this was the policy which was demanded by the national interests of their country.⁵ At the same time—possibly just because they represented a party of the Left—they showed symptoms of nervousness regarding the effect of their action upon public opinion, not only in Latvia itself but also abroad, in the first place in the remaining Baltic countries and secondarily in other countries belonging to the League of Nations. At any rate, they adopted an apologetic and defensive tone, and appealed to the precedents which had been set by Germany and by Lithuania.⁶ This did not, however, appease public opinion in Estonia, where the Latvian Government's action evoked strong criticism on the ground that it had been taken without consulting the Estonian Government and that this departure from the policy of Baltic solidarity, even if it was not a breach of faith, was at least a mistake in tactics which might have grave consequences for all the Baltic countries.⁷

The Latvian Government followed up the step of initialling the draft non-aggression pact by sending a delegation to Moscow in order to negotiate a commercial treaty.⁸ This delegation left Riga at the

¹ See the statement by the Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs reported in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 1st November, 1927.

² *The Times*, 11th March, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 18th March, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ There were powerful economic arguments on both sides, and this question of whether Latvia should orient herself economically—and in consequence politically—towards Russia or towards Europe was the burning question of Latvian internal politics at the time.

⁶ *The Times*, 18th March, 1927; see also a statement by the Latvian Foreign Minister, Monsieur Cielens, reported *ibid.*, 11th March, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 14th March, 1927; *Le Temps*, 15th March, 1927.

⁸ *The Times*, 25th April, 1927.

beginning of May 1927¹ and succeeded in its mission. A Russo-Latvian commercial treaty was duly signed on the 2nd June; and criticism was evoked both in Latvia itself and in Estonia by the terms of this instrument also. The Latvian commercial community criticized it² partly on the ground that the liberty of action accorded to Russian commercial organizations in Latvia was not accorded reciprocally in the same measure to Latvian citizens in the U.S.S.R., and partly on the ground that it invested several of the members and portions of the premises of the Soviet trade agency which was to be established in Latvia with diplomatic immunities which had been notoriously abused in other countries—in Germany in 1924³ and in Great Britain at the very time when the Russo-Latvian negotiations had been taking place.⁴ The Estonians criticized the Russo-Latvian commercial treaty on the ground that it would render unworkable the recently concluded Estono-Latvian customs union;⁵ and this consideration was put forward by the Estonian Foreign Minister on the 27th August during a conference with the Latvian Foreign Minister at Riga.⁶ Moreover, in October 1927, the Latvian Government went on to negotiate with the Soviet Government an arrangement for pooling the export trade in flax, which happened to be a public monopoly in Latvia as well as in the U.S.S.R.;⁷ but this arrangement appears to have fallen through owing to the action of the Soviet Government in throwing a considerable quantity of flax on the market at an 'under-cutting' price.⁸ Meanwhile, the Latvian and Estonian Ministers for Foreign Affairs had been making a personal effort to prevent the Estono-Latvian customs union from being frustrated at the eleventh hour by the Russo-Latvian commercial treaty; and in November 1927, under their joint chairmanship, the special delegations of the two Governments which had been appointed to deal with this matter, met at Tallinn.⁹ They did not, however, reach any conclusive result on this occasion.

During all this time a separate series of negotiations for a security pact appears to have been conducted between Moscow and Warsaw, and on the 27th September, 1927, the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs announced that conversations between Monsieur Chicherin

¹ *The Times*, 2nd May, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 14th September, 1927.

³ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 214–17.

⁴ See the present volume, Part II E, Section (ii), below.

⁵ On this point see an article by a Finnish publicist in *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th September, 1927; also *The Times*, 29th August, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7th October, 1927; *The Times*, 22nd November, 1927.

⁶ See *The Times*, 2nd September, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 31st October, 1927.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 8th December, 1927.

⁹ *Le Temps*, 24th November, 1927.

and the Polish Minister in Moscow, Monsieur Patek, had resulted in agreement on certain points and in a definition of those points which remained outstanding.¹ The outstanding points included not only Poland's obligations under the Covenant of the League but her interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* both in North-Eastern Europe and also along the southern section of the Russo-European border, where Poland, through her alliance with Rumania, was involved in the question of Bessarabia.²

Thus, at the close of the year 1927, the international situation in North-Eastern Europe was not substantially different from what it had been two years earlier. Even the initialling of the Russo-Latvian non-aggression pact, which was perhaps the most important single event of these two years, had not resulted, as for a moment it had seemed likely to do, in the break-up of the Baltic *bloc* and the re-attraction of Latvia into Russia's orbit.

(iii) The Assassination at Warsaw of the Soviet Minister, Monsieur Voykov.

On the 7th June, 1927, Monsieur Voykov, the Soviet Minister at Warsaw, was shot and mortally wounded on the platform of the Central Railway Station in that city, where he had been meeting the former *chargé d'affaires* and secretary of the Soviet Diplomatic Mission in London on their way home to Moscow.³ Monsieur Voykov died within an hour. The assassin was a Russian boy, nineteen years of age, named Boris Kowerda—a pupil in the Russian gymnasium at Vilna, where his family had lived before the War of 1914–18 and had settled again after an experience at Samara of the Bolshevik régime.⁴ The Polish Government immediately conveyed to the Soviet Legation an expression of its regrets and condolences.

On the same day the Soviet Government, having been informed of the crime by telegram, handed to the Polish Minister in Moscow a note in which it blamed the Polish Government for alleged negligence, while placing the crime itself to the account of an alleged world-wide conspiracy.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers this unprecedented and

¹ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 28th September, 1927; *Le Temps*, 29th September, 1927.

² *Survey for 1920–3*, pp. 273–8; *Survey for 1924*, pp. 263–5; *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 349; see also the present volume, p. 298.

³ For the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. see Part II E, Section (ii), below.

⁴ For Kowerda's personal history, which came out at his trial, see *The Times*, 17th June, 1927.

criminal act as bound up with the whole series of acts aiming at destroying the diplomatic representation of the U.S.S.R. abroad and creating a direct threat to peace. The raid on the Peking Embassy, the blockade of the Shanghai Consulate,¹ the police attack on the trade Delegation in London, the provocative rupture of diplomatic relations on the part of Great Britain²—all this series of acts has loosed the activity of terroristic groups, who, in their powerless and blind hatred against the working class, are seizing at the weapon of political murders.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. sees in the murder of its Ambassador the result of the Polish Government's not having taken all necessary measures against the criminal activities in Polish territory of Russian counter-revolutionary terroristic organisations, which are particularly dangerous to the cause of peace in the present tense international situation.³

The Soviet Government reserved the right to revert to the question of responsibility after the receipt of fuller information.

Although Russo-Polish relations had recently improved and negotiations for a Russo-Polish non-aggression pact were actually on foot at the time,⁴ the situation created by the crime was alarming—particularly in view of the thesis presented in the first of the two paragraphs just quoted from Monsieur Litvinov's note of the 7th. International history had shown, in the tragic cases of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, General Tellini⁵ and General Sir Lee Stack⁶ that when the relations between two countries were in any way unsatisfactory on other grounds they might be given a very serious turn by such an event as the assassination of a prominent representative of one state in the territory of the other. Further, the case of Monsieur Vorovsky⁷ had shown that the Soviet Government was inclined to display active resentment against any country in which a crime against the life of a Soviet representative was committed, even when that country was not an immediate neighbour of the U.S.S.R. and had not been at feud with the U.S.S.R. previously. Accordingly the situation created between Poland and the U.S.S.R. by the murder of Monsieur Voykov aroused wide-spread concern.

On the 9th June, 1927, the Soviet Government issued an official declaration⁸ in which it developed the thesis of the note of the 7th June by reviewing a long series of alleged criminal attempts against

¹ See the present volume, Part III, Section (ii), below.—A.J.T.

² See the present volume, Part II E, Section (ii), below.—A.J.T.

³ Text in *The Times*, 8th June, 1927. ⁴ See pp. 225, and 230-1, above.

⁵ See *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 348 *seqq.*

⁶ See *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 212 *seqq.*

⁷ *Survey for 1924*, pp. 258-9. See also the present volume, Part II E, Section (vi), below.

⁸ Text in *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th June, 1927.

the persons of its official representatives and ascribing these attempts, some explicitly and the rest implicitly, to the instigation of the British Government.

In connection with this criminal murder which followed a whole series of direct and indirect attacks on the part of the British Government on U.S.S.R. institutions abroad and the rupture by Great Britain of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government deems it necessary at the present moment to make public a series of other facts sufficiently characteristic of the work of the British Government and its vassal organisms in U.S.S.R. territory. . . . It is quite evident that the British Government, which is rapidly preparing for war against the Soviet Union, is striving by all means to prevent the peaceful labour of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government . . . considers it to be its duty, while pursuing its constructive activities with greater energy, to expose to all Mankind, and in the first place to the peoples of its own country, the anti-Soviet policy of the British Cabinet and its agents.

Meanwhile the Polish Government had given proof of goodwill not only by promptly conveying an expression of its regrets and condolences to the Soviet Legation, but by placing under detention a number of Russian *émigrés* who might conceivably be implicated in the crime.¹ In its reply—presented in Moscow on the 9th June—to the Soviet Government's note of the 7th, the Polish Government again expressed detestation of the 'crime committed in Polish territory by a foreigner'; reminded the Soviet Government that Monsieur Voykov had declined an offer from the Polish Government to give him personal protection; and declared its readiness nevertheless to pay compensation to Monsieur Voykov's widow. On the other hand, it declared that it could not recognize any connexion between the assassination of Monsieur Voykov and the other events mentioned in the Soviet Government's note.²

On the 12th June the Soviet Government presented a counter-reply in which, in the traditional language of diplomacy, it reasserted its point of view and finally insisted on the execution of the following demands:

1. That the Polish Government will adopt all necessary measures for a thorough investigation of the case, finding those guilty, and discovering all the threads of the crime, also prompt and severe punishment of those guilty, particularly the murderer himself.
2. That the Polish Government, conforming with the preliminary negotiations of Monsieur Ulyanov, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* in

¹ *The Times*, 9th and 10th June, 1927. By the 12th June the majority of these *détenus* had been released in the absence of evidence against them.

² For the terms of the Polish Government's note see *The Times*, 10th June, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th June, 1927.

Poland, with the representative of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will admit the Soviet Government's representative to be present at the judicial proceedings.

3. That the Polish Government will at last take immediate and energetic measures to put an end in Polish territory to the activity of terrorist bandit organisations and individuals directed against the U.S.S.R. and its representatives, and will deport from Poland persons engaged in such activity, the Soviet Government expecting to receive from the Polish Government without delay communications announcing that this has been done.¹

In view of the somewhat peremptory tone of this second note from Moscow, the Polish Government refrained from answering it, and the specific demands contained in it were not discussed when the question was taken up again a fortnight later in conversations between the Polish Minister at Moscow and Monsieur Litvinov. Meanwhile, on the 13th June, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Zaleski, stated that this second note from the Soviet Government could form the basis for negotiations between the Polish and Russian Governments in settlement of the affair. He added that the Soviet *chargé d'affaires* at Warsaw could attend the trial of Kowerda and put questions to the prisoner under the ordinary judicial procedure in force.²

At this time the Imperial Russian Penal Code was still in force in those parts of Poland which had formerly been included in the Russian Empire; and in this code there was no death penalty, under the ordinary procedure, except for outrages committed against the Tsar and the members of the Imperial Family.³ On the other hand the Imperial Russian Penal Code provided for the establishment of emergency courts by which the death penalty might be (and, under the Imperial Russian régime, very frequently was) inflicted; and such courts of summary jurisdiction had been established in Poland in 1919 and had been maintained for successive six-monthly periods from that time onwards.⁴ On the 15th-16th June, 1927, Kowerda was tried before one of these courts and was condemned to penal servitude for life, with a recommendation that the President of the Republic should exercise his prerogative of mercy by reducing the

¹ *The Times*, 13th June, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 14th June, 1927.

³ Thus, by a curious coincidence, not the assassin Boris Kowerda but his victim Voykov would have been subject to the imposition of the death penalty if he had been a private person and if this particular provision in the Russian Imperial Penal Code had been maintained in Poland, for Voykov had been one of the Bolshevik Kommissars at Yekaterinburg at the time when the Tsar and his family were shot.

⁴ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 9th June, 1927.

sentence to one of fifteen years' imprisonment with hard labour.¹ The President, however, decided not to act upon this recommendation.² Dissatisfaction at the result of the trial was expressed in the Soviet Russian press,³ but no untoward international consequences followed. The trial appears to have established the fact that Kowerda had acted on his own initiative and not as a member of any organization.

On the 2nd September there was another fatal encounter at Warsaw between a young Russian *émigré*, also domiciled at Vilna, and a member of the Soviet diplomatic staff in the Polish capital; but this time it was the *émigré* who lost the life and the Soviet official who took it. The victim, whose name was Traykovich, had called at the Soviet Legation in Warsaw, asked to see the *chargé d'affaires*, Monsieur Ulyanov, and fallen into an altercation with the porter when the latter hesitated to give him admittance. According to the account of the affair which was given by the Legation,⁴ Traykovich had then wounded the porter with a knife and had drawn a revolver when other members of the Legation staff appeared—whereupon, one member of the staff had shot him dead. On the Soviet side it was suggested that Traykovich's intention had been to assassinate Monsieur Ulyanov; but there seems to have been no evidence of this, unless a presumption could be drawn from the fact that Traykovich, like Kowerda, had personal reasons for hostility to the Soviet régime. At the same time, in view of the assassination of Monsieur Voykov three months before, it was not unnatural that the Soviet Legation staff at Warsaw should be in a state of nervous tension.

This incident, too, was settled without untoward international consequences. Indeed, on both this occasion and on that of the assassination of Monsieur Voykov a noteworthy restraint was displayed by both the Governments concerned.

(iv) Poland and Lithuania (1926-7).

In previous volumes of this series ⁵ the history of Polono-Lithuanian relations has been recorded from the beginning of the feud over Vilna in 1920 down to the close of the year 1925. It will be remem-

¹ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 16th June, 1927; *The Times*, 17th June, 1927.

² *The Times*, 26th July, 1927.

³ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 18th June, 1927.

⁴ This account seems to have differed in some points from those given by certain persons not belonging to the Legation staff who happened to be present when the 'shooting incident' occurred (*The Times*, 3rd and 5th September, 1927).

⁵ *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 248-56; *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 229-32.

bered that on the 15th March, 1923, the Conference of Ambassadors had recognized as the frontier between Poland and Lithuania a line coinciding approximately with the *de facto* military 'front' which had been in existence in this quarter since General Zeligovski's seizure of Vilna in October 1920, but that the Lithuanian Government had contested the title of the Conference of Ambassadors to render a decision in the case and had refused to admit that the state of war between Poland and Lithuania had come to an end. Military operations had, of course, ceased after the signature of a Polono-Lithuanian armistice convention at Suvalki on the 7th October, 1920, and the Lithuanians—conscious, no doubt, that in military strength they were hopelessly outmatched by the Poles—had not attempted to resume hostilities even when the armistice had been violated, two days after signature, by General Zeligovski's *coup*. In acting upon their contention that the state of war still existed, they confined themselves to maintaining a complete embargo upon traffic across the Polono-Lithuanian border and declining to enter into diplomatic and consular relations with Poland. This 'passive belligerency', which Poland could not prevent Lithuania from carrying on, inflicted some economic injury on Poland, or at any rate on the Vilna corridor, for which the natural outlet to the sea led across Lithuanian territory to the Lithuanian port of Memel and the Latvian port of Libau. It was particularly injurious to the local timber trade, which was seriously handicapped by being debarred from floating timber rafts down the River Niemen. At the same time, from the Polish point of view, this economic loss was a small matter compared to the political gain represented by the possession of Vilna; and thus the form of standing protest which had been chosen by Lithuania was ineffective as a method of coercion, while it had the untoward effect of prolonging the period of instability and insecurity in this part of Europe. Indeed, after dragging on for a further two years, it very nearly resulted, at the end of the year 1927, in bringing back that active belligerency between Poland and Lithuania which had happily been in abeyance for seven years. This crisis was surmounted by the exertions of the Council of the League of Nations, and an attempt was then made to terminate the passive state of war, which had been shown by the events of December 1927 to involve a constant latent danger to European peace, and which in any case was an anomalous relation as between two States Members of the League.

Before recording the events which led up to this crisis, it may be well to recall the fact (already stated in a previous volume)¹ that the

¹ *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 255-6.

de facto frontier established by General Zeligovski's *coup* as confirmed by the Ambassadors' award was not inequitable on grounds of nationality—at least so far as Poles and Lithuanians were concerned.¹ The Lithuanian claim to Vilna rested not so much on these present facts as on the history of the past, when Vilna had been the capital of the vast multi-national empire which had been amassed by the Lithuanian dynasty of the Jagellons in the Middle Ages. This historical sentiment for Vilna in the minds of the modern Lithuanians, deep and sincere though it was, might have yielded to the verdict of a plebiscite or of a disinterested and impartial award by some international authority such as the Council of the League of Nations. The peculiarly acute and prolonged soreness which the Polono-Lithuanian frontier controversy produced in Lithuania was to be attributed perhaps not so much to historical sentiment or to the demerits of the frontier-line in itself as to the high-handed manner in which that line had been imposed on the weaker party by the stronger, through a breach of faith which had afterwards been condoned, as an accomplished fact, by the Principal Allied Powers.

It may also be noted that the Lithuanian policy in regard to Vilna was not a party question—as may be seen by comparing a statement on the subject which was made by the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Monsieur Sleževičius, on the 30th October, 1926,² on the eve of the *coup d'état* of the 17th December of that year, with a statement made in September 1927 by Monsieur Voldemaras,³ the Prime Minister of the Government which had been carried into power by the revolution

¹ It must be noted that the respective numerical strengths of the Lithuanian minority left in Poland and the Polish minority left in Lithuania by the *de facto* frontier were matters of controversy. For the Lithuanian minority in Poland, the highest figure mentioned seems to have been 81,000, whereas the Poles put the figure at not more than 72,000. According to the Poles, this latter figure was based on statistics collected for the ecclesiastical authorities of the Vilna Archbishopric by the priests of Lithuanian origin (64,000 being the figure recorded by them), as completed by the data of the Polish Ministry of the Interior relative to the Vilna Archbishopric. In the city of Vilna with a population of 200,000 the Poles maintained that there were only 2,500 Lithuanians, that is, 1·5 per cent., whereas in Kovno, the capital of Lithuania, they maintained that there were 30,000 Poles, constituting 30 per cent. of the total population of that city. The Poles based their estimates of the strength of the Polish minority in Lithuania on the number of Polish deputies returned to the Lithuanian Parliament in 1926, and on this basis they calculated that the total number of Poles in Lithuania was 200,000. The Lithuanians' figure for the number of Poles in Lithuania seems to have been 76,000. The Poles challenged this Lithuanian figure on the ground that large numbers of Poles in Lithuania had been wrongfully entered by the Lithuanian authorities as Lithuanians in their identification papers.

² Text in *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 1st November, 1926.

³ *The Times*, 17th September, 1927.

in which Monsieur Sleževičius and his colleagues had been overthrown. It may be added that the Lithuanian *coup d'état* of the 17th December, 1926, was apparently due to causes arising from the internal politics of Lithuania and not from her foreign relations.¹ At the same time, it must be said that this change of régime did have an adverse effect upon the international situation, since the new Lithuanian Government, while carrying on the foreign policy of its predecessors, conducted it with distinctly less restraint and discretion. The result was a turn for the worse in all Lithuania's foreign relations, not only with Poland but also with Germany over the Memel question² and with the U.S.S.R. over the question of communism in Lithuania.³ In the relations between Poland and Lithuania, the additional element of instability introduced by the *coup d'état* of the 17th December, 1926, at Kovno, was enhanced by the fact that a *coup* of somewhat the same character had been carried out in May 1926 by Marshal Pilsudski at Warsaw.⁴ With a passive state of war still being kept up by the Lithuanians along the Polono-Lithuanian frontier and with a semi-military Government in power in either capital,⁵ it was evident that a small spark might be enough to produce a serious explosion.

It remains to record the course of Polono-Lithuanian relations after the abortive conferences at Copenhagen and Lugano in the autumn of 1925.⁶ Early in the year 1926 the Lithuanian Government formally declared the Niemen open to all nations and published regulations for timber floating;⁷ but this had no importance except on paper, as the Poles had made it clear at Lugano that they would not allow timber to be floated on the Niemen unless the Lithuanians

¹ On this question see *The Times*, 22nd December, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 24th December, 1926. For the history of the *coup* see *The Times* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 18th December, 1926; *The Times*, 28th and 29th December, 1926.

² The history of the Memel question, which has been carried down to the signature of the Convention of May 1924 in the *Survey for 1920-3*, will be carried on from that point in a later volume.

³ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 6th January, 1927. The Lithuanian *coup d'état* of December 1926 was defended by its authors as an emergency measure necessitated by the alleged menace of a communist *coup d'état* in Lithuania which had to be forestalled.

⁴ For the history of the Polish Revolution of May 1926 (which, as a domestic question, falls outside the scope of this survey) see *The Times*, 26th, 28th and 31st May, 1st June, 4th October and 3rd November, 1926.

⁵ It must be mentioned that, on the occasion of the Lithuanian *coup d'état* of December 1926, both Marshal Pilsudski and Monsieur Zaleski, the Polish Foreign Minister, were careful to make declarations of disinterestedness.

⁶ For these conferences, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 231.

⁷ *The Times*, 3rd February, 1926.

conceded railway communication and consular representation. There were no negotiations of any kind during 1926. Frontier incidents were fairly common during the first part of the year¹ and culminated in some genuine nervousness on the frontier in May, at the time of Marshal Pilsudski's *coup* at Warsaw.² During the latter part of the year things were quieter,³ as the Poles had hopes (which proved to be unfounded) that the new Social-Democrat Government in Lithuania would prove more conciliatory.

Monsieur Voldemaras's *coup* at Kovno in December 1926 caused a renewal of nervousness. On New Year's Day 1927 Marshal Pilsudski complained to the French Ambassador in Warsaw of the alleged activity of Lithuanian volunteers along the borders, declared that he had not reinforced the Polish troops there at the time of the Lithuanian revolution of the preceding month, and hinted that, if the Allies were unable to settle the Lithuanian question, he would take the matter into his own hands. As the result of this Polish *démarche* the three Allied Ministers made formal representations at Kovno on the 19th February, 1927,

to the effect that their Governments attached the greatest importance to the establishment of cordial relations between Poland and Lithuania, and would be very glad to see a resumption of the negotiations broken off more than a year ago, in order to secure the establishment of direct and regular river, railway, postal, and telegraphic communications, &c., between the nationals of the two countries.⁴

On the 3rd April Monsieur Voldemaras handed to the three Ministers a memorandum stating his views, which was fairly conciliatory in tone but did not give hope of real progress towards an agreed settlement. The Polish Government prepared a counter-memorandum at the end of May, and in June Messieurs Zaleski and Voldemaras met first in Geneva and then on the 18th of the month in Paris at the house of the French Minister accredited to the Lithuanian Government. There they seem to have discussed some formula by which the existing 'state of war' should be declared at an end and each

¹ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 22nd and 23rd February, 1926; *The Times*, 25th February, 7th, 16th, and 19th April, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 17th April, 1926.

² The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 16th and 17th May, 1926.

³ See, however, *The Times*, 16th July, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29th July, 1926; *Le Temps*, 10th August, 1926; *The Times*, 23rd September, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 9th October, 1926.

⁴ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 4th May, 1927, in answer to a parliamentary question. Colonel Wedgwood, the member who had put down the question, asked 'why these four [*sic*] Powers took this step, which could have been more suitably taken by the League of Nations'.

state should recognize the other *de iure*. In the end nothing came of this, apparently because the Lithuanians insisted that any formula should include an admission that the Vilna question remained open and the Poles would not accept this condition. During the first six months of the year 1927 frontier incidents were comparatively infrequent, or at any rate unimportant.¹

During the last half of 1927 relations became steadily worse. The following were the principal symptoms:

On the 2nd July the Poles crowned 'The Miraculous Virgin of Ostra Brama' (the most venerated image in the holy city of Vilna) as 'Queen of Poland'; and it was taken as adding insult to injury when the Polish authorities offered to open the frontier from the 20th June to the 7th July in order to allow Lithuanians to attend this ceremony.² In August a Polish aeroplane flew over Kovno—an aggravation of the usual type of frontier incident.

The 9th October, 1927, the seventh anniversary of General Zeligovski's *coup*, was celebrated as a national day of mourning at Kovno³ and as a national festival—honoured by the presence not only of Marshal Pilsudski and several of his ministers of state but of General Zeligovski—at Vilna.⁴ On the eve of this anniversary, when national feeling on both sides was working up towards its highest pitch, the series of untoward symptoms culminated in a crisis which became a matter of international concern.

At the beginning of October 1927 there was published in the Polish press an open letter purporting to come from twenty-eight Polish teachers in Lithuania and alleging that the signatories had been deprived of civic rights and relegated to an internment camp at Varniai for having refused to give the children of the Polish minority in Lithuania instruction in history according to the Lithuanian official version.⁵ Thereupon, on the 4th October, the Polish Government, by way of reprisals, arrested a number of Lithuanians, some of them priests, and closed a number of Lithuanian schools in the Province

¹ See, however, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 12th March, 1927; *Le Temps*, 14th March, 1927; the *Corriere della Sera*, 1st July, 1927; *The Times*, 15th August, 1927; *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd September, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 3rd September, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 6th September, 1927; *Le Temps*, 19th September, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 9th October, 1927.

² See *Le Temps*, 25th May and 3rd June, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 21st June, 1927.

³ *Le Temps*, 11th October, 1927.

⁴ *Le Temps*, *loc. cit.*; *The Times* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 10th October, 1927.

⁵ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 3rd October, 1927; *Le Temps*, 5th October, 1927.

of Vilna.¹ On the 10th, however, the Lithuanian Legations in London and Paris published statements² declaring that not a single Polish teacher, male or female, was interned at Varniai, and that, although some sixty-eight Polish teachers in Lithuania had been dismissed in 1927 out of eighty-six who had been permitted to teach in 1926 on condition that they passed a qualifying test not later than the 1st August, 1927, the same measure had been meted out in 1926 to about two hundred and fifty Lithuanian teachers likewise, and in 1927 to about two hundred and twenty. Not a single Polish school, it was added, had been closed, though some had ceased work because they were not attended by a sufficient number of pupils. It seems that this Lithuanian *démenti* was substantially correct and that the sensational document on the strength of which the Polish Government had taken action was a fake.³ Moreover, even if it had been proved

¹ According to the Lithuanians, several scores of Lithuanian laymen and fourteen Lithuanian priests were arrested and forty-eight Lithuanian schools closed. According to *The Times* (6th October, 1927) twenty persons, ten of them priests, were arrested and forty-five schools closed. According to the Governor of Vilna, twenty-nine schools and one training college were closed and thirteen laymen and five priests arrested (*The Manchester Guardian* and *Le Temps*, 7th October, 1927).

² *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 11th October, 1927.

³ At the same time, it did not necessarily follow that Polish teachers in Lithuania had no grievances against the Lithuanian Government. Even under the Sleževičius régime in Lithuania there had been rumours of petty persecutions inflicted on the Polish minority (for examples, see *Le Temps*, 15th February, and 10th October, 1926). An identical qualifying test might be applied to Polish and Lithuanian candidates with different degrees of rigour. Signal examples of the device of varying the rigour of an examination for political purposes were the employment of the dictation test under the Australian Immigration Law (see *Survey for 1924*, p. 130) and the standard set by the Italian educational authorities in the school-leaving examinations for the German secondary schools in the South Tirol in the years 1924 and 1925 (C. H. Herford, *The Case of German South Tirol against Italy*, pp. 88-9). The Lithuanians, however, maintained that in this case the test which the Polish candidates had to pass had been made easier purposely in order to avoid friction with the Polish minority. On the other hand it does seem to have been the fact that the Polish minority in Lithuania had seen their educational facilities increase under the relatively liberal Sleževičius régime and then diminish again under the dictatorship of Monsieur Voldemaras. According to a Polish account, the Lithuanian authorities prescribed that parents who wished their children to attend Polish schools must present certificates of their Polish origin from the authorities of their communes, and the communes refused to issue such certificates on the ground that the parents had been entered, on their identification papers, as Lithuanians and that these entries could not be revised. According to the same Polish account, upwards of ten of the disqualified teachers obtained permission, in the course of the nine months following the 1st August, 1927, to carry on their profession; so that by the spring of 1928 eighteen Polish schools in Lithuania had been reopened, as compared with seventy-eight Polish elementary schools, with 4,400 pupils,

that the Voldemaras régime was reintroducing a repressive policy towards the Polish minority in the matter of education, the proper retort for the Polish Government was to bring the matter to the attention of the League of Nations either under Article 11 of the Covenant or on the strength of the undertakings in regard to minorities which Lithuania had given as one of the conditions of her admission to membership.¹ Retaliation in kind could not be justified on any consideration, and in this case it could not even be excused on the plea of flagrant provocation, since the specific action alleged to have been taken by the Lithuanian Government, to which the Polish Government's precipitate action against the educational organization of the Lithuanian minority in Poland was a reply, appears to have had no existence except in the columns of certain Polish newspapers.

The incident thus created was followed up on both sides. On the 14th October four priests and ten laymen (including, it was said, some Germans and Jews as well as Lithuanians) were exiled from Vilna on the ground that they were Lithuanian citizens.²

On the 15th October the Lithuanian Prime Minister, Monsieur Voldemaras, addressed a telegram³ to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations demanding the application of the measures contemplated in the Polish Minorities Treaty of the 28th June, 1919; and he followed up this telegram with a second communication in which, on the strength of Article 11 of the Covenant, he demanded that his complaint should be placed on the agenda of the Council.⁴ A parallel appeal to the Vatican appears to have been made by the Lithuanian priests who had been expelled from the Vilna district on the 14th.⁵

Monsieur Voldemaras's appeal to Geneva was unwelcome to those permanent members of the Council of the League who had formerly acted as 'the Principal Allied Powers', because they feared that it

which had existed in Lithuania in 1926. For an examination into the question of the relative generosity of Polish educational policy towards the Lithuanian minority in Poland and Lithuanian educational policy towards the Polish minority in Lithuania, see *The Times*, 22nd November, 1927.

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 215, 217.

² Apparently these exiles were not allowed by the Polish authorities to return home until April 1928. According to *The Times*, 12th October, 1927, the persons arrested at Vilna on the 4th October, 1927, were released by Marshal Pilsudski during his visit to the city on the occasion of the festival of the 9th October. According to the Lithuanian account, these prisoners were only released in batches, some one, some two and some three months later.

³ Text in *Le Temps*, 17th October, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 19th and 20th October, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 20th October, 1927.

⁵ *The Times*, 25th October, 1927.

might be difficult to submit this particular Polono-Lithuanian incident to the formal procedure of the League without reopening the much larger and more formidable question of Vilna. Indeed, the series of incidents which had now culminated in a crisis had for some time been causing those Powers anxiety on that score; and it has been mentioned already that as far back as February 1927 the British, French and Italian Ministers had made informal representations at Kovno on the matter of Polono-Lithuanian relations. Upon the receipt of Monsieur Voldemaras's appeal to the League, the same three Powers apparently attempted to induce the Lithuanian Government to settle the controversy out of court, at least in principle, before the date of the next Council meeting arrived;¹ but the Lithuanian appeal to the League was not withdrawn.

Meanwhile, the situation was complicated by two fresh elements: the danger of a raid upon Kovno by the Lithuanian *émigrés* who had fled during or after the *coup d'état* of December 1926 and had made their head-quarters at Riga; and the danger of intervention on the part of the U.S.S.R. At both Kovno and Moscow it was reported (apparently not without evidence)² that on the 5th November the Polish Minister at Riga had promised the Lithuanian *émigrés* Polish support in an attempt to overthrow the existing régime in Lithuania by force, on the understanding that they would pursue a policy friendly to Poland if they succeeded in their *coup*.³ A sinister interpretation was given to a second visit which Marshal Pilsudski paid to Vilna at the beginning of the last week in November;⁴ and a campaign of protest against alleged Polish schemes of aggression was started in the Russian press.⁵ On the 24th November the Russian Minister at Warsaw presented a note⁶ to the Polish Government which, in courteous and moderate language, conveyed a grave warn-

¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, 24th October, 1927; *Le Temps*, 24th November, 1927. It was further reported that on this occasion the British, French and Italian Governments had asked the German Government to join them in their *démarche*. (Compare the invitation to Germany to take joint action with the other Principal European Powers in the Yugoslav-Albanian crisis of March 1927, which is recorded in the present volume, p. 177.)

² At Geneva on the 7th December, 1927, Monsieur Voldemaras read to the Council of the League of Nations the text of a letter bearing the signature of two of the *émigrés*, regarding their meeting, here mentioned, with the Polish Minister at Riga on the 5th November, 1927.

³ *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th November, 1927; *ibid.*, and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 26th November, 1927. See further *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th November, 1927; *The Times*, 13th December, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 24th and 26th November, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 22nd November, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 26th November, 1927.

⁶ *The Times*, 25th November, 1927.

ing. While mentioning that the Soviet Government had 'not failed also to invite the attention of the Lithuanian Government in a friendly manner to the need of avoiding any steps calculated to aggravate the already tense situation', the note suggested that 'the preservation of peace' depended 'in much larger measure on Poland than on Lithuania' and invited 'the Polish Government's attention to the immeasurable dangers of an eventual attempt by Poland to infringe Lithuania's independence in any shape whatsoever'.

Meanwhile the two principal parties to the dispute had been assiduously carrying on their controversy. On the 21st November Monsieur Voldemaras addressed another note to the Secretary-General of the League in which he specifically declared that Lithuanian *émigrés* were organizing a movement against his own régime and that this movement was being supported by the Polish Government,¹ and on the 27th he repeated these charges in a public statement to the press.² In the same statement he announced that he was ready to resume normal relations with Poland when 'a satisfactory agreement' had been reached with Poland as to Vilna and when Poland manifested 'a readiness to respect the independence of Lithuania'. On the 28th, however, he issued another public statement in which he said that 'the world was unnecessarily alarmed about Lithuania' and that 'there would not be a Polish invasion or an open Polish-Lithuanian war', though he intimated that Marshal Pilsudski might be expected to apply coercion to Lithuania by the indirect method of supporting the Lithuanian *émigrés*.³ Marshal Pilsudski, on his part, outdid Monsieur Voldemaras in the intemperance of his language, but followed Signor Mussolini's example by showing himself more pacific and conciliatory in deed than in word. On the 28th November, 1927, the Polish Ambassadors in Berlin, London, Paris and Moscow presented identic notes⁴ declaring that the Polish Government harboured 'no intention against the political independence and territorial integrity of the Lithuanian Republic' and that their sole aim was 'to re-establish with Lithuania, in the most peaceful spirit, normal relations and good neighbourliness', but at the same time insisting that the 'state of war' which was being maintained by the Lithuanian Government should be brought to an end. On the 1st December, however, on the eve of the departure of the Polish Foreign Minister, Monsieur Zaleski, for Geneva, Marshal Pilsudski issued a

¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, 3rd December, 1927.

² Text in *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th November, 1927.

³ *The Times*, 29th November, 1927.

⁴ Text in *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th November, 1927.

public statement in a very different tone, of which the following passages are samples:

The state of war prosecuted against us by Lithuania is the only one now existing in the world. It is an anomaly, a diseased condition of that tiny fragment of the earth's surface. . . .

When the news of the Lithuanian mobilisation reached me, I spent a whole night in making my decision. . . . I decided to bow before a higher political reason, a more elevated logic, and declared on the next morning to the French Ambassador that I had decided not to mobilise and that I would await the decision of the League of Nations in answer to our note. . . .

Monsieur Voldemaras, the Lithuanian Prime Minister, awakened doubt in me concerning the state of his mind and is in my opinion irresponsible. . . . Monsieur Voldemaras says that Marshal Pilsudski, by visiting Vilna (which is my native country and the home of my relations), had threatened the independence of the Lithuanian State. . . . Everyone will admit that such an argument must have been borrowed from the mentality of lunatic asylums. . . .¹

On the same day the Lithuanian Government replied that it had not proceeded and was not proceeding with any form of mobilization, either open or secret;² and when Monsieur Voldemaras confronted the Council of the League at Geneva on the 5th-10th December, he induced the French, British, Italian and German Governments to send their military attachés or other representatives stationed at Warsaw and Kovno respectively on a visit of inspection to the Polono-Lithuanian border.³ These officers were able to report that no mobilization had taken place on either the Lithuanian or the Polish side.⁴

On the 5th December there assembled at Geneva Monsieur Volde-
maras, representing Lithuania, Monsieur Zaleski, representing Poland,
the members of the Council—on which France, Great Britain, Italy
and Germany were represented by their respective Foreign Ministers
—and Monsieur Litvinov on behalf of the U.S.S.R. The first few
days were occupied with private conversations in which the delegates
of the Principal European Powers wrestled first individually and then
collectively with Monsieur Voldemaras.⁵ Monsieur Litvinov also
appears to have exerted his influence in favour of conciliation;⁶ but

¹ Text in *The Times*, 2nd December, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 3rd December, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 12th December, 1927; *Le Temps*, 12th December, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 12th December, 1927; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 14th December, 1927.

⁵ *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 6th December, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 7th December, 1927.

⁶ Sir Austen Chamberlain testified to this at the close of the proceedings

Monsieur Voldemaras's intransigence was not easily to be overcome, and the cause of conciliation was not advanced when he and Monsieur Zaleski stated their cases formally before the Council on the 7th.¹ On the 9th Marshal Pilsudski arrived in person to reinforce his Foreign Minister; and on the morning of the 10th the Council, in private session, presided over an encounter between the two dictators. At this meeting, a formula of agreement was struck out, and this was hammered into the shape of a resolution, in the course of the same afternoon and evening, by the Council's *rapporteur* Jonkheer Beelaerts van Blokland (Netherlands), in strenuous consultation with Monsieur Voldemaras and Monsieur Zaleski. This resolution, as eventually agreed to by all parties, read as follows:

The Council of the League of Nations:

Declares that a state of war between two Members of the League is incompatible with the spirit and the letter of the Covenant, by which Lithuania and Poland are bound;

Takes note of the solemn declarations made by the Lithuanian representative that Lithuania does not consider herself in a state of war with Poland and that in consequence peace exists between their respective countries;

Takes note of the solemn declarations of the Polish representative that the Polish Republic fully recognises and respects the political independence and territorial integrity of the Lithuanian Republic;

Recommends the two Governments to enter into direct negotiations as soon as possible in order to establish such relations between the two neighbouring States as will ensure 'the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends';

Places at the disposal of the two parties the good offices of the League and of its technical organs should their assistance be desired in the negotiations which it recommends;

Decides that the Lithuanian Government's complaints regarding the treatment of persons of Lithuanian race or speech, referred to in its appeal, shall be examined by a Committee consisting of the Acting President of the Council and two other Members of the Council appointed by him. This Committee will report to the Council in due course;

Decides that, in the event of a frontier incident or threat of an incident, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations may, at the request of one of the parties, consult the Acting President of the Council and the Rapporteur, who shall then advise any steps they consider necessary to bring about a better state of feeling. The Council notes

(*The Manchester Guardian*, 12th December, 1927). Immediately after the publication of the Polish note of the 28th November, the Moscow *Pravda* had counselled the Lithuanian Government to declare the state of war to be at an end without abandoning its refusal to recognize the Polish title to Vilna (*The Manchester Guardian*, 30th November, 1927).

¹ For reports of this meeting see *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th December, 1927.

that both parties have agreed to facilitate any enquiry by the League of Nations;

Notes with satisfaction the Polish representative's declaration to the effect that the Polish nationals referred to in the Lithuanian Government's appeal will be authorised to return to Poland without hindrance. In case of unforeseen difficulties, the Rapporteur would place his good offices at the disposal of the parties with a view to removing those difficulties.

The Council declares that the present resolution in no way affects questions on which the two Governments have differences of opinion.

At 10.30 p.m. on the same day, just twelve hours after the two dictators had met face to face under the Council's auspices, this text was adopted by the Council and accepted by Messieurs Voldemaras and Zaleski on behalf of their respective Governments.¹

The Council's resolution undoubtedly served the cause of peace by making it possible for both dictators to return in triumph to their respective countries² and so to save their faces without having to continue the dangerous exercise of breathing fire and slaughter. Yet while it overcame the crisis of the moment it did not remove its permanent underlying cause, since it was explicitly stated in the text that it in no way affected questions on which the two Governments had differences of opinion, and the parties were merely recommended to enter into direct negotiations as soon as possible in order to establish such relations as would ensure 'the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends'. Moreover, Jonkheer Beelaerts van Blokland, in his report covering the draft resolution, had explicitly cited, as an instance of the controversial questions which the resolution would leave unaffected, 'the rights that the Lithuanian Government claims to have over the territory of Vilna.' In other words, the deep-seated trouble, of which the recent crisis was a superficial symptom, remained unhealed; and Monsieur Voldemaras took care to make it plain that the Lithuanian claim to Vilna was intact. In fact, he was even reported to have contended that the resolution of the Council of the League 'practically annulled' the celebrated decision of the Conference of Ambassadors.³ This was not an auspicious overture for those 'direct negotiations' into which the Polish and Lithuanian Governments had been piously recommended to enter.

¹ *Le Temps*, *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 12th December, 1927.

² For the triumphal return of Monsieur Voldemaras see *The Times*, 19th December, 1927; for the triumphal return of Marshal Pilsudski see *The Manchester Guardian*, 23rd December, 1927.

³ For a public statement made by Monsieur Voldemaras at Paris on the 15th December, 1927, see *The Times*, 16th December, 1927; for another made at Kovno on the 19th see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 20th December, 1927.

PART II

EUROPE

E. EUROPE AND THE U.S.S.R. (1925-7)

(i) Introduction.

ON the 7th November, 1927, the Soviet régime in Russia completed the first decade of its existence. At that date there were no signs or even portents of that catastrophic downfall which its enemies had been prophesying daily for the past ten years. On the other hand, since the 7th November, 1917, the situation both within the U.S.S.R. and in the great world beyond its frontiers had undergone profound changes, and most of these changes were for the worse from the Communist point of view. If certain 'Capitalists' abroad had been disappointed of their hope that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Russia would collapse, the Russian Communists, on their side, had proved not to have been justified of their faith—so ardently held during the Conference of Brest-Litovsk—that the rest of the world would go the way of Russia and that 'Capitalist Society' would fall with an apocalyptic crash in order to make way for a Marxian Heaven on Earth.

The internal changes which had clouded the prospects of the Marxian 'Church Militant'¹ in Russia were, first, the death of Lenin on the 21st January, 1924—an event which evoked a struggle among the Companions of the Prophet for the heritage of his mantle—and, second, the rise of a new bourgeoisie in the Russian towns and a new class of 'kulaki' or 'rich peasants' in the vast Russian countryside.

As for the external changes with which the Russian Communists were confronted, these may be summed up in the general statement

¹ The form taken by the Marxian movement in Russia after the Communist Revolution of November 1917 was something unfamiliar in the contemporary Western World, and the hostile reception with which it met—at any rate among the dominant minority in Western Society—was partly due to this unfamiliarity, as well as to the specific tenets and actions of the Russian Communists after their seizure of political power. When regarded, however, in historical perspective, the relations of the Russian Communist Party and the Third (Communist) International to the U.S.S.R. might be seen to belong to the same category of phenomena as the relation of primitive Islam to the Arab Caliphate or of the Zoroastrian church to the Persian Empire of the Sasanidae or (to take an example from Western history) of the Catholic Church to the Hapsburg Monarchy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries after Christ (see further the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, Section (ii) (a)).

that, to all appearance, 'Capitalist Society', by the close of the year 1927, was out of danger of succumbing to the shock of the blows which it had dealt itself in the fratricidal war of 1914-18, and had entered upon the long road towards a recovery to which it could venture to look forward with reasonable assurance, unless the old fratricidal warfare were to break out again.

The strongest evidence for this view was the steadily increasing economic prosperity and political stability of Germany; for, of all the great countries of the Western World, Germany had been afflicted by the War and its immediate consequences most cruelly. If any of these countries was likely to be captured by Communism as a result of War and post-War distress, Germany seemed marked out for that fate; and if the banner of Communism had once been planted firmly in the great industrial country which occupied the central position on the map of Continental Europe, then 'Capitalist Society' in the European half of the Western World might indeed have been threatened by militant Communism to a degree which was hardly conceivable so long as the Church Militant's base of operations was restricted to the remote and economically backward domain of Russia. Thus the accesses, or symptoms, of 'Red' revolution in parts of Germany in 1919, in 1920 and finally in 1923 were fraught with danger for the established régime in Europe as a whole; and, conversely, the conclusion of the London Reparation Agreement in 1924¹ and of the Pact of Locarno in 1925² and the eventual admission of Germany to membership in the League of Nations in 1926 were milestones on the road to recovery for that régime in Europe and not merely in Germany.

Meanwhile, changes equally unfavourable to the prospects of the Communist Church Militant had occurred on the other principal fronts on which it was waging its spiritual war.³

For example, its hope of capturing the Islamic World had begun to recede as soon as the Turks had overthrown the Greeks in Anatolia in the autumn of 1922; for the Turks, when they found themselves no longer at bay, began to follow their inward preference for a *rapprochement* with the West rather than with Moscow. On this head, the Bolsheviks suffered their first disillusionments during the Peace Conference of Lausanne;⁴ and the fresh opportunity which

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 375-84.

² See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 49-66.

³ For a conspectus of the zones of operations of the Communist Church Militant beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R., see the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, Section (ii) (a).

⁴ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 374-6.

seemed to be offered to Monsieur Chicherin's diplomacy by the discomfiture of Turkey in her controversy with Great Britain over the Mosul Question proved illusory likewise. The success which Monsieur Chicherin obtained in concluding the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression on the 17th December, 1925, was in turn neutralized by the tripartite treaty of the 5th June, 1926, between Turkey, Great Britain and 'Irâq¹ and still more emphatically by the Turco-Italian treaty of non-aggression which was concluded on the 30th May, 1928.²

Still greater, if possible, was the disillusionment suffered by the Russians in China, where they had been giving the Kuomintang the same encouragement and assistance in its campaign against 'Western Imperialism'³ as they had previously given to Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha and his comrades in the Anatolian War of 1919-22. At the beginning of the year 1927 it seemed as though the Russian apostles of the Marxian Church had secured a considerably stronger position in China than they had ever been allowed to make for themselves in Turkey. Yet, at the close of that year, the structure which had been built up by Monsieur Borodin, in the course of four years, with a single-minded ability and devotion to which even his opponents paid tribute, lay in ruins—a monument, apparently, to nothing but the invincible irony of human affairs.⁴

This series of changes in the world at large which has been indicated above had a clearly recognizable effect upon Russian activities beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R.; and it may also be conjectured to have affected the course of the internal dissensions within the bosom of the Russian Communist Party—dissensions which began on the morrow of Lenin's death and reached a decision in the banishment of Trotsky to Siberia four years later. In this latter domain conjectures were the most that could be offered by contemporary observers abroad, who had no means of recording, with any assurance or precision, the history of this obscure but momentous struggle in Russia for control of the dictatorial power.

As regarded the activities of the Russian Communists in the world at large, it was evident that the conflict of interests between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Third (Communist) International had not yet been resolved, notwithstanding the injury which

¹ For these two treaties see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 525 and 527-8 respectively.

² This treaty will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*, as well as the relations of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan with one another and with the U.S.S.R. since 1926.

³ See the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 239-41.

⁴ See the present volume, Part III, Section (ii), below.

it continued to inflict upon both of them.¹ For example, in the affair of 'the Arcos Raid',² the British Government was able to obtain information which could be construed as evidence that employees of a Russo-British trading concern established in London under the auspices of the Soviet authorities were engaged in conducting propaganda in Great Britain on the Communist International's account; and on the strength of this construction the British Government broke off relations with the Government at Moscow. Thus, in 1927, an indiscretion, if not a misdemeanour, on the part of the Communist International robbed the U.S.S.R. of the last fruits of that British recognition which it had secured in 1924; and the Soviet Government did not attempt to conceal how hard it was hit by this blow.

On the whole, however, in this long and stubborn tug-of-war between the Communist Church Militant and the Russian State, the State seemed gradually to be gaining the upper hand. During the three years 1925 to 1927, the propaganda of the Third International was less conspicuous—even when full credit is given to Monsieur Borodin's work in China—than the diplomatic activities of Monsieur Chicherin and his Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. During these years Monsieur Chicherin set himself no less a task than the construction of a 'system' of international relations gravitating round Moscow, in order to provide a counter-attraction to the European 'system' inaugurated in the Pact of Locarno.³ The substance of Monsieur Chicherin's 'system' was a network of treaties of neutrality and non-aggression, the earliest of them being the Russo-Turkish Treaty of December 1925. Monsieur Chicherin set himself to weave this network outwards from Moscow in two directions—towards the Middle Eastern States of the Islamic World on the one hand and towards the Border States of Europe on the other, with an outlying strand connecting Russia with Germany.⁴ In this endeavour

¹ For an analysis of this conflict and an estimate of its causes and effects, see the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 167 *seqq.*

² For this affair, see pp. 266 *seqq.*, below.

³ For a lucid and interesting account of Monsieur Chicherin's policy in this matter, see an article contributed, under the title of 'The U.S.S.R. System of Neutrality and Non-Aggression', to the *Bulletin of International News*, vol. iv, No. 25, New Series, 9th June, 1928, issued by the Association for International Understanding, 10, St. James's Square, London, S.W. 1.

⁴ The conclusion of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of 1925 and the complementary Turco-Persian Treaty of 1926 has been recorded in the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 525 and 545-6 respectively; the history of the Russo-Afghan Treaty of the 31st August, 1926, the Russo-Persian Treaty of the 1st October, 1927, the Perso-Afghan Treaty of the 28th November, 1927, and the Turco-Afghan Treaty of the 25th May, 1928, will be dealt with in the

Monsieur Chicherin was contending against heavy odds. Germany, for instance, for whom a breach with either Russia or the West would be an extremely embarrassing contingency, showed, in the course of the negotiations which culminated in the Russo-German Treaty of 1926, that, if she were ever driven to make a choice between the one side or the other, she would be likely to cleave to the West in the last resort.¹ In the circumstances, the measure of success which Monsieur Chicherin attained in building up his Russo-centric 'system' was no mean diplomatic achievement.

It may be noted that Monsieur Chicherin's network of neutrality and non-aggression treaties resembled Mr. Kellogg's proposal for a multilateral pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy² in laying stress upon the negative rather than the positive aspect of the Security and Disarmament Problem—in contrast to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Locarno, and the network of Continental European reinsurance treaties centring round France, which all resembled one another in this at least, that they contemplated concerted action against eventual peace-breakers in addition to binding over the contracting parties not to become peace-breakers themselves.

It may be noted further that while both the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America remained, and showed every intention of continuing to remain, non-members of the League of Nations, both these Powers were showing signs of an increasing readiness to co-operate with the League, its organs and its members—especially in its non-political activities—by the end of the year 1927.³

Thus the U.S.S.R. seemed likely, on a long view, to eclipse the Third International in the firmament of international affairs; and already, at Moscow, Monsieur Chicherin had had the last laugh in his long tussle with Monsieur Zinoviev.⁴ By the close of the year 1927 Monsieur Zinoviev had seen one chapter, at least, of his melodramatic career brought to an end by his expulsion from the Russian Communist Party,⁵ while Monsieur Chicherin remained in undisturbed

Survey for 1928. For the Russo-German Treaty of the 24th April, 1926, the Russo-Lithuanian Treaty of the 28th September, 1926, and the Russo-Latvian Treaty initialled in March 1927, see the present volume, pp. 309, 225 and 229.

¹ See the present part, Section (v), below.

² The history of the 'Kellogg Pact' will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

³ For the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the League during the years 1925 to 1927 inclusive, see the present part, Section (vi) below.

⁴ For the embarrassment which Monsieur Zinoviev, as the moving spirit in the Third (Communist) International, had caused to Monsieur Chicherin as Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government, see the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 172-5.

⁵ *The Times*, 16th November, 1927.

possession of his office—with a prospect of greater peace and quiet than his comrades had ever yet permitted him to enjoy in the execution of his formidable task.

These dissensions within the Russian Communist Party, which reached their *dénouement* towards the end of the year 1927, cannot be ignored in this Survey because they were evidently bound to affect the foreign policy of the Soviet Government, and that Government's policy was an important factor in international affairs. At the same time, the subject can only be touched upon superficially here—partly because it was in itself an internal affair of a single country, and partly because, as has been noted above, it was a subject which, for contemporary observers abroad, remained exceedingly obscure.

The known facts were briefly as follows.¹ The dissensions had broken out almost immediately after Lenin's death, and the first trial of strength had been between Trotsky, single-handed, and a cabal of other prominent Companions of the dead Prophet, in which Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin took the lead. Under the weight of superior numbers, Trotsky had been driven into retirement by the end of the year 1925, when the victors gave him an opportunity of re-entering the arena by falling out among themselves. There followed a second and apparently conclusive trial of strength in which Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, in uneasy alliance, pitted themselves against Stalin and his satellites; and this time it was the coalition that suffered defeat. The allies were brought to their knees by the autumn of 1926; but they failed, or were judged by their conquerors to have failed, to resign themselves sufficiently to the new situation, and eventually the campaign against them was carried to its logical conclusion. In June 1927 Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party by the Central Control Commission;² but this action was not confirmed at a joint session of the Central Control Commission and the Central Committee itself which was held at Moscow in July and August.³ In September, however, Trotsky was expelled from the Executive Committee of the Third (Communist) International;⁴ and in October he and Zinoviev were both expelled from the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party again and this time

¹ See L. Lawton, *The Russian Revolution* (London, 1927, Macmillan), especially Chapters 20 and 21; W. J. Brown, *Three Months in Russia* (London, 1928, Labour Publishing Company), especially Chapter 16.

² *The Times*, 27th June, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 11th and 13th August, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1st and 3rd October, 1927.

definitively.¹ The next step, which followed in November, was the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Russian Communist Party itself, and this was accompanied by the degradation of twelve other Companions of Lenin—including Kamenev, Rakovsky and Radek—from office in the Russian Communist Party and in the Soviet Government.² On the 18th December, 1927, the Annual Congress of the Russian Communist Party, under the guidance of Stalin and Bukharin, confirmed the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and decreed the expulsion of ninety-eight other members, including the twelve leaders who had been degraded from office in November.³ Next day, about twenty of the hundred, headed by Kamenev and Zinoviev, put in a plea for mercy; but the Congress refused to entertain it, and merely empowered the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission to consider applications for readmission from individuals and not from groups—and this on the understanding that action upon such applications should not be taken until after a probationary interval of six months.⁴ At the end of December the Soviet Government deprived Rakovsky of his position as chairman of the delegation for negotiations with France⁵ and Kamenev of his diplomatic post at Rome.⁶ In January 1928, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rakovsky and several others were expelled from the 'Tsik' or Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets⁷—the members of which might be replaced constitutionally, even before the expiry of their mandates, by 'candidates' nominally elected. On the 3rd January, 1928, thirty members of the Opposition were banished to the provinces, and simultaneously others were 'invited' to take up their residence equally far from Moscow.⁸ The list of the thirty included Trotsky's name. The place of banishment assigned to him was Vernyi in the Kirghiz Kazak Republic, on the frontier adjoining Chinese Turkistan. He was stated to have left Moscow on the 16th January, 1928; and the crowds that watched the train start were reported to have raised cheers for the Russian Communist Party, the Third International and the U.S.S.R.⁹

¹ *The Times*, 25th and 26th October, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th November, 1927.

³ *The Times*, 19th December, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 20th December, 1927.

⁵ Rakovsky had been superseded as Ambassador in France in October, but his withdrawal had taken place at the request of the French Government and not on the Soviet Government's initiative (see Section (iii), below).

⁶ *The Times*, 30th December, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 6th January, 1928.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 12th January, 1928. See the communiqué issued through the 'Tas' agency, as reproduced *ibid.*, 19th January, 1928.

⁹ For Trotsky's last hours in Moscow see reports, in *The Times* of the

These appear to have been the main facts, so far as the actual course and outcome of the dissensions were concerned; and it also appears to be established that there were three main issues at stake (so far as the dissensions could be traced to differences over policy as distinct from a personal struggle for power). The first issue was that of democracy versus dictatorship within the bosom of the Russian Communist Party. The second issue was, in general, whether or to what extent the peasantry should be sacrificed to the urban proletariat or the urban proletariat to the peasantry, and, in particular, whether the 'kulaki' or 'rich peasants' should be tolerated or fought. The third issue was whether 'the World Revolution' was or was not still to be regarded as a practical possibility in the immediate future, and—supposing that the answer was in the negative—whether it would then be possible to maintain a Communist Russia in existence in the midst of a Capitalist world.

These seem to have been the main issues which divided the factions in the Russian Communist Party during the four years ending in January 1928, but the lines of division remained somewhat obscure. Trotsky was reported to be an advocate of democracy within the Party, of a campaign against the 'kulaki', and of the doctrine that to despair of 'the World Revolution' was tantamount to apostacy from the Marxian faith. Stalin was reported to be in favour of keeping the Russian Communist Party in leading strings and of letting the 'kulaki' and 'the World Revolution' alone. A foreign observer could only mention these reports without attempting to pronounce upon their accuracy.

One serious obstacle to divining the real beliefs and aims of the opposing leaders lay in the fact that it was incumbent upon all of them to demonstrate, at every stage of the controversy, that they themselves were the true believers and their opponents the heretics; and they therefore waged a kind of theological warfare in which texts and counter-texts from the Marxian and Leninian Canons were bandied to and fro. Owing to this, the first impression which their controversial literature¹ was apt to make upon the mind of the

18th and 19th January, 1928, of dispatches from the Moscow correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*. These reports, however, cannot be taken as authoritative. Indeed, it cannot even be regarded as certain that the person conducted on board the train on this occasion in the guise of Trotsky was really Trotsky himself.

¹ See, for example, a collection of speeches, discussions, articles and brochures by Stalin, translated into English by E. and C. Paul under the title of *Leninism* (London, 1928, Allen & Unwin). For the other side, see *Platform der russischen Opposition: Eingereicht dem ZK der WKP (B) von einer Gruppe*

uninitiated layman who glanced at it, in the hope of finding therein a key to their dissensions, was that their rival creeds were indistinguishable from one another to the naked eye. No doubt the significant differences in these documents could be detected by an application of the Higher Criticism. At the same time it was probably true that while the Companions of Lenin were intensely conscious, during these years of their own fratricidal strife, of the differences which divided them, these differences were still slight by comparison with the ideas and ideals which they continued to share with one another in profound opposition to the whole philosophy of 'Capitalist Society'. The two fundamental articles of this underlying common creed seem to have been that 'the World Revolution' was destined to be accomplished one day, whether sooner or later, and that, on the eve of that day, whenever it was to come, the Capitalist nations would rise up against the Church Militant in her city of refuge, the U.S.S.R., but would not prevail against her.

It is perhaps not too bold to conjecture that, at the moment when these words were being written, those two articles of faith were still professed—and professed in all devoutness and sincerity—by Stalin in the Kremlin and by Trotsky in Central Asia. The conjecture may be made with some confidence because these have been the elements of apocalyptic religion in all places and at all times.

(ii) Anglo-Russian Relations (1925-7).

In the *Survey for 1924*¹ the record of Anglo-Russian relations has been carried down to the decision, taken by Mr. Baldwin's Government which succeeded Mr. MacDonald's Government on the 6th November of that year, not to ratify the treaties which had been signed on the 8th August. This decision was notified to the Soviet Government on the 21st November and accepted by them on the 28th; and thus, save for the fact that the Soviet Government was now recognized *de iure* by Great Britain, relations returned to the basis of the years 1921-4, that is, they continued to be governed by the Trade Agreement of the 16th March, 1921. This agreement contained the stipulation that either party should refrain from conducting official propaganda directed against the other, and provided that the agreement should cease to be binding in the event of any infringement of this condition.²

Leninistischer Bolschewiki nicht veröffentlicht vom Stalinschen ZK, veröffentlicht vom Verlag 'Fahne des Kommunismus'.

¹ Part I C, Section (iv).

² For the terms of the Trade Agreement of the 16th March, 1921, see the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 220-2.

On the 6th January, 1925, Mr. Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary in Mr. Baldwin's Government, discussed with Monsieur Rakovsky, the Soviet *chargé d'affaires* in London, the questions of Communist propaganda (with special reference to the 'Zinoviev Letter')¹ and of commercial relations.² Mr. Chamberlain and Monsieur Rakovsky had another interview on the 1st April, and on this occasion Monsieur Rakovsky, who had just returned from a visit to Moscow, suggested that they 'should enter into general discussions, with a view to improving' the relations between their two countries, and 'finding out what agreements could be substituted for the treaties concluded by the late [British] Government which His Majesty's present advisers had been unable to ratify'.³ To this suggestion Mr. Chamberlain replied that he 'saw little use in entering into such general discussions so long as he was under the impression, from which he could not at present escape, that the political obligations in the Trade Agreement were not being fulfilled, and that the influence of the Soviet Government or of the Communist International, whose activities he could not dissociate from those of that Government, was continuously being employed in an unfriendly spirit to British interests'.⁴ Mr. Chamberlain also took occasion to contradict the reports which had appeared in the Russian press to the effect that he had been engaged in forming an anti-Soviet combination.

In the autumn of 1925 it was arranged that Messieurs Krassin and Rakovsky, the Soviet Ambassador and *chargé d'affaires* in Paris and London respectively, should change places.⁵ Monsieur Krassin had already represented the Soviet Government in London in 1920 and 1921, and it was he who had negotiated the trade agreement of March 1921. He was known to be personally anxious for an improvement of relations between Great Britain and Russia; and, since his previous mission had been successful,⁶ his appointment gave some

¹ In the summer of 1925 anxiety regarding Russian propaganda became specially acute in Great Britain, in view of the situation in China (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part III, Section (xi)). On the question of Russian influence in China, see also the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, Introduction, and the present volume, Part III, Section (ii), below.

² See the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2895 of 1927, p. 35.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ Monsieur Rakovsky had a final interview with Mr. Chamberlain on the 5th November (see *op. cit.*, p. 39).

⁶ Compare the statement by Sir Robert Horne (who had negotiated the 1921 agreement on the British side) in the House of Commons on the 3rd March, 1927, that his negotiations with Monsieur Krassin had been 'of the most agreeable order' and that he believed him to have been 'genuine in the desire to bring about amicable relations between Russia and Britain' and

grounds for the belief that the Soviet Government genuinely desired to come to terms with the Conservative Government in Great Britain. At all events, Monsieur Krassin's appointment coincided with a definite, if cautious, advance on the part of Mr. Chamberlain. Monsieur Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, visited Paris in November 1925, and again in the following month, and had interviews with Monsieur Briand.¹ Mr. Chamberlain authorized Monsieur Briand to inform Monsieur Chicherin that if he desired to discuss Anglo-Soviet relations and asked Mr. Chamberlain to receive him in London, Mr. Chamberlain would be willing to meet him.² This *démarche*, however, led to no result, whether because the message did not reach Monsieur Chicherin³ or because he chose to ignore the overture, and in a speech at Berlin on the 21st December Monsieur Chicherin denied that arrangements were being made for him to meet Mr. Chamberlain. None the less, Monsieur Chicherin's references on this occasion to Anglo-Soviet relations showed that he wished to keep the door open. He did not know, he said, whether the British Government would be prepared to enter into fresh negotiations with the Soviet Government, which, for its part, was still waiting to learn the grounds for the rejection of the treaties negotiated with Mr. MacDonald's Government in 1924. The Soviet Government was thoroughly desirous of establishing friendly relations with Great Britain, but it could make no new proposals until it had been informed of the British objections to the terms agreed upon in 1924. If these expressions meant that Monsieur Chicherin genuinely hoped that Monsieur Krassin might be able to find a way out of the *impasse* and come to terms with Mr. Baldwin's Government, his hopes were doomed to disappointment; for Monsieur Krassin was prevented by ill health from taking up his duties in London until the autumn of 1926, and in the interval the prospects for an Anglo-Soviet *rapprochement* grew perceptibly less promising as a result of Soviet activities in connexion with the coal-mining dispute and the general strike in Great Britain.

Throughout the coal strike of 1926 contributions to the miners'

'anxious that Russia should keep her word in the stipulations made in the Trade Agreement'.

¹ See Section (iii), below.

² See the statement made by Sir Austen Chamberlain to Monsieur Rosenholz in London on the 13th July, 1926 (*Cmd.* 2895, p. 42). Sir Austen Chamberlain was careful to explain on this occasion that he had sent no definite invitation to Monsieur Chicherin.

³ Monsieur Rosenholz, in his interview with Sir A. Chamberlain on the 13th July, 1926, expressed the opinion that the message had not reached Monsieur Chicherin 'in that form'.

funds were sent from Russia, and the sums transmitted were said to have reached a total of 11,500,000 roubles by the middle of December.¹ The British Government took the view that the receipt of these funds could not be prohibited, since the miners were engaged in a 'constitutional' industrial dispute,² but they drew a distinction between money sent to the miners and funds intended to help forward the prosecution of the 'illegal' general strike.³ The declaration of this general strike in Great Britain in May 1926 was greeted with enthusiasm in Moscow; and messages of encouragement⁴ addressed to British Communists were followed up by the dispatch of a sum of £26,427 from Russia to a London bank for the support of the strikers.⁵ This money, however, was refused by the Trades Union Congress, and a second sum of £200,000, which was also sent to a London bank, was returned to Moscow on the instructions of the Home Secretary.⁶

In view of the well-known difficulty of determining the direct responsibility of the Soviet Government for the collection and dispatch of these funds,⁷ the British Government based the protest which it decided to address to Moscow on the technical point that a law of the 14th April, 1926, had prohibited the transfer abroad of sums exceeding 100 roubles without the permission of a Special Currency Commission, and that the sums in question must therefore have been sent, if not actually on the instructions of the Soviet Government, at least with its knowledge and consent.

A note of protest was drafted and dispatched to the British *chargé d'affaires* at Moscow at the beginning of June,⁸ but it was not

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th December, 1926.

² It was further suggested that these contributions were illegitimate on the ground that they had been obtained by compulsory deductions from the wages of Russian workers and that the Soviet Government was thus ultimately responsible for the levy and therefore for the contributions. The allegation, however, that the contributions were compulsory does not seem to have been either formulated in precise terms or supported by conclusive evidence; and in any case the British Government refrained from taking any action on the strength of it.

³ See the exposition of the Government's policy in the House of Commons on the 25th June, 1926.

⁴ See translations of documents from the *Izvestiya* in *Cmd.* 2895 of 1927.

⁵ Statement by Sir W. Joynson-Hicks in the House of Commons on the 17th June, 1926.

⁶ Sir W. Joynson-Hicks, *loc. cit.*

⁷ In the debate in the House of Commons on the 25th June, 1926, the arguments put forward by Labour Members to prove that the Soviet Government had had nothing to do with the sums sent to England was met by the common rejoinder from Government spokesmen that it was impossible in practice to distinguish the actions of the Russian Communist Party and the Third International from those of the Soviet Government.

⁸ *The Times*, 14th June, 1926.

actually delivered until the 12th June. His Majesty's Government expressed its regret:

that it cannot maintain silence about the actions of the Soviet Government, especially in allowing the remittance to England of sums intended to support the general strike. The general strike was an illegal, unconstitutional act, being a menace to the established order in Great Britain. In particular, the activity of the Soviet Commissariat of Finance is not conducive to a friendly settlement of the questions outstanding between the two States, which settlement the Soviet Government professes to desire.

The Soviet Government's reply to this note, which was handed to the British Mission on the 15th June,¹ pointed out that:

in the Soviet Union there is not a total prohibition of the export of currency but only a restriction of the export which requires a permit in each individual case. The Soviet Government, expressing the will of the workmen and peasants of the U.S.S.R., could not forbid the trade unions which are organized by the millions of workmen of the U.S.S.R. to send money abroad to render support to trade unions in another country.

At the same time the Soviet Government called the attention of the British Government to:

utterances, not agreeing with the real facts and not in accord with normal relations between Governments, made by some members of the British Government who stated that the sum remitted to the General Council of the British Trade Unions was sent by the Soviet Government, while in reality it was sent by the Central Council of the All-Russian Union of Trade Unions, in agreement with the Soviet trade union centres.

This episode naturally had the effect of intensifying the campaign, which had been on foot in Great Britain ever since the fall of Mr. MacDonald's Government in 1924, for cancelling the trade agreement with Russia and even for breaking off diplomatic relations. The body which had been most active in conducting this campaign was the Association of British Creditors of Russia, which had protested at intervals, through the medium of the press, against the continuance of friendly relations with a Government that they denounced as having robbed British subjects of some £250,000,000 and having refused to make any restitution.² The aims of the Association

¹ *The Times*, 16th June, 1926.

² See, for example, the letters from the Association printed in *The Times* of the 19th June, 4th September, 14th September, 13th November, 1925, and 26th March, 1926. These letters, of course, and in particular the figures put forward in them, must be received with caution as *ex parte* statements of the case.

had the active support of a number of Conservative Members of Parliament,¹ and the London Chamber of Commerce also took the view that satisfactory commercial relations with Russia could only be developed when the Soviet Government had restored confiscated properties and refunded their repudiated debts, that the trade agreement of 1921 worked most unfairly, and that the position would be better if it were abrogated.²

The events of May 1926 roused both the Association of British Creditors of Russia and the London Chamber of Commerce to fresh efforts. The Association, in a letter to *The Manchester Guardian*,³ urged that recent events 'constituted just and reasonable grounds for the cancellation of the trade agreement' and quoted a statement made by Sir Robert Horne on the 17th May that 'nearly every stipulation made in that document had been broken in the most flagrant fashion during the last ten days'. The Council of the London Chamber of Commerce, early in June, adopted unanimously the following resolution and forwarded it to the Government:

The Council of the London Chamber of Commerce has consistently urged that recognition of Russia's debts to this country and to its individual citizens is essential if satisfactory trade relations between the Soviet and this country are to be developed; that the Trade Agreement entered into with the Soviet in 1921, whilst failing to make a clear recognition of this obligation the governing factor, nevertheless implied an intention to do so; that, as five years have now elapsed since the signing of the Trade Agreement, and no offer to settle has during that time been made by the Soviet, this Council feels that His Majesty's Government should now insist upon immediate satisfaction, or should give notice to terminate the Agreement, as further delay might be interpreted as acquiescence in the spoliation of British subjects.

On the 17th June a debate took place in the House of Lords, in which Lord Newton put the case against the Soviet Government and Lord Balfour explained the reasons which had made the Government decide to hold its hand, at any rate for a time. Lord Balfour's explanation was supplemented, during a debate in the House of Commons on the 25th June, by Sir Austen Chamberlain, who ex-

¹ See, for example, the debate in the House of Commons on the 25th June, 1926, especially the speeches by Commander Locker-Lampson and Sir A. Knox.

² See a resolution adopted by the Russian section of the Chamber of Commerce in July 1925, which urged the Government to 'deal promptly with the Russian situation' in order to secure these necessary conditions (*The Times*, 22nd July, 1925), and a letter from the Foreign Office (*ibid.*, 8th April, 1926), replying to the arguments for the cancellation of the trade agreement put forward by a deputation from the Chamber of Commerce on the 14th January, 1926.

³ Issue of the 20th May, 1926.

pressed the view that neither British interests nor the interests of world peace would be served by breaking off relations with the Soviet Government. Such a step would, he believed, introduce 'a new and disturbing issue' into both domestic and European politics. At the same time the Foreign Secretary readily agreed with the statement, made by members who had urged the advisability of cancelling the trade agreement, that the provisions of that agreement relating to hostile propaganda had not been observed, and he declared that in every interview which he had had with the Soviet *chargé d'affaires* he had informed him that His Majesty's Government thought it 'useless to enter upon the negotiation of any new agreement so long as old agreements are not honoured or kept'.

These debates in the two Houses of Parliament showed that the Government as a whole, in spite of the fresh provocation which it had received, was anxious not to proceed to extremes, but it was well known that certain members of the Cabinet shared the views of those who desired to see a complete breach with Russia. Public utterances by Lord Birkenhead and Mr. Churchill,¹ for instance, made it clear that Sir Austen Chamberlain could not expect their support even for a waiting policy in regard to Russia, much less for any active steps to place the relations between the two countries upon a more friendly footing.

Whilst a section of the British Government's Conservative supporters had been urging it to take drastic action and cancel the trade agreement of 1921, another section of the public had been criticizing the Government's policy from the opposite point of view, on the ground that a more friendly attitude towards Russia would help the development of trade with that country, and thus give employment to an increasing number of British workers. The volume of Anglo-Russian trade had been growing steadily, in spite of all obstacles, ever since the conclusion of the trade agreement in 1921, and it was pointed out as significant that a marked rise had taken place in the year 1924.² The value of the trade during the six years 1921-6 was as follows: ³

¹ See the extracts from their speeches quoted in the Soviet reply of the 26th February, 1927, to the British note of the 23rd February (*Cmd.* 2895 of 1927).

² The increased value of British exports to Russia in this year, however, was principally on account of re-exported goods, not of home manufactured products.

³ Statement by Mr. A. M. Samuel in the House of Commons on the 16th February, 1927.

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Total Imports consigned from Russia.</i>	<i>Exports consigned to Russia. Produced in Imported</i>		<i>Total Exports.</i>
	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>Merchandise.</i>		
	£	£	£	£
1921	2,695,000	2,181,000	1,210,000	3,391,000
1922	8,103,000	3,641,000	970,000	4,611,000
1923	9,266,000	2,492,000	1,989,000	4,481,000
1924	19,774,000	3,860,000	7,212,000	11,072,000
1925	25,322,000	6,240,000	13,017,000	19,257,000
1926	23,950,000	5,861,000	8,566,000	14,427,000

It will be noticed that the balance of the trade was in Russia's favour,¹ but it was frequently explained on the Russian side that more orders would have been placed in Great Britain if facilities had been available in that country, as they were, for instance, in Germany, for obtaining long-term credits on a large scale.² In this connexion criticism was directed against the British Government, not only for its failure to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Government, but also for its refusal to extend to Russian trade the benefits of the Trade Facilities and Export Credits Acts. In March 1925, for instance, the General Council of the Trade Union Congress passed a resolution calling on the Government, in view of the unemployment in Great Britain and the impossibility of restoring trade to the pre-war level 'so long as Russia is not admitted to the comity of nations ...', to reopen negotiations with the Soviet Government immediately, with the following objects:

- '(1) Complete diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Government of Russia;
- (2) The encouragement and support of trade relations with Russia by the application of the Trade Facilities Act and the Overseas Trade Acts to Russian Trade.'

A year later those members of Parliament who were anxious to develop trade with Russia had an opportunity of expressing their views during a debate on export credits which took place in the House of Commons on the 1st March, 1926. The arguments in favour of granting export credits to Russian traders elicited from Mr. A. M. Samuel, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Overseas Trade Department, the definite statement that 'if a case were to come to me from the Export Credits Advisory Committee asking me to authorize the use of public money for the purpose of giving

¹ This point was taken up by Sir Robert Horne in the debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 26th May, 1927.

² See, for example, the accounts in the press in the summer of 1925 of the activities of a Russian deputation which visited Lancashire with the object of placing orders for textile machinery.

credit facilities to Russia under the scheme, I should decline to accede to it'. Mr. Samuel was supported by the Home Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, in his defence of this policy, which was justified on the ground that Russian exports to Great Britain were far larger than British exports to Russia, so that Russia had already a large credit balance in Great Britain which she could use to finance further orders.

The debate in the House of Commons on the 25th June, 1926, on the money sent from Russia during the general strike afforded another opportunity for the marshalling of arguments, on the one side for the development of trade with Russia, on the other for the cancellation of the trade agreement. Sir Austen Chamberlain, as has been mentioned above, showed on this occasion that he, at least, was sufficiently convinced of the value of Russian trade and of the dangers of an Anglo-Soviet breach to be anxious to keep the 1921 agreement in force and to maintain diplomatic relations, even though he had no intention of entering into fresh negotiations with the Soviet Government until it was prepared to observe the undertakings which it had already given.

A few weeks later, on the 13th July, Sir Austen Chamberlain once more expounded this policy in an interview with Monsieur Rosenholz, the acting Soviet *chargé d'affaires*, who called on him, in spite of recent incidents, to express 'the desire of himself and his Government to endeavour to arrange a general settlement of the questions outstanding' and thus to put Anglo-Soviet relations on a better footing.¹ At the end of September 1926 Monsieur Krassin arrived in London to take up his duties as *chargé d'affaires*.² He saw Sir Austen Chamberlain on the 11th October, and was understood to have proposed that the two Governments should enter into fresh negotiations for a treaty.³ Sir Austen Chamberlain, however, countered these proposals with the reminder that the cessation of propaganda hostile to Great Britain must be the essential preliminary to more cordial relations with the Soviet Government.⁴ On the 24th November Monsieur Krassin died,⁵ and his death gave a fresh opportunity for pressure to be brought on the British Government by those of its supporters who were anxious to see a complete breach with Russia. On the 14th December Mr. Baldwin received a deputation of members of

¹ See Sir A. Chamberlain's dispatch of the 13th July, 1926, to Sir R. Hodgson, the British *chargé d'affaires* at Moscow, in *Cmd.* 2895, pp. 42-5.

² *The Times*, 30th September, 1926.

³ See *ibid.*, 7th and 12th October, 1926.

⁴ Statement by Sir A. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on the 23rd February, 1927.

⁵ *The Times*, 25th November, 1926.

the Conservative Party who impressed upon him the depth of feeling within the party on the subject of relations with Russia and urged that no successor to Monsieur Krassin should be recognized until the Soviet Government had agreed to cease all forms of propaganda against the British Empire. Mr. Baldwin seems to have accepted the view that there was good cause for uneasiness and to have indicated that the Government was merely biding its time.¹

The campaign for the severance of relations with Russia continued to gain impetus during the next few weeks,² and the Government finally decided to yield to the representations of its supporters to the extent of addressing a strong protest to the Soviet Government. In a further interview with Monsieur Rosenholz on the 14th February, Sir Austen Chamberlain referred 'with some emphasis' to the question of Soviet propaganda throughout the British Empire,³ and this verbal protest was followed on the 23rd February by a note which set out at length the causes of complaint which His Majesty's Government had against the Soviet Government. An appendix, consisting of a series of extracts from speeches, articles in the press, &c., contained illustrations of the propaganda to which objection was taken. The reply of the Soviet Government to this note was handed to the British *chargé d'affaires* in Moscow on the 26th February.⁴

A debate on Anglo-Russian relations in the House of Commons on the 3rd March, 1927, showed that the opinion was widely held that the note of the 23rd February made a complete rupture inevitable in the near future. The note, it was pointed out by Sir Robert Horne,⁵ was almost in the nature of an ultimatum and its terms could only be interpreted to mean that on the next provocation diplomatic

¹ *Ibid.*, 15th December, 1926.

² On the 5th February, 1927, the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee issued a protest against 'the threatened rupture with Russia' in which they complained that 'financiers and capitalists who have suffered by the Russian Revolution' and 'die-hard reactionaries to whom the very existence of the Soviet Government is a bitter grievance' were urging the Government to sever diplomatic and trade relations with the U.S.S.R., and urged in their turn 'the establishment of full normal diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries' (see *The Times*, 7th February, 1927, and compare the answer to this protest, from the Association of British Creditors of Russia, *ibid.*, 14th February).

³ Statement by Sir A. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on the 23rd February, 1927, in answer to a parliamentary question.

⁴ Texts of these notes in British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2822 of 1927. See also *Cmd.* 2895 of 1927.

⁵ In the speech which he delivered in this debate, Sir Robert Horne explained why it was that, since negotiating the Trade Agreement of 1921, he had changed his view as to what was the right policy for the British Government to pursue towards the Soviet Government.

relations would be suspended. Sir Austen Chamberlain himself explained that the note was intended as a last solemn warning 'to give the Soviet Government one more opportunity to conform their conduct to the ordinary rules of international life and comity'. At the same time, he submitted that 'you cannot have, whatever the provocation, whatever your own interests, a sudden breach between this country and Russia without its having its repercussions on the whole European situation'; and he explained that this was the consideration which had moved him to advocate that policy of patience which might now be approaching the limits beyond which it could not be carried.

In Russia the British note was received by organized protests and expressions of indignation at the 'interference' of the British Government in Russia's internal affairs.¹ Rumours were also current once more that Great Britain was busily engaged in the formation of an anti-Soviet *bloc*,² and since this legend was given some prominence in the European press, Sir Austen Chamberlain thought it politic to make a statement to the press at Geneva (where he was representing Great Britain at the forty-fourth meeting of the League of Nations Council) on the 8th March, in order to dispel the belief that Great Britain had revised her policy and, in particular, that she was inciting Poland and Rumania to take up an aggressive attitude towards Russia.³ Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that British foreign policy could be summed up in one word—peace—and that his Government had never, at any moment, sought to promote its own interests by making trouble between other countries. Even after the dispatch of his note of the 23rd February, Sir Austen Chamberlain seems to have held to the opinion that a diplomatic rupture between Great Britain and Russia was not desirable, since it might imperil the peace of Europe;⁴ but he was not able to avert the final step for long.

On the evening of the 11th May, 1927, the Home Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, after having consulted Sir Austen Chamberlain,⁵ authorized the police to apply to a magistrate, in accordance with the Official Secrets Acts, for a warrant to search the

¹ See *The Times*, 1st March, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 8th March, 1927.

³ Sir Austen Chamberlain had already referred to, and given a *démenti* to, these rumours during the debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 3rd March, 1927.

⁴ See, for instance, his speech at Birmingham on the 7th April, reported in *The Times*, 8th April, 1927.

⁵ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster, on the 26th May, 1927, confirmed by Sir William Joynson-Hicks at a later stage in the debate.

premises known as Soviet House, at 49 Moorgate Street, in the City of London, which were occupied both by Arcos Ltd. (a company with Russian capital, which had been the first Russian trading organization established in England after the resumption of Anglo-Russian commercial relations) and by the Russian Trade Delegation. The formal ground upon which the application was made was information that 'a document of an official and highly confidential character', relating to the armed forces of Great Britain, 'had been conveyed to Soviet House and there reproduced by means of a photostatic apparatus.'¹ The search warrant was granted by a city magistrate, and at 4.30 p.m. on the 12th May the premises were occupied by a strong force of police, who detained and searched the staff and any visitors who happened to be in the building and began a systematic examination of all the papers which were discovered. In the course of their investigations the police found in a room adjoining that of Monsieur Khinchuk, the head of the Trade Delegation, an official named Anton Miller who was engaged in burning papers. The dispatch box containing these papers was taken from Miller after a struggle. Two strong rooms, the keys of which were withheld, were forcibly opened by means of pneumatic drills.² The search continued during the next few days, and on the 16th May it was announced in the press³ that the missing document which had provided the formal ground for the search had not yet been found, but that the authorities considered the raid to be amply justified 'by the discovery in some of the secret strong rooms of the building of abundant evidence' proving 'the existence of a vast Soviet organization of a violently anti-British character'. According to the statement made by Mr. Baldwin on the 24th May in the House of Commons at Westminster the evidence which had come into the British Government's hands proved that:

- (1) Both military espionage and subversive activities throughout the British Empire and North and South America were directed and carried out from Soviet House.
- (2) No effective differentiation of rooms or duties was observed as between the members of the Trade Delegation and the employés of Arcos, and both these organizations have been involved in anti-British espionage and propaganda.

The proceedings in Moorgate Street naturally aroused considerable

¹ Statement made on the 24th May, 1927, in the House of Commons at Westminster by the Prime Minister.

² See *The Times*, 13th and 14th May, 1927, and the statement by Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons on the 24th May.

³ See *The Times* for that day.

excitement. In the House of Commons, on the 13th May, Sir William Joynson-Hicks was assailed with questions from members who were anxious to know the reasons for the action taken by the police and the position of the Trade Delegation with regard to diplomatic immunity. The Home Secretary declined to give any detailed justification of the raid at this stage, but he promised the House a full statement later on when the search had been concluded and more information was available. In the meantime the Soviet representative in London had not been slow in registering a protest. On the 12th May, Monsieur Rosenholz, who, since Monsieur Krassin's death, had again been acting as *chargé d'affaires ad interim*, addressed a note¹ to Sir Austen Chamberlain in which he complained that the occupation by the police of the Arcos building violated Article 5 of the Trade Agreement of 1921, since the offices of the Trade Delegation were situated in the same building and in accordance with Article 5 of the agreement Monsieur Khinchuk, the Official Trade Agent of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain, was entitled to 'all the rights and immunities enjoyed by the official representatives of other foreign Powers in Great Britain'.² Monsieur Rosenholz also declared that the police had 'assaulted' an official of the Trade Delegation who had refused to give up the keys of a safe containing papers, ciphers, &c., belonging to the Trade Agent, and that they had carried off the post addressed to the Trade Agent which had just been brought in by the couriers. These proceedings he considered a

¹ Text in *The Times*, 14th May, 1927.

² Article 5 of the 1921 agreement provided that the 'official agents' of either party should enjoy not only exemption from compulsory services and from taxation but also 'immunity from arrest and search'. Sir Austen Chamberlain subsequently explained, in a written reply to Parliamentary questions, that some confusion had arisen with regard to diplomatic immunity, owing to the fact that Monsieur Khlopliankin, Monsieur Khinchuk's predecessor, had been Commercial Counsellor to the Soviet Mission as well as official Trade Agent, and had enjoyed diplomatic immunity in the former but not in the latter capacity. On the 8th December, 1926, the Soviet *chargé d'affaires* had asked that Monsieur Khinchuk's name might be inserted in the diplomatic list in place of Monsieur Khlopliankin's, but this request had been refused on the ground that Monsieur Khinchuk did not occupy any post on the Soviet Mission. A further note from Monsieur Rosenholz, of the 4th February, 1927, assuming that Monsieur Khinchuk would be accorded the rights and immunities enjoyed by the official representatives of other foreign Powers, had been answered on the 16th February by the statement that Monsieur Khinchuk 'would be granted the same privileges under the Trade Agreement of 1921 as have been enjoyed thereunder by his predecessors in the office of Trade Agent' (see *ibid.*, 20th May, 1927). Compare the difference of opinion over the immunity of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin which arose in 1924 when the German police invaded the premises in the search for an escaped communist (*Survey for 1924*, pp. 214-17).

'flagrant violation' of Article 5 of the Trade Agreement, which gave official agents the right to communicate by post and telegraph in cipher and to receive and dispatch couriers with sealed bags. The very fact of the raid, Monsieur Rosenholz declared, was an infraction of the Trade Agreement, since it must inevitably injure Anglo-Soviet trade, and in Article 1 of the agreement the British Government had undertaken to place no impediments in the way of that trade. Monsieur Rosenholz further alleged that 'the most elementary guarantees and demands of common decency' had been violated during the raid; that the search had begun before the presentation of the warrant and had proceeded 'in nearly the whole of the premises' without a representative of the institution raided being present; that among those detained had been women possessing diplomatic passports; and that women had been searched by male police officers. On all these grounds, Monsieur Rosenholz considered it his duty 'to protest most emphatically against the violation . . . of the obligations undertaken by the British Government in accordance with the Trade Agreement of 1921'.

Monsieur Rosenholz also tried to get into touch with Sir Austen Chamberlain on the telephone, and, failing, called at the Foreign Office at about 7 p.m. on the evening of the 12th May, but he was received by a junior official, since the Foreign Secretary and the Under Secretaries had already left. He then proceeded to the House of Commons, where he consulted Mr. Arthur Henderson, the Labour Chief Whip.¹ On the following morning (the 13th May), Monsieur Rosenholz saw Sir Austen Chamberlain² and supplemented his note by a verbal protest. He gave additional details of incidents which were alleged to have taken place during the search and suggested that the real object of the raid had been to bring to nought an agreement which had, he declared, just been concluded with the Midland Bank and other concerns for a credit of £10,000,000.³

¹ This visit of Monsieur Rosenholz to a member of the Opposition was described by certain Conservative members as 'a breach of diplomatic etiquette' (see Hansard, House of Commons, 13th May, 1927). Members of the Labour Party called down more severe criticism on their heads a fortnight later, when Monsieur Rosenholz was the guest of the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee at a luncheon party held in the House of Commons on the 27th May, the day after the House had decided by an overwhelming majority to sever diplomatic relations with Russia (see *The Times*, 28th May, 1927; Hansard, 1st June, 1927).

² See Sir A. Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons on the 25th May.

³ On the 14th May the Midland Bank issued a *démenti* of statements regarding this credit which had been published in the press. The truth appears to have been that the negotiations with the Midland Bank had been initiated,

On the 17th May Monsieur Rosenholz's protest was 'resolutely confirmed' in a long note¹ handed by Monsieur Litvinov, the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the British *chargé d'affaires* at Moscow. Monsieur Litvinov repeated, in less restrained terms, the charges already made by Monsieur Rosenholz and declared that the raid constituted 'absolutely unquestionable proof of violation by the British Government of the Soviet-British agreement of 1921'. In conclusion he reserved the right of the Soviet Government 'to present demands for satisfaction for the violation by the British Government of its treaty obligations, for insults suffered, and for material losses caused by the action of the police'.

On the 24th May the promised full statement on the reasons for the raid and its results was made in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister himself. Mr. Baldwin concluded his speech by the announcement of the Government's decision, unless the House expressed its disapproval during the debate on the whole Anglo-Russian situation which had been fixed for the 26th May, to 'terminate the Trade Agreement, require the withdrawal of the Trade Delegation and Soviet Mission from London and recall the British Mission from Moscow'. In reply to a question from Mr. Clynes whether, after the raid and after the discovery of the documents mentioned in his statement, but before the provisional decision taken by the Cabinet had been reached, the Government had made any representations to the Soviet Government with a view to discussion and conference that might lead to a better understanding between Russia and Great Britain, the Prime Minister stated that the answer was in the negative.²

The divisions at the end of the debate in the House of Commons on the 26th May³ showed very large majorities in support of the Govern-

not by the Soviet delegates, but by persons representative of British trade, and that under the arrangement contemplated the Bank would have granted a credit, not to Arcos, but to British manufacturers, in order to enable them to execute orders given by Arcos. It was contemplated that orders might be given up to a total of £10,000,000, and that a considerable proportion of the price should be paid by the buyers in cash before delivery. For further light on the negotiations, see the statements made by Sir E. Turton, Mr. Clynes, and Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons on the 26th May.

¹ Extract in *The Times*, 18th May, 1927.

² A long statement by Monsieur Rosenholz, in reply to the points made by Mr. Baldwin, was issued to the press on the 25th May (see *The Times*, 26th May, 1927). On the same day Monsieur Litvinov, in a statement to the press at Moscow, declared that the British Government's decision 'must be considered as the logical and final issue of the anti-Soviet policy' pursued by the Conservative Government ever since it came into power (*The Times*, *loc. cit.*).

³ On the same day a series of documents officially described as 'illustrating

ment's policy, and on the 27th May¹ Sir Austen Chamberlain formally notified Monsieur Rosenholz of the abrogation of the Trade Agreement of the 16th March, 1921,² and the severance of diplomatic relations,³ and requested that he and his staff, together with the members of the Trade Delegation, should leave the country within ten days. The Soviet Government's reply to this intimation was handed to the British Mission in Moscow on the 28th May. The British Mission left Moscow on the 3rd June, and on the same day Messieurs Rosenholz and Khinchuk left England.⁴

Mr. Baldwin had announced in the House of Commons on the 24th May that the Government's decision to break off relations with Russia and insist on the withdrawal of the Soviet Mission and of the Trade Delegation would not affect the 'legitimate use' of Arcos, and that the Government was prepared 'to make all the arrangements necessary for ordinary trade facilities between the two countries'. The note of the 26th May also stated that His Majesty's Government did not wish 'to interfere with the ordinary course of legitimate

the hostile activities of the Soviet Government and Third International against Great Britain, was issued as a Parliamentary Paper (*Cmd.* 2874 of 1927). See also 'Russian Banks and Communist Funds: Report of an Inquiry into certain transactions of the Bank for Russian Trade, Ltd., and the Moscow Narodny Bank, Ltd. Memorandum by the Directors of the Moscow Narodny Bank, Ltd.' (British Parliamentary Paper, *Cmd.* 3125 of 1928).

¹ The note was dated the 26th May. The texts of this note, and of Monsieur Litvinov's reply of the 28th May, are reprinted in the appendix to the present volume.

² On the 30th May it was announced that the Department of External Affairs of Canada had requested the Foreign Office in London to notify the Soviet Government that the trade agreement (the provisions of which had been extended to Canada by an exchange of notes on the 3rd July, 1922) had been abrogated as between Canada and the U.S.S.R. It was also announced that the Soviet representatives in Canada had been given a fortnight's notice to leave the country (*The Times*, 1st June, 1927).

³ On the same day (the 27th May) the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin approached the German Government with the request that the German Embassy in London should undertake to look after Russian interests in Great Britain. The request was acceded to, though not, apparently, without some reluctance (see *ibid.*, 28th May, 1927). The British Government asked the Norwegian Government to look after British interests in Russia (*ibid.*, 30th May, 1927).

⁴ By the 23rd June, when the Home Secretary made a statement in the House of Commons, all but one of the thirty-one members of the Soviet Mission had left England. Forty-one of the fifty-three members of the Trade Delegation had also left, and six more had received final notice to go. All these officials had been accompanied by their dependants. Out of some three hundred and fifty Soviet citizens employed in Arcos and other trading organizations, forty-eight had left, either voluntarily or as the result of special instructions, and the cases of the remainder were being examined by the Home Office individually.

Anglo-Russian trade' and would therefore 'place no obstacles in the way of genuine commerce between the two countries'. The Soviet Government took the opposite attitude. Immediately after the raid on the Arcos buildings, the Soviet Government was reported to be contemplating an economic boycott of Great Britain, by way of reprisal for the 'violation of the Trade Agreement',¹ and on the 20th May it was announced that Monsieur Mikoyan, the Commissar for Trade, had sent an urgent telegram to all Soviet Trade Delegations and agents instructing them to take immediate steps to divert orders from 'countries where normal diplomatic relations and the possibility of normal trade do not exist'.² On the 30th May Monsieur Rosenholz informed Sir Austen Chamberlain that, unless Soviet citizens who were directors of Arcos and other British companies carrying on trade with Russia received permission to stay in the country in order to supervise the liquidation of the organizations concerned, orders would be given for the immediate liquidation of all the Soviet trading institutions and British companies in which the money of Soviet citizens and organizations was invested.³ This threat does not appear to have been deliberately carried out;⁴ but, according to a number of British business men interested in the subject,⁵ the breach with

¹ *The Times*, 19th May, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 21st May, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 31st May, 1927. A few days later it was announced that official application had been made to the German Government for permission for a number of members of the Arcos staff to stay in Germany until their British business was liquidated. There were already about 1,000 employees of Soviet trading organizations in Germany, and since the German Government did not wish the number to be increased permanently, it appears to have agreed to grant visas to not more than 120 members of the Arcos staff, for a maximum period of six weeks' residence in Germany (*ibid.*, 31st May and 1st June, 1927).

⁴ Before his departure from England Monsieur Khinchuk was also reported to have announced that no further orders would be placed in Great Britain and that no new contracts would be concluded either by Arcos or by other trading organizations, on the ground that the policy of the British Government made it impossible for trading operations to be pursued on the basis of the 'general economic plan of the Soviet Union' (see *ibid.*, 30th May, 1927). Towards the end of June Monsieur Khinchuk was again reported to have announced that the activities of Arcos would be liquidated and that no new orders would be placed in Great Britain (*ibid.*, 27th June, 1927). According to other reports, however, Monsieur Khinchuk, both at this time and afterwards, when he became Assistant Commissar for Trade at Moscow, exerted himself in order to preserve as much trade between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain as possible.

⁵ See, for instance, a letter in *The Manchester Guardian* of the 24th August, 1927, from Mr. H. E. Metcalf, a member of an engineering firm; reports of interviews with Mr. E. F. Wise, the economic adviser of Centrosoyus (*ibid.*, 25th August, 1927), and with Mr. A. G. Marshall, Managing Director of Becos, Ltd. (*ibid.*, 1st October, 1927); and a statement (*ibid.*, 1st March, 1928) on the past year's work of Messrs. Mather & Platt, a Manchester firm of textile

Russia did result in a serious loss of trade to Great Britain and the diversion of orders to other countries. It was true that the actual figures of trade for the period immediately succeeding the severance of relations showed a marked decrease only in respect of re-exports, the value of which for the three months July-September 1927¹ fell to £800,000, as against £2,200,000 in the corresponding period of 1926; but during this period deliveries of British goods were still taking place on contracts concluded before the events of May 1927, and the seriousness of the situation arose from the loss of the new orders which, in the view of many of the firms concerned, would probably have been placed in future on an increasing scale.² In attempting to secure new orders from Russia British traders had to reckon not only with the resentment aroused by the British Government's action but also with the practical difficulties which inevitably arose (in spite of the Government's reservation regarding the interests of legitimate commerce) from the absence of normal diplomatic relations.³

In Great Britain it was the actual and potential effects on trade of the breach with Russia which caused most concern, but in the U.S.S.R. the most striking feature of the situation was the stimulus given by the British Government's action to the 'war scare' campaign conducted by those in authority.⁴ The immediate reaction to the Arcos raid had taken the form of organized meetings of protest in Moscow, Leningrad and other big towns,⁵ and the Soviet leaders who addressed these meetings had seized the opportunity to impress upon their hearers the probability of an immediate outbreak of war and

machinery makers. Compare the statement made by Sir R. Thomas in the House of Commons on the 1st March, 1928, that since the breach with Russia Great Britain had lost £3,000,000 worth of trade in herrings. (These figures were subsequently declared by the Government spokesman, Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister, to be greatly exaggerated.)

¹ During the same period British exports to Russia were valued at £1,022,000 compared with £1,200,000 in 1926, while imports from Russia were £7,600,000 compared with £6,400,000 in 1926 (statement by Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister in the House of Commons on the 8th November, 1927, in answer to a parliamentary question).

² See the report of the interview with Mr. A. G. Marshall, referred to above (*The Manchester Guardian*, 1st October, 1927).

³ See Mr. Metcalf's letter in *The Manchester Guardian* of the 24th August, 1927.

⁴ The potential effects on trade seem, however, to have caused concern in Russia also. See, for instance, a frank and interesting article in *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika* (published by the Communist Academy at Moscow, 1927, No. 9), for the economic consequences of the rupture as viewed from the Russian standpoint.

⁵ See *The Times*, 17th and 31st May, 1927.

the necessity for pressing forward military preparations.¹ In a statement to the press at Moscow on the 25th May Monsieur Litvinov had declared that 'the rupture of diplomatic relations cannot be estimated otherwise than as an energetic preparation for war'.² A manifesto issued by the Communist International at the end of May urged the workmen, peasants, oppressed peoples, soldiers and sailors of the world to prepare 'for a furious, ruthless grapple with Imperialist cut-throats',³ and this was followed on the 1st June by the publication in the Soviet press of appeals from the Soviet Trades Union International and the Executive Committee of the Communist Party, in which the proletariat were warned not to let the war which must inevitably follow the Anglo-Soviet rupture find them unprepared.⁴ A day or two later Monsieur Rykov, in a report to the Moscow Municipal Soviet, declared his belief that the rupture with Great Britain was the first step towards war, and expressed the opinion that its effects on the international situation might be extremely grave.⁵ Early in June the Soviet Embassy in Paris found it necessary to issue a *démenti* of reports of the mobilization or preparations for mobilization of the Red Army;⁶ but it was not denied that a campaign had been started, with the watchword 'our reply to Chamberlain', for the collection of voluntary subscriptions towards the construction of aeroplanes.⁷ The programme of a 'Defence Week'⁸ which opened on the 10th July included the collection of funds for 'our reply to Chamberlain'⁹ and the holding of meetings

¹ See, for instance, a speech by Tomsky on the 28th May, quoted in *The Times*, 31st May, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 26th May, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 1st June, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2nd June, 1927.

⁵ *Le Temps*, 3rd June, 1927. Compare the expressions used by the Soviet Government in its correspondence with the Polish Government after the murder of Monsieur Voykov in Warsaw on the 7th June, 1927 (see Part II D, Section (iii), above).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 12th June, 1927. On the 10th June *Le Temps* had published the report that the Soviet Government intended to mobilize 800,000 men, that 350 aeroplanes were under construction, and that the construction of eight armament factories was contemplated.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 10th, 27th and 30th June, 1927.

⁸ *Izvestiya*, 29th June, 1927 (twenty-six slogans for the 'Defence Week'); 3rd July (general instructions for the 'Defence Week'); 10th July (Appeal by Monsieur A. I. Rykov, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.).

⁹ A British Trade Union delegation which visited Russia in the autumn witnessed a demonstration at Moscow when the workers handed over to the Government more than thirty aeroplanes paid for by weekly contributions of small sums (see *The Manchester Guardian*, 12th December, 1927). This demonstration (as well as other fruits of the 'Defence Week') is reported in the *Izvestiya*, 10th November, 1927.

to protest against Great Britain's 'anti-Soviet machinations'.¹ Responsible Soviet leaders such as Rykov, Voroshilov (Commissar for War), Kamenev (Assistant Commissar for War) and Bukharin continued to circulate reports through the press and in speeches to the effect that war with Great Britain was at hand,² even though they found it necessary at the same time to take steps to counteract the excessive panic which their utterances caused among the peasants, who accepted too literally their warnings of the imminence of war. By the third week of June the Soviet Government was reported to be sending numbers of workmen into the country districts, with instructions to allay the peasants' fears and convince them that, although war was inevitable later on, it was not likely to occur immediately.³

According to various observers who visited Russia during the autumn of 1927 the fear of war was genuine and widespread, and if by this time Great Britain did not loom quite so large as the direct aggressor, this was because a more acute danger had arisen in the immediate neighbourhood. The sudden turn for the worse taken towards the end of 1927 by the long-standing dispute between Poland and Lithuania⁴ gave cause for apprehension in Russia as well as in many European countries; and Monsieur Chicherin, at any rate, seems to have been genuinely impressed by the danger that the Lithuanian-Polish dispute might come to the point of war and that Russia might be drawn into the struggle.⁵

¹ See *The Times*, 12th and 13th July; *Le Temps* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 13th July, 1927.

² See the example (a speech by Kamenev) translated from the *Izvestiya* of the 26th July and printed in *The Times* of the 3rd August, 1927.

³ See *The Times*, 22nd June, 1927. In the Western press it was reported that, notwithstanding these measures, the war scare produced an outbreak of food hoarding (*ibid.*, 13th July and 18th November, 1927); that at the end of July the Government was forced to take special steps to prevent the hoarding of salt (*Le Temps*, 1st August, 1927); and that in the autumn food queues became common in Moscow and other large towns (*The Times*, 11th October, 1927). Even, however, if these reports were correct, it remained to be proved that the phenomena were the effect of the war scare. They may simply have been the effect of governmental control of the food supply.

⁴ See Part II D, Section (iv), above.

⁵ This was the opinion formed by Mr. Irving T. Bush, an American business man who visited Russia in October. Mr. Bush reported that Monsieur Chicherin was sincerely convinced of the danger of war and was anxious that the United States should use her influence with Poland to avert a conflict (see *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th November, 1927). Compare the impressions of Mr. B. Sullivan, a member of the British Trade Union delegation which visited Russia in November to take part in celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Revolution. Mr. Sullivan found a strong feeling in Russia against Sir Austen Chamberlain, who was generally believed to be deep in

The 'war scare' campaign was accompanied by a renewal of the 'Red Terror'. A special feature of the activities of the 'Ogpu' during the second half of 1927 was the accusation of espionage on behalf of Great Britain which was made against many of the victims. Allegations of this kind against four of the twenty persons who were summarily executed by the 'Ogpu' on the 9th June¹ elicited a categorical *démenti* from Sir Robert Hodgson, the former British *chargé d'affaires* in Moscow,² but similar charges were brought against a naval officer who was sentenced to death by a military court on the 16th June³ and against twenty-six persons who were arrested early in July on the ground that they had taken part in an elaborate system of espionage which had been operating from a base in Finland, under directions sent from Great Britain.⁴ Nine of these twenty-six persons were condemned to death in September and thirteen were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.⁵ On the 25th September four more prisoners—accused, this time, of belonging to a Monarchist organization which was said to have the support of Great Britain and other Powers—were condemned to death,⁶ and a month later death sentences were also passed on three out of five persons who were charged with having supplied information to Mr. Charnock, the former British commercial attaché.⁷

In spite of the anti-British feeling to which these events in Russia bore witness, and the resentment which they, in turn, aroused in England, the year 1927 did not close without an attempt being made to find a basis on which official relations between the two countries could be resumed. In his speech at the Guildhall on the 9th Novem-

anti-Soviet plots, and he came to the conclusion that the Russian people were genuinely obsessed by the fear of war (see *The Manchester Guardian*, 12th December, 1927).

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian* and *Le Temps*, 11th June, 1927. The explanation of these executions given in the *Izvestiya* was that they were an answer to the murder of Monsieur Voykov in Warsaw on the 7th June (see Part II D, Section (iii), above) and to recent 'terrorist' acts in Moscow, Leningrad and Minsk. In the note of protest against Monsieur Voykov's murder which the Soviet Government addressed to the Polish Government, that crime was declared to be one link in a chain which included recent events in China and in Great Britain (see p. 232, above).

² *The Times*, 13th June, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 17th June, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 31st August and 6th September, 1927; *Le Temps* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 12th July, 1927.

⁵ *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 14th September, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th September, 1927. During the trial both the British and the Finnish Governments were reported to have protested that none of the accused persons had worked on their behalf (*The Times*, *loc. cit.*).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 26th September, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 24th and 25th October, 1927.

ber, Mr. Baldwin made a reference to Anglo-Soviet relations which seemed to imply that overtures from the Soviet Government would not be unwelcome.

The quarrel [said Mr. Baldwin] was not of our seeking, nor does the determination depend on us. . . . Whenever they are prepared to observe the ordinary decencies of international intercourse, to abstain from interference in our domestic affairs and from a policy of intrigue and hostility elsewhere, they will find us ready to meet them in that spirit of liberality and goodwill which inspires our whole foreign policy.¹

Special significance was attached to this declaration of Mr. Baldwin's, owing to the fact that the Soviet Government had notified the League of Nations of its intention to be represented at the next session of the League's Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, which was due to meet at Geneva on the 30th November. The British delegate on the Preparatory Commission, Lord Cushendun, would thus find himself in close contact with Monsieur Litvinov, who had been designated by the Soviet Government as its principal representative; and it was probable that Monsieur Litvinov would also encounter Sir Austen Chamberlain at Geneva, since the British Foreign Secretary was due in that city on the 5th December, to attend the forty-seventh session of the League Council. If, therefore, there was a desire on the Russian as well as on the British side to come to terms, an opportunity would not be lacking for a meeting on neutral ground. On the eve of the meeting of the Preparatory Commission, the Soviet Government outlined its position in a speech by Monsieur Rykov, delivered before the Ukrainian Communist Party Congress at Kharkov on the 25th November.² Since the initiative in breaking off relations had come from the British Government, that Government, said Monsieur Rykov, must take the initiative for the resumption of relations. The Soviet Government would not decline to negotiate, but no official or semi-official proposals of the kind had so far been received. Relations might be resumed on a basis of reciprocal non-interference in internal affairs; but the Soviet Government, which did not expect Mr. Baldwin to accept responsibility for the actions of international organizations hostile to the U.S.S.R., could not make itself responsible for the Communist International or the Red Trade Union International.

The responsibility of the Soviet Government for the propaganda conducted by the international organizations which had their base in the U.S.S.R. was perhaps the question on which the British

¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th November, 1927.

² See *ibid.*, 26th November, 1927.

Government was least likely to yield, and Monsieur Rykov's declaration (assuming that it represented the Soviet Government's last word on the subject) could therefore hardly be said to have improved the prospects for a *rapprochement* at Geneva. Nevertheless, Monsieur Litvinov, who was duly present at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission which opened on the 30th November,¹ was known to be most anxious to have a conversation with Sir Austen Chamberlain before his return to Moscow. For fear of a rebuff, he made no advance until he received an assurance, on the evening of the 4th December (the Soviet delegation had arranged to leave Geneva on the following day), that a formal request for an interview would not be refused. The request was promptly made and granted, and on the 5th December Monsieur Litvinov and Sir Austen Chamberlain had an hour's conversation. Monsieur Litvinov was reported to have been willing to give a pledge that the Soviet Government itself would abstain from directing or encouraging Communist propaganda in Great Britain, and he was also, apparently, ready to undertake that the notorious college at Tashkend for training propagandists² should cease to direct its activities against India. But he was not prepared to give any assurances that the activities of the Third International and other revolutionary organizations would be controlled, and on the necessity for such assurances Sir Austen Chamberlain stood firm. In these circumstances it was impossible to make much progress. At the end of the interview a brief joint communiqué was issued which stated that there had been a 'frank exchange of views' but that it had not been found possible 'to reach any basis for agreement'.³

The year 1927 therefore closed with no immediate prospect of the resumption of the relations between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. which had been broken off in May; but, at the same time, the first step had been taken in a new attempt to find some basis on which the two states could settle their differences. Even if the meeting between Sir Austen Chamberlain and Monsieur Litvinov at Geneva had borne no immediate fruit, it had been conducted on lines which left the door open for either side, if it so desired, to make a further advance.

(iii) Russo-French Relations (1925-7).

The resumption of diplomatic relations between France and the U.S.S.R. which followed the dispatch, on the 28th October, 1924, of

¹ It was on this occasion that Monsieur Litvinov put forward the Soviet Government's proposal for universal complete disarmament. This phase of the history of the disarmament problem will be dealt with in a subsequent volume.

² See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 226-7.

³ See *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 6th December, 1927.

the telegram in which Monsieur Herriot's Government recognized the Soviet Government as the *de iure* ruler of Russia,¹ was intended to be merely the first step in the process of negotiating a general settlement between the two countries. The original intention was that a formal conference should be held in Paris in January 1925, at which all the outstanding questions would be discussed. From the point of view of France the most important of these questions was that of French claims against the Soviet Government. In addition to State claims, the large number of private French nationals who held Russian Imperial bonds had suffered heavily from the refusal of the Soviet Government to recognize debts incurred under the Tsarist régime, and there was therefore widespread interest in France in the outcome of the negotiations. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, was chiefly concerned with the possibility of obtaining commercial credits. Even those of the Soviet leaders who desired the resumption of normal relations with European countries, and who realized that some sacrifice on their part was inevitable, were only prepared to acknowledge the Soviet Government's responsibility for debts incurred by its predecessors on the condition that its creditors would agree to make further loans.²

Monsieur Krassin, the new Soviet Ambassador in Paris, who presented his credentials on the 13th December, 1924, belonged to the party which was anxious to come to terms with 'Capitalist' countries, but he seems to have begun his negotiations with the French Government by indicating that the Soviet Government could only consider the repayment of pre-war debts when it had secured a loan.³ On the 19th December it was announced that the conference, which was due to open in Paris on the 10th January, 1925, had been postponed,⁴

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, Section (v).

² It may be noted that public utterances by some of the less diplomatic of the Soviet leaders threatened to compromise the Franco-Russian negotiations at the outset. For instance, Monsieur Rykov, the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, made a speech in the middle of January in which he declared that France had only lent money to Tsarist Russia in order to guarantee herself against Germany, and that Russia's debts to France were of the same nature as the debts to the United States and Great Britain incurred by France during the War (see *Le Temps*, 18th January, 1925). On the 4th March Monsieur Rykov stated definitely that the Soviet Government still refused to recognize Russia's pre-war debts to France (*The Times*, 6th March, 1927). These statements appeared to conflict with the basis of Monsieur Krassin's negotiations—that, on condition of a French loan, the Soviet Government would repay, in part at least, the Tsarist debts—but the Soviet authorities seem to have believed that they could maintain their contentions in theory and abandon them in practice.

³ Compare Monsieur Rakovsky's attitude in the negotiations in London in 1924 (*Survey for 1924*, Part I C, Section (iv)).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

and Monsieur Krassin spent the next six weeks in fruitless endeavours to reach some agreement with the French Government and to persuade French banks to grant credits to the U.S.S.R. in order to finance commercial operations.¹ At the end of January Monsieur Krassin left for Moscow, and it was understood that negotiations were to be continued in that city,² where Monsieur Herbette, the French Ambassador, had presented his credentials on the 14th January.³

In the course of the next few weeks both sides seem to have reached the conclusion that the financial questions at issue needed to be examined by experts in preparation for official negotiations, and it was decided that Monsieur Krassin should be accompanied on his return to Paris by a delegation of financial experts.⁴ This Soviet delegation, headed by Monsieur Preobrazhensky, of the Commissariat of Finance, arrived in Paris at the end of March.⁵ After the decision had been taken to postpone the formal conference, Russian questions had been under consideration by a committee at the Quai d'Orsay. The first chairman of this committee was Monsieur de Monzie, who had taken a leading part in the negotiations which resulted in the French recognition of the Soviet Government in the previous year,⁶ but at the end of May he was succeeded by Monsieur Dalbiez. This committee discussed such questions as the future of the ships formerly belonging to General Wrangel, which were now interned at Bizerta, and which were claimed by the Soviet Government,⁷ but financial questions proper were dealt with by a subsidiary committee, the chairman of which was Monsieur Alphand, and it was the financial committee with which the Soviet delegates got into touch.⁸

Informal discussions continued intermittently throughout the spring and summer, but no great progress was made. A proposal was put forward by the French delegates at the beginning of June, by which the Soviet Government would recognize full liability for the pre-war debts, but the French Government would grant a ten years' moratorium, expiring on the 1st January, 1936.⁹ This plan

¹ The only success which Monsieur Krassin achieved during this period was the conclusion of a contract with the Minister of Marine for the supply of 75,000 tons of oil for the French Navy (*The Times*, 27th January, 1925).

² *The Times*, loc. cit.

³ *Ibid.*, 15th January, 1925.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 23rd February, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 2nd April, 1925.

⁶ *Survey for 1924*, p. 252.

⁷ Under Monsieur Herriot's administration the transfer of this fleet to the Soviet Government had been agreed upon in principle, but practical difficulties had prevented the actual transfer from taking place (see the *Survey for 1924*, p. 254).

⁸ See *The Times*, 3rd June, 1925.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 6th June, 1925.

was not acceptable to the Russian delegates, and at the end of July counter-proposals were outlined by Monsieur Krassin in conversation with Monsieur Dalbiez. Monsieur Krassin seems to have offered to settle the pre-war debts on the basis of 40 per cent. of their paper value,¹ but after the scheme had been examined in detail the offer was rejected by the French Government at the beginning of September, ostensibly on the ground that the Soviet Government demanded, as a prior condition, the return of the fleet at Bizerta, and that the terms proposed for the transfer were not considered satisfactory.²

At this stage, when the negotiations seemed to have reached an *impasse*, the Soviet Government decided to try the effect, on its relations with France and Great Britain respectively, of exchanging its Ambassador in Paris, Monsieur Krassin, with its *chargé d'affaires* in London, Monsieur Rakovsky. Monsieur Rakovsky, who was believed to be better qualified for coming to terms with the French than with the British Government, since he had been educated at the Sorbonne, and had many friends in France, was accepted by the French Government, and he arrived in Paris at the end of October.³ The financial negotiations were then resumed and Monsieur Rakovsky seems gradually to have raised the offer made by Monsieur Krassin to the point of proposing recognition of pre-war debts up to about 65 per cent. of their paper value.⁴

In the meantime Monsieur Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who spent some weeks in Germany during the autumn, had come to the conclusion that his personal intervention might help forward the negotiations with the French Government, and the expression of his wish to visit Paris had met with an encouraging reply from Monsieur Briand.⁵ Monsieur Chicherin accordingly spent a few days in Paris at the end of November, and returned there again in the second week of December. During his first visit he seems to have explained that the Soviet decree cancelling Tsarist debts might now be interpreted in the sense that the Soviet Government desired to revise the debts in accordance with their capacity

¹ *Ibid.*, 1st August, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, 7th September, 1925. Monsieur Krassin was reported to have been willing to waive the condition regarding the ships at Bizerta if he could have been sure of obtaining a loan (see *Le Temps*, 7th September, 1925). The real reason for the French rejection of this offer was no doubt the hope of striking a better bargain. The question of Wrangel's fleet does not appear to have been raised again in the subsequent negotiations.

³ *The Times*, 30th October, 1925. He did not present his credentials until the 10th December (*ibid.*, 11th December, 1925).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 30th December, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 21st October, 1925.

to pay,¹ and this statement no doubt helped the French Government to decide that the time had come for formal negotiations on all outstanding questions.² Monsieur Chicherin had conversations with Monsieur Briand and also with Monsieur Berthelot at the Quai d'Orsay, and the procedure to be followed was agreed upon in outline.³ It was decided that the conference should discuss the general problem of political relations and the possibility of concluding a commercial treaty as well as questions of debts and credits, and it was arranged that there should be four sections, to deal respectively with the political, juridical, financial and economic aspects of the negotiations.⁴ The opening of the conference was originally fixed for the 17th February, 1926, but at the last moment it was postponed for a week, apparently because the French delegates were anxious, if possible, to come to a preliminary understanding with various French interests concerned before the formal negotiations began.⁵

During February an important group of French banks prepared proposals for submission to the Soviet delegation which, it was hoped, might meet the Soviet demand for credits. The suggestion was that, in return for petroleum concessions on a large scale in the Caucasus, the banks concerned should grant long-term credits for goods to be purchased by the U.S.S.R. in France.⁶ The Soviet delegates were apparently willing to accept this proposal in principle, but the oil-field which they suggested as the subject of the concession was less attractive than that which the French banks had had in mind,⁷ and their counter-proposals were therefore not received with much enthusiasm. Nevertheless, these preliminary *pourparlers* showed that there was an important body of opinion in France which was anxious to develop economic relations with the U.S.S.R. even on the Soviet Government's own terms. On the other hand, among banks not forming part of this group and firms which were not interested in petroleum concessions, there was still considerable hostility towards the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the National Association of Russian

¹ *The Times*, 12th December, 1925.

² There seems to have been a feeling in official French circles that the Soviet Government was by this time in such urgent need of commercial credits that they would probably be more inclined than before to meet French views on the subject of debts (see *The Times*, 20th January, 1926).

³ See *ibid.*, 27th November, 11th, 12th and 14th December, 1925; *Le Temps*, 28th November and 18th December.

⁴ For the composition of the French and Soviet delegations, see *The Times*, 28th January and 15th February, 1926; *Le Temps*, 19th February.

⁵ See *The Times*, 17th February, 1926.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 11th February, 1926.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 20th February, 1926.

Bondholders, a powerful body comprising holders of all Russian bonds, whether industrial or public, took the line that the whole basis on which the Soviet delegation wished to conduct the negotiations was economically unworkable. The leaders of the Association were strongly opposed to the Soviet idea of repaying debts out of the surplus profits of nationalized industry, after that industry had been reconstructed by means of credits to the Soviet Government, and they held that the only possible solution of the problem was for the Soviet Government to recognize their debts and to restore enterprises which had been nationalized to their former proprietors, who would then be able to reconstruct Russian industry on their own lines. The former proprietors of Russian enterprises, for their part, protested against any arrangement for granting credits to the Soviet Government until they had received compensation.¹ Since the Association of Russian Bondholders had a very large membership, it was impossible for the French Government to ignore its views, and it was apparently arranged, on the eve of the conference, that while the official French delegates should conduct the direct negotiations with the Soviet delegation on the question of compensation and repayment of debts, the bondholders should be called into consultation.²

On the 25th February the conference was opened at the Quai d'Orsay. In a short opening speech Monsieur Briand referred to the importance of the negotiations for the French people, and Monsieur de Monzie, the President of the French delegation, who followed him, declared that he and his colleagues, in undertaking their task, would defend the rights of the 'large number of innocent persons of inconsiderable means' who were suffering through the Soviet default. Monsieur Rakovsky, in his reply, explained that the Soviet Government was anxious to discover a practical solution of the problem of pre-war debts which should prove satisfactory to the small bondholders.³ These opening speeches were clearly designed to allay the

¹ See *ibid.*, 17th February, 1926.

² See *ibid.*, 31st May, 1926. When the conference had been in session for some weeks the French delegates seem to have appealed to the bondholders to take a direct part in the negotiations. The response to this was a resolution adopted by a congress of bondholders on the 30th May authorizing their own representatives to negotiate direct with the Soviet authorities without the mediation of Government officials. On the same occasion the results were announced of a referendum which had been held on the suggestion that the recognition of the Soviet Government by France should be cancelled or revised. Out of about 2,700,000 votes, 2,400,000 were in favour of cancellation and 225,000 in favour of revision of the terms of recognition (see *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*).

³ See *ibid.*, 26th February, 1926; and, for the full text of the speeches, *Le Temps*, 26th February.

anxieties of the French bondholders, but the obligation, thus publicly acknowledged, to consider their interests as of paramount importance, did not make the work of the conference any easier. The French delegates were hampered in their attempts to strike a bargain by the need for taking into account the opinions of a public which was peculiarly sensitive on financial questions at this time (the Franco-Russian negotiations coincided with an acute financial crisis in France); while the Soviet delegates, on their side, had to bear in mind that the conclusion of an agreement which would satisfy the French bondholders would immediately result in the renewal of claims from Soviet creditors in other countries.

As had been planned, the conference divided into political, juridical, financial and economic sections, but only the last two actually started work. At the end of March the Economic Committee was reported to be examining the draft of a commercial treaty, on the model of the German-Soviet treaty;¹ but even in the economic field it was recognized that little progress could be made until the fundamental question of the pre-war debts had been settled, at least in principle. The non-financial members of the conference therefore remained in the background, while the financial experts attempted to find some solution of the problems on their agenda.

The Financial Committee held its first meeting on the 4th March² and continued in session until the middle of July. Early in April it was reported that the banking group which had made an offer in February had come forward with new proposals, which had been accepted in principle by the Soviet delegation. The formation of a Franco-Soviet consortium was now suggested. The French group taking part in the consortium would grant the Soviet Government commercial credits up to a sum to be determined, and would make itself responsible for the annuities payable in respect of debts in accordance with an agreement to be reached between the French and Soviet Governments. The Soviet Government in return would undertake to export a certain annual contingent of raw materials, such as grain and petroleum, which would be sold by the consortium in French and foreign markets. These proposals were contingent on the conclusion of an agreement regarding debts and of a commercial treaty, and though the Soviet delegates undertook to submit the scheme to their Government for approval it was understood that no contract would be concluded for the formation of the consortium, pending the outcome of the general financial negotiations.³

¹ *The Times*, 30th March, 1926.

² *Le Temps*, 5th March, 1926.

³ See *ibid.*, 9th April, 1926.

These negotiations, however, dragged on without much progress being made. The Soviet delegation once more made it an essential condition of recognizing a proportion of the pre-war debts that the U.S.S.R. should be granted long-term credits, and although the French delegates seem to have accepted this principle, at any rate as a basis for discussion, the condition remained one of the chief stumbling-blocks in the way of an agreement. The Financial Committee soon reached the point of examining concrete proposals,¹ but the French and Russian delegates found it impossible to reconcile their ideas of what would constitute a fair bargain. Early in April the Vice-President of the Soviet delegation left for Moscow to submit certain French demands to the Government;² and in the course of the next four months an offer seems to have been made which represented a considerable advance on any previous Soviet proposal. The Soviet delegation apparently suggested an annual payment for sixty-two years of about 55,000,000 gold francs,³ but though the period suggested was acceptable to the French delegation, the annuity seemed to them too low.⁴ In the middle of July it was announced that no definite basis for negotiation had yet been found, and that the discussions had been suspended until the autumn,⁵ and definite proposals made by the Soviet delegation on the 26th July seem to have been rejected by the French Government without further discussion.⁶

It had been anticipated that the conference would be resumed in October, but on the 14th of that month Monsieur Briand had an interview with Monsieur Rakovsky in which he made it clear that unless the Soviet Government was prepared to make a more favourable offer, the French Government felt that the resumption of the discussions would be useless.⁷ Monsieur Rakovsky seems to have indicated that he was ready to make certain concessions, but in spite of this the conference did not reopen until March 1927. In the meantime the question of compensation for nationalized property had been brought to the front by Monsieur Poincaré, who had succeeded Monsieur Briand⁸ as Prime Minister in July, immediately after the Franco-Russian discussions had been broken off. Monsieur Poincaré addressed a letter to Monsieur Briand in December, in

¹ See *ibid.*, 30th March and 5th April, 1926.

² *The Times*, 5th April, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 15th October, 1926; 21st March and 11th April, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 20th August, 1926, mentioned 125,000,000 francs as the French figure for an annuity.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 17th July, 1927.

⁶ See the official French *communiqué* of the 23rd September, 1927 (*L'Europe Nouvelle*, 8th October, 1927).

⁷ *The Times*, 15th October, 1926.

⁸ Monsieur Briand remained in the Government as Foreign Minister.

which he set out the minimum demands that must be satisfied if the French Government was to come to an agreement with the U.S.S.R., and he included among these demands compensation to all French citizens whose property in Russia had been nationalized.¹

The French conditions for the resumption of negotiations were discussed by Monsieur Rakovsky with the Soviet leaders in Moscow in February 1927,² and on the 9th March he arrived back in Paris with fresh instructions.³ Neither party seems to have been very anxious to resume official negotiations at this stage, since it would clearly be difficult for France to come to an agreement with Russia at a moment when Russo-British relations appeared to be nearing the breaking-point,⁴ and the Soviet leaders did not want to run the risk of another failure. It was difficult, however, to postpone the discussions any longer without some definite reason, and the conference accordingly reopened on the 19th March.

The conference was again organized in four sections;⁵ but on this occasion not even the Financial Section seems to have remained at work for more than a few days, and such negotiations as were carried on proceeded through the medium of correspondence. According to Monsieur Rakovsky's version of the negotiations,⁶ agreement was reached in principle on the 19th March that there should be an average annuity on account of debts of 60,000,000 gold francs, but the Soviet delegates asked for a large reduction in the annuity during the earlier years, to be compensated for by larger payments later on. This condition was unacceptable to the French delegation, which also objected to the Soviet terms regarding credits, the grant of which was still made a prior condition of an agreement on debts. On the other hand, the Soviet delegation was unwilling to agree to a French proposal for the insertion in the agreement of a most-favoured nation clause, by which French bondholders would benefit if Soviet creditors in other countries subsequently obtained more favourable terms.⁷ On the 25th March the Soviet delegation seems to have presented a memorandum laying down conditions for the settlement of the debt beyond which the Soviet Government could not go; but on the following day the French delegation replied that these proposals represented no advance on those of the 26th July, 1926, which

¹ See *The Times*, 7th March, 1927.

² *Le Temps*, 18th February; *The Times*, 7th March, 1927.

³ *The Times*, 11th March, 1927.

⁴ See Section (ii), above.

⁵ *Le Temps*, 21st March, 1927.

⁶ See Monsieur Rakovsky's letter to Monsieur de Monzie of the 21st September, 1927 (text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 8th October, 1927; *Le Temps*, 25th September, 1927).

⁷ See *The Times*, 21st March, 1927.

had already been rejected.¹ At the beginning of May Monsieur Rakovsky (again according to his own account)² offered to waive the Soviet terms for the distribution of the annuities and to accept the French most-favoured-nation clause, on condition that the much-needed credits could be supplied. This offer did not tempt the French delegation, and though Monsieur Chicherin visited Paris again towards the end of May and had conversations with Monsieur Poincaré and Monsieur Briand, his intervention met with no success.³ On the 30th June Monsieur Rakovsky wrote to Monsieur de Monzie, pointing out that the negotiations seemed to be in suspense and promising that the Soviet delegates would meet the French delegates in a conciliatory spirit, but making no concrete proposals. The French delegation did not reply until the 26th July, when they expressed, in general terms, the hope that the negotiations might be resumed on a more definite basis.⁴

One of the principal reasons for the languishing of the negotiations seems to have been the attitude of the Soviet delegates on the question of compensation to French citizens whose property in Russia had been nationalized. Monsieur Poincaré, as has been mentioned, had insisted that some arrangement on this point must form part of a settlement, but the Soviet delegates had declared that the principle of compensation for losses caused by nationalization could not be accepted, since it was contrary to the Soviet constitution, and they seem to have evaded the attempts of the French delegates to discuss the question.⁵ With regard to credits, the difficulty seems to have arisen not so much on the principle (which the French delegates had by this time accepted) as on the actual figures. The Soviet delegates asked for a loan of \$220,000,000—one-third in cash and the rest in credits⁶—whereas the French suggested \$60,000,000,⁷ and they found it impossible to agree on a compromise. The course of the discussions was no doubt influenced also by events in England, where the breach with Russia, which had been expected for some time, had actually taken place in May.⁸

¹ See the French official *communiqué* of the 23rd September, 1927 (*L'Europe Nouvelle*, *loc. cit.*; *Le Temps*, 24th September, 1927).

² See his letter of the 21st September, 1927 (*L'Europe Nouvelle*, *loc. cit.*; *Le Temps*, 25th September, 1927).

³ See *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 25th May, 1927.

⁴ See the official French *communiqué* of the 23rd September, 1927 (*L'Europe Nouvelle*, *loc. cit.*; *Le Temps*, 24th September, 1927).

⁵ See *The Times*, 24th September, 1927.

⁶ See *ibid.*, 26th September, 1927.

⁷ *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th September, 1927.

⁸ See Section (ii), above.

Apart from the inevitable reaction of the French Government to the new circumstances created by the British Government's decision, the reports which were published on the subject of Bolshevik propaganda in England added to the uneasiness regarding Communist activities in France which had been growing ever since the French Communist Party in 1924 and 1925 had championed the cause of the Rifis who were in revolt against French and Spanish rule in Morocco.¹ The arrest in April 1927 of a number of Communists suspected of espionage in State arsenals² was followed by energetic denunciations of Communists as 'the enemy' in speeches by Monsieur Sarraut, the Minister for the Interior, and other members of the Government³ and by the institution of proceedings against Communist deputies charged with seditious propaganda.⁴ Although the Radicals (on whose support the Coalition Government was partially dependent) appeared reluctant to make open war on the Communists,⁵ Monsieur Sarraut's statements indicated that the Government intended to take drastic action against persons suspected of subversive activity, and this decision was welcomed by the parties of the Right, which were disposed to treat the Communists as a serious menace to the safety of the State.⁶ By the beginning of June the question was being asked in some quarters whether France would not do well to follow the example set by Great Britain and attempt to cut off Communist propaganda at its source by breaking with the Soviet Government.⁷ During the next few months anti-Communist feeling was strengthened by reports of disturbances—believed to be instigated by Communists—among reservists in the army and navy,⁸ by the trial of the persons accused of espionage who had been arrested in April,⁹ and finally by

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 138–9.

² *The Times*, 16th April, 1927.

³ See *ibid.*, 23rd April, 7th May, 28th May, 8th June; *Le Temps*, 23rd April, 1927.

⁴ See *The Times*, 14th May, 24th May, 2nd June, 20th June, 24th June, 5th July, 19th July, 1927.

⁵ See the debate in the Chamber at the end of May and beginning of June 1927 (*ibid.*, 28th May and 4th June, 1927).

⁶ See *ibid.*, 2nd May, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 8th June, 1927. See also *ibid.*, 29th July, 1927. The French Ambassador in Moscow, Monsieur Herbette, spent some time in France during the first half of 1927, and there seems at one time to have been some doubt whether the French Government would not decide to withdraw him. He returned to Moscow, however, at the end of July, and on his departure the Quai d'Orsay, apropos of rumours which had appeared in the press, announced that he had no special instructions to make representations on the subject of Communist propaganda in France (see *ibid.*, 29th July, 1927).

⁸ See *ibid.*, 20th and 25th July; *Le Temps*, 21st July, 1927.

⁹ *The Times*, 20th and 26th July; *Le Temps*, 27th July, 1927.

the serious riots, accompanied by much material damage, which took place in Paris on the evening of the 23rd August, after the execution in the United States of Sacco and Vanzetti, two anarchists of Italian origin who had been convicted of murder.¹

Before the disturbances of the 23rd August took place, Monsieur Rakovsky, the Russian Ambassador in Paris, had played into the hands of the anti-Soviet party. On the 9th August, in Moscow, where he was attending the sessions of the Central Committee and the Central Commission of Control of the Russian Communist Party, he put his signature to a declaration in which the principal members of the Opposition (Trotsky, Zinoviev and others) defined their views on various points. According to the version of this document which was subsequently published in the Western press,² it contained a paragraph calling for the 'defeat of all the bourgeois states which carry on war against the Soviet Union' and declaring that 'every honest proletarian in the Capitalist countries must look actively for the defeat of his Government', and that 'all soldiers of foreign countries who do not desire to help their slavemasters' must desert to the Red Army. The French Government took exception to the public expression of such sentiments by an Ambassador accredited to it,³ and promptly instructed its Ambassador in Moscow, Monsieur Herbette, to make a formal protest to the Soviet Government.⁴ This *démarche* elicited from Monsieur Chicherin, on the 29th August,⁵ a formal disavowal of any interpretation of the Minority Group's declaration in a sense hostile to France. Monsieur Chicherin repudiated the idea that one of the representatives of the U.S.S.R. 'could organize a propaganda of insurrection and desertion on the territory of France, with which country [the Soviet Government]

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 24th and 25th August; *The Times*, 25th August; *Le Temps*, 25th and 26th August, 1927.

² See the translation of the text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 8th October, 1927.

³ It may be noted that the declaration was also signed by Monsieur Kamenev, the Soviet Ambassador in Rome, but Signor Mussolini's Government took no action in the matter.

⁴ This was not the first occasion on which Monsieur Herbette had been called upon to protest to the Soviet Government. He had hardly arrived in Moscow in January 1925 when Monsieur Zinoviev made a speech in which he referred to the future policy of French Communists, and Monsieur Herbette was desired by his Government to point out that such references would have unfortunate effects (see *The Times*, 15th January, 1925). A few days later Monsieur Herbette again protested against a speech in which Monsieur Rykov disputed the legality of the repayment of loans made by France to Russia (*The Manchester Guardian* and *The Times*, 19th January, 1925).

⁵ See the French Government's note of the 7th October, 1927 (text in *Le Temps*, 9th October, 1927).

entertained peaceful relations'.¹ On the 4th September similar sentiments were expressed by Monsieur Rakovsky himself. He had arrived back in France on the 18th August² and he now issued a statement to the press in which he repeated Monsieur Chicherin's formula almost word for word and declared that any diplomatic representative of the U.S.S.R. who should interfere in any way with French internal affairs 'would be unworthy of the confidence of his Government and unfit to carry out the mission of *rapprochement* between France and the Soviet Union'. The declaration of the 9th August, he explained, had been signed by him purely in his capacity as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and its terms applied to a hypothetical and not to an actual case, and were certainly not aimed in any way at France.³ On the same day (the 4th September) Monsieur Herbetie seems to have informed Monsieur Chicherin that the explanation which he had given was considered satisfactory;⁴ and with the publication, also on the 4th September, of an official French *communiqué*⁵ in which reference was made to Monsieur Chicherin's disavowal of Monsieur Rakovsky's action, the incident appeared to be closed.

The opponents of the Soviet régime in France, however, were not willing to let slip the opportunity offered them by Monsieur Rakovsky's indiscretion, and the issue of the French *communiqué* on the 4th September (which appears to have been the first official reference to the affair in France) was followed by a campaign in the more extreme section of the press not only against Monsieur Rakovsky in person but also against the continuance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government.⁶ The members of the Cabinet were known to be divided on the question of relations with Russia,⁷ and while Monsieur Briand and the Radical Ministers were anxious at least to maintain the *status quo*, a strong party, to which Monsieur Poincaré was understood to belong, had been growing more and more inclined, even before the Rakovsky incident, to take the course which had already been followed by the British Government. At this juncture Monsieur Briand was absent in Geneva, and at a French Ministerial Council, held on the 10th September, it was apparently agreed that no definite decision on the question of rela-

¹ French official *communiqué* of the 4th September (*Le Temps*, 5th August; *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 8th October, 1927). ² *The Times*, 19th August, 1927.

³ Text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 8th October, 1927.

⁴ See the Soviet Government's note of the 13th October, 1927 (*Le Temps*, 15th October, 1927). ⁵ Text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, *loc. cit.*

⁶ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 5th, 6th and 10th September, 1927.

⁷ Compare the similar situation in Great Britain (see Section (ii), above).

tions with Russia should be taken until Monsieur Briand's return. At the same time the Council of Ministers was understood to have reached the conclusion that it would be desirable, in the interests of future Franco-Soviet relations, for Monsieur Rakovsky to be replaced by another Ambassador.¹ This report indicated, at all events, that the party in favour of breaking off relations with Russia had not gained a complete victory, and it soon became apparent that a compromise had been effected between the divergent views held by various Ministers and that the Ambassador was to be sacrificed in order to save the Embassy.

The French Government wished to avoid the onus of making a formal request for Monsieur Rakovsky's recall—partly, no doubt, because, through the mouth of its Ambassador in Moscow, it had already accepted as satisfactory the Soviet explanation of the only incident on which such a request could be based—and it evidently hoped that, if it held its hand, the Soviet Government would take the initiative in the matter. Hints in this sense, however, had no effect on Moscow. On the contrary, the Soviet Government seems to have hoped that if it offered sufficient guarantees of good faith the French Government might yet be induced, not only to reconsider the position with regard to Monsieur Rakovsky, but even to grant the credits which had so long been the subject of negotiation. Monsieur Rakovsky appears to have returned to France in August with instructions to express to the French Government the Soviet Government's readiness to conclude a pact of non-interference and non-aggression,² and the formal proposal for such a pact had been made to the French Government by the middle of September. On the 17th September the following communiqué was issued to the press at the close of a French Ministerial Council:

The Council examined the question of relations with Russia, on which it had postponed its decision until the return of Monsieur Aristide Briand, Minister for Foreign Affairs. It decided not to reply to the proposal for a pact of non-interference, presented by the Soviet Government, as that Government has already on the 29th October, 1924, accepted a formal and unconditional engagement in that respect, the execution of which the French Government reserves its right to control. The Council considers that nothing at the moment justifies the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and is therefore considering the Russian proposal for a pact of non-aggression, which conforms to its policy as well as to the need of security of its Allies in the East. It has con-

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Times*, 12th September, 1927.

² See the statement by Monsieur de Monzie published in *L'Avenir* on the 12th September and quoted in *The Manchester Guardian*, 13th September, 1927. See also *Le Temps*, 19th September, 1927.

sequently requested the Minister for Foreign Affairs to pursue negotiations for this purpose, after assuring himself that all conditions which are of a nature to make it possible are fulfilled.

Monsieur Rakovsky, between the date of his return to Paris and the middle of September, seems also to have had conversations with Monsieur de Monzie in which he made fresh proposals on the subject of debts and credits,¹ but there was no formal discussion of terms, and the French Government was accordingly considerably taken aback when Monsieur Litvinov, the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stated categorically on the 16th September, and again on the 22nd,² that the negotiations regarding debts had resulted in complete agreement on an annuity of 60,000,000 gold francs, and that the question of credits had also been settled in principle, though the exact figures were not yet fixed. Monsieur Litvinov's statements contained a certain measure of truth (since in the negotiations in the earlier part of the year the figure of 60,000,000 gold francs had been provisionally accepted as the annuity in respect of debts, and the French delegates had apparently no longer contested the principle of granting credits) but their publication at this stage had every appearance of propaganda aimed at the French bondholders over the head of the French Government. On the 22nd September an official communiqué³ was issued in Paris which denied the truth of Monsieur Litvinov's assertions, and this was followed on the 23rd by a detailed account⁴ of the negotiations which had taken place since the 19th March, 1927, in support of the French contention that no agreement had been reached at the time of Monsieur Litvinov's declarations. In the meantime, however, Monsieur Rakovsky, on the 21st September,⁵ had put into writing the proposals which he had already made verbally to Monsieur de Monzie, the chief features of which were an undertaking to pay the annuity of 60,000,000 gold francs for sixty-one years in full from the first year, and the reduction of the demand for a loan from \$220,000,000 to \$120,000,000 payable in six annual instalments and all in the form of credits, not cash.⁶

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 26th September, 1927.

² Texts of his statements in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 8th October, 1927.

³ Text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, *loc. cit.* The reason given for the failure to reach agreement was the Soviet insistence on large commercial credits.

⁵ The note seems not to have reached Monsieur de Monzie until the evening of the 23rd September (after the publication of the official French statement on the negotiations) and to have been issued to the press by Monsieur Rakovsky on the same day (see *Le Temps*, 25th September, 1927, where the text of Monsieur Rakovsky's note will be found. The note is also printed in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, *loc. cit.*).

⁶ In his letter to Monsieur de Monzie, Monsieur Rakovsky attempted to

In making new proposals for debt settlement at this stage, the Soviet Government no doubt calculated that the French bondholders would throw their influence into the balance against a rupture of relations so long as a settlement appeared possible,¹ and that the French Government, in view of the approaching elections, would be less likely than ever to ignore the bondholders' views. The new offer undoubtedly aroused interest, although on closer examination it would probably have been found to be only a little less unsatisfactory than Monsieur Rakovsky's previous proposals, since the question of compensation to expropriated owners was still not mentioned. Moreover, it was clear that no great reliance could be placed on the fulfilment of obligations extending over some sixty years, and that the advantages or disadvantages of the arrangement must be estimated on its probable results during the first few years. For at least six years, however, the French Treasury—which would presumably have to finance the credits that were an integral part of the scheme—would be paying out sums considerably in excess of the amount to which the bondholders would benefit.² In one respect the introduction into the diplomatic controversy of new proposals for debt settlement and for a non-aggression pact³ proved an advantage to the French Government, since it afforded some justification for the course of action on which it had decided. Monsieur Rakovsky could now be sacrificed to the anti-Soviet campaign on the ground that the new proposals required handling by a negotiator whose position had not been compromised in the eyes of the French

justify the continued demand for credits as a preliminary to repayment of debts by pointing out the advantages to French industry of securing part of the Russian market. He gave figures to show that, in spite of all difficulties, commercial exchanges between the two countries had been steadily growing. According to statistics supplied by the Soviet Commissariat for External Trade, the value of French exports to Russia had risen from 7,800,000 gold roubles in nine months of 1924-5, to 20,400,000 gold roubles in 1925-6 (twelve months) and 20,000,000 gold roubles in ten months of 1926-7. Russian exports to France, during the same three periods, had been of the value of 26,000,000, 78,000,000, and 84,000,000 gold roubles respectively.

¹ After the publication of Monsieur Rakovsky's new proposals, certain associations of small bondholders seem to have brought pressure to bear on Monsieur de Monzie to accept the terms (see *The Times*, 10th October, 1927).

² On this point, see *The Times*, 26th September, 1927.

³ At the beginning of December 1927 Monsieur Briand had an interview with Monsieur Litvinov at Geneva, and the two statesmen were reported to have agreed that negotiations for a non-aggression pact should be opened as soon as the new Soviet Ambassador reached Paris (see *Le Temps*, 7th December, 1927). A rumour to the effect that a draft had been submitted to the French Government at the beginning of 1928 was semi-officially contradicted (see *Le Temps*, 22nd January, 1928).

public, and at the same time the renewed possibility of a debt settlement could be used to refute the advocates for a complete rupture with the U.S.S.R. The concluding sentence of the communiqué issued at the close of the French Ministerial Council on the 17th September was interpreted to mean that the French Government intended to ask for a new Ambassador before it entered into any new negotiations,¹ and during the next fortnight the Quai d'Orsay seems to have approached Monsieur Rakovsky with the suggestion that he should help to solve the dilemma by himself asking for his recall.² Monsieur Rakovsky did not respond to this appeal, and Monsieur Herbette was then instructed to explain the situation to the Soviet Government.³ This *démarche* merely had the result that on the 29th September the Soviet Government asked that the French Government, if it wished Monsieur Rakovsky to be superseded, should make a formal request for his withdrawal.⁴ A verbal statement by Monsieur Herbette on the 1st October⁵ was not considered sufficient, and on the 4th October Monsieur Chicherin asked for a written exposition of the French Government's reasons for demanding Monsieur Rakovsky's recall.⁶ The French Government, thereupon, on the 7th October, dispatched a note⁷ formally requesting the Soviet Government to withdraw Monsieur Rakovsky, but pointing out that there was no question of a rupture between the two countries. The case of Monsieur Rakovsky was purely a personal question, the settlement of which was necessary 'in order to make possible the success of economic and political negotiations which can only be conducted in an atmosphere of reciprocal confidence between the representative of the Soviets and the Government of the Republic'.

To this note Monsieur Chicherin replied on the 13th October.⁸ While agreeing to Monsieur Rakovsky's recall, he took occasion to remind the French Government of Monsieur Herbette's statement, made on the 4th September, that the incident which had arisen out of the signature of the declaration of the 9th August might be considered closed, and declared himself unable to understand why the question should have been reopened. The French Government was asked to accept, as Monsieur Rakovsky's successor, Monsieur Dovgalevsky, the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo.

¹ See *Le Temps*, 19th September, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 9th October, 1927.

³ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 30th September, 1927; *The Times*, 3rd October.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 9th October, 1927.

⁵ *Le Temps*, loc. cit.

⁶ *Le Temps*, loc. cit.

⁷ *Le Temps*, loc. cit.

⁸ Text in *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th October, 1927; *Le Temps*, 15th October.

Monsieur Rakovsky left Paris on the 16th October, without calling on Monsieur Briand or presenting his letters of recall,¹ and a few days later it was announced that the French Government had decided to accept Monsieur Dovgalevsky as his successor²—although, as was pointed out with some reason by the more extreme press (which continued to clamour for a complete rupture with Russia), there was little ground for the belief that the new Ambassador would prove any less undesirable than the old one.³

The presentation of his credentials by Monsieur Dovgalevsky on the 24th January, 1928,⁴ was followed on the 28th January by an interview between the new Ambassador and Monsieur Poincaré,⁵ and this gave rise to the rumour that the debt negotiations would shortly be reopened. The French press pointed out that little purpose would be served by a renewal of discussions in which credits were given precedence over repayment of debts, but the French bondholders were anxious that the negotiations should not be allowed to lapse completely. Early in February a deputation urged Monsieur de Monzie, as president of the French delegation at the Franco-Soviet Conference, to resume the discussions which had been suspended on Monsieur Rakovsky's departure,⁶ but in spite of the French Government's anxiety to placate the bondholders—which grew keener as the date of the elections approached—no immediate steps were taken in the desired direction. In the spring of 1928 the settlement of the Russian debt to France was apparently little nearer than it had been three years earlier when the first Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. had entered upon his task in Paris.

(iv) Russo-Italian Relations (1925-7).

Italy had been the first of the Great Powers to grant *de iure* recognition to the Soviet Government, on the 7th February, 1924,⁷ and during the next few years relations between Italy and the U.S.S.R. pursued a relatively uneventful course. There was even common ground between Fascist Italy and Bolshevik Russia on which extremes seemed to have no difficulty in meeting. During the years 1924 to 1927 Signor Mussolini showed himself more tolerant than the heads of other European Governments towards the pro-

¹ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th October, 1927.

² *The Times*, 20th October, 1927.

³ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th October, 1927.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 25th January, 1928.

⁵ *The Times*, 30th January, 1928.

⁶ *Le Temps*, 6th February, 1928.

⁷ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, Section (iii).

ceedings of the Soviet Government and the Third International—partly, perhaps, because of a certain feeling of sympathy with rulers whose despotic methods bore some resemblance to his own and who shared with him the brunt of European criticism;¹ partly because the menace of Communist propaganda held fewer terrors for Fascist Italy than for other countries in Western Europe. Again, one of the principal matters in dispute between the Soviet Government on the one hand and the Governments of France and Great Britain on the other was the settlement of debts incurred under the Tsarist régime and the compensation of nationals who had suffered loss as a result of the Revolution, whereas Italian claims under these heads were not sufficiently serious for the maintenance of good relations to be prejudiced by the Soviet Government's refusal to recognize its obligations.² If Italy had not the same imperative reasons as Germany³ for wishing to be on good terms with the U.S.S.R., neither did she feel the full weight of the circumstances which gave rise to friction between the U.S.S.R. and France or Great Britain. She was, in fact, in the fortunate position of having little to lose and possibly a good deal to gain from friendship with the Soviet Government.

The principal advantages which Signor Mussolini had hoped to derive from being first in the field in the matter of *de iure* recognition had been economic.⁴ The attraction of Russia as a potential market for the goods of European countries had been strong in 1924, and even though the passage of time brought a certain measure of disillusionment, competition for trade with Russia continued to be keen, and Italy had no intention of being left behind in the race.⁵

A commercial treaty between Italy and the U.S.S.R. had been signed on the 7th February, 1924, simultaneously with the Italian Government's grant of *de jure* recognition to the Soviet Govern-

¹ 'We must not judge what is going on in Russia for the simple reason that we ourselves do not permit any other Government to intervene in our internal affairs.'—Signor Mussolini in the Chamber at Rome on the 3rd June, 1925, as reported in *Le Temps*, 5th June, 1925.

² In the summer of 1925 a Commission of the Italian Chamber, in a report on the Soviet-Italian commercial treaty which was then under discussion (see below), reaffirmed the right of the state to claim compensation for its nationals who had suffered through acts of the Soviet Government (see the *Corriere della Sera*, 24th May, 1925). It does not appear, however, that the question of compensation was formally discussed between the two Governments.

³ See Section (v), below.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1924*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ 'If other capitalist countries, more capitalist than ours, are hastening to establish relations with Russia, we who, without rhetoric, are a nation eminently proletarian, cannot disinterest ourselves in territories where there are possibilities for our future.'—Signor Mussolini in the Chamber on the 3rd June, 1925, as reported in *Le Temps*, 5th June.

ment.¹ The treaty was brought into force in Italy by a Royal Decree on the 14th March, 1924, but the bill for the conversion of the decree into law did not come before the Italian Parliament until May 1925, so that the treaty was in force for fifteen months before it received final approval. During those fifteen months, according to Signor Mussolini, Italy had imported goods from Russia to the value of 19,000,000 lire and exported goods to the value of 17,000,000 lire.² The debate on the treaty in the Chamber at the end of May and beginning of June 1925 showed that in the opinion of a number of deputies the commercial advantages so far derived from the treaty had been inconsiderable, and Signor Mussolini frankly based his demand for approval on the ground that rejection of the treaty would be fraught with political as well as economic dangers.³ The bill for the conversion of the decree into law was finally passed by the Chamber on the 3rd June, 1925.⁴

During September 1925 attempts seem to have been made by Soviet diplomatists to drive in a wedge between Italy and the other Powers who were then engaged in negotiating for a Pact of Security;⁵ but, although Italy did not take a prominent part in the discussions, Signor Mussolini set the seal of his approval on the 'Locarno policy' by himself attending the Conference during its later stages,⁶ and an Italian signature was duly affixed to the documents initialled at Locarno on the 16th October and signed in London on the 1st December, 1925.

If this failure to turn the friendship of Italy to account was a setback to Soviet diplomacy, it was generally placed to its credit that the Italian Government continued to withhold its ratification of the treaty of the 28th October, 1920, by which the Principal Allied Powers had recognized Rumania's right to the province of Bessarabia.⁷ This treaty had been ratified by Great Britain on the

¹ For the terms of the treaty see the *Survey for 1924*, loc. cit.

² Imports from Russia consisted principally of petroleum and petroleum products. Italy exported chiefly motor-cars and lemons, and also some textile goods. For an account of the commercial exchanges between the two countries in 1926, see the *Corriere della Sera*, 3rd January, 1927.

³ See *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 5th June, 1925.

⁴ *The Times*, loc. cit.

⁵ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 64.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁷ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 273-8, and the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 263-5. In March 1925 Monsieur Chicherin stated in a report to the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. that the Soviet Government had indicated to the Italian Government that the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty would be considered an unfriendly act. He added that Signor Mussolini had offered to mediate between Russia and Rumania on the Bessarabian question, but that the attitude of Rumania had caused the idea to be abandoned (see the *Corriere della Sera*, 19th March, 1925).

14th April, 1922, and by France on the 30th April, 1924, but it could not come into force legally¹ until the ratifications of Italy and Japan had also been deposited. Japan had made it clear that she was waiting for a lead in the matter, and responsibility for taking the next step therefore lay with Italy. Until the year 1926 Signor Mussolini's refusal to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty was the cause of a certain coolness in the relations between Italy and Rumania, but in the course of that year Italian penetration of the Balkan Peninsula became one of the leading points of Signor Mussolini's foreign policy, and in these circumstances the goodwill of Rumania was found to weigh heavier in the balance than the goodwill of the U.S.S.R. The question of the Bessarabian Treaty naturally played a part in the negotiations between Italy and Rumania which resulted in the signature of a pact of friendship and cordial collaboration on the 16th September, 1926, but Signor Mussolini was still unwilling to commit himself definitely to ratification. No reference to the Bessarabian Question was made in the pact, but in a note to General Averescu, the Rumanian Prime Minister, Signor Mussolini explained that ratification of the treaty of 1920 would not take place 'until it was possible without prejudice to the general interests of Italy'.²

¹ Rumania had been in *de facto* occupation of Bessarabia since 1918. A Russo-Rumanian Conference held at Vienna in 1924 (see the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, Section (vii)), broke down on Rumania's refusal to discuss the Bessarabian Question; and since the Soviet Government continued to declare that it did not and would not recognize the transfer of the province to Rumania, Russo-Rumanian relations remained in a position of stalemate, and Bessarabia itself suffered the hardships of a closed frontier and martial law. Economic distress, accentuated by three successive bad harvests during the years 1923-5, laid the Bessarabian peasants open to Bolshevik propaganda, but actual raids from Soviet territory seem practically to have ceased after the failure of the Communist rising at Tatar Punar in September 1924 (see the *Survey for 1924*, p. 265). The smuggling of arms continued to form an important part of the contraband trade carried on across the Dniestr; but from 1924 onwards frontier incidents were rare, and those that occurred were frequently settled out of hand by a Mixed Russo-Rumanian Commission set up for that purpose. As time went on this Commission seems also to have dealt with more general questions, such as navigation on the Dniestr, and to have proved that friendly co-operation between Russians and Rumanians was not impossible (see C. N. Clark, *Bessarabia*—New York, 1927, Dodd, Mead & Co—pp. 273-5). By the beginning of 1927 the internal position in Bessarabia had improved considerably. A good harvest in 1926 alleviated the distress of the peasants; the stringency of martial law was relaxed; and the civil administration showed a marked improvement as a result of the replacement of certain incompetent or venal officials. For the position in Bessarabia during the years 1924-7, see C. N. Clark, *op. cit.*, and articles in *The Times*, 30th October, 11th November and 19th December, 1925, 3rd and 7th September, 1926; and in *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st January, 1926.

² See the *Survey for 1926*, Part II C, Section (i).

This cautious statement (which may, however, have been supplemented by private assurances) would have enabled Signor Mussolini to pursue his policy of procrastination for an indefinite period, but it was sufficient to cause alarm in Moscow. On the 6th October, 1926, the Soviet Government sent a formal note to the Italian Government protesting that the terms of Signor Mussolini's communication to General Averescu were incompatible with Italo-Soviet friendship, and were likely to lessen the chances of a peaceful settlement of the Bessarabian Question.¹

On the 8th March, 1927, Signor Scialoja, who was representing Italy at the forty-fourth session of the League Council, took his fellow delegates by surprise by announcing to the press at Geneva that the Italian Government had decided to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty without further delay.² On the same day the decision was notified to the Government at Bucarest, where the announcement was greeted with enthusiasm.³ The Royal Decree⁴ effecting ratification, which was dated the 9th March, was approved by a large majority of the Italian Chamber on the 10th March. In presenting the decree to Parliament Signor Mussolini explained that ratification had been postponed in the hope of seeing the Bessarabian Question settled by friendly consultation between Russia and Rumania, but since this attitude could not be maintained for ever and further procrastination seemed useless, the Italian Government had decided to ratify the treaty.⁵ Signor Mussolini, however, did not indicate the motives which had led him to choose that particular moment for an act which had been so long deferred. The fact that ratification had been effected immediately after the British Government had sent to the Soviet Government a note foreshadowing the breach of diplomatic relations which followed in May,⁶ naturally gave rise to the suspicion that British influence was responsible for Signor Mussolini's decision, and although Sir Austen Chamberlain, in a statement to the press at Geneva,⁷ categorically denied that the Italian Government's step was due in any direct manner to his per-

¹ See *The Times*, 22nd and 27th January, 1927.

² See *Le Temps*, 9th March, 1927.

³ See *The Manchester Guardian* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 10th March, 1927.

⁴ The text was printed in the *Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia* of the 12th March. A translation was published by the Reference Service on International Affairs of the American Library in Paris in *European Economic and Political Survey*, vol. ii, no. 14, 31st March, 1927.

⁵ See the *Corriere della Sera*, 15th March, 1927; *European Economic and Political Survey*, loc. cit.

⁶ See Section (ii), above.

⁷ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 9th March, 1927.

suasion, it was perhaps inevitable that Moscow should see a connexion between the two events. Signor Mussolini had indeed attempted to forestall the criticism that he was joining an 'anti-Soviet bloc' by informing the Soviet Government in advance of his decision to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. On the 7th March (the day before the announcement was made at Geneva and Bucarest) Signor Mussolini replied to the Soviet note of the 6th October, 1926, by informing the Moscow Government that ratification was about to take place.¹ At the same time he declared that his decision must not be considered 'an act of unfriendliness towards Russia, but only the expression of Italy's desire to fulfil the international obligations which she has undertaken'. To this note the Soviet Government replied on the 17th March.² In a communication handed to Signor Mussolini on that date, Monsieur Kamenev, the Soviet Ambassador in Rome, reaffirmed his Government's view that the annexation of Bessarabia by Rumania was an 'act of pure violation' and that the treaty of the 28th October, 1920, was 'devoid of legal force', and lodged a 'decided protest' against Italian ratification at a moment 'which is regarded by the public opinion of the whole world as being darkened by menaces to peace'. The Italian Government's action, Monsieur Kamenev considered, could only 'contribute towards aggravating this dangerous situation and supporting those plans which are directed against the U.S.S.R. and consequently against peace in Europe'.

Two events which occurred in the course of the next nine months indicated that Signor Mussolini, in spite of the moment which he had selected for ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, had not intended that act to inaugurate a change of policy towards Russia. On the 9th August Monsieur Kamenev, together with Monsieur Rakovsky and other members of the 'Minority Group' in Russia, signed a declaration calling upon members of the proletariat in countries which might be at war with the U.S.S.R. to rise against their Governments and upon soldiers to desert to the Red Army. It was significant that the Italian Government, unlike the French Government,³ did not think it necessary to protest against this action on the part of an Ambassador accredited to them.⁴ It was significant, again, that

¹ Text of the Italian note in *European Economic and Political Survey*, loc. cit.

² *Op. cit.*, loc. cit.

³ See Section (iii), above.

⁴ The Italian press found cause for congratulation on this occasion in the fact that, owing to the rigorous measures taken to deal with Communism in Italy (suppression of the Communist press, dissolution of the Communist Party, &c.), relations between Italy and the U.S.S.R. were not at the mercy of political vicissitudes in Moscow (see *Le Temps*, 10th October, 1927).

the murder of the Italian Vice-Consul at Odessa at the end of December 1927 did not give rise to a dispute of the kind frequently engendered by such occurrences between states whose relations were strained. The Italian Government seems to have accepted as satisfactory the steps taken by the Soviet authorities for the arrest and trial of the murderers and to have addressed no protest to the Soviet Government.¹

(v) Russo-German Relations (1926-7).

The relations between Germany and Soviet Russia during the year 1925 have been discussed in a previous volume,² in connexion with the Russian attitude to those negotiations for a Security Pact which finally bore fruit in the Locarno Agreements. As is there recorded, the efforts made by Soviet diplomatists to divert the German Government from the 'Locarno policy' proved of no avail, but at the same time Herr Stresemann and his colleagues lost no opportunity of asserting that their determination to pursue their negotiations with the Western Powers implied no hostility to the Soviet Government and no change of policy towards the U.S.S.R. In 1925 the basis of German-Soviet relations was still the treaty which had been concluded at Rapallo on the 16th April, 1922.³ It was true that the events of the intervening years—and especially the adoption of the Dawes Plan at the London Reparation Conference of August 1924⁴—had greatly improved Germany's position *vis-à-vis* the Western Powers and had decreased to a corresponding extent the probability of a close alliance between Germany and Russia. Nevertheless, no German Government could afford to neglect the friendship of a country with such vast resources as Russia, which offered, or appeared to offer, unrivalled openings for German trade and industry; and, apart from economic questions, Germany's geographical situation made it a matter of vital importance for her to be on good terms with the U.S.S.R., in view of the position in which she was placed by the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty. How to keep the balance between East and West was one of the most delicate problems which the German Foreign Office had to solve in 1925, and the problem continued to present itself, in varying degrees of acuteness, during the following years.

¹ See the *Corriere della Sera*, 30th December, 1927; 12th and 14th February, 1928.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 63-6.

³ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 30-1.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part II A, Section (vi).

The pressure exerted on Germany by the Soviet Government during the negotiations for a Security Pact culminated in the visit paid by Monsieur Chicherin to Berlin in October 1925, on the eve of the Locarno Conference. The immediate result of Monsieur Chicherin's exertions was the signature at Moscow of a new commercial treaty, which had been under negotiation for some time,¹ but in the light of subsequent events it seems probable that the outlines of another treaty, of a more general nature, were also discussed on this occasion.

Soviet-German conversations of a more or less formal kind seem to have begun towards the end of 1924² (shortly after the German Government, in its memorandum of the 29th September, had announced its intention of applying for membership of the League of Nations)³ and to have proceeded concurrently with the negotiations for a Security Pact which were opened, between Germany and the Western Powers, by the German note of the 9th February, 1925.⁴ On the German side, the principal object of these discussions was to allay Russian fears that Germany was about to enter an anti-Soviet *bloc*; and with this end in view the German Government showed itself willing to come to some arrangement which would bring German-Soviet relations, as defined by the Treaty of Rapallo, into harmony with the new situation that would arise if the negotiations for a Security Pact reached a satisfactory conclusion and Germany entered the League of Nations. Russian diplomats, on the other hand, at first concentrated all their efforts on the attempt to turn Germany from her purpose, and it was not until it became evident that these efforts would be of no avail that an alternative policy was evolved. In the course of the year 1925 Monsieur Chicherin and his colleagues conceived the idea of counterbalancing the evil effects which they anticipated from the diplomatic developments in the West by including Germany in a new Soviet system of treaties of non-aggression and neutrality.⁵

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 65 and pp. 255-6. The treaty comprised an agreement concerning conditions of residence and business and legal protection; an economic agreement; a railway agreement; an agreement concerning navigation; a fiscal agreement; an agreement concerning commercial courts of arbitration; and an agreement concerning the legal protection of industrial property. A consular treaty was signed at the same time. (The texts of all the agreements are printed in the *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. liii.)

² See *The Times*, 15th, 16th and 27th April, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 15th and 20th April.

³ *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 13.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁵ The first treaty of this kind concluded by the Soviet Government was that with Turkey, which was signed on the 17th December, 1925. For the

The basis of a treaty of neutrality seems to have been discussed between Herr Stresemann and Monsieur Chicherin at Berlin either in October, just before the German delegates left for Locarno, or in December, when Monsieur Chicherin once more visited Berlin and had conversations with members of the Government.¹ How far the German-Soviet negotiations had actually gone before the Locarno Conference remains uncertain, but the anxiety displayed by the German delegates during the conference on the subject of Germany's obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant² clearly reflected the German Government's desire not to be committed to the possibility of hostile action against Russia. The conclusion of the Locarno Pact was only rendered possible by the collective note in which the other Powers represented at Locarno assured Germany that, in their view, a state would only be called upon to take action under Article 16 of the Covenant 'to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account'.

Although this collective note was merely an expression of opinion and had no binding force, since the Council of the League was alone competent to decide what action would be required from League members in the event of a decision to apply Article 16, the German Government evidently considered that the assurance thus given justified it in undertaking to remain neutral in the case of a conflict with the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the German-Soviet negotiations did not make any marked progress after the return of the German delegation from Locarno. One reason for delay was doubtless the difficulty of agreeing on terms which would satisfy Russia without proving incompatible with the Covenant of the League, even as interpreted by the Powers in their note. Since the Rhineland Pact and the other Locarno agreements had merely been initialled and not signed at Locarno, the Soviet Government may also have had a lingering hope of detaching Germany from her Western policy at the eleventh hour; but the signature of the Locarno Agreements in London on the 1st December, 1925, which was followed on the 10th February, 1926, by Germany's formal application for admission to membership of the League of Nations,³ apparently convinced Monsieur Chicherin of the wisdom of accepting what Germany was

circumstances in which this treaty was concluded see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (xi).

¹ In a telegram to Monsieur Chicherin, dispatched on the occasion of the signature of the treaty in April 1926, Herr Stresemann referred to 'the agreements, the basis of which we discussed last year' (see *Le Temps*, 29th April, 1926).

² See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 50-1.

³ See the *Survey for 1926*, p. 8.

prepared to offer. At all events, towards the end of February the negotiations seem to have taken a rather more definite form.¹ The German Government was at this time under the impression that Germany would be admitted to membership of the League during the Special Assembly which had been convened for the 10th March, and its intention seems to have been to postpone the conclusion of the agreement with Russia until Germany, as a member of the League, had accepted the obligations imposed by the Covenant—with such modifications in the case of Article 16 as might be granted to her in accordance with the note from the other signatories of the Locarno Pact. The situation, however, was completely changed by the course of events at Geneva in March.² The failure to reach a solution of the controversy over the composition of the Council meant that Germany's admission to the League was postponed, through no fault of her own, for at least six months. The German Government was thus obliged to make a difficult choice. Either it must try to persuade the Soviet Government to wait for an indefinite period—a course which might adversely affect German interests and even imperil German security in the East—or it must place itself in an ambiguous position in relation to the Western Powers by committing itself to a policy of neutrality and non-aggression towards Russia before it was legally bound to pursue a similar policy towards Germany's neighbours in the West.³ In this situation, it would clearly be an important diplomatic victory for the Soviet Government (which had recently found fresh cause for alarm in a Treaty of Guarantee between Poland and Rumania signed on the 26th March, 1926),⁴ if Germany could be induced to sign a treaty of neutrality without delay, and pressure from Russia apparently turned the scale.⁵ At all events, the German Government formally notified the Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy early in April that it was negotiating with the Soviet Government for a treaty which was designed to adapt the terms of the Rapallo Treaty to those of the Treaty of Locarno.⁶

Although the German Government seems to have informed the Entente Powers at an earlier date that conversations were in progress

¹ See *The Times*, 27th April, 1926.

² *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, Section (i) (e).

³ By Article 10 of the Rhineland Pact the Locarno Treaties were not to come into force until Germany had become a member of the League of Nations.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part II B, Section (i).

⁵ At the beginning of April it was reported in Berlin that Monsieur Chicherin had made a declaration at Moscow demanding from Germany a clear confirmation of the Rapallo Treaty and an assurance that Germany would in no circumstances take part in any action against Russia (see *The Times*, 8th April, 1926).

⁶ See *The Times*, 14th April, 1926.

with the Soviet Government,¹ the nature of the discussions was apparently kept secret, and the publication in the British press of the news that an important treaty was about to be concluded came as a surprise to the public not only in France and Great Britain but also in Germany.² In informing the Western Powers of the step which it proposed to take, the German Government explicitly affirmed that the new agreement would not in any way conflict with the Locarno Treaty,³ but this assurance did not suffice to avert suspicions of the purity of Germany's motives. The most striking feature of the situation, from the point of view of the Western Powers, was that the announcement of active negotiations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. followed hard upon the rebuff which Germany had suffered at Geneva in March. At first sight it looked as though Germany were retorting to their failure to secure her admission to membership of the League with a permanent seat on the Council by deliberately turning her back upon the West and throwing herself into the arms of Soviet Russia⁴—a Power which openly proclaimed its hostility to the League on the ground that it was an instrument of the Western Powers.⁵ Fears on this score were only partially allayed by the German Government's assurances that the terms of the agreement under negotiation were perfectly compatible with those of the Locarno Treaty and the Covenant and by indications that the official attitude in Germany was to consider the Government morally bound to act as though the Reich were already a member of the League and the Locarno Treaties were in force.⁶ The sincerity of

¹ *Ibid.*, 15th April, 1926. According to *The Times* (19th April, 1926), the German delegates at Locarno had indicated the likelihood of a new treaty with Russia.

² *The Times* (issue of the 14th April, 1926) referred to the treaty as a 'reinsurance treaty' and the use of this term elicited protests from the German press (see the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *The Times*, 15th April, 1926).

³ *The Times*, 14th April, 1926.

⁴ The situation created, as between Germany and the Western Powers, by the announcement of the Russo-German negotiations in 1926 recalled in some respects the situation created by the announcement, during the Genoa Conference of April 1922, of the conclusion of the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo (see the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 30-1).

⁵ The announcement of the German-Soviet negotiations coincided with a striking illustration of the Soviet attitude to the League. In a note of the 13th April Monsieur Chicherin refused a second invitation to his Government to serve on the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference on the ground that disarmament discussions could not usefully take place 'in the Geneva atmosphere of tradition and intrigue' (see the present volume, Part I A, p. 5).

⁶ The German press on the whole took the line that the arrangement with Russia was merely intended to secure the same stability in the East as was secured in the West by the Locarno Treaties. See, for instance, an article in

Germany's protestations of good faith was borne out by the Government's acceptance, on the 12th April, of the invitation to serve on the Committee on the Composition of the Council which had been appointed before the close of the League Assembly in March,¹ since this acceptance proved that Germany was prepared to co-operate in the work of the League although she was not yet a member. Even if Germany's intention to abide by the Locarno policy were taken for granted, however, there remained the doubt whether her commitments to Russia (the exact terms of which were still uncertain) would in fact prove consistent with her obligations under the Covenant. By the middle of April it was known that the new German-Soviet treaty would not merely bind Germany to take no aggressive measures herself against Russia but would also include provisions for German neutrality in the event of a conflict between Russia and another Power,² and the inclusion in the treaty of a definite undertaking to remain neutral once more raised the question of how far Germany could be permitted to evade the obligations imposed on members of the League by Article 16 of the Covenant.

When the news of the German-Soviet negotiations was first published, less anxiety as to the possible implications seems to have been felt in France than in Great Britain³—partly, no doubt, because Franco-Russian relations at this time were relatively less unstable than British-Russian relations.⁴ Sir Austen Chamberlain, however, after discussing the matter with the German Ambassador on the

the *Germania* of the 15th April (cited in *The Times*, 16th April, 1926) which laid stress on this point of view and put forward the plea that the most urgent need of Europe was the building of a bridge between Russia and the West—a task which Germany was well qualified to undertake.

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, Sections (i) *e* and (i) *g*).

² See *The Times*, 17th April, 1926. On the 18th April Herr Stresemann made a speech at Stuttgart in which he explained that the treaty was intended to ensure that the two Powers should abstain from participating in aggressive measures against each other. This statement was rightly interpreted to mean that a neutrality clause would be included in the treaty. (See *Le Temps*, 21st April, 1926.)

³ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 22nd April, 1926.

⁴ See Sections (ii) and (iii), above. It may also be noted that France, in her capacity as Mandatory for Syria, had recently negotiated a treaty of friendship with Turkey in which the two Powers undertook 'to observe reciprocally the rules of neutrality' and not to 'encourage or support any aggression directed against each other'. Since Turkey was not a member of the League, and the treaty had been initialled on the 18th February, 1926, at a moment when it was still uncertain whether Turkey intended to resist, by force of arms, the League's award on the Mosul question (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (xi)), the Quai d'Orsay may well have felt disinclined to raise the question of neutrality as between a member and a non-member of the League.

16th April,¹ apparently decided that he could accept the German assurances as satisfactory, and he seems to have taken no further step beyond instructing the British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord D'Abernon, to impress upon the German Government the importance of ensuring that the terms of the treaty should be in no way inconsistent with those of the Covenant.²

In France the view taken at first was that there was room within the framework of the Covenant and of existing treaties for any number of pacts of non-aggression, and that it was open to Germany to make such agreements as she considered necessary for her security, provided that the obligations incumbent upon a signatory of the Locarno Treaties and a member of the League were not affected thereby.³ This lenient view was soon modified, however, under pressure from France's allies in Central and Eastern Europe, who looked with alarm upon the possibility of a German-Soviet combination. The attention of Czechoslovakia and Poland was concentrated especially on the question of German neutrality. The inclusion in the treaty of a neutrality clause seemed to them to foreshadow the danger of a conflict with Soviet Russia in which Germany would prove an impassable barrier to the help which they might otherwise count on receiving from France. It was pointed out, for instance,⁴ that in the event of a war between Russia and Poland or Rumania, in which Russia was the aggressor, Germany, as a neutral, could prohibit the passage of troops through her territory, and she would also be free to use the power of veto derived from the possession of a seat on the League Council⁵ in order to prevent the League from taking any action against Russia. Germany could thus constitute herself in effect the protector of Russia against Europe.⁶ The excitement which was aroused at Warsaw⁷ and Prague by the news of the

¹ See *Le Temps*, 18th April, 1926. See also *The Times*, 19th April, 1926.

² Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons on the 28th April, 1926, in answer to a parliamentary question.

³ See *Le Temps*, 16th April, 1926.

⁴ See *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 22nd April, 1926.

⁵ Germany had shown herself determined throughout not to enter the League unless she could be sure of a permanent seat on the Council, and the principle of her right to such a seat had not been contested during the controversy over the composition of the Council which had resulted in the postponement of Germany's application for membership from March to September 1926 (see the *Survey for 1926*, Part I A).

⁶ This argument ignored the fact that Germany would be free to use her veto in this way, if she chose, whether she had signed a neutrality treaty with Russia or not, so that the imminent conclusion of the treaty did not really affect the situation to any great extent.

⁷ The Polish Government seems to have hoped at first that all the Locarno

German-Soviet negotiations was so great that it seemed for a while as though the whole question of Germany's admission to membership of the League might be reopened.

On the 21st April the Berlin press published the report that Monsieur Beneš, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, had circulated to the Powers signatories of the Locarno Treaty a questionnaire dealing with various points in which Germany's obligations under the treaty with Russia might be expected to conflict with her duties as a Member of the League. According to the version published in Germany, this questionnaire was in the following form:¹

(1) Is the German Ministry obliged, as the result of the German-Soviet Treaty, to inform Moscow of all its various confidential negotiations with the Powers and the League in so far as they affect the interests of the Soviet and Germany?

(2) If, in the case of a war in which Soviet Russia is involved, the Soviet is not the aggressor, will Germany or the League decide who is the aggressor?

(3) If the League decrees the boycott of Soviet Russia, what will be the attitude of Germany as a member of the League?

(4) Is the clause relating to the neutrality of Germany based upon Article 16 of the Covenant of the League, or on the modification of this article consented to by the Allies in Locarno, relieving Germany of certain obligations?

(5) If the neutrality of Germany is determined by this supplementary declaration, what authority is to decide upon its interpretation?

These questions were not addressed officially to the German Foreign Office,² and according to the Czechoslovak account of the incident³ Monsieur Beneš had not elaborated a formal questionnaire but had merely given his views on a series of points which had been raised by certain Powers, and which had been referred to him less in his capacity as Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia than as an expert on League matters. Monsieur Beneš may not have deserved the accusations of unwarrantable interference in German affairs which were levelled against him in the German press;⁴ but whatever form his comments took there seems no doubt that they reflected the anxiety which was widely felt at this time lest Germany's position as a

Powers would join in a vigorous *démarche* to Germany on the subject of her negotiations with Russia (see *The Times*, 22nd April, 1926).

¹ See *The Times*, 22nd April, 1926. The Czechoslovak Government seems to have informed the German Government that the version published in Germany was inaccurate and that the first question, in particular, was a fabrication (*ibid.*, 24th April, 1926).

² *Ibid.*, 24th April, 1926.

³ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 23rd April; *Le Temps*, 25th April, 1926.

⁴ See *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 22nd April, 1926.

prospective member of the League and of the Council might be compromised as the result of her negotiations with Russia.

In the meantime these negotiations had been proceeding, to the accompaniment of a chorus of hostile comment from abroad, and the delicate process of drafting the neutrality provisions had been completed by the 24th April. On that day the treaty was signed in Berlin by the German Foreign Minister, Herr Stresemann, and the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, Monsieur Krestinsky. The terms of the treaty were elaborated and supplemented in notes which were exchanged at the same time.¹

The texts of the treaty and of the notes, which were made public on the 26th April,² are reproduced in full in the Appendix to the present volume. The kernel of the treaty was contained in Article 3, which provided that if one of the contracting parties 'despite its peaceful attitude be attacked by one or more third Powers, the other contracting party shall observe neutrality for the whole duration of the conflict'. Article 3 further provided that neither contracting party should adhere, on the occasion of a conflict, to a coalition 'formed between third Powers with a view to the economic or financial boycott' of the other contracting party.

In paragraphs 2 and 3 of Herr Stresemann's note to Monsieur Krestinsky the German Government promised its energetic opposition to any efforts directed exclusively against the U.S.S.R. which might take shape within the League of Nations and defined its attitude in the event of action under Article 16 of the Covenant. Monsieur Krestinsky was reminded that an accusation of aggression against Russia could only be determined with binding force for Germany with her own consent, and that such an accusation, if regarded as unjustified, would not oblige Germany to take part in measures instituted under Article 16. As to the possibility of German participation in sanctions, Herr Stresemann referred Monsieur Krestinsky to the collective note from the Locarno Powers on the interpretation of Article 16.

The Treaty of Berlin, with its annexes, was approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag on the 27th April.³ The German Government found itself in the unusual position of receiving almost unanimous support, and the treaty was hailed as something in the nature of a miracle, since all the German parties, though from different motives, agreed in giving it their blessing. The treaty was

¹ The *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *The Times*, 25th April, 1926.

² See the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *The Times*, 27th April, 1926.

³ See *The Times*, 27th and 28th April, 1926.

approved by the Reichstag, again with hardly a dissentient voice, on the 10th June,¹ and on the 29th June ratifications were exchanged in Berlin.² In accordance with Article 4, the treaty came into force, for five years, on ratification.

Whilst the treaty had been under negotiation, German spokesmen had prophesied that as soon as signature had taken place and the terms had been published hostile comment would cease in other countries, since it would then be realized that no grounds for uneasiness existed. The wording of the treaty and of Herr Stresemann's note bore witness to the skill of German jurists in treading a narrow path beset with pitfalls, but the hope that publication would at once disarm foreign critics was not fulfilled. In Great Britain, it was true, the general impression seemed to be that the treaty was juridically correct and consistent with Germany's other undertakings, though the moment for signature was felt in some quarters to have been ill chosen.³ In Paris, on the other hand, earlier misgivings seemed at first merely to have received confirmation. The whole spirit of the treaty was believed to be in contradiction with the League and Locarno systems, and doubts were expressed whether the neutrality provisions could be reconciled, even juridically, with the terms of the Covenant. Hints were thrown out that unless Germany could produce a satisfactory explanation the question of her admission to the League might be reopened, and it was rumoured that the whole matter was to be brought up at the next regular meeting of the League Council, or possibly at a special meeting.⁴ The main preoccupation in France was still the danger that Germany might use her veto on the League Council in favour of Russia and to the detriment of Poland or France's other allies, and French opinion was no doubt affected by the impression which the treaty created at Warsaw and Prague. The Polish press seems to have been almost unanimously of the opinion that the terms of the treaty were in flagrant contradiction with the Covenant and might seriously compromise the results achieved at Locarno.⁵ In Czechoslovakia, also, a good deal of criticism was expressed, but Monsieur Beneš bore out his reputation for caution by refusing to commit himself pending a thorough examination of the text,⁶ and on the 28th April the semi-official *Prager Presse* went so far as to say that the published terms

¹ See *The Times*, 11th June, 1926.

² The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 30th June, 1926.

³ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th April, 1926.

⁴ See *The Times*, 28th April; *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th and 29th April, 1926.

⁵ See *Le Temps*, 30th April, 1926.

⁶ See *The Times*, 1st May, 1926.

did not appear to justify the fears which had been expressed in some quarters.¹

On the 29th April it was announced in *Le Temps* that the text of the treaty was being carefully examined by the various Chancelleries and that the results of this process would be compared before any step was taken. The examination apparently revealed no juridical point on which objections could be based, and the influences working in favour of moderation were assisted by Herr Stresemann, who gave a further exposition of Germany's policy in a broadcast address on the 1st May.² Herr Stresemann once more declared that there was not the least ground for alarm, that the object of the treaty was merely to carry on Germany's traditional policy of maintaining peaceful and friendly relations with Russia, and that Germany still hoped to constitute herself a bridge between East and West. The view that the German-Soviet treaty did not radically alter the situation finally gained the day, and any idea of making Germany choose between friendship with Russia and Locarno and all that it stood for was abandoned. The admission of Germany into the League duly took place in September 1926, and she received her permanent seat on the Council without any modification of the rule of unanimity which gave to any single Power the right of veto.³

While the relations between Germany and Russia on the political plane had thus been causing concern to other European Governments, attempts to improve economic relations between the two countries had not been meeting with any great success. The agreements comprised in the economic treaty of the 12th October, 1925, had come into force in March 1926, one month after the exchange of ratifications, which took place on the 11th February,⁴ but difficulties were encountered in working out a scheme of export credits, and on the success of such a scheme depended to a large extent the expansion of trade which had been expected to follow the conclusion of the treaty. At the beginning of 1926 the German Government elaborated a plan whereby the state would give a partial guarantee to firms exporting goods to Russia, up to a total value of 300,000,000 marks. The state guarantee was to cover only 60 per cent. of the

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th April, 1926.

² See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 2nd May; *The Times*, 3rd May, 1926.

³ It was apparently contemplated at one time that the rule of unanimity on the Council should be discussed by the Committee on the Composition of the Council, but it became clear soon after that committee began work on the 10th May, 1926, that no recommendations on this point were likely to be made (see the *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, p. 59).

⁴ The *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *The Times*, 12th February, 1926.

total value in each case,¹ and the remaining 40 per cent. of the risk was to be borne by the firms. This scheme² came into operation, so far as the Government's guarantee was concerned, on the 21st April, when a committee appointed to examine applications from German firms entered upon its functions.³ The German Government, however, accepted no responsibility for the financing of the orders to which their guarantee would extend, and it was here that the plans threatened to break down. The small firms which the scheme was especially intended to benefit could not find the necessary funds without assistance, and negotiations therefore took place between the Soviet Government and a German banking syndicate. The German bankers, on the ground of the special risks attaching to business operations with the U.S.S.R., demanded a higher rate of interest and commission than the Soviet negotiators were prepared to pay,⁴ and a proposal was examined for the financing of the scheme by an American group, headed by Mr. W. A. Harriman. This idea was abandoned early in April, apparently because the State Department at Washington signified its disapproval,⁵ and the negotiations between the German banks and the Soviet Government, which were continued with the personal assistance of Herr Curtius, the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs, finally resulted in agreement at the end of June. The banking syndicate reduced its discount rate to a figure more acceptable to the Soviet Government, and apparently undertook to finance orders up to the value of about 150,000,000 marks out of the total figure of 300,000,000 marks which came within the scope of the partial state guarantee.⁶

The state guarantee had been intended to apply only to orders placed before the end of 1926, but in December the value of contracts coming under the scheme did not amount to more than about 140,000,000 marks, and the Government decided to extend the

¹ The Reich Government was to be responsible for 35 per cent. and the Governments of the Länder for 25 per cent. of the total.

² The credits up to a total of 300,000,000 marks contemplated under this scheme were to be used mainly to finance orders for machinery. Half of the total was intended to apply to orders for heavy machinery and complete factory equipment, and half to smaller orders for single machines or vehicles. The maximum term for the large orders was to be four years and that for the smaller orders two years (see *The Times*, 22nd March and 1st July, 1926). In October 1926 negotiations were reported to be taking place for additional credits which might be assigned to textile goods and small steel manufactures (*ibid.*, 16th October, 1926), and the Ministry of Agriculture was also reported to be considering a system of guarantees for agricultural exports (*ibid.*, 20th October, 1926).

³ *The Times*, 22nd April, 1926.

⁴ See *The Times*, 22nd April and 1st July, 1926.

⁵ See *The New York Times*, 10th, 11th and 12th April, 1926.

⁶ *The Times*, 1st July, 1926.

period to the 31st March, 1927.¹ By that date, however, the value of contracts made under the scheme appears to have reached and surpassed the figure of 300,000,000 marks to which the partial state guarantee was originally to apply; for on the 7th April, 1927, the Reichstag approved a bill providing for a partial state guarantee for further credits up to a total of 23,500,000 marks.²

The results of this experiment in guaranteeing credits seem to have been rather disappointing from the German point of view, and it was also significant that by the end of the year 1926 many of the German firms which had obtained concessions in Russia were finding themselves in difficulties. This was especially the case with large concessions, involving heavy expenditure at the outset. Many of the concessionnaires had started with inadequate capital and found themselves hampered by lack of funds as well as by the high rates which they were charged by the German banks for such money as they were able to raise.³ During 1926 negotiations for concessions were reported to be taking place between the Soviet authorities and German coal, iron and chemical industrialists,⁴ and the number of concessions actually granted to German firms appears to have increased from twenty to thirty-four in the course of a year ending in March 1927,⁵ but in most cases the operations contemplated seem to have been on a comparatively small scale.

Early in 1927 the problem of keeping the balance between East and West once more became acute for Germany in view of the increasing strain which was noticeable in the relations between Great Britain and Russia.⁶ The dispatch of a final British note of warning to the Soviet Government at the end of February was followed in Germany by semi-official announcements that the Government's attitude was, and must remain, one of complete neutrality, and when the rupture of British-Soviet relations took place in May the German press, though some sections of it were inclined to criticize the British Government's action, was almost unanimous in proclaiming that there must be no change in German policy towards either party to the dispute.⁷ The practical difficulties of keeping to the middle path

¹ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 18th December, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 7th and 8th April; *Le Temps*, 5th June, 1927.

³ These seem to have been the principal causes of the difficulties encountered by the Mologa Aktien Gesellschaft, which had obtained a big forest concession in 1923. Early in 1927 this company applied to the Reich Government for a large subsidy to enable it to place its operations on a sound basis. (For some account of this company's experiences see *The Times*, 15th March, 1927.)

⁴ *The Times*, 30th July, 18th August, 16th and 22nd October, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 15th March, 1927.

⁶ See Section (ii), above.

⁷ See *The Times*, 26th May, 1927. At the beginning of June the Executive

were illustrated for Germany by the request, which was promptly presented by the Soviet Government, that the German Government should undertake to look after the interests of Russian subjects in England—a request which could not well be refused, but which was not accepted without full realization of the delicate nature of the task.¹

At the beginning of June Monsieur Chicherin, who was staying in Germany, asked for an interview with Herr Stresemann. The German Foreign Minister, who was about to leave for Geneva—where the forty-fifth session of the League Council was expected to afford an opportunity for discussing the Russian question in the course of those conversations between Foreign Ministers which customarily took place ‘on the margin’ of the Council—did not refuse this request, and the meeting took place at Baden-Baden on the 7th June. The exact purport of the conversation was not revealed, but Herr Stresemann was believed to have given Monsieur Chicherin an assurance that German policy towards Russia had not undergone any change.² Monsieur Chicherin then proceeded to Berlin, where he remained for the period of the League Council’s session, and it was rumoured that he was kept informed by the German Government of the tenor of the conversations at Geneva so far as they affected Russia.³ Before Monsieur Chicherin left

Committee of the Communist International issued a manifesto in which it declared that British Imperialism would doubtless have no difficulty in obtaining ‘from the reactionary Germany of Hindenburg’ the free passage of troops and munitions across German territory. The German press pointed out that such statements made it difficult for Germany to maintain a neutral attitude (see *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th June, 1927).

¹ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 28th May, 1927.

² See *Le Temps*, 10th June, 1927. It was suggested in the press (see *The Times*, 10th June, 1927) that the possibility of further German credits was also discussed on this occasion.

³ See *The Times*, 17th June, 1927. The nature of these Geneva conversations was subsequently described as follows by Sir A. Chamberlain in answer to a parliamentary question on the 6th July, 1927: ‘On the invitation of some of the representatives at the meeting of the six Powers [i.e. the States signatories of the Locarno Agreements], I gave an explanation of our reasons for breaking off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and explained British policy as already publicly stated in the House when we debated the matter. Similar explanations of their own policy were given by some of the other Ministers present. No proposals were made by any one for a joint conference with Russia, nor for any joint action in regard to Russia. Circumstances vary in different countries, and each Government must pursue the policy adapted to its own interests.’ On the same occasion Sir A. Chamberlain gave a *démenti* of rumours that he had made representations to the German delegates to the effect that if the German credit scheme for trade with Russia were abandoned it might be possible to fulfil German aspirations regarding the evacuation of the Rhineland.

Berlin, he was said¹ to have received from Herr Marx the friendly warning that the propaganda of the Third International was causing wide concern in Europe and that a bad impression had been created by the renewal of the 'Ogpu's' activities in Russia.²

On this occasion, when for the first time there appeared to be a real danger that the Treaties of Berlin and of Locarno might prove hard to reconcile, the German Government seems to have played the difficult role of neutral with discretion and to have realized that, at this stage, any active steps to bridge the gulf between East and West would be foredoomed to failure.

(vi) The U.S.S.R., the League of Nations, and Switzerland.

The admission of Germany to membership in the League of Nations on the 8th September, 1926, left the League with only two Great Powers standing aloof from it: the United States and the U.S.S.R. Two years later both these Powers seemed as far as ever from applying for admission, and both for the same psychological reasons. In both countries aloofness from the League had become an almost sacrosanct dogma, and this dogma had been proclaimed so emphatically and so repeatedly that it was difficult to see how it could be abandoned or even modified by either Power without 'loss of face'. At the same time both Powers had begun, by the spring of 1928, to show an increasing readiness to co-operate with the States Members of the League in working for some, at least, of those ends for which the League itself had been called into existence. On the part of the United States this tendency was manifested in Mr. Secretary Kellogg's proposal for a multilateral pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy—perhaps the most important event in international history since the coming into force of the League Covenant on the 10th January, 1920, as part of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.³ The manifestations of the same tendency on the part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were less important; yet it was not without significance, as a sign of the times, that by that date the Soviet Government had taken part in the work of a League Economic Conference and a League Disarmament Commission.

As far back as 1922, the Soviet Government had co-operated with the League of Nations Epidemic Commission.⁴ This, of course, was a non-political matter which concerned the vital interests, in the

¹ See *Le Temps*, 18th June, 1927.

² See Section (ii), p. 276, above.

³ The history of 'the Kellogg Pact' will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 139.

literal sense, of the population of the U.S.S.R. In principle and in general it was inconsistent with Russian Communist doctrine even to co-operate with an international institution which was officially regarded by the Soviet Government as both illegitimate and futile—illegitimate because its object, according to the pronouncements of Soviet Russian statesmen, was the world-wide maintenance of the 'Capitalist' régime, and futile because the 'Capitalist' states which had entered into this international association were *peritura regna*, inexorably doomed, by a Marxian necessity of history, to be destroyed, sooner or later, through a world-wide social revolution.

As, however, it became more and more apparent that the World Revolution, like those Last Judgements which had been as confidently expected in other times and at other places by earlier Communions of Latter-Day Saints, was destined to come later rather than sooner, if it ever came at all, the transcendental concentration of thought and emotion upon 'Last Things' seems to have yielded ground, in the minds of the Russian Communist leaders, to the material cares of the day, which exerted a steady pressure in favour of seeking to establish peaceful and stable relations of trade and diplomacy between the U.S.S.R. and the 'Capitalist' states of the contemporary world.

This division of mind was reflected in the policy of the Soviet Government towards the League of Nations; for, without ceasing to proclaim its principles, the Soviet Government took certain steps which seemed to imply that its actual objection to co-operation with 'Capitalist' states, even when associated, as Members of the League, in a permanent international organization, was a matter not so much of principle as of opportunism and that the stumbling-blocks which it saw in its path, like those which deterred the United States and gave pause to Germany, consisted of such mundane and practical considerations as the terms of peace treaties, the nature of sanctions, and the alleged ascendancy, within the League, of particular Great Powers. On the 10th April, 1922, for example, at the Genoa Conference,¹ Monsieur Chicherin made a statement regarding his Government's attitude towards the League in which he concluded by offering to co-operate with the other Governments—if only in remodelling the League on certain lines laid down as desirable from the Soviet Government's point of view. Again, the Soviet Government sent an observer to the Rome Naval Conference of February 1924;² and

¹ For a general account of the Genoa Conference, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 25-33.

² For a general account of the Rome Naval Conference, see the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 77-80.

on that occasion the Russian Communist leaders intimated, through the mouthpiece of their press, that, although they were hostile to the League, they did not intend to boycott 'Capitalist' states, either separately or collectively, but, on the contrary, contemplated taking part in any conference, whether convened by one 'Capitalist' state or by a group of such states calling itself a League of Nations, which was to deal with matters in which they were interested. This, they declared, was pre-eminently their policy with regard to the question of disarmament, and they proposed always to be represented at any international discussions of which this was the subject. In the event, Monsieur Chicherin did reply at length when the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance¹ was circulated by the Secretariat at Geneva to the Soviet Government, as well as to other Governments, for observations;² and in 1924, when a Labour administration was in power in Great Britain and when negotiations between the British Government and the Soviet Government were on foot,³ the feasibility of practical co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the League was emphasized in interviews which Monsieur Rakovsky gave to certain organs of the British press, while in private the Russian negotiators seem to have gone so far as to explore the possibility of actually applying for membership in the League, subject to assurances of non-interference in the U.S.S.R.'s domestic affairs.⁴

This tendency of Soviet Russian policy, however, was checked, and the countervailing doctrinal and *a priori* considerations were rein-

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I A, Section (iii).

² Text of Monsieur Chicherin's reply in *League of Nations Official Journal*, May 1924.

³ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, Section (iv).

⁴ Monsieur Rakovsky seems to have stated that the Soviet Government had 'no objection of principle' to the League and would be prepared to join it if some of the obligations of the Covenant were made less stringent. In other words, he seems to have taken much the same line as was afterwards taken by the German Government in the negotiations precedent to the Pact of Locarno (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part I A, Sections (ii) and (iii)). This reference to the possibility of the U.S.S.R. applying for membership in the League seems to have been incidental to a more definite proposal for clearing up all outstanding difficulties between the U.S.S.R. and the British Empire (as the then outstanding difficulties between France and the British Empire actually had been cleared up in 1904) as a preliminary to joint action on the part of the Soviet Government and of Mr. MacDonald's administration in Great Britain in the cause of world peace—particularly in the matter of disarmament. This proposal seems to have come to nothing because Monsieur Rakovsky contemplated treating the outstanding economic and financial questions in the same category as frontiers, fisheries, and propaganda as relatively trivial matters which were to be disposed of summarily in order to clear the way for positive joint action in more important fields, whereas Mr. MacDonald thought it more urgent to settle these economic and financial questions first on their own merits, in isolation from other affairs.

forced by the concrete fact of the feud between the U.S.S.R. and Switzerland which had arisen over the murder of a Soviet diplomatist, Monsieur Vorovsky, in Swiss territory.¹ Pending a settlement of this feud the Swiss Government had signified its willingness that a Soviet 'observer' should attend League of Nations conferences at Geneva;² but the Soviet Government had taken up the position that it would not send representatives to participate in League of Nations activities on Swiss soil so long as the Swiss Government had not complied with the Soviet Government's demands in regard to the Vorovsky affair.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Government refused an invitation to the Second Opium Conference at Geneva in November 1924,³ and in January 1925 it informed the Secretary-General of the League that it did not intend to adhere to the protocol for the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice or to the international convention of the 3rd November, 1923, for the simplification of customs formalities.⁴ At the same time it intimated its readiness, in principle, to take part in the work of a special technical committee on the tonnage measurement of vessels engaged in inland navigation, and it was actually represented at the conference on the subject which was held in Paris in November 1925, when its representatives signed the convention which the conference drew up.⁵ Nevertheless, Soviet Russian statesmen did not cease to give emphatic expression in public to their disapproval of the League of Nations and to their determination to remain outside it,⁶ and the *impasse* over the feud with Switzerland continued. In 1926 the Soviet Government refused to be represented either on the preparatory committee for the forthcoming international economic conference⁷ or on the preparatory disarmament commission, if these bodies were to do their work in Swiss territory.⁸ In January 1927 the Soviet Government further refused, on the same ground, an invitation to take part in the work of a League committee on the control of the private manufacture of

¹ For this crime and its diplomatic consequences, see the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 258-9.

² *Survey for 1924*, loc. cit.

³ *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 134.

⁴ *The Times*, 17th January, 1925.

⁵ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 108.

⁶ See, for example, statements by Monsieur Chicherin reported in the *Corriere della Sera*, 16th October, 1925, and in *The Times*, 24th December, 1925, and a statement by Monsieur Litvinov in the *Corriere della Sera*, 25th November, 1925.

⁷ The history of the international economic conference which met at Geneva in 1927 will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

⁸ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *Le Temps*, 24th January, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th February, 1926; *Le Temps*, 11th March and 12th April, 1926; *The Times*, 19th April, 1926.

arms and munitions.¹ In February 1927 it was reported to have returned to the Secretary-General of the League a note of the 18th January in which he had conveyed an invitation to participate in another League conference at Geneva, as a protest against his action in continuing to address to it invitations of this character notwithstanding its repeated refusals.²

Thus the feud between the U.S.S.R. and Switzerland was baffling the efforts of the League of Nations to secure world-wide participation at least in its non-political activities; and it was impossible for the League itself to take the initiative in bringing the two countries together. At Moscow it had no influence whatsoever, and it scrupled to use its influence at Berne in order to induce the Swiss Government to modify its attitude on what was essentially a Swiss and only incidentally a League affair. In these circumstances certain States Members of the League made efforts to bring the *impasse* to an end by bringing the two parties to the controversy together. The task was difficult, since on both the Swiss and the Russian side the position taken up had now become a question of *amour propre*; and the French Government, which lent its good offices for the purpose in January and February 1926, was unsuccessful.³ Thereafter, the *impasse* continued until, more than a year later, the German Government succeeded in starting conversations between the Swiss and Russian diplomatic representatives in Berlin, and this time a formula acceptable to both sides was attained. The text of a declaration, embodying this formula, was exchanged between the two negotiators on the 14th April, 1927, and therewith the feud was officially terminated.⁴

After this settlement with Switzerland, the Soviet Government showed itself less disinclined than before to participate in the League of Nations' activities. On the 29th April, 1927, for example, Monsieur Litvinov communicated to the League Secretariat his Government's decision to send representatives to the forthcoming Economic Conference, an invitation to which had previously been refused, and

¹ *Le Temps*, 30th January, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 11th February, 1927.

³ For this attempt at a reconciliation see *ibid.*, 30th January, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd February, 1926; *The Times*, 10th February, 1926; a communiqué from the Swiss Federal Council published in *Le Temps*, 11th February, 1926; a statement made by Monsieur Motta on the 17th February, 1926, as reported in *Le Temps* on the 18th February; and the summary, in *The Times*, 15th February, 1926, of a statement issued by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

⁴ For this settlement see *The Manchester Guardian*, 18th April, 1927, and also *The Times* of the same date, where the text of the declaration of the 14th April, 1927, is given. See further *Le Temps*, 10th June, 1927, reporting a statement made on the 8th June, 1927, by Monsieur Motta.

Russian experts duly took part in the proceedings which opened at Geneva on the 4th May. On the 26th July, 1927, Monsieur Chicherin accepted an invitation to send representatives to the Third General Conference on Communications and Transit which was to open on the 23rd August; but this acceptance seems to have been revoked before the date fell due.¹ In October 1927 Monsieur Chicherin announced that the U.S.S.R. would thenceforward co-operate in the League's work for the limitation of armaments;² and Russian delegates duly presented themselves when the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament was opened at Geneva on the 30th November, 1927.³ In December 1927 it was reported that negotiations were in progress between the Soviet Government and the Secretariat of the League for stationing Monsieur Rayevsky, at that time the representative of the Soviet 'Tas' News Agency in Paris, in permanent quarters at Geneva; but this suggestion, if made, fell through owing to the strength of the hostility towards the Soviet régime which had been aroused in Switzerland by the militant attitude of the Soviet Government over the Vorovsky affair and which had not been appeased by the official settlement.⁴ Protests appeared in the Swiss press against what was represented as a manoeuvre for securing the presence of a permanent diplomatic representative of the Soviet Government in a country which was still withholding recognition from the U.S.S.R.;⁵ and when the League Secretariat sounded the Swiss Government on the matter, the Swiss Government was reported to have declared that it would oppose the establishment of Monsieur Rayevsky's permanent head-quarters at Geneva, even in his capacity as correspondent of the 'Tas' Agency, though it had no objection to Monsieur Rayevsky visiting Geneva in that capacity as often as he pleased in order to follow the work of League of Nations conferences.⁶

¹ For this incident see *The Times*, 2nd August, 1927, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th August, 1927.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st November, 1927.

³ The history of this session will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

⁴ For this hostility see *The Times*, 10th February, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th June, 1927; *The Times*, 17th December, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th December, 1927.

⁵ It seems to have been assumed, in these protests, that Monsieur Rayevsky was to be stationed at Geneva as a permanent 'observer' of League of Nations proceedings on the Soviet Government's behalf—an arrangement which would perhaps have been comparable to the Latin American Office which was established at Geneva in January 1923 in order to keep the Latin American States Members of the League in touch with the Secretariat (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 465). This appears to have been a misapprehension—the actual suggestion being that Monsieur Rayevsky should transfer his permanent head-quarters from Paris to Geneva without any change in his functions or status.

⁶ For this incident see *Le Temps*, 9th December, 1927; the *Frankfurter*

This was the state of the relations between the League of Nations and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of the year 1928. It will be seen that these were not unaffected by the Soviet Government's relations with the country in whose territory the Secretariat of the League was domiciled. At the same time, it would hardly be warrantable to regard the course of Russo-Swiss relations from 1923 onwards as having been the principal obstacle to closer co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the League. In the light of the view, repeatedly and emphatically expressed in the Soviet Russian press and by Soviet Russian statesmen, that the activities of the League were dominated by the former 'Principal Allied Powers', and particularly by Great Britain, it seems more probable that the determining factor in Soviet Russian policy towards the League from 1924 to 1927 was the growing estrangement between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, of which the first symptoms were the publication of 'the Zinoviev letter' during the General Election of October 1924, and the breaking off of negotiations by the subsequent Conservative administration, and which culminated two and a half years later in 'the Arcos Raid'.¹

Zeitung, 14th December, 1927; *The Times*, 17th December, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th December, 1927.

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, Section (iv), and Section (ii) of this part of the present volume. Compare the Soviet Government's indictment of the British Government on the occasion of the assassination of Monsieur Voykov at Warsaw (Part II D, Section (iii), above).

PART III

CHINA

(i) The Chinese Civil War.

IN 1927, as in the preceding year,¹ the internal affairs of China were so closely interwoven with her foreign relations that they could not be ignored in a survey of international affairs; and it may therefore be convenient to preface the present part of this volume by carrying on the record of the Chinese civil war from the middle of February 1927—the point at which it was broken off in the preceding volume—down to the end of the year. Since the subject only falls incidentally within the scope of this work it need not be dealt with here in greater detail than is necessary for an understanding of the foreign relations of China during the months in question.²

By the middle of February 1927 almost the whole of China proper, as well as the three Manchurian provinces, had been drawn into the single struggle, between the Kuomintang on the one side and a coalition of Northern 'war lords' on the other, which had been started when General Chiang Kai-shek launched his 'Northern Expedition' from Canton in May 1926.³ Only the three south-western provinces—Szechuan, Kweichow, and Yunnan—and the one northern province of Shansi continued to hold aloof from the main course of events.⁴ The local 'war lords' of the south-west were still keeping up that chaotic warfare of all against all which had been characteristic of an earlier stage of the civil war in China as a whole. 'The Model Tuchün' of Shansi, Yen Hsi-shan, was still maintaining that statesmanlike neutrality which had enabled him to make his province an oasis in the desert; but he inclined more and more towards the Kuomintang as their armies approached his borders; and before the year closed he had raised the Nationalist flag and taken up arms against the Northern 'war lords' in the Nationalist cause.

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, p. 223.

² For more detailed accounts of the Chinese civil war during the year 1927, see *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1264–75; for this and the following sections see also *Chronology of Events in China, 1911–27*, issued by the Association for International Understanding, 10 St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

³ For the history of this campaign down to the 16th February, 1927, see the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 295 *seqq.*

⁴ The North-Western province of Kansu did not become a war zone, though it was in the sphere of influence of one of the parties to the civil war, Feng Yü-hsiang.

As for the belligerents in the main civil war, their several positions, by the middle of February 1927, were roughly as follows. The Kuomintang forces obeying the supreme command of General Chiang Kai-shek and paying allegiance to the Kuomintang Government at Wuhan (Greater Hankow) held the six south-eastern and central provinces of Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupeh.¹ They were thus astride the Yangtse along the middle section of its course, from about Ichang to Kiukiang, but had not yet reached the line of the river between Kiukiang and the sea. Here the trans-Yangtse sections of the two provinces of Anhwei and Kiangsu, as well as the greater part of Chekiang, were still in the hands of Sun Ch'uan-fang—though Sun was tottering to his fall, and had only been able to hold out at all at the price of subordinating himself to the Northern group of 'war lords' headed by the Manchurian Chang Tso-lin. In support of Sun, Chang Tso-lin's henchman, Chang Tsung-ch'ang of Shantung, had brought a force down the Tientsin-Pukow Railway to Pukow itself, on the north bank of the Yangtse opposite Nanking. Further west, a force of Chang Tso-lin's own Manchurian (Fengtien) troops was advancing slowly down the Peking-Hankow Railway through the province of Honan, with the new capital of the Kuomintang Government as their ultimate objective; but their advance was impeded partly by the insubordination of generals professing allegiance to Chang Tso-lin's nominal ally Wu P'ei-fu and partly by the passive resistance of Wu himself (who, though disastrously defeated by the Kuomintang in the previous year, could not bring himself, as Sun Ch'uan-fang had done, to accept a Fengtien hegemony), and partly by the no less equivocal attitude of the Honanese *condottieri*, who were ready at short notice to serve the cause of the highest bidder, whoever he might be. The difficulties of campaigning in Honan were further increased for all parties by the existence of a secret military organization for self-help among the Honanese peasantry. These 'Red Spears' (a Chinese counterpart of the 'Green Guards' of Eastern Europe) could not face an organized force in the field; but they could avenge, if not avert, the wrongs suffered by the civilian population at the hands of soldiers and brigands indiscriminately by cutting lines of communication and by falling upon and annihilating small parties of uniformed troops without stopping

¹ This was the official state of affairs down to the formal split in the Kuomintang in April 1927, which is recorded below (Section ii). In practice, however, the Kuomintang forces taking orders from the Government at Wuhan and those taking orders from General Chiang Kai-shek, whose head-quarters were then at Nanchang, were acting independently of one another from as early as November 1926.

to ask whether Wu or Chang or Chiang or Feng was the general under whom the marauders were professing to serve at the moment.¹ Meanwhile Wu P'ei-fu, in dubious alliance with Chang Tso-lin, still maintained a force in being in the western corner of Honan; and here he was faced by Feng Yü-hsiang, who had concentrated his Kuominchün Army in south-eastern Shensi and who was in alliance (equally dubious, considering Feng's record for double-dealing and treachery) with the Kuomintang.

A new stage of the campaign was opened by Chiang Kai-shek's victory over Sun Ch'uan-fang's forces outside Hangchow on the 16th February, 1927,² and his occupation of both Hangchow and Ningpo two or three days later.³ Chang Tsung-ch'ang's Shantung troops thereupon crossed the Yangtse from Pukow and took over the defence of Sun's area,⁴ in the hope of preventing Shanghai from passing into the Kuomintang's domain; but this move was a failure. Politically, it actually may have prepared the ground in Shanghai for the Kuomintang; for the Shantungese had a bad reputation there owing to their behaviour during previous occupations, and this reputation was confirmed by their brutality on this occasion—for example, in their attempts to suppress the general strike, during the last ten days of February 1927, in those quarters of Greater Shanghai which lay outside the two foreign settlements.⁵ Militarily Chang Tsung-ch'ang was outmanœuvred by the advance of a Kuomintang force down the Yangtse against his line of communications in the third week of March.⁶ On the 20th March the Kuomintang forces cut the Nanking-Shanghai Railway at Changchow;⁷ on the 22nd they occupied Shanghai (up to the limits of the cordon held by the British Shanghai Defence Force and the other foreign contingents which were co-operating with it);⁸ and on the 24th they completed their

¹ For the 'Red Spears' see *The Times*, 23rd June, 1927, and the text of a report to the Department of State at Washington in *The United States Daily*, 26th October, 1927. It should be added that the 'Red Spears' were apt to recoup themselves by taking to the predatory activities of the gentry whom it was their self-imposed mission to fight, so that their public spirit was not always an unmixed blessing to their neighbours.

² *The Times*, 17th and 19th February, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 21st February, 1927.

⁴ Sun was reported to have renounced his independent command on the 21st February, 1927 (*ibid.*, 23rd February, 1927; cf. *The Times*, 3rd March, 1927).

⁵ See the *Survey for 1926*, p. 376, and, for the later phases of the Shanghai General Strike, the present volume, Section (iii) (b) of this part. It should be noted that the contest was conducted with equal brutality on the strikers' side.

⁶ *The Times*, 18th March, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 21st March, 1927.

⁸ See Section (iii) (b) below for the effect of this event upon the relations between Chinese and foreigners in Shanghai.

conquest of Sun Ch'uan-fang's domain south of the Yangtse by occupying Nanking.¹ A first attempt to follow up these successes by crossing the Yangtse and advancing northwards along the Pukow-Tientsin Railway was defeated before the middle of April.²

Meanwhile, along the line of the Peking-Hankow Railway, in Honan, the Fengtien forces had fought their way across to the south bank of the Yellow River by the middle of March,³ and they so far overcame the resistance of the local *condottieri* that in April they got into touch with Chang Tsung-ch'ang's and Sun Ch'uan-fang's forces along the Lunghai Railway—a lateral line which linked the Tientsin-Pukow with the Peking-Hankow Railway south of the Yellow River, intersected the Peking-Hankow Railway at right-angles at Chengchow, and ran on almost as far as the great south-western angle of the Yellow River where Honan marched with Shensi. This seemed to place the Northern Coalition in a good posture for resisting any further attempt of the Kuomintang to advance, or even for reconquering the Yangtse Valley—particularly in view of the political split in the ranks of the Kuomintang which had reopened under the surface in November 1926 and undisguisedly in March 1927.⁴ On the 22nd April, however, the Hankow faction of the Kuomintang sent out an expeditionary force, under the command of Tang Sheng-chih,⁵ to make a counter-advance up the Hankow-Peking Railway, and by the end of the first week in May they had made contact with the Fengtien forces, along this line, at Chumatién in Southern Honan.⁶ Thereupon, the communications of the Kuomintang forces were cut by the 'Red Spears',⁷ and they were compelled to fall back as far as the northern border of Hupeh; but they immediately started to outflank the Fengtien forces from the east—their own eastern flank being covered by a fresh advance on the part of Chiang Kai-shek, who reoccupied Pukow on the 15th May. (It was characteristic of the Kuomintang that the political breach which had broken out within its ranks did not prevent the factions from continuing to co-operate in their military operations against the common enemy.) On the 14th May the Hankow Army launched an attack on the Fengtien Army's eastern flank,⁸ and during the rest of

¹ See Section (iii) (c) below for the outrages committed against foreigners in Nanking on this occasion.

² See *The Times*, 4th, 5th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th April, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 14th March, 1927.

⁴ For this split see Section (ii) below.

⁵ For Tang Sheng-chih's previous history see the preceding volume, pp. 297-8, and the present volume, p. 338 below.

⁶ *The Times*, 11th May, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 12th May, 1927.

⁸ See the Hankow Government's communiqué published in *The Times*, 24th May, 1927.

the month there was continuous and heavy fighting between these two forces. The Fengtien troops were in fact the first well-equipped, well-disciplined and well-led troops with whom the Kuomintang Army had had to fight a pitched battle since it had started on its Northern Expedition from Canton just twelve months before. Its previous successes, sensational though they were, had been gained by military and still more by political manœuvres rather than by actual prowess in the field. In these new circumstances the Kuomintang Army displayed considerable fighting spirit. It kept up its attacks in spite of heavy casualties; but its initial successes were undone by a counter-attack from the Fengtien Army which re-took Chumatien on the 26th May,¹ and the issue was only decided by the intervention of Feng Yü-hsiang from the west. Early in May Feng, starting from Shensi, had begun to advance eastwards along the Lunghai Railway, thus threatening the communications of the Fengtien Army from the opposite side; further south he succeeded in immobilizing Wu P'ei-fu in south-western Honan; and by the 24th he had also thrown his left wing across the Yellow River and was advancing eastward along both banks. On the 27th he took Loyang (Honanfu) on the Lunghai Railway; and by the 30th he was threatening the point of intersection of the Lunghai and the Peking-Hankow Railways at Chengchow. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang Army had counter-attacked the Fengtien Army at Chumatien and had driven it back, though again at a heavy cost;² and under this double pressure the Fengtien Army fell back to the north bank of the Yellow River during the last four days of May, leaving behind large quantities of war material. Feng occupied Chengchow on the 1st June and moved his headquarters to Kaifengfu on the 8th. By this success he not only extricated the Hankow Kuomintang Army from its difficulties,³ but incidentally forced the armies of Chang Tsung-ch'ang and Sun Ch'uan-fang, further east, to fall back in line with the Fengtien Army. In consequence the Nanking Kuomintang Army commanded by Chiang Kai-shek was able for the second time to advance up the Pukow-Tientsin Railway.⁴ By the end of May Chiang had occupied Hsu-

¹ *The Times*, 27th May, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 1st, 2nd and 3rd June, 1927.

³ It appeared as though Feng timed his intervention so as not to extricate his Hankow Kuomintang allies until they and their Fengtien opponents had fought long enough and hard enough to weaken one another thoroughly. This conjecture cannot be proved, but such generalship would be in the best traditions of Chinese strategy and there is no doubt that, whether deliberately or not, Feng did, in this campaign, play the profitable part of *tertius gaudens*.

⁴ Chiang had already begun to advance north from Pukow before Feng's victory in Honan (see *The Times*, 24th and 25th May, 1927).

chowfu, the junction between the Pukow-Tientsin Railway and the Lunghai Railway, with the result that the control of this lateral line passed into the Nationalist Group's hands. Chiang pushed on up the Pukow-Tientsin Railway until his advance guard approached Yen-chow and threatened Tsinanfu, the provincial capital of Shantung,¹ and he was not brought to a halt in his invasion of this province until the third week in June.²

These military events had a number of political consequences.

The first was that on the 5th June, 1927, the 'Model Tuchün' of Shansi, Yen Hsi-shan, hoisted the Kuomintang flag in his capital at Taiyuanfu, moved troops up to the Chihli border,³ and called upon Chang Tso-lin to hoist the Kuomintang flag likewise and adopt the three principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Though Yen still held back from attacking the Northern Coalition, his action still further compromised the position of the Fengtien Army and fortified the position of Feng Yü-hsiang in the Peking-Hankow Railway theatre of operations. Politically, too, it seems to have undermined Chang Tso-lin's position in Peking. Indeed, it was perhaps this more than anything else which gave Chang's fortunes a decisive turn towards ultimate disaster.

The political position of the Hankow Kuomintang Government was also profoundly affected by the May campaign in Honan. At the most critical moment of that campaign, Hankow itself had been

¹ At this moment one of Sun Ch'uan-fang's commanders revolted at Kaomi on the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway and hoisted the Kuomintang flag, but the revolt was quickly suppressed, and this was perhaps the turning point in this Shantung campaign (see *The Times*, 6th and 8th July, 1927). The revolt was said to have been engineered in the interest of Feng, who was anxious to get possession of a sea-port through which he could import supplies of arms (instead of continuing to depend on the precarious source of supply from the U.S.S.R. via Mongolia).

² *The Times*, 20th, 28th and 29th June, 9th and 13th July, 1927. On the 13th June it was stated in the House of Commons at Westminster by the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that at that moment the defence of Shantung rested on a few hundred ('White') Russians who were concentrated on the southern border of the province. The cessation of Chiang's northward advance on this occasion may have been due partly to the incident of the revolt in the opposing army at Kaomi (an incident which increased the Kuomintang generals' distrust of Feng), partly to the appearance of a Japanese Defence Force at Tsingtao (this will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*), and partly to the weakening of Chiang's forces owing to the elimination of Communist units which had been involved in the Nanking outrages of the 24th March, 1927 (see the present volume, section (iii) (c) of this part).

³ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 6th July, 1927. See also *The Times*, 6th, 9th and 17th June, 1927.

threatened by the simultaneous advance of Yang Sen—an independent *condottiere* who was a nominal adherent of Wu P'ei-fu¹—from Szechuan and of Southern troops supporting Chiang Kai-shek's faction of the Kuomintang from Hunan. After the retreat of the Fengtien Army across the Yellow River, Feng Yü-hsiang took over responsibility for the defence of Honan; and the Hankow Kuomintang Army, thus released for service elsewhere, drove off Yang Sen on the 14th June, 1927, and re-established the authority of the Hankow Government in Hunan by the end of the month. Thus the victory in Honan saved the Hankow Government's life, but it was nevertheless a pyrrhic victory so far as the Hankow Kuomintang Army was concerned; and the shock caused by the heaviness of the casualties suffered in Honan in May seems to have been one of the factors which destroyed the prestige of the Russian Communist Mission at Hankow² and led to the departure of Monsieur Borodin in July.³

Another political result was an increase in the power of Feng Yü-hsiang—though this increase must be ascribed not only to his contribution to the common military victory over the Northern Coalition⁴ but to the split in the Kuomintang, which, so long as it lasted, gave Feng the position of arbiter in the Nationalist counsels. In spite of the discomfiture of the Northern Armies, Chiang Kai-shek was so much preoccupied with his feud with Hankow that early in June he apparently attempted to arrive at an understanding with Chang Tso-lin through the intermediation of Yen Hsi-shan.⁵ Chang, however, in spite of his recent military failure, seems to have counted on the political split in the Kuomintang to do his work for him, while the military failure of his confederates Chang Tsung-ch'ang and Sun Ch'uan-fang actually redounded to Chang Tso-lin's political advantage. Profiting by their 'loss of face', on the 16th June he declared himself Generalissimo of the Army and Navy of the Chinese Republic, had himself inaugurated on the 18th, and took up his residence in the President's Palace at Peking on the 27th. Simultaneously the negotiations between Chang and Chiang were broken

¹ For Yang Sen's part in the Wanh sien Incident see the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 307–13.

² On this point see 'China Revisited', by Archibald Rose, in the *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, January 1928.

³ For the decline and fall of Russian Communist influence in China in the course of the year 1927 see Section (ii) below.

⁴ For a conjecture as to Feng's strategy see the footnote on p. 326 above.

⁵ *The Times*, 6th and 7th June, 1927. Chiang Kai-shek had been reported to be making overtures to Chang Tso-lin as early as April 1927 (*ibid.*, 16th April, 1927).

off; and during the third week of June Feng Yü-hsiang held a conference with Chiang at Hsuehchowfu,¹ after interviewing representatives of the Hankow Government at Chengchow on his way.² On this occasion Feng and Chiang were reported to have reached an understanding; but, in view of Feng's record, it still remained uncertain which faction of the Kuomintang he would eventually elect to support. The only certain fact was that Tang Sheng-chih was sent to the rear and that Chiang, who now retired to Nanking, left the command of the Northern Expedition in Feng's hands.

The political split in the ranks of the Kuomintang once more affected the course of the civil war in July. By this time the tables were turned, and, instead of Chiang's supporters threatening Hankow from Hunan, forces favourable to the Communist cause³ were threatening Nanking from Kiukiang. Under this threat Chiang Kai-shek openly entered into negotiations with the Northern Coalition. On or before the 19th July his representatives arrived at Peking,⁴ and one party of Chang Tso-lin's followers, headed by his chief-of-staff, Yang Yu-t'ing, were reported to have been in favour of a settlement; but the news that Chiang was already withdrawing his troops southwards along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, in order to meet the threat from Kiukiang, appears to have hardened Chang's heart, and these negotiations likewise came to nothing. On the 24th July the Northern forces began to follow up Chiang's retreat;⁵ on the 12th August Chiang temporarily retired from public life;⁶ and on the 17th August Chang Tsung-ch'ang reached Pukow again, while Sun Ch'uan-fang came into line on the north bank of the Yangtse to the east of him. An attempt, however, which Sun made to cross the river was a disastrous failure,⁷ and on the 2nd September the Northern

¹ *The Times*, 20th and 21st June, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 22nd and 25th June, 1927.

² For this interview and for Feng's reported ultimatum to the Hankow Government following the Hsuehchowfu Conference with Chiang, see section (ii), p. 341, below.

³ By this time the Hankow Government, as well as the Nanking Government, had broken with the Chinese Communist Party and the Russian Mission.

⁴ *The Manchester Guardian*, 19th and 20th July, 1927; *The Times*, 20th and 22nd July, 1927.

⁵ *The Times*, 27th and 28th July, 6th, 13th and 18th August, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th July, 1927.

⁶ Although Chiang's decision to retire at this juncture may have been due in part to the Northerners' advance, the determining factor was the political situation as between the different factions of the Kuomintang. This is dealt with in Section (ii) below.

⁷ *The Times*, 27th August, 3rd, 5th and 10th September, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th and 30th August, 1927.

forces once more evacuated Pukow, which was reoccupied by the Kuomintang, the Northerners remaining in occupation of the railway junction of Hsuchowfu.

Herewith, the 1927 campaign of the Chinese civil war came to a standstill in both the main theatres of operations; but that was not the end of the fighting during this year, for in the autumn a local campaign took place in an area which had previously escaped almost unscathed.

The demands presented in June by the 'Model Tuchün' of Shansi, Yen Hsi-shan, had been rejected by Chang Tso-lin and his allies; and in July Chang had felt it advisable to forestall the threat to which his western flank was now exposed from Shansi by withdrawing the Fengtien Army up the Hankow-Peking Railway as far as Paotingfu,¹ a point which was actually nearer than Tientsin to the Capital. Thereupon Yen had occupied the evacuated sector of the railway in the southern part of the province of Chihli, in the no-man's-land left between the domains of Chang and Feng, but he had still refrained from warlike operations. On the 27th September, however, he unexpectedly launched an attack on the Fengtien forces along the Suiyuan-Peking Railway, and on the 29th along the Hankow-Peking Railway likewise. At first the Fengtien forces were taken by surprise, and they evacuated Kalgan on the 3rd October, while on the other front the Shansi forces fought their way to within striking distance of Paotingfu. On the 10th October, however, the Fengtien Army launched a counter-offensive on both fronts,² while simultaneously Chang Tsung-ch'ang's forces advanced westward along the Lunghai Railway in order to immobilize Feng Yü-hsiang; and on both fronts the Shansi troops were now driven back with heavy losses. The Fengtien troops retook Kalgan on the 15th October, and by the middle of November they had occupied not only the whole length of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway but the northern part of Shansi Province as far south as the inner line of the Great Wall.³ They failed, however, to capture Yen's capital of Taiyuan or otherwise to obtain a military decision—partly owing to the rigours of a winter campaign in northern China in a mountainous region⁴ and

¹ *The Times*, 15th August, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 12th October, 1927.

³ See a statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 7th December, 1927.

⁴ It seems doubtful whether the course of the campaign was affected appreciably by the most spectacular incident in it, namely, the stubborn resistance of a flying column of Shansi troops who on the 11th October had thrown themselves into the walled town of Chochow on the Peking-Hankow Railway, north of Paotingfu and only 40 miles from Peking itself. The garrison of

partly owing to the activity of Feng Yü-hsiang. Feng replied to Chang Tsung-ch'ang's attack by co-operating with the Nanking Kuomintang Army in a counter-attack which culminated before the end of December in the recapture of Hsuehchowfu and the restoration of direct contact between the two wings of the Nationalist group of armies along the lateral Lunghai Railway.

This was the military situation at the end of the year 1927. It will be seen that the last eleven months' fighting had resulted in a considerable curtailment of the Northern Coalition's domain. The four provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhwei and Honan had passed out of their possession; the loss of Kiangsu had carried with it the loss of Shanghai; and the conquest of northern Shansi was a poor compensation for the accession to the Nationalist cause of a province whose situation was strategically commanding and whose resources had been conserved by a neutrality consistently maintained until that autumn.

This change in the situation, while considerable in itself, might still seem little to show for all the alarums and excursions that have been chronicled above. Against this must be set the fact that, through these wearisome and destructive exercises at their own expense, the Chinese had at least been continuing their self-education in the Western technique of war.

(ii) The Internal Dissensions in the Kuomintang and the Decline and Fall of Russian Communist Influence in China.¹

In the preceding volume some account has been given of the internal dissensions within the Kuomintang Party at Canton in March and April 1926, on the eve of the Northern Expedition which, in less than a year, extended the domain of the Kuomintang Government from the southern littoral of China to the Yangtse. If these

Chochow stood an eighty-six days' siege before they surrendered, with the honours of war, on the 6th January, 1928. (According to *The Times*, 31st December, 1927, Chochow surrendered, after a 79 days' siege, before the end of December 1927.)

¹ For the history of the Kuomintang, and of the influence of the Russian Communists in its counsels, down to the spring of the year 1927 see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 315-6, 322-3, and the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, Section (γ) (vii), pp. 283-5. See further the study by G. E. Sokolsky (= Chapter xxviii of *The China Year Book*, 1928), which is well documented. It should be noted that, in the nature of the case, most of the critical events in this field occurred behind the scenes, and that therefore statements in regard to them are particularly difficult to verify or control. This is unfortunate, since the principal agents in these events, who were necessarily the main ultimate sources of information, were presumably concerned to present that picture which would be most favourable to their own respective reputations.

dissensions had not been temporarily suspended the Northern Expedition could not have been carried to that degree of success or indeed carried out at all; and in fact, until the seal of success had been set upon it by the decisive defeat of Sun Ch'uan-fang in February 1927, in succession to the overthrow of Wu P'ei-fu, the several factions in the Kuomintang continued, at least ostensibly, to hold together. Their dissensions, however, had been merely suspended and not composed, and in the spring of 1927 they broke out openly again.

One cause of these dissensions was national and personal. The Chinese leaders of the Kuomintang tended to resent the tutelage of their Russian mentors; and this resentment was fed by the very consciousness of the services which the Russians were rendering to the Chinese Nationalist cause, though that consciousness was at the same time the main source of the influence which the Russians had obtained. The only important sentimental factor of a positive kind that may have worked in the Russians' favour was the fact that the alliance with Russian Communism had been inaugurated and blessed by the Founder of the Kuomintang himself. In his lifetime, it is true, Dr. Sun Yat-sen had not displayed, in the same degree as his great contemporary Lenin, the gift for making a heterogeneous company of followers and associates work together in a common cause. Sun's magnetic unifying power was posthumous; and the quasi-canonization of his personality and his writings, though quite in the spirit of the Chinese tradition, also bore such a remarkable resemblance to the canonization of Lenin that it is reasonable to suppose that, under Russian influence, it was at least partly inspired by the Russian precedent.¹ Thus while Lenin's death removed a unifying force² Dr. Sun's death may be said to have created one. Yet, though this factor may have worked in favour of the Russian advisers of the Kuomintang, the national and personal antipathy proved too strong to be overcome. By the spring of 1926 this national and personal conflict in the camp of the Kuomintang had become most sharply expressed in the rivalry between its principal Russian adviser and organiser, Monsieur Borodin, and its principal Chinese military leader, General Chiang Kai-shek.

In addition, there was an important difference of programme and policy between those adherents of the Kuomintang who wished to

¹ Lenin died on the 21st January, 1924, Sun on the 12th March, 1925.

² For the effect of Lenin's death upon the history of the Russian Communist Party see the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 172-4, and the present volume, Part II E, Section (i).

remake China in the image of the more liberal and progressive representatives of the 'bourgeois' and 'capitalist' states of the Western World, and those who aimed at a revolution of the kind which the Communists had brought about in Russia in 1917. A Chinese Communist Party had been founded about the year 1920 as one of the national organizations affiliated to the Third (Communist) International; and these Chinese Communists, after serving as a bridge between the Russian Communists and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, had been admitted to membership in the Kuomintang at the beginning of the year 1924.¹ While the two groups thus adhering to the Kuomintang had certain important negative aims in common—for example, the overthrow of the local 'war lords' between whom the greater part of China was at that time parcelled out, and the abolition of privileges enjoyed in China by foreign Governments and by individual foreigners—it is evident that their positive aims were ultimately incompatible. The bourgeois group depended on the support of such elements in the Chinese people as the enterprising and prosperous merchants of Canton, Shanghai and other treaty ports where the Chinese mercantile class had been in direct touch with Westerners for several generations. The Communist group was seeking to organize a militant phalanx of supporters among the small but rapidly growing industrial proletariat of these same urban centres and looked forward to building up its reserves out of the vast masses of the peasantry, who constituted the overwhelming majority of 'the four hundred millions' and who even in normal times—and *a fortiori* in this time of long-drawn-out revolution and civil war—were always sufficiently near to starvation to be readily influenced by revolutionary appeals.² The first notable material success of the Chinese Communist Party had been the organization and maintenance of the strike pickets at Canton in 1925 and 1926; and, before the anti-British boycott was officially terminated on the 10th October

¹ For the origins of the Chinese Communist Party see the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A (a), foot-note on p. 240; and G. E. Sokolsky in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1316–20.

² For the importance which was attached to the conversion of the Chinese peasantry by the fathers of the Communist Church Militant at Moscow see Document No. 6 in *Soviet Plot in Russia*, documents published by the Metropolitan Police Headquarters, Peking, 1927, Instalment No. II: 'Resolution relating to the Chinese Question carried at the Seventh Extended Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the International Communist Party, Moscow': (iv) 'The National Revolution and the Peasantry'. In the provinces of Hunan and Hupeh, after their conquest by the Kuomintang Northern Military Expedition in 1926, an agrarian revolution seems to have been fomented energetically by Monsieur Borodin and his colleagues.

of the latter year,¹ the pickets had become an incubus upon the Chinese merchants of Canton as well as a thorn in the flesh of the British communities in Shameen and Hongkong. This social friction which the strike and boycott produced in Canton itself may have been one cause of that savage outbreak of class-war which devastated the city in December 1927.²

The conflict within the Kuomintang which took place in the spring of 1926 was opened in March, at a moment when Monsieur Borodin happened to be absent from the city, by an attempt on the part of General Chiang Kai-shek, in alliance with Mr. C. C. Wu and other representatives of the right wing of the bourgeois group, to eject the Chinese Communists and the Russian Mission. Monsieur Borodin returned in time to arrest the execution of the *coup*, but he found his position seriously shaken, and thereafter he and Chiang Kai-shek, having each failed to drive the other off the field, appear to have struck a bargain on the understanding that Borodin should give Chiang's projected Northern Military Expedition substantial support, and that in return for this Chiang should throw over his associates. Accordingly, the moderate Mr. C. C. Wu, as well as the reactionary police commissioner Wu Teh-chen, was expelled from Canton and the Northern Expedition was launched.³ A compromise was favoured by the left wing of the bourgeois group, who wanted (if only provisionally and out of opportunism) to keep the Communists as members of the Kuomintang, if this could be provided for without bringing the Kuomintang under the Chinese Communist Party's domination. A provisional solution of the problem was arrived at in a Kuomintang Party Conference in May 1926. At this Conference Communists were not disqualified for membership of the Kuomintang, but they were made ineligible for serving as heads of departments in the Kuomintang Central Party Organization, and were restricted to a maximum of one third of the seats on the Central Executive Committee. At the same time the Conference set up a joint committee of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party; and it was resolved that instructions issued to Communist members of the Kuomintang by the Chinese Communist Party or by the Third (Communist) International were to be submitted first to this joint

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, p. 289.

² For this outbreak see p. 361 below.

³ For this story see G. E. Sokolsky in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1341, 1359 and 1362. For the same story and two variants see Mr. Arthur Ransome in *The Manchester Guardian*, 5th May, 1927. The history of these events in the spring of 1926 is retold here because it is of importance for the understanding of what followed and because the account given in the *Survey for 1926*, p. 295, is inadequate.

committee for its approval, and also that Communist members of the Kuomintang were not to engage in any other political activity without the Kuomintang Party's approval. In personal terms, these new arrangements saved Chiang's face, but they did not really curtail Monsieur Borodin's influence in the Party, since he apparently preferred to work, not through professed Communists, but through 'Semi-Communists' whose activities in the Communist cause would be likely to be less obtrusive.¹

Thus the conflict within the Kuomintang in the spring of 1926 was indecisive; and the next bout in the struggle may be said to have begun as early as October 1926, when a Kuomintang Extraordinary Congress—sitting in Canton under Monsieur Borodin's auspices while Chiang was winning his victories over Wu P'ei-fu and Sun Ch'uan-fang—voted, among other things, the transfer of the capital to Hankow (instead of to Nanchang) and the recall from exile of Mr. Wang Ching-wei, a left-wing member of the Kuomintang who had been expelled by Chiang during his attack on the Communists in the preceding March.² Monsieur Borodin did not openly assert himself, however, until after the removal of the Kuomintang Government from Canton to Hankow at the turn of the calendar year.³

The course of events at Hankow, from the occupation of that city by the Kuomintang forces down to the signature of the two Chen-O'Malley Agreements regarding the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang on the 19th February and the 2nd March, 1927, has been described in the preceding volume. It is evident that, throughout those months, a further conflict within the Kuomintang was going on at Hankow behind the scenes, with the question of the policy to be pursued towards foreigners as a concrete issue; and according to some foreign observers⁴ the militant tactics which were pursued at this juncture, on Monsieur Borodin's initiative, against the local British community, were altogether incidental to the struggle between the Chinese factions. According to this view the deliberate attempt to provoke the British naval landing party in the British Concession at Hankow to fire on the Chinese mob on the 3rd January, 1927,⁵ was

¹ On this point see G. E. Sokolsky in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1385-6.

² Mr. Wang Ching-wei was not a Communist, though his radical views sometimes led him to associate himself with the Communists—e.g. in March 1926 and again (see p. 349 below) in April 1927. As is recorded later, he took a leading part in July 1927 in expelling the Russian Mission from Hankow (see pp. 353-4 below).

³ See the *Survey for 1926*, p. 327.

⁴ e.g. Mr. G. E. Sokolsky, *op. cit.*

⁵ See the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 347-9. The date may have been determined by Mr. Lampson's visit to Hankow from the 8th to the 17th December, 1926,

aimed not so much at inflaming Chinese public opinion against Great Britain as at embarrassing the right wing of the Kuomintang itself, and particularly General Chiang Kai-shek as the officially responsible military commander,¹ by embroiling them with one of the principal foreign Powers.² According to the same view the outrages against foreigners at Nanking on the 24th March, which were as palpably deliberate as the invasion of the British Concession at Hankow at the beginning of the year,³ were to be interpreted as a second and more determined attempt to secure the same end after the machinations at Hankow had been frustrated—mainly by the coolness of the British naval authorities and naval ratings on the spot and by the moderation of the British Government, but partly also by the efforts of the moderate element in the Kuomintang to prevent bloodshed.⁴ A similar interpretation was suggested for the strikes, accompanied by terrorism, which occurred during January and February 1927 at Shanghai, and for the shelling of the French Settlement at Shanghai on the 22nd February by two Chinese gunboats whose crews had mutinied against the régime of the Northern 'war-lords'.⁵

The evidence was perhaps insufficient for determining exactly how far this interpretation of events was right, but there were certain

and by the publication of the British 'December Memorandum'; for these indications of a conciliatory spirit on the British Government's side were so striking that the Communist group in the Kuomintang and the Russian Mission may have felt that a Sino-British 'incident' had to be precipitated forthwith if a Sino-British *rapprochement* was to be forestalled (see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 347).

¹ As has been mentioned above, Chiang at Nanchang and the Kuomintang Government at Hankow had in practice been acting independently of one another since November 1926.

² 'The Nanking Affair had precipitated a long impending split within the Nationalist ranks. The looting of foreign property at Nanking and the shooting of foreigners were the culmination of a continued policy of agitation, rapine, terrorism and murder; the tools of this policy were the unpaid soldiery of the Nationalist armies and the mobs of the great cities, but its organization and driving force were borrowed, directly or indirectly, from the Third International. This policy had failed to create an anti-British incident in Hankow in January. It had been unable to seize Shanghai owing to the protective presence of the Defence Force. By March it was becoming directed against the Nationalist generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, of whose power the Communists were jealous. The organized side of the Nanking outrages appears to have been an attempt to embroil Chiang Kai-shek with the foreign Powers.' (Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons on the 9th May, 1927, in answer to a parliamentary question.)

³ For these outrages at Nanking see Section (iii) (c), below.

⁴ For these efforts see the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 350-2.

⁵ See the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 373-80, for relations between Chinese and foreigners at Shanghai during the first two months of 1927, and the present volume, Section (iii) (b) of this part, for the sequel down to the end of that year.

known or reported facts which gave some colour to it. For instance, while Monsieur Borodin made a triumphal progress to Hankow in December 1926 General Chiang Kai-shek remained in his general head-quarters at Nanchang, in Kiangsi, with his ally Mr. Chang Ching-kiang, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang Party; and, in a speech delivered here, he was reported to have denounced the tactics of the Communists on the 21st February. Otherwise, the right wing of the Kuomintang seem to have held their hand so long as the Chen-O'Malley negotiations were in progress, out of a desire not to embarrass Mr. Chen in a transaction which they considered to be of high importance to the common cause, since Mr. Chen and the other leading members of the Hankow Government at that time belonged to the left wing of the bourgeois group in the Kuomintang which was in favour of co-operating with the Chinese Communists and the Russian Mission still.

The storm which split the Kuomintang Government¹ broke over the question whether the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang should hold its next meeting in General Chiang Kai-shek's stronghold at Nanchang or in Monsieur Borodin's at Hankow.² Chiang appears to have taken the offensive by causing notice to be given for a meeting at Nanchang on the 1st March, and it was reported that the Russian Mission had not been invited to attend and that their dismissal was to be moved. Instead, however, of meeting at Nanchang on the 1st March the Committee actually met at Hankow on the 10th March; and though resolutions were passed to reinforce the rule, laid down in May 1926, that Communist members of the Kuomintang should not engage in independent political activities, the fact that the meeting was boycotted by representatives of the Centre and the Right enabled the Left to have things their own way,³ and the general effect of the resolutions passed on this occasion was to alter the balance of power between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party in the latter's favour as compared with the previous

¹ For a first-hand account of the Kuomintang Government immediately after its transfer to Hankow see a series of articles in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 27th February and 6th, 9th and 20th March, 1927. See further a series of articles by Mr. Arthur Ransome, who visited Hankow about the same time, in *The Manchester Guardian*, 18th, 20th and 23rd April, and 3rd May, 1927—particularly his impressions of Monsieur Borodin (20th April, 1927) and of Mr. T. V. Soong, Mr. Sun Fo, Mrs. Sun Yat-sen and the Minister of Justice, Mr. Hsu Chien (3rd May, 1927). Monsieur Borodin, who spoke no Chinese, and Mr. Eugene Chen, who spoke very little, used English as their medium of communication with Mrs. Sun Yat-sen and her brother Mr. Soong, who had both been educated in the United States.

² *The Times*, 1st and 7th March, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 16th, 18th and 29th March, 1927.

compromise. In another resolution the Conference voted the deposition of General Chiang Kai-shek from his post of commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang Armies. Ostensibly, the unity of the Party had not been broken when the meeting at Hankow terminated on the 16th March. Practically, the incident had reopened the breach and had decided the first round in the new contest between Monsieur Borodin and General Chiang Kai-shek in Monsieur Borodin's favour. In the meantime Monsieur Borodin had secured military backing by winning over the commander of the Kuomintang Army at Hankow, General Tang Sheng-chih;¹ and before the end of March Chiang's position had become so insecure, even at Nanchang, that on the 26th of the month, only five days after Shanghai (outside the limits of the two foreign settlements) had passed into the Nationalists' hands, he withdrew to that city, almost in the guise of a refugee. On the 17th April² he was formally deposed from his command by the Kuomintang Government at Hankow.

When Chiang arrived at Shanghai he found that those quarters of the city which were under Chinese administration³ had already passed under Communist control since their evacuation on the 22nd of the month by the troops of Chang Tsung-ch'ang; and he took steps forthwith—with the active support of the local Chinese merchants and with the benevolent neutrality of the foreign authorities in the treaty port⁴—to wrest these important positions from the Com-

¹ Tang Sheng-chih was the semi-independent Tsuchün of Hunan in support of and in alliance with whom the Northern Military Expedition had been launched from Canton by General Chiang Kai-shek in the spring of 1926 (see the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 297–8). For Tang's part in the Honan campaign of May 1927, in which he commanded the Hankow Kuomintang Army, see Section (i), p. 325 above. See further p. 329 above for the elimination of Tang as a result of the conference at Hsuehchowfu, in June 1927, between Chiang and Feng.

² The date is given by Mr. Wang Ching-wei in his speech published in the *Man Kwok Yat Po* of Canton, 9th November, 1927.

³ For the topography of Shanghai see the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 363–4. See further the map reproduced from the *Survey for 1926* at the end of the present volume.

⁴ The British Defence Force and the other foreign military and naval contingents which had been landed at Shanghai held aloof from the fighting which followed, and the police of the International Settlement appear to have maintained an attitude of reserve. On the other hand, the police of the French Settlement were reported to have co-operated with Chiang Kai-shek's forces in suppressing the Communists in their area (*The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 1362). At this time Chiang's relations with the Foreign Powers were not easy. The Powers were inclined to hold him responsible for the outrages of the 24th March at Nanking and for other misdemeanours against foreigners which had actually been instigated by his opponents in the Kuomintang—perhaps with the deliberate intention of discrediting him in foreign eyes. At

munists' hands.¹ On the 2nd April he broke up by force, and not without bloodshed, a Communist military organization in Chapei.² On the 7th General Pai Chung-hsi, the local commander of the Kuomintang forces in Shanghai, who was at this time supporting General Chiang Kai-shek, raided and closed the headquarters of the Communist Political Bureau in Chapei and imposed a censorship upon mails and telegrams from Hankow, with a view to checking propaganda.³ Finally, on the 12th April, a general attack on the Communists was delivered by Chiang's supporters in all quarters of Shanghai outside the two foreign settlements, particularly in Chapei and Nantao. The Communists resisted desperately behind barricades and even delivered counter-attacks, and the fighting continued for three days with heavy casualties; but by the 14th April the anti-Communist forces had prevailed, and on that date, by proclamation of General Pai Chung-hsi, the General Labour Union was dissolved.⁴ Meanwhile, Chiang published a 'manifesto to the people' and a 'declaration to members of the Kuomintang'⁵ and summoned a Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang to meet at Nanking on the 15th April. At this meeting there was inaugurated a new Kuomintang Government, in opposition to the Government at Hankow, with Nanking for the provisional capital.⁶ The Hankow Government immediately retorted by expelling Chiang and his principal associates

the same time it was difficult for Chiang to accept the foreign point of view regarding these misdemeanours without giving his opponents in the Kuomintang an opportunity to denounce him as a 'running dog' of the foreigners who was betraying the Chinese national cause; and accordingly he was placed in the paradoxical position of having to run the risk of alienating the foreigners, at a time when he was much in need of their support, in defence of the actions of his opponents who were attempting his overthrow.

¹ For the attempts of the 'Reds' to make themselves masters of Shanghai in February and March, 1927, see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 376, and the present volume Section (iii) (b) of this part below.

² *The Times*, 4th April, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 9th April, 1927. For the precautionary measure taken on the same day against the Soviet Consulate at Shanghai by the authorities of the International Settlement see p. 345 below.

⁴ For the events of the 12th-14th April, 1927, at Shanghai see *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 13th April, 1927; *The Times*, 14th and 18th April, 1927.

⁵ Texts in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1365-7.

⁶ Mr. C. C. Wu was immediately designated Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new Nanking Government, but it was arranged that he should not take up his post until Mr. Eugene Chen, the Minister in office at Hankow, had completed his current negotiations with Great Britain and other foreign Powers (*The Times*, 25th April, 1927). Mr. Wu officially assumed office at Nanking during the second week in May (*ibid.*, 14th May, 1927).

from the ranks of the Kuomintang Party,¹ appointing Feng Yü-hsiang commander-in-chief of all the Kuomintang Armies, and ordering Tang Sheng-chih, the local commander at Hankow, to march on Nanking.² The Nanking Government, on its part, started a 'party purification movement' for hunting down Communists in its domain³—a movement which degenerated into an 'Anti-Red Terrorism' and even into a pretext for kidnapping or blackmailing men of substance against whom no reasonable suspicion of Communist sympathies could lie. To this the Hankow Government retorted on the 28th April, 1927, by promulgating Provisional Regulations of a 'Commission for the Maintenance of Order and Peace in Wuhan' which was to try counter-revolutionaries.⁴

The emergence of two rival Kuomintang Governments in a virtual state of war with one another advertised the split in the party to the world at large. Nanking now started to compete with Hankow for the allegiance of the territories which by that date had been brought into the Nationalist fold; and the new Government obtained a triumph in securing the adherence of the provinces along the southern littoral—including the cradle of the Kuomintang, Canton, where a struggle between the right wing of the party and the Communists had been taking place at the same time and with the same result as at Shanghai.⁵ Thus the left wing, after taking the offensive against the right wing in March, found the tables turned in April; for the establishment of a right wing Government, controlling the whole coast-line from the estuary of the Yangtse to the borders of French Indo-China, not only cut off the Hankow Government from its maritime communications with the U.S.S.R. but deprived it of the lucrative sources of public revenue in Shanghai and Canton.⁶ Hemmed in between Chiang's forces on one side and the advancing armies of the Northern Coalition on the other, the Hankow Government

¹ Text of the articles of expulsion in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1367-70.

² *The Times*, 20th April, 1927.

³ Anti-Communist raids were carried out not only at Shanghai but at Soochow, Wusieh, Hangchow, Ningpo, Swatow and Canton (statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 26th April, 1927).

⁴ Text of these regulations in *The United States Daily*, 17th June, 1927.

⁵ The course of events at Canton from the transference of the Kuomintang Government to Hankow at the end of the year 1926 down to the suppression of the Communist outbreak in December 1927 is recorded on pp. 358-62 below.

⁶ Statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 26th April, 1927. On the other hand the Hankow Government had the advantage of possessing the military arsenal at Hanyang, one of the component cities of Wuhan (Greater Hankow) (see *The Times*, 13th July, 1927).

suddenly found its authority restricted to the two provinces of Hupeh and Hunan, with Kiangsi as a kind of no-man's-land between its own and its Nanking rival's domain.

In May, when the armies of Chang Tso-lin, Yang Sen and Chiang Kai-shek were advancing upon Hankow simultaneously from three directions,¹ it seemed as though the days of the Hankow Government were numbered; and the departure of the British representative from Hankow, under instructions,² on the 17th May, indicated that the British Government at that moment supposed the Hankow Government to be in the throes of dissolution. At the end of May the Hankow Government obtained a respite through the defeat and withdrawal of the Fengtien army in Honan, which enabled General Tang Sheng-chih to turn his arms against his other assailants, including the supporters of Nanking.³ At the same time this respite had only been secured thanks to the intervention of Feng Yü-hsiang; and on the 21st June Feng, immediately after his conference with representatives of the Hankow Government at Chengchow on the 6th⁴ and with Chiang at Hsuehowfu during the third week of the month,⁵ sent a telegram to the Hankow Government demanding that the social and agrarian revolution which was being carried through in Hunan should cease and that the Communist members of the Government and their Russian advisers should be expelled.⁶ A joint manifesto was also reported to have been issued by Feng and Chiang asking for the support of the Chinese people for a further military campaign against the Northern 'war-lords', for adherence to the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and for the elimination of the Communists.⁷ Feng's telegram, which was presumably dispatched in collusion with those representatives of the Hankow Government with whom he had been conferring a fortnight earlier, foreshadowed a drastic change of policy at Hankow; and, in fact, in June 1927 the Hankow Government was overtaken by an unexpected, sudden and violent revulsion against the ascendancy of the Chinese Communist Party and the Russian Mission.

In order to understand the origins of this revulsion it is necessary to take account of certain developments of policy, during the preceding months, at Peking and at Moscow.

¹ See Section (i), above.

² See Section (iii) (d), pp. 396-7 below.

³ See Section (i), p. 326 above.

⁴ See Section (i), p. 329, above, and the present Section, p. 354 below.

⁵ See Section (i), p. 329 above.

⁶ Summary of this telegram in *The Manchester Guardian*, 25th June, 1927. Cf. *The Times*, 24th June, 1927.

⁷ *The Manchester Guardian*, loc. cit.; *The Times*, 1st July, 1927.

During the first part of the year 1927 the position of the Russian Communists in China was assailed by the Northern Coalition more effectively than it was by any faction in the Kuomintang.¹

On the 28th February, 1927, the Soviet Russian merchant-steamer *Pamiat Lenina*, on its way up the Yangtse en route from Vladivostock to Hankow, was detained and searched by representatives of the Shantung 'war lord', Chang Tsung-ch'ang. Next day the search was repeated by certain 'White' Russian mercenaries in Chang's service, and these claimed to have discovered incriminating documents in the diplomatic mail which the ship was carrying.² Thereupon the ship was commandeered and the crew and passengers—who included three diplomatic couriers of the Soviet Government and also Madame Borodin—were sent under arrest to Tsinanfu. The Soviet Embassy at Peking made energetic protests to the Wai-chiao Pu (the Foreign Ministry of the shadowy Central Government of the Chinese Republic)³ to which the Ankuochün (the Northern Military Coalition) retorted, in a statement issued on the 17th March from their general head-quarters at Peking, by submitting that, so far from the Soviet Government having any ground for complaint, the persons arrested on board the *Pamiat Lenina* had been caught in the act of violating the provision in the Sino-Russian Agreement of the 31st May, 1924,⁴ that neither party should engage in propaganda incompatible with the welfare of the other party.⁵ Early in May the Captain of the *Pamiat Lenina* and the four passengers were conveyed to Peking,⁶ and here, on the 9th, they were handed over by the military to the local judicial authorities,⁷ who the next day committed them for trial on a charge of seditious propaganda.⁸ On the 12th July, however, they were released from custody by a judge of the Peking High Court on the ground that the charges against them were not grave enough to exclude them from the benefits of an amnesty which had been declared by Chang Tso-lin.⁹ It was rumoured

¹ See *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 789–824, for the seizure of the SS. *Pamiat Lenina* on the 28th February, 1927, and for the police raid on premises adjoining the Soviet Embassy in the Legation Quarter at Peking on the 6th April.

² For a statement on the subject by Monsieur Merkulov, a 'White' Russian adviser to Chang Tsung-ch'ang, see *The Times*, 11th March, 1927.

³ Four successive notes were presented by the Soviet Embassy on the 5th, 10th, 11th and 17th March, 1927. (Texts of the notes of the 5th and 17th March in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 789–91.) Another note appears to have followed at the beginning of May (*The Times*, 5th May, 1927).

⁴ For this agreement see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 334–7.

⁵ Text of this note in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 791–2.

⁶ *The Times*, 4th May, 1927.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 11th May, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 10th May, 1927.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 15th July, 1927.

that the judge had taken a bribe for setting the prisoners at liberty unconditionally instead of taking bail. At any rate, he promptly disappeared, the Chief Justice of the High Court resigned, and orders were issued for the re-arrest of the accused.¹ These meanwhile had taken refuge in the Soviet Russian Embassy in the Legation Quarter, and an application from the Peking Government for their extradition was refused by the Diplomatic Body.² Madame Borodin was reported to have arrived at Moscow by the beginning of November.³ Meanwhile, in October, forty-seven officers and members of the crew of the *Pamiat Lenina* were reported⁴ to be still in prison at Tsinanfu, without any charges having yet been preferred against them or their case having ever come up for a hearing before any court.

The second assault on the position of the Russian Communists in China which the Northern Military Coalition delivered in the year 1927 was more formidable, as may be seen from the following statement in regard to it which was made in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 11th April, 1927, by Sir Austen Chamberlain:⁵

‘The chief of the Metropolitan Police called on the Senior Minister on the 6th April, with a letter in duplicate calling attention to the subversive activities of Russians in the Legation Quarter, and requesting authority to search certain specified Russian property, namely the Dalbank, the Chinese Eastern Railway building not actually inside the Russian Legation itself, and the building belonging to the Russian Indemnity Commission. The original of this letter was duly countersigned by the Senior Minister, authorizing ingress for the Metropolitan Police, and handed back to the authorities. The Senior Minister had previously consulted the representatives of the other Protocol Powers, who decided that the hospitality of the Quarter must not be used against the local Government, and agreed that, provided the local authorities came furnished with the proper warrant, the Legation Quarter Police should be instructed under a specific order from the Senior Minister to allow them to search any suspected Russian private property specifically named in the warrant.

‘The search began at 11 a.m. and continued throughout the day. It was effected by the Metropolitan Police, some gendarmes and many

¹ *The Times*, 18th July, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 15th July, 1927.

³ *Le Temps*, 4th November, 1927.

⁴ *The China Year Book*, 1928, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See further *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 7th and 9th April, 1927, and *The United States Daily*, 8th April, 1927; also a circular telegram sent on the 6th April, 1927, by Chang Tso-lin to the commanders of the Ankuochün forces (text in *The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 792) and the foreword to *Soviet Plot in China*, *op. cit.*, *supra*.

plain clothes detectives. An attempt was made by the Russians to burn some documents but this was frustrated. The Senior Minister has informed His Majesty's Minister that among the captures was a list of names of four thousand agents in Peking ready to stir up trouble and commit acts of violence at a given moment. Other seizures comprised one machine-gun, thirty rifles and a quantity of ammunition, together with a number of flags with inflammatory slogans which were to be used for demonstrations.

'Official seals were captured of the "Anti-British Committee," whose special function appears to be agitation against Great Britain. The seals of similar committees for agitation against Japan and France were also seized. Twenty-two Russians were arrested, and between forty and fifty Chinese, for whom the authorities had long been searching, including the recognized leader of the Communist Party of North China, who had taken refuge with the Russians.

'The Russian Embassy itself, which is shut off by a high wall, was strictly respected, though the raiding party exceeded their authority by overflowing into the barracks of the Imperial Russian Legation Guard, which are separated from the Embassy proper and lie west of the wall. Though it can be argued that the barracks have no claim to diplomatic immunity, seeing that Russia has no longer any right to the guard, the Protocol Powers, through the Senior Minister, thought it well to address a protest to the Government against the action of the police in thus exceeding the specific authority given by the Senior Minister.

'The following *communiqué* was issued on the night of the 6th April by the Chinese Government:

The Chinese Government, having been informed of the presence in the Dalbank and the office of the Chinese Eastern Railway of arms and ammunition, and knowing that these places have been centres of Communist agitators, decided to conduct a search. The search has been made on the basis that these places are not covered by diplomatic immunities and that the Soviet Government has renounced the privileges provided for in the Protocol of 1901, as well as the rights of extraterritoriality. Therefore the Embassy itself, only, has the privilege of inviolability.

The search was effected at 11.0 this morning by Chinese police after the Chinese authorities, on the presentation of a regular warrant from the judicial authorities, had received from the competent authorities of the Legation Quarter the necessary authorization for the execution of the warrant.

'I have since received information that, after taking cognizance of the letter from the Metropolitan Police, at a meeting of the Protocol

Powers on the 9th instant, it was agreed that the Senior Minister should at once reply in a letter which, after acknowledging the receipt, proceeds as follows:

I am desired by my colleagues to inform you that they expect all persons who were arrested by the Chinese police in the course of that search will receive a fair trial before the competent judicial authority. I shall be happy to receive an assurance from you to that effect.'

This stroke was promptly followed up elsewhere. At Tientsin, for example, on the 7th April, the Chinese Police raided the Soviet Bank, the Dalbank, the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway and other premises in the French Concession, with the sanction of the French Consul.¹ On the evening of the same day the municipal police of the International Settlement at Shanghai, assisted by a 'White' Russian unit of the Shanghai Volunteers, drew a cordon round the Soviet Consulate there and incidentally refused entrance to the local Kuomintang Commissioner for Foreign Affairs except on the condition—which he declined—that he should submit to be searched.²

Meanwhile at Peking on the 6th April, the date of the Peking raid, the Wai-chiao Pu addressed a note to the Soviet *chargé d'affaires* to complain of alleged abuse of privilege and the *chargé d'affaires* a note to the Wai-chiao Pu to protest against alleged violation of diplomatic rights.³ Thereafter, in a note of the 9th April to the Chinese *chargé d'affaires* at Moscow,⁴ the Soviet Government conveyed to the Wai-chiao Pu the following demands: first, that the Chinese military detachment and police should be removed without delay from the houses of the Soviet military *attaché*, the collaborators of the Soviet Embassy, and the Soviet commercial representatives; second, that all officials of the Soviet Embassy and of the Soviet economic institutions who had been arrested should be immediately set free; third, that all documents taken from the house of the military *attaché* should be immediately returned; and, fourth, that property (e.g. money, objects, furniture, books) which had been taken away by the police and by the military authorities of the Ankuochün should be immediately restored to their owners. The Wai-chiao Pu was notified that, pending the satisfaction of these demands, the Soviet Government would recall from Peking their *chargé d'affaires* together with the whole staff of the Embassy, leaving only the personnel for performing consular functions. The demands were

¹ *The Times*, 8th April, 1927.

² *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

³ Texts of both notes in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 793-4.

⁴ Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 794-7.

rejected by the Wai-chiao Pu on the 16th April;¹ and on the 26th the Soviet Government announced that it intended to abide by its decision.² Therewith, diplomatic relations ceased between Moscow and Peking.

Towards the end of April 1927, a special military court was constituted at Peking to try the persons who had been arrested on the 6th;³ and on the 28th twenty of the Chinese prisoners, including the leader of the Communist group in Peking, Li Ta-chao, were put to death by strangulation—apparently with great brutality.⁴ Next day, four of the surviving Chinese prisoners (one of them a woman) were sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment, and six to two years', while the wife and two daughters of Li Ta-chao, as well as some of the others, were released.⁵ The preliminary trial of fifteen of the Russian prisoners was opened on the 12th July, and on the 15th September these were all found guilty of having agitated to produce an internal disturbance in China.⁶ The case was then sent up to a higher court.⁷

Meanwhile, the Chinese Metropolitan Police Head-quarters published, in five instalments, photographic reproductions of the documents seized on the 6th April, with English translations of the Russian texts.⁸ At Moscow, these photographs and texts were denounced as forgeries;⁹ but this contention was not borne out either by internal evidence or by the circumstances in which the documents were stated to have been procured. Outside the boundaries of the U.S.S.R., the documents were widely accepted as genuine, not only in Europe and America but in China itself; and their contents exercised a considerable effect upon Chinese public opinion.

The nature and significance of the evidence obtained on the 6th April, 1927, were appraised as follows by the Chinese Metropolitan Police themselves in the foreword to their publication:

During the systematic and thorough search of the premises in question the following articles were found:

(a) A mass of documents, which throw an interesting light on the functions of the Soviet Embassy and particularly on the nature of the work of the military *attaché*.

¹ Text of cablegram of the 16th April, 1927, from the Wai-chiao Pu to the Chinese *chargé d'affaires* at Moscow in *op. cit.*, p. 797.

² Text of note in *op. cit.*, pp. 798–9.

³ *The Times*, 27th April, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 29th and 30th April, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 30th April, 1927.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 16th September, 1927.

⁷ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

⁸ The instalments of this publication were printed under the title of *Soviet Plot in China* (Peking, 1927).

⁹ *The Times*, 30th April and 7th May, 1927.

(b) A vast amount of Communistic propaganda material in the form of pamphlets; propaganda posters; pass-books for members of the Communistic Party; red silk identification badges with the Soviet sickle and star stamped upon them; thousands of small paper flags with communistic inscriptions, as used in communistic parades and demonstrations.

(c) An assortment of rifles and pistols of various makes; one Thompson automatic sub-machine gun; one Bergman automatic rifle; a great quantity of small arms and ammunition.

(d) A list of over 4,000 members of the Communist Party in the Peking area; an elaborate diagram showing the numbers of active members of the Communist Party in various countries. . . .

The raid established the fact that the compound of the former Imperial Russian Legation Guard contained the head-quarters of the Communists in which most elaborate and detailed plans and preparations had been made for the overthrow of the Government in Peking and for the establishment of a communistic régime.

The captured documents proved conclusively:

(1) That the Soviet Embassy had a most extensive political and military secret service organization in China, which conducted a thorough espionage everywhere, even in the foreign legations in Peking.

(2) That the so-called Soviet advisers and military instructors in the South are members of the various councils of the Kuomintang and the Communists; that they participate actively in the affairs of the afore-said parties and that they were paid by the Soviet Government through the military *attaché* in Peking.

(3) That the Soviet Government, with its Embassy in Peking acting as an intermediate agency, was furnishing arms, munitions and other war supplies to the enemies of the Government to which its Embassy was accredited.

The effect of these disclosures was painful to Chinese public opinion of all parties. At a time when all politically conscious Chinese were almost hyper-sensitive to foreign interference in Chinese affairs, the Russian Communists were exposed as having deliberately set themselves to exploit China for their own purposes by underhand methods which were both more offensive to Chinese self-respect and more dangerous to Chinese independence than any of those overt acts by which the Treaty Powers were accustomed to assert their established rights. Moreover, the documents contained incidental comments upon the social and economic and political backwardness of the Chinese people and upon certain weaknesses in the Chinese national character which were all the more wounding because they so evidently expressed the frank opinion of Russian observers writing to one another confidentially without ever expecting that their remarks would be read one day by the Chinese themselves.¹ The disclosures

¹ See, for example, Document No. 6 in Instalment No. 2.

were particularly painful for those bourgeois members of the Kuomintang who had been in favour of co-operating with the Communists; for they seemed to prove conclusively that the Russian Mission, under orders from Moscow, was only collaborating with the bourgeois left wing in order to practise the well-known Communist technique of gradual infiltration¹ and so to bring the machinery of the Kuomintang under the control of those members who belonged, virtually or avowedly, to the Chinese Communist Party, with the ultimate object of forestalling the development of a 'capitalistic' 'bourgeois' régime in China by deflecting the whole revolutionary movement on to communistic lines. According to a resolution carried at the Seventh (Extended) Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Third (Communist) International, which opened at the end of November 1926,

The Communist Party of China must strive to have the Kuomintang developed into a real People's Party, into a solid revolutionary block of the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty town bourgeoisie and other oppressed elements which have entered into a decisive struggle against imperialism and its agents. To this end the Communist Party must act as follows:

(1) systematically and persistently struggle against the right wing of the Kuomintang and the ideology of Ta Tsi-tao² and their endeavour to change the Kuomintang into a bourgeois party;

(2) give a proper form to the left wing and enter into close collaboration with it, but without trying to substitute in it the members of the Communist Party in the work of leadership;

(3) persistently criticize the centre which vacillates between the right and left wings, between the further development of the revolution and an agreement with imperialism.³

The effect on Chinese opinion of these disclosures regarding the policy of the Russian Communists in China militated in favour of General Chiang Kai-shek and his associates in their trial of strength with Monsieur Borodin for the domination of the Kuomintang. Nevertheless, the right wing could not hope to prevail so long as the left wing of the bourgeois group and the Russian Mission both genuinely desired to continue their provisional co-operation and both

¹ 'The opinion that the Communist Party must give up the Kuomintang is erroneous. The whole process of the development of the Chinese Revolution, its character and its prospects demand that the Communists should remain in the Kuomintang and continue their activity in it. In order to increase their activity in the ranks of the Kuomintang with the aim to promote the further developments of the revolutionary movement, the Communists must enter into the Canton Government.' (Document No. 6, V, 15.)

² Tai Chi-t'ao, also known as Tai Ch'uan-hsien.—A. J. T.

³ Quoted from *The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 813.

abode loyally by the agreements for regulating the relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party which had been made in May 1926 and March 1927.¹ The attitude of the left wing leaders immediately after the open breach between Chiang and the supporters of Monsieur Borodin in March 1927 is illustrated by the conduct of Mr. Wang Ching-wei, who arrived at Shanghai from abroad at the beginning of April 1927² and discussed the situation with Chiang for five days.³ According to his own account, Wang did not contest that Chiang's avowed objectives—the expulsion of Monsieur Borodin and the elimination of the Communists from the Kuomintang—were ultimately desirable; but he was in favour of constitutional and cautious tactics, and was so much opposed to Chiang's insistence upon immediate drastic action⁴ that he repaired, against Chiang's wishes, to Hankow and ranged himself with the Hankow Government when, on the 18th April, Chiang inaugurated his rival Government at Nanking.⁵ Wang afterwards defended his conduct on the ground that it was imperative to maintain co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communists at Hankow so long as the military campaign in Honan between the Hankow Kuomintang forces and the Fengtien forces was in progress;⁶ and it would appear that, until after the withdrawal of the Fengtien Army to the north bank of the Yellow River at the end of May, the policy of co-operation was still being carried out in good faith not only by the left wing of the Kuomintang at Hankow but by the Russian Mission acting under instructions from Moscow. At any rate, this would be the natural inference from a document which was published by the Chinese Metropolitan Police Headquarters at Peking as one of the papers seized on the 6th April, 1927, in their raid upon premises adjoining the Soviet Embassy.⁷ In this document,⁸ which purported to contain instructions from the Soviet Government to its military *attaché* at Peking in pursuance of a resolu-

¹ See pp. 334–5 and 337 above.

² Wang had not returned from exile when recalled by the Kuomintang Extraordinary Congress in October 1926 (see p. 335 above).

³ See Mr. Wang Ching-wei's speech published in the *Man Kwok Yat Po* of Canton, 9th November, 1927; see also *The Times*, 4th April, 1927, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 6th April, 1927.

⁴ Wang expressed, in retrospect (*op. cit.*), the opinion that at this juncture he had been wrong and Chiang right in his policy.

⁵ See p. 339 above. ⁶ For this campaign see section (i) above.

⁷ For this raid and its consequences see pp. 343 *seqq.* above.

⁸ Document No. 3 in *Soviet Plot in Russia* (*op. cit. supra*), Instalment No. 1. The documents in this publication are given in photographic reproductions of the Russian originals with English translations attached. There seems to be no reason to doubt their authenticity.

tion passed by the (extended) Plenary Session of the Third (Communist) International in November 1926,¹ it was laid down that

every attention must be paid at present to lend to the revolutionary movement in China an EXCLUSIVELY [*sic*] national character. To this end it is necessary to carry on agitation in favour of the Kuomintang as of the party of the national independence of China. . . . Be careful not to carry out at present the communistic program. This might strengthen Chang Tso-lin's position and augment the split in the Kuomintang. We have categorically ordered Borodin to abstain for the present from too strong pressure on the capitalistic elements, having in mind the aim to keep in the Kuomintang all classes of the population, including the bourgeoisie, until the fall of Chang Tso-lin.

The breach between the Russian Mission and the left wing of the Kuomintang—which occurred in June 1927 and which precipitated the fall of Russian Communist influence in China—appears to have been due to the fact that Monsieur Borodin had by then received fresh instructions which were directly at variance with those quoted just above. For this conflict of instructions, which had such important consequences, there are two possible alternative explanations. Either there was a change of policy at Moscow some time between November 1926 and June 1927; or else two mutually irreconcilable policies in regard to China were being pursued by the two different masters at Moscow whom Monsieur Borodin was required to serve, namely, the Soviet Government and the Third (Communist) International.

If there was a change of policy at Moscow, the motives for this can only be conjectured. Possibly the authorities at Moscow had in mind the history of their earlier relations with the Turkish Nationalists,² who, after accepting Russian assistance in the life-and-death struggle of the Anatolian War, had no sooner won their unexpected and sensational victory over the Greeks in the summer of 1922 than they 'astonished the Russian Government by their ingratitude' during the Peace Conference of Lausanne.³ The Turkish Nationalists and

¹ For a discussion of the Chinese situation during the session of the Executive Committee of the Third (Communist) International in November 1926, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th February, 1927. For the alleged text of the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Third International, on which these alleged instructions from the Soviet Government were based, see p. 348 above.

² This was afterwards suggested by General Chiang Kai-shek in the 'Manifesto to the Chinese People' which he published in April 1927 (see p. 339 above).

³ For the divergence between Turkish and Russian policy at Lausanne over the question of the Black Sea Straits, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 370.

'My master will astonish yours by his ingratitude' was the prophecy of an

the Western Powers, the authorities at Moscow may have reminded themselves, had both found their interest in coming to an understanding with one another at Russia's expense as soon as the overthrow of the Greeks—whom the Western Powers had used as cats-paws in an attempt to destroy the Turkish Nationalist Movement without spending their own blood and treasure—had liberated the Turkish Nationalists from the fear of destruction and had compelled the Western Powers to face the fact that the Turkish Nationalists could not any longer be either suppressed or ignored. In the Far East, Moscow may have reasoned, the Western Powers had now repeated the tactics which they had previously employed in the Near East, and once again without success. Their 'running dogs', Wu P'ei-fu and Sun Ch'uan-fang, had just been routed by the Chinese Nationalists, with Russian Communist support, as signally as, four years earlier, the Turkish Nationalists, with the same support, had routed the Greeks; and by analogy it was probable that the Chinese—consciously or unconsciously taking a leaf out of their Turkish *confrères'* book—would forthwith seek to relieve themselves of their formidable Russian Communist mentors¹ by coming to an agreement quickly with the Bourgeois Governments of the West while these Governments were in a chastened mood. It was certainly evident that General Chiang Kai-shek intended to take the first opportunity to eliminate Monsieur Borodin; and it was also evident that the British Government was making energetic and sustained efforts to reach a good understanding with the moderate element in the Kuomintang, even at a considerable sacrifice of existing treaty rights. In these circumstances the authorities at Moscow may have come to the conclusion that, if they were to prevent history from repeating itself to Russia's disadvantage, they must take the offensive and definitely capture or supplant the Kuomintang before the British policy of conciliation, which had been put into action in

Austrian diplomatist, when, on the eve of the Crimean War, he was asked whether Francis Joseph would not support Nicholas against the Western Powers in return for the service which Nicholas had done him in assisting him to crush the Hungarian insurrection in 1849.

¹ This suspicion, if it was entertained at the time by Moscow, was borne out, after the event, by the following passage in Mr. Wang Ching-wei's speech, cited above, in which he gave his version of the overthrow of the Communists at Hankow and the expulsion of Monsieur Borodin and his compatriots which actually occurred (see pp. 354-5 below) in June 1927:—'The policy of allying ourselves with Russia and admitting the Communists into our Kuomintang is one merely for meeting the period and the circumstances, and cannot be maintained perpetually like the Three Aspects of Democracy. When the period and circumstances have changed, this policy will have to be changed with them.'

Mr. Lampson's conversations at Hankow with Mr. Chen and in 'the December Memorandum',¹ had time to produce its moral effect.

Again, it is possible that a change of policy was forced upon Moscow by the Chinese Communists; for these could claim that the recent victories of the Kuomintang over Wu and Sun had been due to their propaganda among the troops and the civilian population behind the lines at least as much as to the military operations in the field. They may have calculated that a weapon which had just proved so effective when employed against the common enemy could now be turned with equal effect against their bourgeois allies in the bosom of the Kuomintang; and they may have chafed at the prospect that successes which they regarded as their own handiwork should accrue to the advantage of their rivals.

Alternatively, it is possible that the fresh instructions which had reached Monsieur Borodin by the beginning of June 1927 are to be accounted for, not by any change of policy at Moscow, nor again by any change in the situation in China itself, but by the perpetual 'tug-of-war' between Monsieur Borodin's two masters, the Third (Communist) International and the Soviet Government. It seems evident that Monsieur Borodin was responsible, not only to the Executive Committee of the Third (Communist) International, but to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;² and the instructions cited above³ indicate that the policy of co-operation with the left wing of the Kuomintang was the policy of the Soviet Government, which had seized upon and emphasized those passages in the resolution of the Seventh (Extended) Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the International that could be interpreted as agreeing with its own views. It is possible that the new and conflicting instructions which Monsieur Borodin afterwards received from the Third (Communist) International were deliberately drafted in order to counteract the Soviet Government's policy; and this conjecture certainly does not seem improbable in the light of other instances in which the Third (Communist) International undoubtedly

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, sections 8 (xii) (c) and (e).

² The Soviet Government seems to have been concerned to prevent Monsieur Borodin's official connexion with them from becoming a matter of public knowledge and to have insisted that he was a private citizen in the service of a foreign Government (the Kuomintang Government) for whose actions the Soviet Government was not responsible. (See three documents, dated the 12th November, 1926, and the 1st and 4th February, 1927, respectively, which were published by the British Foreign Office as Part II of the Parliamentary Paper *Cmd. 2874* of 1927.)

³ See p. 350 above.

interfered—and that with equally disastrous effect—in the Soviet Government's relations with foreign countries.¹

Whatever the explanation of Monsieur Borodin's new instructions may have been, the actual course of events at Hankow in June 1927 seems to have been as follows.²

On the 1st June,³ a Hindu member of the Central Executive Committee of the Third (Communist) International named Roy, who was visiting Hankow, mentioned to some of the members of the Government—particularly Mr. Sun Fo (the son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen) and Mr. Wang Ching-wei—that new instructions had been sent by the authorities of the International to him and to Monsieur Borodin. This information disturbed the Chinese leaders, because they had received no intimation of it from Monsieur Borodin himself, although there was a standing agreement between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party to the effect that all instructions and plans to be given out to the Communist elements in the Kuomintang by either the Chinese Communist Party or the Third International were to be submitted first to the joint committee of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang for approval. Mr. Sun and Mr. Wang prevailed upon Mr. Roy—who appears to have disliked Monsieur Borodin and disapproved of the policy of fomenting an agrarian revolution in China—to show them his copy of the new instructions without Monsieur Borodin's knowledge; and the document which thus came into their hands confirmed their worst fears. It directed that land in Hunan and Hupeh was to be confiscated by the peasants, without any reference to the Hankow Government, through the agency of the Chinese Communist Party; that the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang was to be reconstructed and at least one peasant (i.e. Communist) to be included in it, and the party organization of the Kuomintang likewise to be reconstructed on more radical lines which would ensure that, in due course, the Kuomintang as an organization should disappear altogether and leave the Chinese Communist Party alone in the field; that a court was to be created for trying counter-revolutionary generals and punishing them for their

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, especially pp. 173-5.

² The following account is based on the narrative of Mr. G. E. Sokolsky in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1371-3, and on Mr. Wang Ching-wei's speech which was published in the *Man Kwok Yat Po* of Canton on the 9th November, 1927. Each of these accounts gives some information which is not given in the other; but where both accounts cover the same ground they agree so closely as to create a presumption that Mr. Sokolsky's principal source was either Mr. Wang Ching-wei himself or somebody in Wang's entourage.

³ The exact date is given by Wang, *op. cit.*

opposition to the revolutionary activities of the Communist Party;¹ and that a Red Army was to be raised, to the number of 20,000 Communists and 50,000 workmen and peasants of Hunan and Hupeh.²

Mr. Wang Ching-wei and Mr. Sun Fo at once took action. They first ascertained that the command of the prospective Red Army had been offered secretly both to Ch'eng Ch'ien and to Tang Sheng-chih and had been declined by both. They also discovered who were the civilians who were to be used in order to secure the proposed change of leadership in the Kuomintang. They then paid a visit to General Feng Yü-hsiang at Chengchow on the 6th June, returning to Hankow on the 13th.³ Thereafter, on the 13th July, at a meeting held in the house of Mr. Wang Ching-wei at Hankow, it was resolved to place the Chinese Communist Party under a ban; and on the 15th,⁴ at a meeting held in the Central Bank at Hankow, it was further decided that Monsieur Borodin and the other members of the Russian

¹ This may have been directed, not only against General Chiang Kai-shek and his lieutenants, but against General Tang Sheng-chih, who had supported the Hankow Government out of opportunism and had never given any indication of having even moderate revolutionary convictions. Tang's relations with the General Labour Union of Hankow came to an open breach before the end of June 1927 (*The Times*, 1st July, 1927).

² In this account of the instructions, Sokolsky and Wang substantially agree (the only important difference being that, in Sokolsky's version, the instructions for ousting the left wing of the bourgeois group are more specific). These can hardly be the same instructions as those reported in a dispatch of the 2nd June, 1927, from the correspondent of *The Times* at Riga, published in *The Times* on the 3rd. This version likewise lays emphasis on the immediate importance of the agrarian revolution and outlines a policy of exploiting the Kuomintang for the eventual benefit of the Chinese Communist Party. On the other hand, according to *The Times*, 'the outstanding feature of the instructions, which is repeatedly emphasized, is the injunction that the Communist Party must not break with the Kuomintang, with which it must for the present co-operate at all costs in order to gain control'. This feature—which is conspicuous by its absence in Mr. Roy's version—was prominent in the earlier instructions sent to Monsieur Borodin by the Government of the U.S.S.R., as cited in Document No. 3 of the documents seized on the 6th April, 1927, and subsequently published by the Chinese Metropolitan Police. (See pp. 346–7 and 349 above). The probable explanation is that the report from the correspondent of *The Times* at Riga relates to these earlier instructions emanating from the Soviet Government, and has nothing to do with the later and conflicting instructions emanating from the Third International.

³ The exact dates are given on the authority of Mr. Wang Ching-wei, *op. cit.*; but Wang diplomatically passes over the fact, recorded by Mr. Sokolsky, that the person visited at Chengchow was Feng. This was evidently the interview (recorded in section (i) above, p. 329) which Feng had with representatives of the Hankow Government when he was on his way to confer with Chiang at Hsuechowfu; and it would follow that his reported summons of the 21st June to expel the Communists was made in collusion with the Hankow Kuomintang Government to which, according to the report, it was addressed.

⁴ The 15th according to Wang, the 14th according to Sokolsky.

Mission should be sent back to Russia; that all extremist activities should be suspended; that a delegate should be sent to Moscow to explain the true character and purpose of the Kuomintang; and that a (fourth) plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang should be convened to meet in Hankow on the 15th August.¹ On the 18th July, martial law was proclaimed at Hankow and there were wholesale arrests of Communists and labour organisers.²

Monsieur Borodin, who had been coming and going uneasily between Hankow and his *villeggiatura* while his position was being undermined, finally left Hankow on the 27th July;³ and since the Nanking Government would not give him a *laissez-passer* to travel by water down the Yangtse and so to Vladivostock, he was compelled to travel overland through Feng Yü-hsiang's domain and then across Mongolia. His arrival in Moscow was reported in October.⁴ General Galen,⁵ the principal military member of the Russian Mission, left Hankow on the 11th August,⁶ and took the same road.⁷

¹ These resolutions were taken in the presence of Mr. T. V. Soong, who had been Minister of Finance of the Kuomintang Government before the split between Hankow and Nanking. At the time of the split, Mr. Soong had repaired to Shanghai, whence he returned to Hankow on the 12th July (*The Times*, 16th July, 1927). For the version of these events which was given by the Soviet press agency 'Tas' see *ibid.*, 22nd July, 1927.

² According to a press report, more than 4,000 persons were put to death on this occasion (*The Manchester Guardian*, 19th July, 1927).

³ *The Times*, 29th July, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 7th October, 1927.

⁵ His name was variously given as Galen, Galentz and Gallin, but Galen seems to have been the form employed officially. In any case, the name seems to have been a pseudonym, and the bearer of it was reported to have been of German extraction and indeed to have been a descendant of Blücher (see *The Times*, 11th June, 1927).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 12th August, 1927.

⁷ The fall of the leaders of the Russian Mission entailed that of their subordinates and followers, and some of these fared badly in making their way out of China. For instance, at Shanghai, on the 18th July, a party of six Russians, eight Chinese, and one Korean, all alleged to be Communists, were arrested on board the Soviet SS. *Henli*, en voyage from Hankow to Vladivostock (*The Times*, 19th and 21st July, 1927). These were released on the 22nd July by order of General Chiang Kai-shek (*ibid.*, 23rd July, 1927). Again, at the end of September 1927, five Soviet citizens took ship at Swatow. Of these, one had apparently travelled under duress with Ho Lung's army from the Yangtse to the neighbourhood of Swatow, while another had been sent to Swatow by General Galen to assist in the repatriation of his comrades from China to Russia. The others were in commercial employment. After travelling by sea from Swatow to Amoy, these five Russians were allowed to proceed to Shanghai, only to be arrested by the French police upon landing in the French Settlement. From Shanghai they were conveyed as prisoners first to Nanking and eventually for trial to Soochow. There, on the 16th December, 1927, two were acquitted on a preliminary examination while the other three were held for trial. The Procurator, however, filed a protest against the discharge of the two acquitted, and in March 1928 all five were still under detention.

The Executive Committee of the Third International at Moscow retorted by proclaiming that the revolutionary role of the Hankow Government was finished and that it was now controlled by a counter-revolutionary force. At the same time, it reprimanded the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for incompetence; and it summoned all members of the Party, as individuals, to quit the Hankow Government immediately and cease co-operation with it in any form, and to demand severe punishment for all those implicated in the repression of the workmen and peasants. At the same time, Chinese Communists were instructed to retain their membership in the Kuomintang, despite all efforts to expel them, and to continue their labours among the workmen and peasants and their agitation in favour of an agrarian revolution. Finally they were to create a secret militant organization for carrying on underground those activities which they were now inhibited from carrying on in the open.¹ Within a few days, it was reported from Moscow that these instructions were being carried out.²

The departure of the Russian Mission from Hankow was soon followed by that of a number of Chinese leaders who had hitherto been prominent in the counsels of the Kuomintang, both at Hankow and at Nanking. The quarrel between non-Communist and Communist politicians at Hankow seems to have redounded to the advantage of General Tang Sheng-chih, who had ruled as an ordinary Tsuchün in Hunan before his entry into alliance with the Kuomintang, in the spring of 1926, against his old master Wu P'ei-fu. Tang now seized the opportunity to resume his familiar role with an extended domain. In consequence, Mr. Eugene Chen resigned the Hankow Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's widow (a sister of Mr. T. V. Soong), who had held a prominent position among the Kuomintang leaders at Hankow, announced her decision to retire from politics. Before the end of August, both Mrs. Sun Yat-sen and Mr. Eugene Chen had arrived at Vladivostock en route for Moscow.³

A more surprising consequence was the temporary eclipse of Chiang Kai-shek, who might have been expected to benefit more signally than Tang Sheng-chih by the final removal of his old rival Monsieur Borodin. The reasons for his discomfiture seem to have been partly military and partly political. Militarily, he found himself threatened at the same moment from the north by the Ankuo-chün, with whom he tried and failed to come to terms in July,⁴ and

¹ For these instructions see *The Times*, 15th July, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 21st July, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 29th August, 1927.

⁴ See p. 329 above.

from the west by various forces under the command of generals such as Ho Lung, Yeh Ting and Chang Fa-kwei, who had paid some form of allegiance to the Hankow Government so long as the Chinese Communist Party and the Russian Mission retained their influence in it, but who took things into their own hands after the anti-Communist revulsion at Hankow in July.¹ Politically, Chiang found that Mr. Wang Ching-wei and his friends at Hankow had not been led by their recent quarrel with Monsieur Borodin to forget and forgive their older quarrel with Chiang himself; and indeed the effect of the anti-Communist revulsion at Hankow was actually prejudicial to Chiang inasmuch as it opened up a prospect of healing the breach between Hankow and Nanking which had occurred in April; for the Hankow leaders who had just thrown out the Communists and the Russians were in a position to call, with some show of reason, for corresponding action from their fellow-members of the Kuomintang at Nanking; the victim whose sacrifice they demanded was Chiang Kai-shek; and Chiang's military position at the moment was too weak for him to contemplate resisting by force a solution which was convenient to almost all concerned except himself. Accordingly, Chiang resigned his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Nanking Kuomintang forces on the 12th August and retired successively to Shanghai, Ningpo (his native district in the Province of Chekiang) and Japan.²

The successive removal of Monsieur Borodin and General Chiang Kai-shek made negotiations for a reunion between Hankow and Nanking possible. Preliminary meetings which began on the 24th August, 1927, at Kiukiang between Mr. Wang Ching-wei, Mr. Sun Fo and others on the one side and Mr. C. C. Wu on the other,³ were followed up by conferences on a larger scale at Shanghai, beginning on the 9th September, and these were followed in turn by a formal joint conference of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang Party, which opened at Nanking on the 15th September⁴ and set up a special committee with dictatorial powers. On the 19th this special committee arrived at an agreement regarding the organization and personnel of a reunited Kuomintang Government, and the new Government was duly installed at Nanking

¹ For this military threat to Chiang Kai-shek from the west, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 22nd July, 1927; *The Times*, 3rd and 12th August, 1927; *The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 1379.

² *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th August, 1927. Texts of two public statements on his resignation by General Chiang Kai-shek himself in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1380-5, and 1397-8.

³ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd September, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 17th September, 1927.

on the 20th September.¹ The moral effect of this reunion was weakened by the facts that Dr. Sun Yat-sen's family held aloof; that General Tang Sheng-chih, who held the field at Hankow, had refrained from taking part in the proceedings; that General Feng Yü-hsiang had not shown his hand; and that the southern littoral was partly in Communist hands and was altogether indifferent to the political permutations and combinations that were going on in the Yangtse Valley. A punitive expedition which the new Kuomintang Government dispatched against Tang Sheng-chih on the 21st October² broke his power³ and occupied Hankow itself on the 16th November;⁴ but the Government derived little benefit from this success, since one of the two commanders of the expedition, Ch'eng Ch'ien (the general who had been responsible for the outrages against foreigners at Nanking on the 24th March, 1927),⁵ overthrew the local representatives of the new Nanking Government on the 5th December and proceeded to reign at Hankow in Tang Sheng-chih's stead. Meanwhile, about the middle of November, Chiang Kai-shek had returned from Japan to Shanghai;⁶ on the 1st December he married Miss Mei-ling Soong, a sister of Mr. T. V. Soong and of Mrs. Sun Yat-sen; and on the 10th December he was requested, by the Preparatory Conference for the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committees of the Kuomintang, to reassume the position of Commander-in-Chief.⁷

At this juncture the situation at Canton, which had been gradually growing more chaotic ever since the transference of the Kuomintang Government from that city to the Yangtse a year earlier, passed through a violent crisis, as a result of which the Kuomintang Government consummated the decline and fall of Russian Communist influence in China, which had set in with the temporary split between Hankow and Nanking and the subsequent expulsion of the Russian Mission, by breaking off consular relations with the Government of the U.S.S.R.

In order to understand the genesis of the Communist *coup* at

¹ For a summary of a manifesto published by the new Government at Nanking, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 20th October, 1927.

² *The Times*, 22nd October, 1927.

³ Tang fled from Hankow on the 13th November and his troops evacuated the city on the 15th (statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 7th December, 1927).

⁴ *The Times*, 24th October, 1927; 2nd and 14th November, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th, 18th and 23rd November, 1927.

⁵ See section (iii) (b), below.

⁶ *The Manchester Guardian*, 18th November, 1927.

⁷ *The Times*, 12th December, 1927.

Canton on the 11th December, 1927, it is necessary to review briefly the course of events along the southern littoral during the earlier part of the year.

On the 9th April, 1927, the local authorities at Canton signified their acceptance of telegraphic instructions to break off relations with the Hankow Government which they had received from Chiang Kai-shek and at the same time took precautionary measures against the possibility of Communist disturbances.¹ On the 16th April, 1927, the military commander at Canton, General Li Chai-sum, forestalled preparations for an 'anti-imperialist' demonstration by taking the offensive against the Communists, as Chiang Kai-shek had done at Shanghai a few days earlier.² At Canton, as at Shanghai, the Communists were not overpowered without bloodshed. It was reported that thirty were killed, seventy injured and two thousand arrested.³ Herewith, the ascendancy of the right wing of the Kuomintang was temporarily confirmed at Canton; further arrests were made in the city a week later;⁴ and meanwhile the efforts of the Communists to keep up a guerrilla warfare in the immediate hinterland of Canton were frustrated,⁵ though Li Chai-sum failed to dislodge them completely from the province of Kwangtung.⁶ Thus the southern littoral reacted in the same way as the lower Yangtse valley to Monsieur Borodin's 'forward policy' at Hankow. At the same time, the allegiance of the new régime at Canton to the new Kuomintang Government at Nanking was only nominal; and thereafter the southern littoral went its own way with little change in the local situation⁷ until after the downfall of the Russians and the Communists at Hankow in July. It has been mentioned already⁸ that one result of the anti-Communist revulsion at Hankow was to induce certain military commanders, who had hitherto paid allegiance to the Hankow Government, to take things into their own hands; and these commanders now began to range at large, in search of some new base of operations, like so many Ishmaels with their hand against every man's and every man's hand against theirs. Since their soldiers were mostly natives of Kwangtung and had been away from home since the launching of the Northern Military Expedition more than a year before, they naturally turned

¹ *The Times*, 11th April, 1927.

² See p. 339 above.

³ *The Times*, 18th and 22nd April, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 25th April, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 19th and 20th April, and 6th May, 1927.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 6th May, 13th and 25th July, 1927.

⁷ Li Chai-sum seems to have taken some further action against the local Communists and Labour Unions in June.

⁸ See p. 357 above.

their steps towards the southern littoral, whence they had originally come; and in September one of Li Chai-sum's former subordinates, General Chang Fa-kwei, who had marched down from Kiukiang (after contributing to the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek by making as though he would march on Nanking), appeared with his army at Canton and installed himself there side by side with his old chief as a far from welcome colleague.¹ In the last week of September, two other former subordinates of Li, Generals Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, who had likewise marched south through Kiangsi and made their way across the mountains, descended upon Swatow—a port at the eastern extremity of Kwangtung Province, where Li's authority was shadowy—and set up a Communist régime.² Li's forces dislodged them from Swatow at the beginning of October,³ but did not put them out of action. Meanwhile, Chang Fa-kwei set himself to undermine Li's authority in Canton;⁴ but before an overt breach between the two military commanders occurred, the local situation was modified by the arrival at Canton of Mr. Wang Ching-wei,⁵ who had suddenly retired from Shanghai on the 13th September in the middle of the negotiations for the reunion of the Kuomintang which were being carried on at the time in that place.⁶ Mr. Wang Ching-wei was accompanied by Mr. T. V. Soong; and on the 1st November, with General Li's support, they proclaimed that 'the time had arrived to establish at Canton a national Government based on civilian control'.⁷ The new régime at Canton pronounced itself in favour of tranquillity and moderation in both internal and external affairs;⁸ and on the 15th November Mr. Wang and General Li left Canton to attend the Preparatory Conference for the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committees of the Kuomintang at Shanghai.⁹ At Hong-kong, however, Mr. Wang gave his companion the slip and doubled back to Canton, whereupon Chang Fa-kwei attacked Li's forces on the 16th November and made himself master of Canton,¹⁰ but failed to drive Li's lieutenants out of the fringes of Kwangtung Province.¹¹ An edict dismissing Chang Fa-kwei was issued by the Nanking Government on the 3rd December.¹² Meanwhile, Chang carried on the

¹ *The Times*, 1st October, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 26th and 28th September, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 4th October, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 13th and 19th October, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1st November, 1927

⁶ *The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 1391.

⁷ *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd and 29th November, 1927; *The Times*, 3rd and 8th November, 1927.

⁸ *The Times*, 9th November, 1927.

⁹ See above.

¹⁰ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 18th November, 1927; *The Times*, 19th and 21st November, 1927.

¹¹ *The Times*, 1st and 5th December, 1927. ¹² *Ibid.*, 5th December, 1927.

policy of Li towards the local Communists; and at the end of November he ordered the Hongkong strikers who still remained in Canton to obey a previous order of the Government to evacuate certain premises which they had commandeered. The strikers replied by setting fire to the buildings and had to be ejected by force; and this clash between Chang Fa-kwei and the Communists stimulated the latter to take their turn in attempting a *coup*. At the moment, Chang's position in Canton was weak, since he had been compelled to send the bulk of his forces into the hinterland to resist the counter-offensive of Li's lieutenants. In the hinterland, the 'Red' forces whom Li had expelled from Canton in April but failed to destroy, were still in being, and they were now reinforced by the army of the Communist General Yeh Ting, which Li had expelled from Swatow, but likewise failed to destroy, in October.¹ On the 11th December, 1927, a small 'Red-Peasant Army', led by Yeh Ting, made its way into Canton City, raised the labour pickets and disbanded strikers, and set up a Communist régime, to the accompaniment of wholesale looting and arson and a reign of terror²—that is, so far as the Chinese 'bourgeoisie' was concerned, for no foreigners were molested in the course of the *émeute*, and on the 12th December the British Vice-Consul succeeded in evacuating eighty-one foreign refugees (eleven British subjects, fifteen Americans and fifty-five Germans), without casualties, on board a British warship.³ Large numbers of Chinese refugees—including Mr. Chu Chao-hsin, at that time Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Canton and formerly *chargé d'affaires* of the Peking Government in London and delegate in Geneva⁴—found their way to Hongkong. On the 14th December, the city of Canton was retaken by anti-Communist forces led by Li Fu-lin (or, in Cantonese, Li Fuk-lam),⁵ and the 'Red Terror' was avenged by a 'White Terror' which was equally ruthless and longer drawn out. The number of its victims was estimated to have been not less than two thousand.⁶

Locally, the political effect of this catastrophe was to destroy the prestige of Chang Fa-kwei—who was believed to have made overtures to the 'Red Peasant Army' with a view to co-operation against Li Chai-sum's forces, in the teeth of warnings from his own chief of

¹ See p. 360 above.

² For descriptions of this Communist régime at Canton, see *The Times*, 12th and 13th December, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 13th December, 1927.

³ Statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 15th December, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 13th December, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 14th and 15th December, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th December, 1927.

⁶ *The Times*, 17th December, 1927.

police.¹ Thereafter, that portion of Li's troops which had retired to the Kwangsi border (Li himself was a Kwangsi man) started to descend the valley of the West River² and on the 29th December this force reoccupied Canton.³ In anticipation of that event, Mr. Wang Ching-wei had sailed from Canton for Europe on the 21st December, General Chang Fa-kwei had repaired to General Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters, and General Li Fu-lin had gone out to make his peace with General Li Chai-sum at Hongkong.

Meanwhile the Communists and the 'Red Peasant Army' remained in control of many districts in the eastern part of Kwangtung, and here the 'Red Terror' continued. On the 22nd December, for example, they sacked a Roman Catholic mission and orphanage at Swabue—a town on the coast between Swatow and Canton—and took prisoner seven nuns (three Italians and four Chinese) and three priests (two Italians and one a native of Hongkong). The Hongkong priest was sentenced to death; but, on the news of this sentence reaching Hongkong, a British warship was sent to effect a rescue, and this was successfully accomplished on the 27th December.

A more far-reaching political effect of the Communist *émeute* at Canton in December 1927 was that it brought about a rupture of consular relations between the reunited Kuomintang Government at Nanking and the Government of the U.S.S.R. In succession to the expulsion of the Russian Mission from Hankow in July and to the rupture of diplomatic relations between the Peking Government and the Soviet Government in April, this breach between Nanking and Moscow in December consummated the decline and fall of Russian Communist influence in China which signalized the year 1927.

The destruction and suffering caused by the *émeute* at Canton had been extreme; and, upon the suggestion that Russian Communist machinations had been responsible for this catastrophe,⁴ drastic action of an anti-Russian character was taken immediately, not only at Canton but at Nanking, Shanghai, and Hankow.

At Canton, on the evening of the 13th December, the Soviet Consulate was occupied by the anti-Communist forces, its contents—including papers—were seized, and the Consul-General with his whole staff, as well as their families and their Chinese servants, were made prisoners. On the 14th they were paraded through the streets of Canton in a most humiliating fashion and were exposed on the way

¹ *The Times*, 13th December, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 22nd and 28th December, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 30th December, 1927.

⁴ It was alleged that certain Russians, including the Soviet Vice-Consul at Canton, had been captured when actively assisting the Chinese 'Reds'.

to insults and mishandling from the crowd. Thereupon, the Consulate staff, consisting of five persons, together with six Chinese servants, were shot, while the Consul-General himself and the women and children were thrown into prison and eventually deported via Hong-kong to Vladivostock.¹

At Nanking, on the 13th December, Chiang Kai-shek, who had just been reappointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang forces,² announced to representatives of the foreign press that all Soviet Consulates were to be closed forthwith throughout the Kuomintang Government's domain;³ and on the 14th the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. C. C. Wu, issued an order to this effect, explicitly on the ground that the Communists at Canton had availed themselves of the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet State Commercial Agencies as bases of operations.⁴ In pursuance of this order, notices to quit Shanghai within a week were served, on the 15th December, upon the authorities of the local Soviet Consulate, Trade Commission and Dalbank.⁵ The first party of officials from the Shanghai Consulate sailed for Vladivostock on the 20th December,⁶ and the Consul-General himself left a few days later.⁷ At the request of the Soviet Government, the German Government undertook to look after Soviet interests, appertaining to consular affairs, in the Kuomintang Government's domain.⁸ The local Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Shanghai, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, seems to have carried out his instructions from Nanking with fair consideration and humanity. Soviet citizens who were able to prove that they were resident at Shanghai for commercial and not for political purposes were allowed to remain on condition that they had themselves registered (a condition which was applied to 'White' Russian residents as well).⁹ A

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 31st December, 1927, for an interview given by the Soviet Consul-General himself, Monsieur Pokhvalinski, to a correspondent of the Press Association at Hongkong. Compare *The Times*, 16th, 19th and 27th December, 1927.

² See p. 358 above.

³ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th December, 1927.

⁴ Text of this order in *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th December, 1927.

⁵ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th December, 1927.

⁶ *The Times*, 21st December, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 22nd December, 1927.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 22nd and 23rd December, 1927.

⁹ For the extension to 'White' Russians of this obligation to register, see *ibid.*, 17th December, 1927. This extension was certainly justified in view of an incident which had occurred in Shanghai on the 7th November, 1927. On that evening, when the Soviet Consulate was illuminated in honour of the tenth anniversary of the Russian Communist Revolution, an attack on the building was made by a 'White' Russian crowd, without interference from the members of the International Settlement Police Force or Volunteer Force on duty on the spot (the Soviet Consulate being situated within the Settlement boundaries), who, according to the Soviet Consul-General, were 'White' Russians them-

special official committee was appointed to supervise the liquidation of Soviet Russian firms; and on the 21st December, 1927, this body decided that the Soviet Trade Mission, the Soviet Mercantile Fleet Agency, the Dalbank, the Transport Office of the Ussuri Railway and the U.S.S.R. Insurance Corporation should be liquidated, but that the Centrosojus and the Chinese Eastern Railway Commercial Agency should be allowed to carry on their business under the committee's supervision. The Centrosojus was registered as a company in Great Britain, and the committee had been petitioned in its favour by Chinese merchants, on the grounds that it brought business to Shanghai and that it had large debts outstanding to Chinese creditors.¹ The Chinese Eastern Railway enjoyed the peculiar status of an international company in which the Peking Government and the Soviet Government were partners.² The Shanghai branch of the Dalbank succeeded in convincing the Kuomintang Government that it had never engaged in political activities,³ and in February 1928 it was permitted to reopen under supervision by the Ministry of Finance.

At Hankow, the action taken against both Russian and Chinese Communists was more violent than at Shanghai, and there were even brutalities on a par with the 'White Terror' at Canton, although at Hankow there had been no previous 'Red Terror' to serve as an excuse for them. Here, as many as two hundred Russian Communists were reported to have been arrested and interned.⁴ On the 17th December, the Soviet Consul-General and his wife and fourteen other consular officials were deported on board a Chinese steamer bound

selves. (According to the municipal authorities, the policemen on duty on the spot consisted of Chinese and foreigners, including Sikhs.) Thereupon, the occupants of the Consulate defended themselves by revolver fire, and casualties occurred before other members of the Police Force intervened. It was apparently the practice of the municipal authorities to station 'White' Russian members of the Police Force or the Volunteers on duty outside the Soviet Consulate—a practice which, on the face of it, was equivalent to 'asking for trouble'. (For this incident see *The Times*, 8th and 9th November, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th, 9th, 10th and 12th November, 1927.)

¹ *The Times*, 20th December, 1927.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 342-3.

³ Already, on the 16th July, the premises of the Dalbank at Shanghai had been searched by the municipal police of the International Settlement, on a warrant from the Provisional Court which had been issued by the Garrison Commander of Shanghai, but without the knowledge of Mr. Quo Tai-chi (who was already Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Shanghai at the time). The official purpose of the search was to obtain information regarding alleged transfers of funds, through this bank, from Moscow to Chinese recipients; but no evidence was forthcoming, and the Provisional Court dismissed the charge.

⁴ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th December, 1927.

for Shanghai, *en route* for Vladivostock, and they complained that they had been roughly treated.¹ Fifteen Chinese Communists, including five girls, were executed at Hankow on the 18th December, 1927,² and two more men and two girls on the 20th.³ At Hankow, again, in January 1928, the local authorities appear to have put pressure upon the local branch of the Centrosojus to pay a very large military levy for the privilege of continuing to do business there, and actually to have extorted from them a considerable sum.

Meanwhile the Soviet Government had addressed a note of protest to the Kuomintang Government,⁴ denying the charges against the Soviet Consulate in Canton upon which the Kuomintang Government's action was avowedly based, and arguing that in any case the Kuomintang Government (which, as reconstituted at Nanking, had never been recognized by Moscow) had no right to close Soviet Consulates in Chinese territory, since the existence of these Consulates depended on the Sino-Russian Treaty which the Soviet Government had concluded with the Peking Government in 1924.⁵ Mrs. Sun Yat-sen also sent a personal telegram of protest from Moscow to General Chiang Kai-shek.⁶ On the 18th December, the Kuomintang Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. C. C. Wu, made a conciliatory statement⁷ to the effect that the action taken was not intended to constitute a severance of all political and commercial relations, that it had been taken reluctantly and solely as a means of self-defence, and that in trying to suppress subversive and dangerous activities he and his colleagues were actuated by no hostility towards the Russian people. In replying to Monsieur Chicherin, he tendered evidence to show that the accusations against the Soviet Consulate at Canton were well founded.⁸ Thereafter, in a statement to the Russian press, Monsieur Chicherin attributed the 'White Terror' at Canton and the closing of the Soviet Consulates in the domain of the Kuomintang to the 'hidden hand' of British Imperialism.⁹

¹ *The Times*, 19th and 20th December, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 21st December, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 22nd December, 1927.

⁴ Text in *The Manchester Guardian*, 19th December, 1927. The note was received by the Kuomintang Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Shanghai on the 17th December, 1927.

⁵ For this treaty see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 334-6.

⁶ *The Manchester Guardian*, 19th December, 1927.

⁷ To a correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian* (see the issue of the 19th December, 1927).

⁸ *The Times*, 23rd December, 1927.

⁹ *Ibid.*, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 24th December, 1927.

(iii) Relations between Chinese and Foreigners other than Russians
(March to December 1927).

(a) INTRODUCTORY NOTE

During the last ten months of the year 1927 the relations of the Chinese with the Russians, which have been recorded above,¹ overshadowed their relations with other foreigners. Meanwhile, so far as the latter were concerned, the situation which had prevailed at the beginning of the year did not undergo any radical change, though it did become perceptibly easier as the influence of the Russian Communists over the Kuomintang declined towards its fall.

Until the end of the year, the centre of the depression—if the so-called ‘anti-foreign movement’ in China may be described in terms of a travelling storm—continued to lie over the Yangtse Basin. Symptoms of another break in the weather on the southern littoral came to nothing,² and indications that the depression was likely to travel northwards from the Yangtse across Shantung and towards Manchuria were not borne out until the following year.³

In the Yangtse Basin, the barometer may be said to have reached and passed its lowest point some time between the closing of British Consulates and the evacuation of British subjects from treaty-ports and mission stations above Hankow, which was completed towards

¹ Section (ii).

² For example, at Canton, in June 1927, a boycott was put on against the Japanese in retaliation for the landing of Japanese troops in Shantung (this landing in 1927 will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*, in connexion with the subsequent landing in the latter year); and in September 1927, when this anti-Japanese boycott at Canton was raised owing to the withdrawal from Shantung of the Japanese troops, it was proposed to replace it by reviving the anti-British boycott—not on account of any fresh political grievance against the British but for the strictly economic purpose of providing the strike pickets with means of subsistence. ‘As a result of the representations of H.M. Consul-General at Canton, the boycott threatened there failed to materialize. On the 10th November [1927] the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs stated to the Consul-General that he had been instructed by the local authorities to inform him that the boycott would be suppressed and any goods that had been seized would be returned.’ (Statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 7th December, 1927. Compare *The Times*, 16th September, 5th, 8th and 11th November, 1927.) For the subsequent clash at Canton between the Kuomintang authorities and the strikers, and its sequel in the Communist *émeute* of December, see Section (ii) above.

³ The chief indication of future trouble between Chinese and foreigners in the north was the landing of Japanese troops at Tsingtao in June 1927, in anticipation of a possible advance of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces up to the line of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway. There were also indications of future trouble at Tientsin and in Manchuria. These events in northern China in 1927 will all be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

the end of March and the beginning of April,¹ and the reopening of the Upper Yangtse to British trade towards the end of the year.² During the four months immediately preceding the fall of Monsieur Borodin in July,³ the British and other Western residents who still remained in the Yangtse Basin, outside the cordon of Western troops which had been drawn round the two foreign settlements at Shanghai,⁴ were living virtually in a state of siege⁵—the women and children having been evacuated down river, while such men as remained were concentrated on board ship or else on the river bank with arrangements for taking to their ships at a moment's notice. Many of the Consuls, too, were carrying on their duties on board ship after finding by experience that their official status no longer guaranteed their safety on land;⁶ and, even under these conditions, the foreign communities could not have held out if they had not been covered by the guns of foreign warships. An unofficial estimate published on the 28th April, 1927,⁷ reckoned up the number of foreign warships present in the Yangtse at that moment to a total of over a hundred.⁸

Meanwhile the practice of firing indiscriminately, and without provocation, at passing foreign vessels, which had become frequent after the arrival of the Kuomintang forces at the Yangtse in the previous year,⁹ remained habitual; and it was now common form that

¹ For details of the evacuation of British subjects from the Upper Yangtse, see *The Times*, 30th March, 1927, and a series of British Admiralty *communiqués* published *ibid.*, 31st March, 1st, 4th, 5th and 7th April, 1927.

² For the reopening of the British Consulate at Ichang in December 1927, as the result of the establishment of friendlier relations with General Yang Sen, see *The Times*, 25th and 30th November, and 16th December, 1927.

³ See Section (ii), above.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 377–9.

⁵ For the general conditions prevailing along the Yangtse during this virtual state of siege, see the British Admiralty *communiqués* referred to in a previous note, as well as subsequent *communiqués* from the same source which were published in *The Times* on the 13th, 20th, 26th, 27th and 28th April; 3rd, 17th and 21st May, 1927. See also statements made by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 26th April and the 29th June, 1927; a series of American official statements published in *The United States Daily* on the 31st March and the 7th and 13th April, 1927; a series of articles by Mr. Arthur Ransome, describing a journey by river from Shanghai to Hankow, which appeared in *The Manchester Guardian* on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 12th April, 1927; and extracts from the diary of a journey by river from Shanghai to Hankow in August 1927, which were published in *The Times* on the 5th October, 1927.

⁶ e.g. the British consuls at Hankow, Nanking and Chinkiang at the time when Mr. Locker-Lampson made his statement of the 26th April, 1927.

⁷ *The Times*, 28th April, 1927.

⁸ For numbers and movements of foreign warships at Shanghai and in the Yangtse, see, in addition to the British Admiralty *communiqués* cited above, *The Times*, 8th, 22nd, 28th April, 4th June, 3rd and 17th November, 1927.

⁹ See the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 314–15.

warships should retaliate.¹ Chinese military commanders also continued to commandeer, or attempt to commandeer, foreign merchant-ships.

Again, there was a continuance of outrages against the persons and property of foreigners *qua* foreigners, whether these outrages were inspired by fanaticism fanned by propaganda or were committed in cold blood with the object of producing some particular political effect.²

These specifically 'anti-foreign' outrages were to be distinguished from acts of brigandage and piracy for which the motives were not

¹ The following (not exhaustive) list of instances of firing by Chinese troops on foreign ships between March and December 1927 is given by way of illustration:

13th March, 1927. A United States warship and merchant ship were fired on by Northern soldiers near Wuhu. The warship retaliated (*The United States Daily* and *The Times*, 16th March, 1927).

8th April. A British warship was fired on by Kuomintang troops near Chinkiang. The warship retaliated (*The Times*, 11th April, 1927).

13th April. Another British warship was fired on near Chinkiang and retaliated (*ibid.*, 14th and 18th April, 1927).

15th April. A foreign merchantship and a United States warship were fired on by Northern troops from Pukow. The United States warship and a British warship retaliated (*The United States Daily*, 16th April, 1927).

17th April. A British merchantship and a United States warship were fired on at Nanking. The warship retaliated (*The Times*, 18th April, 1927).

25th April. A United States warship was fired on by Kuomintang troops near Kiangyin and retaliated (*ibid.*, 27th April, 1927).

Early in May. A British warship was twice fired on in the estuary of the Yangtse and once retaliated (*ibid.*, 4th May, 1927).

9th May. A British warship was fired on near Nanking and retaliated (*ibid.*, 10th May, 1927).

16th May. A British passenger steamer was fired on from Whampoa, near Canton, by cadets of the military college. Amends were demanded and made (*ibid.*, 17th, 21st, 24th and 25th May, 1927).

17th May. A Japanese warship was fired on at Chinkiang and retaliated (*ibid.*, 19th May, 1927).

27th May. A United States warship was fired on near Hankow and retaliated (*The United States Daily*, 31st May, 1927).

22nd June. A United States merchantship was fired on near Ichang (*ibid.*, 28th June, 1927).

25th August. A United States warship was fired on near Nanking and retaliated (*The Times*, 26th August, 1927).

End of August. A convoy of British merchantships was fired on and a British warship retaliated (*ibid.*, 1st September, 1927).

Fourth week in October. A British warship was fired on near Wuhu and retaliated (*ibid.*, 26th October, 1927).

The foreign warships which were fired on seem in the majority of cases to have been engaged at the time in convoying foreign merchantships (not necessarily merchantships of their own nationality).

² For examples of outrages of both kinds, see subsections (c) and (d) below, and also a speech delivered by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 6th April, 1927.

political but economic, and from which foreigners and Chinese suffered indiscriminately. In Chinese history, the incidence of brigandage and piracy had always been an index of the economic stress and of the individual freedom from restraint produced by bouts of political disorder. In 1927, as in the foregoing years, the principal haunts of the pirates were the navigable rivers (especially the Yangtse and West River) and those sea-routes leading to and from Hongkong and Canton which could be commanded from Bias Bay.¹

To record individually all these relations—public and private, political and economic—between Chinese and foreigners, during the last ten months of 1927, would not only require a volume in itself but would defeat its own ends by bewildering the reader with a mass of detail. For these reasons, the survey has been limited in this section to the events of major importance which occurred, during the months in question, at Shanghai, Nanking, and Hankow.

(b) SHANGHAI

In the preceding volume,² the record of relations between Chinese and foreigners at Shanghai has been carried down to the 25th February, 1927, when units of the British Shanghai Defence Force were moved out to form a cordon round the International Settlement in view of the fact that the Kuomintang forces were then marching on the city after the decisive victory which they had gained on the 16th February over Sun Ch'uan-fang's forces outside Hangchow.

During the weeks that intervened between that date and the

¹ In the preceding volume, eleven instances have been recorded of piracies during the year 1926 and the first quarter of the year 1927, ending with the British naval punitive expedition to Bias Bay on the 23rd March of the latter year. A fuller record of the principal piracies during 1926 and the whole of 1927 will also be found in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 675-700; and the report of a commission appointed by the Governor of Hongkong to inquire into the piratical attack on the SS. *Sunning* (for the circumstances, see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 342) is printed in the same place, with a note on consequent Hongkong legislation. There was a second British naval punitive expedition to Bias Bay on the 1st September, 1927, and an expedition to the West River on the 4th September. Accounts of all these, as well as the expedition to Bias Bay in March 1927, are given in *The China Year Book*, 1928, *loc. cit.* For the kidnapping of Captain Lalor, the master of the British merchantship *Siangtan*, near Ichang on the 30th November, 1927, and his release on the 12th December after a British missionary, the Rev. Forbes Tocher, had negotiated with the pirates for his ransom, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 5th December, 1927; *The Times*, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th and 19th December, 1927. Captain Lalor had been in command of the SS. *Wanliu* at the time of the Wanh sien Incident in September 1926 (see the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 307-17).

² *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, Section (δ) (xiü) (f).

eventual occupation of Shanghai by the Kuomintang forces on the 21st–22nd March (outside the cordon of foreign troops which had been drawn round the two foreign settlements), there were several disquieting features in the situation. To begin with, it was uncertain whether the presence of the British Defence Force and other foreign contingents on Chinese soil might not actually provoke those ‘incidents’ against which it was intended to provide a safeguard.¹ In particular, it was uncertain whether trouble might not arise over the fact that the British military cordon trespassed, in places, upon territory, outside the boundaries of the International Settlement, which was under direct Chinese administration.² Another possible source of danger, in the event of the foreign troops in Shanghai finding themselves compelled to meet an attack, was that there was no prospect of a unified command.³

In the actual event, the evacuation of the area surrounding the foreign cordon by the Shantung forces of Chang Tsung-ch’ang and the occupation of this area by the Kuomintang forces of Chiang Kai-shek on the 21st–22nd March, 1927,⁴ passed off without any catastrophe such as followed the occupation of Nanking on the 24th.⁵ A fortnight before the Kuomintang occupation of Shanghai took

¹ On the 8th March, 1927, the whole question of policy involved in the British Government’s decision to dispatch the Force was raised in the House of Commons at Westminster in committee of supply on a supplementary estimate for expenditure on the Force down to the 31st March, 1927. After a debate in which the opposition was led by Mr. Clynes, the vote was carried by 303 to 124. On the 16th March the Government’s policy was approved, in a further debate, by 241 votes to 116. There was yet another debate on China on the 6th April, 1927.

² See the parliamentary question on this point which was asked in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 2nd March, 1927, by Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy. The Chinese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Shanghai appears to have lodged a protest on the subject with the Senior Consul on the 4th March. For the topographical facts see the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 363–4. The trespass could only be defended on grounds of military necessity in an emergency. A legal warrant for it could hardly be suggested on any construction of Treaty Rights.

³ At first, apparently, there was not even a prospect of concerted action in face of an emergency, at least so far as the United States forces were concerned (see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 375, and a statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster in answer to a parliamentary question on the 2nd March, 1927). Eventually arrangements for concerted action between the British, French and American forces, in case the emergency arose, seem to have been arrived at. (For the French attitude in this matter see *The Times*, 29th and 31st March; 2nd, 7th and 8th April, 1927. For the American attitude see *ibid.*, 28th March, 1927, and a statement of President Coolidge’s views in *The United States Daily*, 30th March, 1927.)

⁴ For these operations in the Chinese civil war, see section (i) pp. 324–5 above.

⁵ See sub-section (c) below.

place, the Kuomintang Government issued a declaration of policy to the effect that it had decided to re-establish Chinese control over the foreign settlements by negotiation and not by force, and that in the term 'force' it included not only armed attacks but riots by organized mobs, though not political propaganda or economic pressure.¹ The replacement of the Shantung forces by the Kuomintang forces was, in fact, effected without any collision at all between the latter and the foreign troops—the few encounters which the foreign troops had with Chinese forces during these critical days being invariably with the Shantungese. Again, the change was effected without any organized mob violence like that which, at Hankow and Kiukiang in January, had brought the relations between Chinese and foreigners to the verge of a catastrophe of the kind which afterwards actually occurred at Nanking. At Shanghai, the right wing of the Kuomintang never lost that control over the situation which they failed to retain at Nanking, Kiukiang and Hankow; and although at Shanghai, as at other treaty ports, the activities of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese organized labour were a source of considerable anxiety to men of property (Chinese and foreign without distinction) during the weeks immediately preceding and following the change of régime, at Shanghai the militant 'Reds' were forcibly suppressed by General Chiang Kai-shek² without the foreigners becoming involved.

A recrudescence of these 'Red' activities was the first symptom at Shanghai that the change of régime was imminent. About the end of the first week in March, the General Labour Union began to prepare the ground for a fresh attempt at a general strike³ (to coincide with the arrival of the Kuomintang Army) by a campaign of intimidation—conducted by 'plain-clothes' gunmen—against unions or individual workers who opposed their policy. This time, the weapon of assassination was systematically employed, and the series of murders, which began on the 7th March, had taken a toll of twenty victims by the 18th,⁴ while the Provisional Court which had superseded the Mixed Court on the 1st January, 1927,⁵ apparently failed to show the necessary resolution in dealing with the perpetrators of these crimes.⁶ At noon on the 21st March the general strike was duly proclaimed and all public utility services, including the

¹ *The Times*, 10th March, 1927.

² See p. 339 above.

³ For the abortive general strike at Shanghai on the 19th–23rd February, 1927, see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 376.

⁴ For this series of murders, see *The Times*, 8th, 9th, 15th and 19th March, 1927.

⁵ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 389, and the *Survey for 1926*, p. 369.

⁶ *The Times*, 19th March, 1927.

Post Office, were involved.¹ At the same time, it was announced that the strike was not directed against foreigners, but was simply intended to celebrate the Kuomintang victory and was only to last for three days. It was actually called off on the 24th at the instance of General Chiang Kai-shek's lieutenant, General Pai Chung-hsi,² who had published a proclamation on the preceding day, calling upon the population not to insult foreigners or to destroy their property.³ Meanwhile, Chinese police-stations in the areas outside the settlements had been occupied by Chinese Communists, who took possession of the arms which they contained, and there had been sniping by Communist gunmen, in which several casualties were inflicted on the foreign troops. On the 21st, for instance, one Panjābī soldier of the British Defence Force was shot dead and another seriously wounded, and on the 22nd two more Panjābīs were shot dead and three English soldiers and one Japanese were wounded.⁴ Thereafter, on the 25th March, the first collision between the Communist gunmen and General Pai Chung-hsi's troops occurred in Chapei;⁵ by the end of the month, the sniping was reported to have ceased;⁶ and in the course of April General Chiang Kai-shek took the offensive against the Communists at Shanghai and suppressed them, as has been recorded above.⁷

Meanwhile, action had been taken by the commanders of the foreign troops and by the authorities of the two foreign settlements.

On the 12th March, the British forces turned back a body of 500 Shantung troops under arms who endeavoured to enter the International Settlement.⁸ On the 21st, the foreign troops already at their stations along the cordon were supported by the landing of naval forces, including American marines,⁹ for the maintenance of internal security in the International Settlement; and, at the request of the Municipal Council of the International Settlement, posts of the national forces concerned were stationed under arms, outside the cordon, to guard foreign properties along the municipal roads outside

¹ Statement in the House of Lords at Westminster by the Lord Privy Seal on the 23rd March, 1927.

² *The Times*, 25th March, 1927.

³ Text of this proclamation in *The Times*, 24th March, 1927.

⁴ Statements in the House of Commons at Westminster by the Prime Minister on the 22nd March, 1927, and in the House of Lords by the Lord Privy Seal on the 23rd. See further *The Times*, 22nd and 25th March, 1927.

⁵ *The Times*, 25th March, 1927.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1st April, 1927.

⁷ See section (ii), p. 339.

⁸ *The Times*, 14th March, 1927.

⁹ Fifteen hundred American marines according to *The Times*, 22nd March, 1927. On the 23rd March, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in a statement made in the House of Commons at Westminster, gave the number of American marines then present at Shanghai as 1,200.

the settlement boundaries.¹ Three Japanese and six British posts of the kind were detailed to this area,² and Royal Marines were also landed at Pootung, on the riverside opposite the foreign settlements, in order to protect British lives and property there.³ On the evening of the 21st, Chinese troops (believed to be Shantungese) broke through the cordon on the north of the International Settlement and started looting, but were driven out by machine-gun fire from two British armoured cars, at the cost of four British wounded and an unrecorded number of Chinese casualties.⁴ On the 22nd, foreign residents were evacuated from the area outside the cordon, owing to the increase of sniping there.⁵ On the 22nd, again, a brigade of Shantungese troops which had been occupying the North Railway Station Yard in Chapei, just outside the northern boundary of the International Settlement, attempted to force their way into the Settlement in order to save themselves from being disarmed by the Kuomintang forces. The British troops on the spot were unable to stop them without opening fire; and about sixty of them were killed and many wounded before order was restored. Of the remainder about a thousand were disarmed by the British troops inside the cordon and another thousand surrendered to Japanese marines outside.⁶ This seems to have been the last as well as the most serious collision between Chinese and foreign troops at Shanghai during this crisis. By the 23rd March, the tension was already decreasing; and on the 25th a message of thanks to the British Government 'for the prompt and adequate measures taken for the defence' of the International Settlement was signed by three thousand foreign residents in Shanghai, representing more than thirty-two nationalities.⁷ In fact, during the change in the Chinese régime at Shanghai foreign civilian residents seem to have suffered no casualties whatever.

Meanwhile, on the 21st March, the Municipal Council of the International Settlement had published a proclamation declaring a

¹ For these roads and their status see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 370.

² The Panjābis who were sniped by gunmen on the 21st were 'proceeding in motor-lorries to their posts on the northern outskirts of the Settlements' (statement by the Lord Privy Seal, cited above), and it may be inferred that the scene of the attack upon them lay outside the Settlement boundaries.

³ For these dispositions, see the statements in the Parliament at Westminster by the Prime Minister and the Lord Privy Seal which have been cited above. Cf. *The Times*, 22nd March, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 23rd March, 1927.

⁶ For this collision see *The Times*, *loc. cit.* According to information from Shanghai which was published in *The Hongkong Weekly Press* of the 1st April, 1927, 49 rounds were fired on this occasion by the British troops and 43 casualties were inflicted on the Shantungese troops.

⁷ *The Times*, 8th April, 1927.

state of emergency and had followed this up by a notification of emergency measures on the 24th.¹

The decrease of tension, which had begun to show itself as early as the 23rd March, continued steadily until the last serious danger of a catastrophe at Shanghai was removed by the success of General Chiang Kai-shek's local offensive against the Communists on the 12th April.² During the rest of the year 1927 Shanghai was happy in having little or no history; but, for the sake of completeness, it may be well to touch upon the relations of the British military authorities, the consular body and the international municipal authorities with the local representatives of the Kuomintang from April to December.

On the whole, the relations of the British Defence Force with the Chinese authorities and the Chinese population were remarkably good; and the conduct of the individual members of the Force appears to have made a favourable impression on the Chinese mind.

The chief cause of friction was the practice, in which British military aircraft indulged, of flying over territory under Chinese administration. Diplomatic protests against this practice were made more than once by the Foreign Minister of the Nanking Government, Mr. C. C. Wu;³ but on the 1st June, 1927, Sir Austen Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons at Westminster, in answer to a parliamentary question, that the British Naval Commander-in-Chief on the China Station had been authorized to use his aircraft in whatever way he thought desirable for the defence of the International Settlement at Shanghai, and that it had been foreseen that this might necessarily involve flights over fortified areas and districts where fighting [between Chinese forces] was in progress. On the 16th August, 1927, a British airman made a forced descent on the Kiang-wan golf course, which lay in Chinese territory outside the Settlement boundaries. An unarmed party of the British Defence Force was sent out to retrieve the aeroplane, and they succeeded in bringing in the engine and fuselage, but before the wings could be brought away a party of Chinese troops intervened and prevented their removal. The British Consul-General requested the local Chinese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs to take the necessary steps to enable the wings to be withdrawn, but met with a categorical refusal; and thereupon the General Officer commanding the British Shanghai Defence Force, Major-General Duncan, conveyed, through the same channel, an ultimatum expiring at 11.0 a.m. on the 17th. Thereafter, the Nanking Foreign Minister, Mr. Wu, was reported to have declared his intention

¹ Texts of both documents in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1225-6.

² See p. 339 above.

³ *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th June, 1927.

of using the incident in order to bring the British practice to public notice, and he was said to have declined an offer from the French Consul-General to act as mediator. No restitution having been made on the 17th by the hour designated in General Duncan's ultimatum, the General gave orders that the posts which had been occupied temporarily on the 21st March, outside the cordon,¹ on the loop-line connecting the Shanghai-Hangchow and Shanghai-Nanking Railways, should be reoccupied at 2.0 p.m., and that at 4.0 p.m. the railway should be cut at the level-crossing immediately south of Soochow Creek. At the latter hour, fifty yards of metals were torn up and the place was guarded with machine-guns to prevent unauthorized repair. This act of retaliation placed the Nanking Government in a quandary, since it interrupted their principal line of military communications at a moment when the campaign against Chang Tsung-ch'ang and Sun Ch'uan-fang along the line of the Pukow-Tientsin Railway was in a critical phase.² Accordingly, through the mediation of the Japanese Admiral at Shanghai, the wings of the disabled aeroplane were restored to General Duncan at 7.30 p.m. on the 18th August, upon receipt of a formal assurance that the landing in territory under Chinese administration had not been deliberate. The same evening, the railway was repaired by British military engineers, the British posts were withdrawn within the cordon, and a statement³ was issued by the British Head-quarters at Shanghai in which the practice of flying over territory under Chinese administration was defended.⁴

As regarded the composition and strength of the foreign forces at Shanghai, the position at the moment when the city (outside the cordon) changed hands was given by Sir Austen Chamberlain, in a statement made in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 23rd March, 1927, as follows:

The British military forces at Shanghai consist of eight regular battalions of infantry, together with the necessary ancillary troops. The only other foreign Power which has dispatched troops, as distinct from naval forces, to Shanghai is France. The following is a statement of the naval forces now at Shanghai, including those at Woosung:

Great Britain. 5 cruisers and 1 gunboat and 1,000 Royal Marines.

United States. 1 cruiser, 3 torpedo-boat destroyers, 3 gunboats, 1 oiler and 1 transport, with 1,200 Marines.

¹ See p. 324 above.

² See pp. 329-30 above.

³ Text in *The Manchester Guardian*, 19th August, 1927.

⁴ For this 'incident' of the 16th-18th August, 1927, see *The Times*, 17th, 18th and 19th August, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 18th and 19th August, 1927—particularly the text, published in *The Times*, 18th August, 1927, of the *communiqué* issued by the Shanghai Defence Force Headquarters on the 17th.

Japan. 4 cruisers, 3 torpedo-boat destroyers and 2 gunboats.

France. 1 cruiser, 2 gunboats and 1 dispatch-vessel.

Italy. 1 cruiser, 1 torpedo-boat destroyer and 1 gunboat.

Netherlands. 1 cruiser.

Spain. 1 cruiser.

Portugal. 1 sloop.

On the 4th April, in consequence of events at Nanking on the 24th March, it was announced¹ that the British Government had decided to send a further brigade of infantry, with ancillary units, as reinforcements to Shanghai. On the 13th April, Sir Austen Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons that the total British military forces then stationed in China consisted of sixteen infantry battalions, together with the necessary ancillary troops, without counting the four battalions that were *en route*, and that the total naval personnel on the China Station, including one Royal Marine battalion, was approximately 14,000. On the 17th May, the Financial Secretary to the War Office stated that the British Military forces in Shanghai at that date consisted of twelve infantry battalions and one marine battalion, with ancillary troops, and that at Hongkong there were—including the four battalions arriving—seven infantry battalions with ancillary troops. In July it was decided that the British troops additional to normal strengths, which were to be maintained in China for the time being, were to be limited to the strength of a division with only a third of the normal artillery establishment of a division, and that the Twentieth Indian Brigade was to be withdrawn.² The two English battalions of the Indian Brigade sailed from Shanghai on the 23rd July.³ At the beginning of September, the British War Office announced that a gradual reduction of the British troops in the Far East would begin in about a fortnight's time.⁴ The following figures, covering the period 1st July to 1st November, 1927, were given in the House of Commons on the 15th November, 1927, by the Secretary of State for War:

Date.	Number of Infantry Units stationed at			
	Shanghai.	Hongkong.	Tientsin.	Wei-hai-wei.
1st July	10	5 ⁵	1	1
1st August	8	5 ⁵	1	1
1st September	8	5 ⁵	1	1
1st October	6 ⁷	4 ⁶	1	1
1st November	6 $\frac{3}{4}$ ⁷	3 ⁶	1	1 Company

¹ *The Times*, 4th April, 1927.

² Statements in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 6th and 13th July, 1927; *The Times*, 8th July, 1927.

³ *The Times*, 25th July, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2nd September, 1927.

⁵ Includes four battalions of the 15th Brigade.

⁶ Includes three battalions of the 15th Brigade.

⁷ Includes one battalion of the 15th Brigade.

The above table does not include:

(i) One Royal Marine Battalion which was stationed at Shanghai from February to September, when it was reduced in strength by approximately half.

(ii) The normal infantry garrison in China which consists of two battalions at Hongkong and one battalion at Tientsin.

On the 14th December, 1927, the House of Commons at Westminster agreed to a supplementary vote of £3,090,000 for the excess cost involved in the employment of extra troops in China. In the foregoing debate, Mr. Trevelyan (Labour) pointed out that in 1926 the total value of United Kingdom produce and manufactures exported to China had been £9,259,000, but that in 1927 this had fallen to £5,194,000, and he suggested—whether or not the inference was correct—that ‘Lancashire was being blockaded at Shanghai’. The vote was agreed to by 242 to 103.

In the summer of 1927, Shanghai became the main theatre of a dispute between the Nanking Government and foreign Powers over certain changes in Chinese taxation which the foreigners opposed¹ primarily on the ground that the new imposts in themselves were unwarranted, but perhaps also partly from a feeling that the Nanking Government was at that time exercising only a precarious authority over a fraction of the country. On the 30th June, 1927, the Political Council of the Nanking Government issued an order by which it abolished *likin* (internal transit duty)² and similar internal taxes in the six provinces under its control³ as from the 1st September and—in substitution therefor—raised the import tax on ordinary commodities to 12½ per cent. as from the 1st September, and that on luxuries to 30 per cent. as from the 1st August; and imposed special duties on alcohol as from the 11th August, and on cigarettes, coal and kerosine as from the 1st August, in the Province of Kiangsu (which included the cities of Nanking and Shanghai). It also imposed a 50 per cent. surtax on tonnage dues as from the 11th July.⁴ About the same time, the Nanking Ministry of Finance imposed an embargo on the export trade of specie from Shanghai, though free trade in treasure was expressly granted by treaty. The flat rate of 30 per cent. on luxuries was afterwards converted into a scale of

¹ See a statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 13th July, 1927.

² For this problem of *likin* in the history of the Chinese tariff, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 480-1, and the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 371-3.

³ Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu and Anhwei.

⁴ For these measures, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st July, 1927; *The Times*, 2nd July and 9th August, 1927; *The United States Daily*, 8th July, 1927.

differential rates ranging from 20 to $62\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.;¹ the surtax on tonnage dues was reduced from 50 per cent. to 20; and tea was provisionally exempted from export tax as the result of a petition from the Shanghai Tea Merchants' Association.² Nevertheless, the prospect of these new imposts upon the trade of Shanghai was still sufficiently serious to cause the foreign mercantile community to make strong protests to the representatives of their respective Governments; and the latter were also unfavourably impressed by an official communication received from the Nanking Foreign Minister on the 25th July, in which he not only announced the specific measures which his Government was proposing to take, but contended that, in principle, it had the right to regulate the tariff in accordance with actual needs and modern requirements. In consequence, the new measures met with resistance. For example, when the embargo on the export of silver from Shanghai threatened to produce a financial crisis at Tientsin, three and a half million taels of bar silver were shipped from Shanghai on the 19th July for Weihaiwei, *en route* for Tientsin, on board British torpedo-boat destroyers, which were exempt from the China Maritime Customs authorities' jurisdiction;³ and, after this, the embargo was lifted on the 9th August.⁴ The surtax on tonnage dues was resisted by foreigners,⁵ without violation of their obligations under existing treaties, through an arrangement under which the masters of vessels paid over the amount of the legal treaty tonnage dues to their respective Consuls and the latter thereupon cleared the vessels without the intervention of the Customs.⁶ The special Kiangsu alcohol duty was resisted by a similar procedure. The importers deposited with their respective Consuls the amount of the legal treaty duty plus the Washington surtax⁷ and then obtained judgement in their respective

¹ *The Times*, 26th July, 1927; full text of the official announcement in *The United States Daily*, 4th August, 1927. According to *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th July, 1927, the new scale on luxuries was not 20, 30 and $62\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. but 15, 20 and $57\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The date as from which the luxury tax was to be collected appears to have been postponed from the 1st August to the 1st September.

² *The Times*, 28th July, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 20th July, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 10th August, 1927.

⁵ To begin with, the tonnage surtax appears to have been paid, under protest, by one American ship and by several ships flying the flags of small countries (*ibid.*, 12th August, 1927).

⁶ *The Manchester Guardian*, 13th August; *The Times*, 15th August, 1927. It is interesting to note that the China Maritime Customs Service itself had arisen out of a similar emergency arrangement which had been introduced at Shanghai during the local interregnum of Chinese authority at the time of the T'ai'ping Rebellion.

⁷ For the history of the Washington Surtax see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part III, section (viii) and the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, section γ (ix).

national courts at Shanghai for the delivery of the goods by the wharf companies, which thereupon gave delivery notwithstanding the fact that the Customs Banks had refused to accept from the importers the sums legally due without the additional payment of the special tax, and that in consequence the wharf companies had received no licence from the Customs authorities to release the goods.¹ These measures of resistance were so effective that the Nanking Government decided to abandon the whole of its scheme of fiscal innovations for the time being.² It may be noted that an active part in carrying out the measures was taken by the Japanese. The Japanese Minister in China paid a visit to Nanking to convey his Government's views on the matter in person. At Shanghai, there was close co-operation between the Japanese and the British authorities; and the result was a *rapprochement* between Japanese and British policy in China which had been absent earlier in the year.

During the same period there was another fiscal controversy at Shanghai in which the parts played by Chinese and foreigners were reversed.

In the preceding volume it has been recorded³ that, in the autumn of 1926, the demand of the Chinese ratepayers in the International Settlement at Shanghai for representation on the Municipal Council had at last been met by an offer of three additional seats on the Council to be assigned to Chinese, and that this offer had been accepted by the Chinese Central Government at Peking and by the Provincial Government of Kiangsu, but that in February 1927 the Chinese Rate-Payers' Association,⁴ instead of electing their three members of Council, had nominated a provisional committee of nine to share the administration of the International Settlement with the existing foreign authorities.⁵ The Municipal Council did not recognize this

¹ This procedure was followed by the British, the Japanese, and the Americans (see *The Times*, 12th, 19th, 23rd, 26th, 29th August and 2nd September, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th and 5th October, 1927).

² See *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th and 24th August; *The Times*, 24th and 29th August, 1927. The first step was the cancellation of the order for the closing of *likin* stations (*The Times*, 26th August, 1927); the next was the postponement of the imposition of the new import duties (*United States Daily*, 31st August, 1927); the next was the rescinding of the surtax upon tonnage dues (*The Times*, 1st September, 1927).

³ *Survey for 1926*, p. 372.
⁴ It seems to have been questionable how far this body was representative of Chinese interests in the International Settlement.

⁵ This would have given the Chinese an equal share with the foreigners in the administration of the International Settlement, whereas the offer of three places on the Council side by side with the existing nine would have given them only a 25 per cent. share. Down to that time statistics of the respective contributions of Chinese and foreigners to the rates of the International

body; but in March 1927, during the critical time when the Shantung forces were being superseded by the Kuomintang forces in the area outside the boundaries of the International Settlement, the Council published a manifesto¹ declaring that it was only awaiting the appointment by the Chinese community of three Chinese members in order to proceed with the consideration of certain outstanding problems, the solution of which required the advice and opinion of representative Chinese, but that, in the Council's opinion, this was not a suitable time for the Powers concerned to consider any drastic change in the Shanghai administration. Thereafter, on the 13th April, the enfranchised foreign ratepayers of the International Settlement, at their annual general meeting, voted increases in the rates and taxes as from the 1st July, raising the land-tax (formerly 7/10 of 1 per cent.) to 8/10 of 1 per cent. and the general municipal rate (formerly 14 per cent.) to 16 per cent.; and on the 11th May the Chinese Rate-Payers' Association held a meeting of its own and asked the local Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the Kuomintang Government to lodge a protest against these increases on the ground that the Chinese had no representation on the Municipal Council and had not been consulted on the subject. At a further meeting on the 23rd June the Association passed a resolution in favour of passive resistance; and on the eve of the 1st July the Municipal Council agreed to postpone the collection of the additional rates for a period of two weeks in the case of Chinese rate-payers, in the hope that in the meantime the deadlock over the question of Chinese representation on the Council might be removed. At first the Chinese rate-payers, who could count on the Nanking Government's support and who reckoned that the Provisional Court² would be unwilling to give judgement against them if they were prosecuted by the municipal authorities, showed an inclination to be intransigent. The various grievances of the Chinese residents in the Settlement were ventilated in an open letter³ (to which the Municipal Council

Settlement had not been made public; but, in a memorandum published in July, the Municipal Council stated that, on the average, each foreigner contributed £18 and each Chinese £1 annually (*The Times*, 15th July, 1927). Since, in 1927, the foreign population of the International Settlement was 22,552 and the Chinese population 810,272 (*Survey for 1926*, p. 366), it would appear to follow from the Municipal Council's statement that the aggregate contribution of the foreign population to the rates barely exceeded 50 per cent. of the aggregate contribution of the Chinese population.

¹ Text in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1226-8.

² For the inauguration of the Provisional Court in place of the Mixed Court at Shanghai on the 1st January, 1927, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part III, section (xi) (f).

³ *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd July, 1927.

replied by publishing a memorandum setting forth its own case),¹ and there were threats of a refusal to pay any rates whatever, even on the previous footing, and even to call a general strike, unless the additional rates were rescinded. This passive resistance was countered, on the Municipal Council's part, by certain coercive measures, such as the cutting off of electric power. However, the crisis was temporarily averted on the 15th August, 1927, when the Chinese Rate-Payers' Association resolved to give notice that all its members would pay the additional rates for the six months ending the 31st December, 1927, and at the same time resolved to demand that the number of additional seats offered to Chinese on the Municipal Council should be raised to a minimum of six.² In December, the Municipal Council took the politic step of appointing a Chinese Advisory Committee to assist in drawing up the next budget; and, on the advice of this body, the Chinese Rate-Payers' Association, after prolonged discussions, agreed, at the beginning of April 1928, to a new proposal, put forward by the Municipal Council, that, while not more than three Chinese members should be added to the Council itself for the time being, six Chinese should be appointed to the standing Committees. On the 18th April, 1928, this agreement between the Municipal Council and the Chinese Rate-Payers' Association was ratified by the enfranchised foreign rate-payers at their annual general meeting, and on the same occasion a resolution to admit Chinese to the public parks of the Settlement was carried almost unanimously. The previous exclusion of Chinese from these parks, while a minor grievance if measured in terms of material detriment, had been taken by the Chinese as symbolic of the inferior status of 'natives' to which they had been reduced, in their own country, by foreigners, and it had therefore aroused not only more constant irritation but perhaps even deeper feeling than matters such as the non-representation of the Chinese residents on the Municipal Council, in which far greater material interests were involved. Thus the simultaneous passage of the two resolutions of the 18th April, 1928, opened up a fairer prospect of harmonious co-operation between Chinese and foreigners in the International Settlement at Shanghai than had been visible for many years.

¹ *The Times*, 15th July, 1927.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th August, 1927. For the previous history of this controversy see *ibid.*, 25th and 29th June, 1st, 2nd, 4th and 27th July, 1927; *The Times*, 1st, 4th and 15th July, 1927. See also a statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 13th July, 1927, in answer to a parliamentary question.

(c) NANKING¹

The outrages against foreigners which were committed at Nanking by Kuomintang troops, immediately after their entry into that city, at the heels of the retreating troops of the Northern Coalition, on the morning of the 24th March, 1927, were more serious than any which had occurred since the launching of the Kuomintang Northern Military Expedition in the previous spring. It may be noted that,

¹ The account, given in this section, of the outrages against foreigners which were committed at Nanking by Kuomintang troops on the 24th March, 1927, and the following days, is based on a comparison of the following documents:

A. *First-Hand Accounts.*

1. Official report by the U.S. Consul at Nanking, Mr. John K. Davis (summary in *The United States Daily*, 4th April, 1927; text *ibid.*, 10th, 11th and 12th May, 1927. N.B. There appears to be a lacuna between the instalments published on the 10th and on the 11th).

2. Report of personal experiences from the 23rd to the 25th March, 1927, by the British Consul-General at Nanking, Mr. Bertram Giles (published in British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2953 of 1927).

3. Report by the British Vice-Consul at Nanking, seen and approved by the British Consul-General (quoted by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the course of a debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 6th April, 1927; published in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 723-4).

4. Report, dated the 29th March, 1927, by Captain England, R.N., Commanding Officer of H.B.M.S. *Emerald*, on events at Nanking up to and including the 25th March, 1927 (*Cmd.* 2953 of 1927).

5. Report, dated the 4th April, 1927, by Captain England, in continuation of his preceding report (*Cmd.* 2953 of 1927).

6. Sworn statement by Mrs. Giles, the wife of the British Consul-General at Nanking (published in *The Times*, 31st March, 1927; in *Cmd.* 2953 of 1927; and in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 724-5).

7. Sworn statement by Mr. Brown, in the employ of a British firm at Nanking (*Cmd.* 2953 of 1927).

8. Statement by seventeen American missionaries stationed at Nanking (published in *The United States Daily*, 9th May, 1927, and in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 725-6).

9. Statement by twelve American missionaries stationed at Nanking, six of them being also signatories of Document 8 (published in *The United States Daily*, 9th May, 1927, and in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 726-9).

B. *Second-Hand Accounts.*

10. Summary of the facts concerning the death of Dr. J. E. Williams at Nanking on the 24th March, 1927, as established by the sworn affidavits of the American eyewitnesses, taken by Consul John K. Davis at Nanking and by Consul-General Clarence E. Gauss at Shanghai (*The United States Daily*, 8th April, 1927).

11. Preliminary statement issued on the 31st March, 1927, by the Foreign Minister of the Kuomintang Government at Hankow, Mr. Eugene Chen (*The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 729).

12-16. Statements by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 28th March, 1927 (12); the 30th March (13); the 4th April (14); the 6th April (15); and the 9th May (16).

while the anti-foreign activities at Hankow and Kiukiang in January 1927¹ were ostentatiously concentrated against the British, those at Nanking in March were directed against all foreigners indiscriminately.² The British, American and Japanese Consuls at Nanking were all attacked in their official quarters with full knowledge of their respective nationality and status;³ and the British, American, Japanese, French, and Italian communities in Nanking were all represented in the list of foreigners killed and wounded.

Nanking was an ancient and famous Chinese walled city. The city wall, which was about twenty miles long, had been laid out with an eye to taking military advantage of the *terrain* (according to the lights of military science before the invention of artillery); and this fact had several corollaries which are important for an understanding of the events recorded below. First, the area enclosed by the wall, which formed a pear-shaped figure on the map, was set at right angles to the Yangtse, with the stalk of the pear pointing towards the river-bank and with a space from half to three-quarters of a mile broad between the river-bank and the nearest section of the city wall. Secondly, the area within the walls, so far from being completely built over, was largely cultivated or waste; and this uninhabited intra-mural area was relatively large at Nanking,⁴ which at different times had been the capital, or one of the capitals, of the Chinese Empire⁵ and had been laid out for a larger population than the 400,000 which, in round numbers, was the estimate for the year 1927. In the third place, the chief centres of population and of business activity in the city were situated at a considerable distance from the river-bank, and this had determined the location of some of the principal foreign establishments. For example, the American University of Nanking was about four and a half miles from the river, the American Consulate about two and a half and the British Consulate about one and a half.⁶ Even Standard Oil House ('Socony

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A (8) (xii) (e).

² See a declaration on this point, made by a N.C.O. of the Kuomintang Army to the American Consul, in Document 1. See also Document 9. On one occasion, however, on the 24th March, the party at the British Consulate saved themselves by describing themselves as Americans (Document 2), and this implies that the animus against the British was still greater than that against other foreigners.

³ Document 1, summary.

⁴ The phenomenon of a more or less extensive uninhabited intra-mural area was usual, not only in other Chinese walled cities, but likewise in European walled cities in antiquity and in the Middle Ages. See also Herodotus's celebrated description of Babylon.

⁵ e.g. from A.D. 1368 to 1399 during the first period of the Ming Dynasty.

⁶ For these distances see Document 1 and *The Times*, 22nd March, 1927, as well as the sketch-map, *ibid.*, 26th March, 1927.

House'),¹ which stood on a hill just inside that short sector of the wall which overlooked the Yangtse, was about a mile distant from the bank in a direct line. It should be added that, in 1927, Nanking possessed a railway connexion with Shanghai, and that the trans-Yangtse suburb of Pukow was the terminus of another railway which ran northward to Tientsin and thence to Peking.² The terminus of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway and the ferry station opposite Pukow were both situated in the strip of open ground between the city wall of Nanking and the river-bank, and this strip had become covered by the modern industrial and commercial suburb of Hsiakwan.

Down to the resumption of the Kuomintang offensive in the middle of February 1927,³ Nanking had been included in the domain of Sun Ch'uan-fang; and, upon Sun's military collapse, the city had been occupied by the Fengtien and Shantung expeditionary force which had been concentrated, since November 1926, at Pukow.⁴ During the interval between the resumption of the Kuomintang offensive and the actual arrival of the Kuomintang troops there was the same anxiety among foreigners (though not the same tension between foreigners and the local Chinese population) at Nanking as at Shanghai. The foreign community at Nanking had in mind the events which had occurred at Hankow and Kiukiang earlier in the year; and their forebodings seemed to be confirmed by the disorders which broke out at Wuhu, the next treaty port up river from Nanking, on the 8th March. At Wuhu, on that date, there was looting by a mob incited by agitators, and a British naval landing party evacuated all British women and children on board a merchant-steamer in the Yangtse. This rioting was simultaneous with the arrival of Kuomintang troops belonging to General Ch'eng Ch'ien's army who were under the immediate command of Ho Yao-tsu. The same commander (Ho) and the same troops were concerned in the outrages at Nanking sixteen days later, and also in the Tsinanfu affair of May 1928.⁵ At Wuhu, however, the Chinese police and other troops endeavoured to afford protection; and, although these troops were tardy in their action, General Ch'eng Ch'ien himself, in concert with the local authorities, succeeded in re-establishing law and order; business, Chinese and foreign, was resumed on the 10th March; and demonstrations on the 9th and 12th March passed off without incident.⁶ In the

¹ S(andard) O(il) C(ompany) O(f) N(ew) Y(ork).

² For the part played by the Tientsin-Pukow Railway in the Chinese civil war during the the year 1927, see pp. 323-5.

³ See section (i), p. 324 above.

⁴ See p. 323 above.

⁵ This will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

⁶ For these events at Wuhu see a statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in

light of the precedents, the foreign authorities and foreign residents at Nanking, though they 'foresaw endless trouble in connexion with boycotts and agitations', did not contemplate 'that foreigners themselves or their houses would be directly attacked.'¹ Nevertheless, when it became evident that Nanking would change hands, the foreign authorities advised that the women and children of their respective communities should leave, and made arrangements for evacuating them. By the evening of the 22nd March, only six British women remained in the city,² and these of their own deliberate choice;³ and by the evening of the 23rd only forty-nine American women and nineteen children.⁴ On the 22nd seventeen American marines and blue-jackets and on the 23rd eighteen British marines from the warships stationed off Nanking, in the Yangtse, were smuggled through the city-gate in motor-cars by twos and threes. The British marines (who were only able to bring with them one service rifle and a few service revolvers) were posted at the British Consulate; the Americans were divided between the American Consulate and Socony House, and at the same time the number of signalmen at the latter point was increased.⁵

During the 23rd and the greater part of the night of the 23rd-24th, the Northern troops were retiring across the river from Nanking to Pukow; and the misdemeanours committed against foreigners by these troops at this time seem to have been negligible.⁶ 'At 7.0 a.m. [on the 24th] conditions on the bund were completely quiet', but 'at 7.30 very heavy rifle fire took place all along the bund and across the river',⁷ and this marked the completion of the occupation of the walled city of Nanking by the Kuomintang forces and their arrival on the river-bank. From that moment onward the foreign warships and the hulks belonging to British firms, as well as the International Export Company's premises on the bank, seem to have been continuously under fire,⁸ and a blue-jacket on board H.B.M.S. *Emerald* was killed by a rifle bullet wound in the head in the course of the morning.⁹ Early on the same morning, murderous attacks on foreigners began on land.

The perpetrators of these attacks were soldiers belonging to the Kuomintang Army, as was proved not only by the uniforms which they wore¹⁰ but by the well-attested and conclusive evidence that they

the House of Commons at Westminster on the 16th April, 1927; also *The Times*, 10th, 12th and 16th March and 29th April, 1927.

¹ Document 2.

² Documents 2 and 15.

³ Document 4.

⁴ Document 1.

⁵ For these dispositions see Documents 1 and 4.

⁶ Documents 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 13.

⁷ Document 4.

⁸ Document 4.

⁹ Document 4.

¹⁰ Documents 3, 5, 8, 14.

spoke in the dialects of the southern provinces Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwantung.¹ The plan of attack was premeditated and preconcerted,² as was 'proved by the uniformity of acts and statements of the troops who carried it out; by the simultaneous nature of the action in all parts of the city; by the thoroughness and swiftness with which it was carried out; by statements overheard by some of us³ in hiding, unknown to the speakers; and by the statements made to numbers of us by Chinese friends, while we were concealed and they were in communication with the soldiers.'⁴ The perpetrators showed signs of having been worked up to a fanatical hatred of foreigners by propaganda;⁵ but they were not out of control, for they did not molest the local Chinese population, either in their persons or in their property,⁶ and they were observed to obey signals on the whistle from their officers and bugle calls intimating that they were to cease operations (for instance, after the foreign warships opened fire on the afternoon of the 24th).⁷ Cases were reported in which officers looked on at outrages committed by soldiers without interfering;⁸ and it was even alleged that some officers took part in the outrages themselves.⁹

The outrages were committed without provocation; and this was true not only of the looting of houses and the stripping of individuals of their valuables and even of the clothes in which they stood, but of the murders and the still more numerous abortive attacks with intent to kill. At the Japanese Consulate—where two Japanese nationals received bayonet wounds and where the Consul himself was fired at (but not hit) as he lay ill in bed—the naval officer in command of the guard of blue-jackets, at the instance of the civilians, had dismantled his defences and refrained from offering resistance in order to avoid giving provocation—an experience which affected him so painfully that, after reporting to his Admiral, he committed suicide.¹⁰ When the Kuomintang soldiers surrounded the British Consul-General's private house in the Consulate grounds, where the party of British marines was posted, the non-commissioned officer who was at that moment in command 'ordered them to load their rifles¹¹ and prepared

¹ Documents 1, 3, 9.

² Documents 1, 5, 8, 9, 13.

³ i.e. of the American missionaries responsible for the statement here quoted.

⁴ Document 9. Cf. Document 3.

⁵ Documents, 1, 2, 9.

⁶ Documents 5, 3, 7.

⁷ Documents 3, 8, 9, 13.

⁸ Documents 2 and 3. See, however, Document 6, for one instance in which an officer did intervene on behalf of foreigners who were being ill-treated by soldiers.

⁹ Document 9.

¹⁰ *The Times*, 30th March, 1927.

¹¹ They had been armed with old-fashioned rifles belonging to the Consulate (Document 2).

to open fire, but cancelled this order shortly afterwards'.¹ Upon news of the occupation of his house, the Consul-General went across from his office (a separate building in the same grounds) accompanied by three officers (two of whom had come on shore from H.B.M.S. *Emerald*, while the third was an intelligence officer of the Shanghai Defence Force²). Though they all came unarmed, the soldiers immediately started firing on them with intent to kill and kept up the fusillade till they reached cover. The Consul-General and one officer were wounded, and another Englishman, Dr. Satchwell Smith, who was crossing the lawn, was shot in the back and killed.³ The only victim who appears to have struggled with his assailants (and he, too, was apparently unarmed) was the Harbour Master, Mr. Huber (British), who was shot dead in the Consul-General's office later in the morning.⁴ The American Consul evacuated his Consulate before it was attacked, in agreement with the officer of marines in command of the guard there; yet his party, though they displayed the American flag, were shot at continually as they made their way from the Consulate to Socony Hill, and one Chinese servant was killed and one American blue-jacket wounded before they reached shelter.⁵ Moreover, when the Kuomintang soldiers broke into the Consulate immediately after the party had left, they fired at the Chinese staff, though fortunately without inflicting casualties.⁶ Again, at the University of Nanking, an American citizen, Dr. J. E. Williams, was shot dead by one soldier while he was being plundered, without offering resistance, by another.⁷ In all, six foreigners were killed, namely: Dr. Williams, Dr. Smith, Mr. Huber, and two priests, one French and one Italian, on land, and Able-Seaman Knox on board H.B.M.S. *Emerald*; the British Consul-General, Captain Spear of the British Shanghai Defence Force, one American and several Japanese were wounded;⁸ and a number of foreign women were subjected to outrageous treatment, not stopping short of attempts to rape them.⁹ It may be noted that

¹ Document 5. Cf. Documents 2 and 7.

² There seems to be no evidence that the course of events at Nanking on this day was affected by the fact that this officer was present in this capacity. Indeed, there is nothing to show that the Kuomintang military authorities were aware of his status. His presence, however, in Chinese territory under Chinese administration so far afield was perhaps unfortunate, because—like the flights of British aeroplanes and the extension of certain sections of the British military cordon beyond the limits of the Shanghai International Settlement—it was a formal infringement of Chinese sovereignty for which it would have been difficult to find a warrant in existing treaty rights.

³ Documents 2 and 6.

⁵ Document 1.

⁸ Document 14.

⁶ Document 1.

⁹ Document 9.

⁴ Documents 2 and 7.

⁷ Document 10.

the American, British and Japanese Consuls and the British Consul's wife were all shot at with intent to kill, and that their Consulates were all looted. The looting of foreign property in Nanking by the Kuomintang soldiery continued for several days.¹

Meanwhile, in the course of the 24th March, the foreigners who had escaped with their lives came to be collected into three parties: one at the University, another at the British Consulate and a third on Socony Hill. The party at the British Consulate were held under duress and threatened. The party on Socony Hill were attacked with rifle fire; and when Socony House was on the point of being rushed by the assailants, the American Consul (who had retreated thither, as recorded already) agreed that the American blue-jackets posted there should shoot to kill.² When, even so, it seemed impossible to keep the assailants at bay without support from the warships in the river, the party on the hill signalled,³ at 3.22 p.m., to H.B.M.S. *Emerald* and to the American torpedo boat destroyers present to open fire;⁴ but this signal was immediately cancelled, as the Consul hoped that his party 'might be able to get away without it, and was not certain what the effect of the firing of naval guns would be upon the safety of the Americans and other foreigners scattered in various parts of the city'.⁵ At 3.37 p.m., however, when 'the situation at Socony House became desperate',⁶ the signal was repeated, and this time the ships opened fire and kept up a barrage behind the party on the hill, while the latter made their way over the city-wall (at this point about fifty feet high) and then across the open space between the wall and the river, where they were met by a naval landing-party.⁷

The firing from the warships was carried on intermittently for seventy minutes, seventy-six shells altogether being fired by H.B.M.S. *Emerald* and about the same number by the American ships.⁸ These shells can have caused little or no loss of Chinese civilian life or property, since the ground covered by the barrage lay in that area inside the walled city which was not built over. (The few isolated buildings in the neighbourhood belonged to foreigners.)⁹ General Chiang Kai-shek afterwards estimated the Chinese casualties at six

¹ Document 14.

² Document 1.

³ The American signalmen distinguished themselves by the courage with which they exposed themselves under fire (see Captain England's testimony in Document 4).

⁴ Documents 1 and 4.

⁵ Document 1. Cf. Document 4.

⁶ Document 4.

⁷ For descriptions of this escape see Documents 1 and 4.

⁸ Documents 4 and 14.

⁹ Document 14.

killed and fifteen wounded,¹ and presumably these were not civilians but Kuomintang soldiers engaged in the attack upon the foreign refugees on Socony Hill.

It should be mentioned that while the Kuomintang soldiery stood convicted of systematic looting and cold-blooded murder, and their officers, on the most charitable interpretation, of criminal inertia, there was no imputation against either the Northern troops² or the civilian population of Nanking itself. Indeed, the 'Chinese merchant class and shopkeepers and coolies . . . seemed to be very distressed at the whole business';³ 'local police did what they could to assist' the foreigners 'and several times intervened to save their lives';⁴ and many of the Chinese officials and servants of the British and American Consulates showed courage and devotion⁵—the gateman of the American Consulate accompanying the Consul *en route* from the Consulate to Socony Hill under fire, until he was shot down.⁶

'The effect of the firing [from the warships] was instantaneous' when the sound reached the British Consulate. 'The street cleared as if by magic; no further parties of soldiers disturbed us for the rest of that evening; and, although they continued to stream in and out of the Consulate on the following day, we experienced but little trouble at their hands.'⁷ This experience confirmed the impression of the commanding officer of H.B.M.S. *Emerald*, who reported that 'the outstanding feature of the effect of the ships' fire was the complete cessation of everything ashore. All firing and shouting stopped forthwith, and the change to complete silence was very noticeable.'⁸ The bombardment was afterwards vigorously defended in public statements by American missionaries who had been present at Nanking at the time.⁹

After the bombardment of the area adjoining Socony Hill and the rescue of the refugees in Socony House,¹⁰ a deputation from the local branch of the Swastika Society (the Chinese equivalent of the Western Red Cross) came on board the *Emerald* to negotiate on behalf of the officer commanding the Kuomintang troops which had occupied Nanking that morning. The British and American authorities handed to this deputation a demand, in writing, that an order should be given immediately for the protection of foreigners; that the

¹ Document 14.

² On this point see p. 385 above.

³ Document 7. Cf. Document 8.

⁴ Document 7. Cf. Documents 1 and 2.

⁵ Documents 1, 2, 6, 7.

⁶ Document 1.

⁷ Document 2.

⁸ Document 4.

⁹ Documents 8 and 9.

¹⁰ The following account of events, from that moment until the completion of the evacuation of the foreigners in Nanking, is based on Documents 1 and 4.

officer should come on board himself by 11.0 p.m.; and that all foreigners in the city should be escorted to the bund by 10.0 o'clock next morning—otherwise, Nanking and Hsiakwan would be treated as military areas. At 10.30 p.m. the delegates returned with a letter from a superior officer, General Ch'eng Ch'ien, the commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang Army to which the occupying troops belonged, who stated that he had only arrived in Nanking at 5.30 p.m. (i. e. a few minutes before the naval bombardment began)¹ and gave assurances that foreigners would be protected and would be brought out of the city. The foreign authorities answered by insisting that a Kuomintang general should come on board before noon on the 25th to receive their formal demands; but to this General Ch'eng Ch'ien returned 'an insolent and evasive reply',² and by noon on the 25th the foreigners had not been brought out of the city and no general had come on board. Three subordinate officers, however, presented themselves on board the U.S.S. *Isabel*, 'and it was impressed on them verbally that unless the foreigners were brought to the bund during the afternoon drastic action would certainly be taken. They were strongly advised to report this to their superior officer without delay, and they left *Isabel* thoroughly frightened.'³ At a conference of British, American and French naval officers held on board the *Isabel* at 4.0 p.m. on that day, the 25th, 'plans were concerted for bombarding if the foreigners were not brought out of the city, and it was while the final discussion was actually taking place that the British Consulate Party were brought down to the bund by the Swastika Society, and they were followed closely afterwards by the Americans from the Nanking University.'⁴ A further and more serious collision between the foreign warships and the Kuomintang forces at Nanking was thus averted at the eleventh hour by the good will and energy of the Swastika Society, who, by their conduct in this crisis, gave their countrymen a demonstration that enlightened patriotism might be not incompatible with disinterested humanity.⁵

While further attacks upon the persons of foreigners in Nanking were thus precluded by the completion of their evacuation on board ship on the afternoon of the 25th March, the looting of their property,

¹ Document 4. Cf. Document 11.

² Document 4. For details see Document 1. It should be noted, however, in fairness to General Ch'eng Ch'ien, that sixteen days earlier, at Wuhu, he does appear to have made efforts—and on that occasion with success—to protect foreigners and to restore order when he found that his subordinates had got out of hand. (See p. 384 above.)

³ Document 4.

⁴ Document 4.

⁵ For the action taken by the Swastika Society see Documents 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.

both private and public, on land continued for some days;¹ and similar depredations on private property were afterwards committed at the next treaty-port down the river, Chinkiang, which was occupied by Kuomintang troops from Nanking on the 3rd April,² though here no casualties were inflicted, since at Chinkiang all foreign residents had taken refuge on board ship before the Kuomintang troops arrived. The British Concession at Chinkiang was eventually evacuated by these troops on General Chiang Kai-shek's orders;³ and the British Consulate there was withdrawn during the week-end preceding the 23rd May, 1927.⁴ This Consulate, as well as other buildings at Chinkiang which were foreign property, were occupied again by Chinese troops on several subsequent occasions. At Nanking the British Consulate-General and other British buildings remained under constant Chinese occupation for more than a year.

Meanwhile General Chiang Kai-shek had shown his helplessness and embarrassment in face of these outrages, for which he bore the ultimate responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang Armies, first by sending assurances, before the evening of the 24th March, that he would ensure the safety of the lives and property of all foreigners,⁵ and thereafter by sending a message on the 1st April to the British Consul-General at Shanghai, informing him that he regretted and assumed responsibility for the events at Nanking and that he would afford satisfaction in due course, although he reserved the right to protest against the bombardment.⁶

On the 11th April the American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese Governments presented identic notes⁷ in duplicate:⁸ through their Consuls-General at Shanghai to General Pai Chung-hsi for his superior General Chiang Kai-shek,⁹ and through their Consuls-

¹ Document 14.

² Speech by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 6th April, 1927.

³ *The Times*, 26th April, 1927, and 7th May, 1927. Statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 26th April, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 23rd May, 1927. Official property generally was found untouched, but all personal property had been looted or damaged.

⁵ Document 4.

⁶ Document 14. Compare General Chiang Kai-shek's statement to British and American journalists at Shanghai on the 31st March, 1927, as reported in *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st April, 1927.

⁷ Full text in *Cmd.* 2953 of 1927 and in *The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 730.

⁸ The five identic notes were presented in duplicate at Shanghai and Hankow because at that moment the Kuomintang Government was on the eve of splitting into two.

⁹ For a description of the ceremony at Shanghai see *Le Temps*, 13th April, 1927.

General at Hankow to Mr. Eugene Chen. The notes conveyed the following three demands:

1. Adequate punishment of the Commanders of the troops responsible for murders, personal injuries and indignities and material damage done, as also of all persons found to be implicated.

2. Apology in writing by the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army, including an express written undertaking to refrain from all forms of violence and agitation against foreign lives and property.

3. Complete reparation for personal injuries and material damage done.

Simultaneously, an explanatory statement, couched in studiously conciliatory language,¹ was issued by the Ministers of the five Powers at Peking.

On the 31st March, Mr. Chen had anticipated these diplomatic protests by issuing a preliminary statement² in which (in contradiction with the apparently conclusive evidence which has been cited in this *Survey*) he maintained that the outrages had been committed by Northern soldiers ('many of whom wore uniforms taken from Nationalist soldiers') and local ruffians, at the instigation 'of reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements'; implied (without positively asserting) that no Kuomintang troops had entered Nanking before General Ch'eng Ch'ien's arrival there at 5.30 p.m. on the 24th March;³ and suggested that, for every foreign casualty, a hundred casualties had been inflicted on Chinese by the naval bombardment.

On the 14th April he replied to the five identic notes from the foreign powers in separate notes which were distinguished from one another by carefully calculated variations.⁴ To every Power whose Consulate at Nanking had been attacked, he expressed regret for this outrage and undertook to make good all damage done, without prejudice to the question of the party by whom the damage had been caused. To every Power, he further promised reparation for material damage and personal injuries suffered by its nationals, except in

¹ Text in *The Times*, 12th April, 1927, and in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 730-1.

² Document 11.

³ His words ran: 'The British, American and Japanese Consulates were attacked and a few foreign lives unfortunately lost and some foreign property looted before order could be fully restored by the Nationalist forces under General Ch'eng Ch'ien, who entered Nanking on the 24th March at 5.30 p.m. The latter ordered the execution of a number of those who had attacked and looted foreigners.'

⁴ Text of his reply to the British Government in *Cmd.* 2953 of 1927 and in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 731-2; texts of his replies to the United States Government and to the Japanese Government in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 732-5. The text of his reply to the United States Government is also printed in *The United States Daily*, 16th April, 1927.

cases in which these could definitely be proved to have been caused either by Northern soldiers or *agents provocateurs* or by the naval bombardment; and he declared that, over and above written undertakings, effective measures would be taken to afford proper protection in future to foreign lives and property. As regarded the establishment of guilt, he proposed that bilateral commissions of inquiry should be set up to investigate the circumstances not only of the outrages against foreigners but of the naval bombardment on the 24th March, and he suggested that the questions of punishment and apology should await the results of such investigations. Finally, he submitted to every Power that the chief danger to foreign lives and property in China lay in their insistence upon maintaining the régime of the Unequal Treaties. In addition to these points common to all his five notes, Mr. Chen proposed to the French Government that 'the Shameen Shooting Incident' of the 23rd June, 1925,¹ and to the British Government that not only this but 'the Shanghai Shooting Incident' of the 30th May, 1925,² and the Wanh sien Incident of 1926³ should be included in the respective terms of reference of the proposed Sino-French and Sino-British Commissions of Inquiry. To the Japanese Government he sought to appeal by invoking 'Japanese comprehension of the historical forces which to-day are operating in China just as similar forces operated in Japan within the past half-century and emancipated her from the servitudes of unequal treaties'.

The several recipients of these notes from Mr. Chen appear to have been of one mind in regarding them as unsatisfactory, and at the same time to have reached the identical conclusion that, in view of the split in the Kuomintang which had reappeared since the commission of the outrages on the 24th March and had become definite since the presentation of the identic notes on the 11th April,⁴ any attempt to enforce sanctions would be inopportune.⁵ The British Government's attitude was defined on the 9th May, 1927, in the House of Commons at Westminster, by Sir Austen Chamberlain, who stated that they did not propose to address any further note to Mr. Chen and had so informed the other Powers. He explained that Mr. Chen's

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 386-7.

² *Op. cit.*, Part III, section (xi) (a).

³ See the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 308-14.

⁴ For the history of this split in the Kuomintang, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part III, Introduction; the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 283-5; the present volume, section (ii) of this part.

⁵ For the United States Government's views on this matter, see *The Times*, 19th and 20th April, 4th and 9th May, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th April, 1927.

notes had 'received their answer in the practical disappearance of the Power which he affected to represent'; but that 'the questions of responsibility and reparation' were 'on a different footing'; that 'whatever Government' emerged 'from the present confusion north and south of the Yangtse' would be 'held responsible for outrages on British subjects resulting from the civil war'; and that 'compensation and reparation' would 'be demanded'. In this connexion, Sir Austen Chamberlain referred to the Government which had been formed on the 18th April at Nanking,¹ and declared that 'the moderation of the Powers in dealing with the Nanking incident' was 'largely inspired by a desire not to embarrass this or any other new Government in their task of introducing order in the territory under their control'.

Mr. Chen's failure to accept the demands of the 11th April was one of the reasons afterwards given by the British Government, in the communication handed to Mr. Chen on the 17th May, 1927,² for its decision to withdraw its representative from Hankow.

Meanwhile, in the course of the next few months, the Foreign Minister of the new Kuomintang Government at Nanking several times intimated an intention to accept responsibility and to make reparation for the outrages committed in March.³ Thereafter, the Nanking as well as the Hankow Kuomintang Government virtually dissolved;⁴ and in this situation, on the 21st August, a hundred British marines were temporarily landed at Nanking in order to protect the International Export Company's property.⁵ After the emergence of a reunited Kuomintang Government at Nanking in the autumn of 1927,⁶ negotiations for a settlement of the issues raised by the Nanking outrages of March 1927 were reopened between this Government and the foreign Powers concerned in the spring of 1928.⁷

(d) HANKOW AND KIUKIANG

In the preceding volume,⁸ an account has been given of the negotiations between Mr. Owen O'Malley and Mr. Eugene Chen for the modification of the status of the two former British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang; and it has been recorded that these negotia-

¹ See p. 339 above.

² For this communication see p. 396 below.

³ For intimations to this effect, see *The Times*, 27th May and 30th June, 1927; *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd July, 1927.

⁴ See p. 357 above for Chiang Kai-shek's resignation on the 12th August.

⁵ *The Times*, 23rd August, 1927.

⁶ See p. 357 above.

⁷ These negotiations will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.

⁸ *Survey for 1926*, pp. 354-8.

tions resulted in the signature, on the 19th February, 1927, of an agreement for the conditional rendition of the Concession at Hankow and, on the 20th February, of an agreement for a similar arrangement at Kiukiang—an understanding which was implemented on the 2nd March by the signature of a further agreement for the unconditional rendition of the British Concession in the latter treaty-port. Simultaneously with the exchange of notes on the 2nd March, Mr. Chen, in pursuance of the precedent agreement of the 20th February, transmitted to Mr. O'Malley, in compensation for the losses suffered by British subjects during the disturbances at Kiukiang in January, a cheque for \$ (Mexican) 40,000.¹

At both Hankow and Kiukiang, the stipulated changes of régime were duly carried out on the appointed date, the 15th March. At Hankow, in accordance with the agreed regulations, the new special Chinese municipality came under the administration of a Council consisting of the Chinese Mayor of Wuchang as Director and six Councillors, three of whom were Chinese and the other three British subjects nominated by the British Consul-General.² After Mr. O'Malley's departure from Hankow, another member of the British diplomatic service, Mr. Basil Newton, was appointed to represent the British Minister in China *auprès* the Hankow Government.³

Meanwhile, for the moment, the local situation on the middle Yangtse was affected less by the extensive sacrifices of acquired rights which Great Britain had just made in the cause of conciliation than by the vicissitudes of the struggle between the several factions in the Kuomintang. In the course of these vicissitudes, a Government more than ever dominated by the Russian Mission held the field at Hankow from April 1927 until July;⁴ and under this régime conditions were no better for foreigners than they had been during the first quarter of the year. At Hankow, by the last week in April, only about two hundred British subjects and about seventy-five Americans, mostly men, still remained, and these were concentrated for safety either on board ship or in houses on the river front. The British Consul-General had had to establish himself on board ship; and four further British warships had arrived to reinforce the British naval

¹ Texts of the five notes, relative to Kiukiang, which were exchanged between Mr. O'Malley and Mr. Chen on the 2nd March, 1927, in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 739-41. The texts of the Hankow Agreement and the accompanying documents are also printed in *op. cit.*, pp. 741-8.

² After the first year, the three British Councillors were no longer to be nominated by the Consul-General but to be elected from among persons entitled to vote. (Statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 6th April, 1927. Cf. *The Times*, 17th March, 1927.)

³ *The Times*, 23rd March, 1927.

⁴ See section (ii), above.

forces already in the port. 'The situation' was 'very tense and large numbers of better class Chinese' were 'leaving'.¹ After the formation of the right wing Kuomintang Government at Nanking on the 18th April, the Hankow Government did, indeed, make certain efforts to improve conditions for foreigners²—partly, perhaps, because they feared that the weight of foreign influence might be cast into the Nanking Government's scale, but more directly on account of the financial straits to which they were reduced through the Nanking Government's control of the sources of public revenue at Shanghai and Canton.³ At this stage, the Hankow Government seem to have realized that their best prospect of revenue lay in a resumption of business by the local foreign community;⁴ but this prospect was made still farther remote by the mistaken financial expedient of an embargo upon silver, to which they resorted on the 18th April, and moreover by this time it was too late for them either to reassure and reconcile the foreigners or to restrain the passions and appetites which they had aroused among their own followers. In these circumstances, Sir Austen Chamberlain stated, in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 9th May, 1927, that the question of a re-occupation of the former British Concession at Hankow had been considered by the British Government; that, in their opinion, they had ample justification for re-occupying the Concession and for regarding the Chen-O'Malley Agreement as cancelled by the Hankow Government's own acts; and that they had the means for re-occupation at hand; but that, on full consideration, they had decided not to take this step now and hoped that it might not be forced upon them, in as much as the Hankow Agreement had been signed, not for the exigencies of the moment, but with a view to the whole future policy of Great Britain in China.⁵ They did decide, however, to withdraw their representative from Hankow; and on the 17th May Mr. Newton handed to Mr. Chen a communication⁶ in which, after recapitulating the relations between the two Governments and putting on record the position in which British subjects found themselves in the Hankow

¹ Statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 26th April, 1927. For the insecurity of life and property and paralysis of business at Hankow, see further *The Times*, 24th and 30th March; 6th April; 2nd and 21st May, 1927.

² *The Times*, 2nd May, 1927.

³ See p. 340 above.

⁴ *The Times*, 2nd May, 1927.

⁵ For earlier intimations by Sir Austen Chamberlain that the British Government, in its policy in China, was acting on a long view, see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 243.

⁶ Text of Mr. Newton's note in *Omd.* 2953 of 1927; *The Times*, 19th May, 1927; *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 751-2.

Government's domain,¹ he announced that the British Government had been forced to the conclusion that his retention at Hankow, as the representative of the British Minister in China, was both useless and undesirable and that, in accordance with instructions, he was therefore leaving Hankow forthwith. He duly left on the 19th May, 1927.²

It remains to record briefly the history of the former British Concession at Hankow, under the new régime, from the 15th March, 1927, down to the close of the year.³

Financially, the new municipality at first found itself in a precarious situation, owing largely to the fact that the municipal administration was forced to accept depreciated currency. From the 3rd August, however, payment of rates and taxes was placed on a silver basis. The efficiency and discipline of the police force also deteriorated at first but was reformed in May; and in November, in the British Government's opinion, neither the state of discipline of the police force nor the sanitation of the area furnished substantial ground for complaint. The office of Director, however—the incumbent of which, according to Article 6 of the Regulations attached to the Chen-O'Malley Agreement, was to be appointed by the Foreign Minister of the Kuomintang Government and confirmed by that Government as a whole—changed hands no less than four times before the Hankow Kuomintang Government's demise; and on the 26th September the fourth incumbent fled to Shanghai in order to avoid arrest by the military authorities⁴—leaving an order to the effect that the Council as a whole should serve, during his absence, as a committee of management.⁵ At the meeting of the Council on the 29th September, at which three British and two Chinese members were present, it was resolved by a majority vote to abolish the

¹ In both Sir Austen Chamberlain's statement of the 9th May and Mr. Newton's communication of the 17th May, one of the points made in the indictment against the Hankow Government was that all British subjects had had to be evacuated from districts up-river from Hankow and that the British consulates at Chengtu, Chungking, Ichang and Changsha had had to close. In justice to the Hankow Government it must be noted that the Province of Szechuan, in which Chungking and Chengtu lay, was not only outside their domain but was in the hands of local Tsuchüns some of whom—for example, Yang Sen—were in a state of war with them.

² *The Times*, 21st May, 1927.

³ The following facts are taken, unless otherwise stated, from the answers given to parliamentary questions in the House of Commons at Westminster by Sir Austen Chamberlain on the 8th and 16th November, 1927.

⁴ Apparently he was charged with having embezzled funds belonging to the Hankow Government when previously employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*The Times*, 4th October, 1927).

⁵ *The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 753; *The Times*, 30th September, 1927.

emoluments which the Director had hitherto received.¹ On the 1st October, 1927, the local Political Council at Hankow, which at that time was an instrument in the hands of General Tang Sheng-chih, appointed a new Director; and this appointment was afterwards confirmed by the Foreign Minister of the Government at Nanking, Mr. C. C. Wu.² On the 8th October, however, the British Consul-General at Hankow, acting on instructions from the British Minister at Peking, addressed a note³ to the local Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in which he submitted that the Kuomintang Government which had been a party to the Chen-O'Malley Agreement had disappeared from Hankow and that, pending the re-establishment of an effective Kuomintang Government, the British authorities could not recognize any new Director and saw no alternative but to leave the Director's powers in the hands of the existing Sino-British Council. On the 18th October, the local Commissioner for Foreign Affairs replied⁴ by asserting that the Kuomintang Government which had been a party to the Chen-O'Malley Agreement had not disappeared but had simply transferred its seat from Hankow to Nanking,⁵ and that the British Government was violating the Chen-O'Malley Agreement in refusing to recognize the Director newly appointed 'by the competent authorities'. Meanwhile, the Municipal Council proceeded to exercise the Director's functions and was still continuing to do so at the end of the year.

In the course of this same year 1927 the Japanese community at Hankow, as well as the British, had to suffer from Chinese aggression. On the 3rd April, for example, an attempt was made to occupy the Japanese Concession by those tactics which had been employed against the British Concession on the 3rd January.⁶ An altercation between a Japanese blue-jacket and a Chinese workman was followed up by an invasion of the Concession by a Chinese mob; but a landing-party from a Japanese warship in the river drove the mob out of the Concession by force,⁷ and although, as a measure of precaution, all

¹ *The China Year Book*, 1928 and *The Times*, 4th October, 1927.

² *The China Year Book*, 1928 and *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

³ Text in *The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 753.

⁴ Text of his note in *The China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 754-5.

⁵ For the actual relations between the Governments at Hankow and Nanking, see Section (ii). It may be noted that the Nanking Government dispatched a punitive expedition against General Tang Sheng-chih on the 21st October and occupied Hankow by force of arms on the 16th November (see p. 358 above).

⁶ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part IIIA, section (δ) (xii) (c).

⁷ In the process, two Japanese and about twelve Chinese appear to have been killed.

Japanese residents were taken on board ship that evening, the Japanese Consul rejected a proposal from General Tang Sheng-chih that the Japanese guards should be withdrawn.¹ Instead, the landing-party was increased to 600 men,² with field-guns,³ and the resumption of trade was refused until order had been restored.⁴ In June, the Hankow Government appears to have accepted Japanese demands for compensation for damages to Japanese property during this *émeute* and to have offered guarantees for the future; but on the 21st September there was a clash between Japanese and Chinese soldiers at Hankow, in consequence of which the Japanese Concession was temporarily garrisoned by a landing-party once again.⁵

It will be seen that at Hankow, during the year 1927, the Japanese Government showed itself less reluctant than the British Government to resist Chinese aggression by force; and this local difference of tactics added appreciably to the difficulties encountered by the British Government in carrying out the policy upon which it had embarked, since it fortified the opposition to that policy among the British communities in the treaty-ports.⁶ It was in accordance with human nature that these British communities on the spot, who were bearing the brunt of the Chinese reaction against the ascendancy of foreigners in China, should chafe at a policy which, when viewed at close quarters, might wear the false appearance of being a surrender to force. His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain, however, was enabled by its situation and was required by its responsibilities to take a larger view; and, according to its own repeated declarations, the policy which it was pursuing was the outcome of mature consideration with an eye to a distant future. It therefore held on its course, without allowing itself to be deflected from it either by the importunities of British residents in China on the one hand or by the excesses of Chinese extremists on the other.

¹ For these events of the 3rd April, 1927, see *The Times*, 4th, 5th and 6th April, 1927.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 7th April, 1927.

³ Statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 26th April, 1927.

⁴ Mr. Locker-Lampson, *loc. cit.*

⁵ For this incident at Hankow on the 21st September, 1927, see *The Times*, 23rd September, 1927.

⁶ It should be noted that the community directly affected—that is, the British community in Hankow itself—seem to have taken a more moderate view than some of their countrymen elsewhere in China. They do not seem to have asked, on any occasion, that the Chen-O'Malley rendition agreement regarding the ex-British Concession at Hankow should be rescinded, but only that the new regulations governing the municipal area should be amended along lines calculated to check the abuses which became apparent in the working of these regulations after the agreement came into force.

PART IV

THE AMERICAN CONTINENT (1926-7)

A. PAN-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

(i) Introduction.¹

IN the international relations of the American Continent during the years 1926 and 1927, the fundamental fact was the expansion of the financial and economic activities of United States citizens beyond the frontiers of the United States into other American countries. This expansion, which was now proceeding on a great and still rapidly increasing scale, was a recent phenomenon. It had been inconspicuous before the beginning of the twentieth century and had not become of outstanding importance until after the outbreak of the General War of 1914-18; but within a short number of years it had grown to dimensions in which it was dominating and transforming the relations between the United States and her American sisters.

The United States had, of course, been far in advance of the other American countries in economic development ever since the New World of American states was first called into being. Already by 1823, her lead on this plane had given her a sufficient political preponderance in the New World to permit the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. Yet this older economic superiority of the United States over the other American countries had been not a difference of kind but only one of degree; and until 1900, or even until 1914, it was still possible to describe the situation of the whole continent in a general formula which applied to the United States as well as to the rest. All the American countries were then still occupied in opening up virgin territories and developing latent resources within their own respective frontiers; ² and all were still dependent upon the European

¹ See further the Foreign Policy Association of New York: *Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 23, 20th January, 1928: 'Mexico, the Caribbean, and Tacna-Arica: Current Relations with the United States', especially the list of references on pp. 369-70 and the statistical appendix on pp. 371-7. Two of the tables in this appendix are quoted at the end of the present section by the courtesy of the Association. See also vol. iii, Special Supplement No. 4, January 1928: 'The United States and Latin America: A Suggested Programme', by R. L. Buell, Research Director of the Association.

² In the United States, 'the Indian frontier' did not wholly disappear until 1893 (see F. L. Paxson: *History of the American Frontier* (Boston, Houghton

money market for borrowing the capital which had to be invested in initial outlays in order that their potential wealth might be made to fructify. The United States was simply leading in a race which all American countries were running; and while this economic lead was sufficient to give her a political preponderance over the others, that preponderance was kept within limits by the general similarity of her economic position to theirs.

It might even be said that the Monroe Doctrine, which in its origin had been partly suggested by British statesmanship, had for long remained a British as well as a United States affair. The British Navy behind the United States Navy had been the ultimate sanction which had prevented the suppression of the revolt in Spanish America by the Holy Alliance; and it had also been Great Britain who had obtained the lion's share of the economic benefit of the Monroe Doctrine in the early days. Under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine, British merchants and British investors had been able to forestall their continental European rivals on the market in Latin America as well as in the United States and in the American dominions of the British Crown. At that stage, the Monroe Doctrine, however much it may have ministered to the political security of the United States, was certainly not an instrument of United States 'economic imperialism', since the United States was not yet in a position to practise imperialism at her neighbours' expense on the economic plane. Indeed, that situation might never have arisen on the American Continent but for the economic consequences of the General War of 1914-18. No doubt, even if that war had not been fought, the United States would have emancipated herself from her financial and economic dependence upon Europe some time before her American sisters, and indeed she had already passed over from the ranks of the borrowing countries into those of the lenders as far as Latin America was concerned; but she would still have been only one among a number of countries with fresh supplies of capital to invest in the more backward regions of America, and her advantage in geographical proximity would have been offset by her lateness in entering the field. In these circumstances, it is improbable that she would have gained any pronounced economic ascendancy in the New World over the trading and investing countries of Europe before the other American countries, in turn, had begun to emancipate themselves from dependence upon foreign capital and to stand economically on

Miffin, 1924)); and, even after the resistance of the Indian population to the expansion of the American people had ceased, the mastery of the physical environment in the Far West remained to be completed.

their own feet.¹ The natural course of development, however, was thrown out by the War of 1914-18, and the War, by giving a strong additional impetus to tendencies which were already at work, produced a transformation which in effect was revolutionary. The United States suddenly found herself not merely liberated from the indebtedness to Europe to which she had hitherto been subject but transformed into the ultimate creditor of all the European countries. *A fortiori*, she found herself not merely admitted to compete with her former European creditors for the remainder of the American market, but left virtually dominant in a field in which she had previously done little more than stake out a claim. It is true that the 'pre-war' European investments in Latin America remained intact, and even as late as the year 1928 their aggregate value was probably still greater than the aggregate value of United States investments in that region; but the determining factor was that for Latin America, as for Europe itself, the United States was now the sole source from which new money could be borrowed on any large scale. Thus her economic relations to the other American countries were transformed through the same causes as her economic relations to the European countries, but to a still higher degree; and this profound economic change had corresponding political consequences.

Hitherto, the Latin American countries had profited from one of those 'divisions of powers' which were traditionally supposed to be favourable to liberty. On the one hand, the political hegemony claimed and exercised by the United States under the name of the Monroe Doctrine had safeguarded them against the dangers latent in their economic dependence upon Great Britain and latterly also upon other European trading and investing countries such as Germany. On the other hand, the fact that these European countries and not the United States were at this time furnishing the Latin American countries with the means for their economic development had safeguarded them against those other dangers which their political dependence upon the United States would otherwise have involved. Thanks to this fortunate 'division of powers', the various republics of Latin America had enjoyed, for a century, a relative freedom from external pressure which had rarely fallen to the lot of countries in that stage of economic and political development; but the effect of those changes, resulting from the General War of 1914-18, which have been indicated above was to deprive the Latin American republics rather abruptly of this advantageous position. The economic

¹ On this point, see the passage from a speech by Mr. Hoover which is quoted on p. 411 below.

as well as the political ascendancy over Latin America now passed to the United States; this new and sudden concentration of powers gave her ascendancy a crushing force; and the Monroe Doctrine, which, under the Taft and Wilson régimes, had already been showing a tendency to change from an instrument of national self-protection in the hands of the United States Government into an instrument of 'economic imperialism', now developed in this direction with greatly increased rapidity.¹

The United States Government did not cease to insist that the Monroe Doctrine was not an international understanding but a unilateral expression of its own policy, of which that Government itself must be the sole interpreter. At the same time, the most authoritative spokesmen of the United States Government were unwilling to entertain the idea that their policy might be incompatible with the sovereign independence of other American countries.

An attitude of peace and good will prevails among our nations [President Coolidge declared on the 16th January, 1928, in the inaugural address² which he delivered to the delegates of twenty-one American republics assembled at Havana], a determination to adjust differences among ourselves, not by a resort to force, but by the application of the principles of justice and equity, is one of our strongest characteristics.

The sovereignty of small nations is respected. It is for the purpose of giving stronger guaranties to these principles, of increasing the amount and extending the breadth of these blessings, that this conference has been assembled.

The whole atmosphere of the conference is animated with the spirit of democracy and good will. This is the fundamental concept of your organization.

All nations here represented stand on an exact footing of equality. The smallest and the weakest speaks here with the same authority as the largest and most powerful.

You come together under the present condition, and the future expectation, of profound peace. You are continuing to strike a new note in international gatherings by maintaining a forum in which not the selfish interests of a few, but the general welfare of all, will be considered.

A more specific disclaimer of 'imperialistic' designs on the part of the United States was made on the 21st January, 1928, by the principal United States delegate to the Havana Conference, Mr. Charles

¹ It may be noted that, during the ten years following the close of the General War of 1914-18, the expansion of the financial and economic activities of the United States into Europe was proceeding all the time on a scale comparable to that of the expansion into Latin America. Yet Europeans did not feel the impact of the United States as acutely as it was felt by Latin Americans during these years, because in Europe it was taking place on the economic plane alone and not on the political plane simultaneously.

² Text in *The United States Daily*, 17th January, 1928.

Evans Hughes, in an address¹ delivered to the local American Chamber of Commerce:

It is the firm policy of the United States to respect the territorial integrity of the American republics. We have no policy of aggression. We wish for all of them, not simply those great in area and population and wealth, but for every one to the very smallest, strength and not weakness.

What a fatuous idea it would be to think that the United States desired that any of these States should be weak, or the prey of disorder. There is no promise for the United States in that.

We do not wish their territory. We have troubles enough at home, without seeking responsibilities abroad. The rights we assert for ourselves we accord to others.

Nothing could be happier for the United States than that all the countries in the region of the Caribbean should be strong, self-sufficient, fulfilling their destiny, settling their problems, with peace at home and the fulfillment of their obligations abroad. It is in the strength of these Powers as equal and responsible states, and not in the weakness of any, that lies our confidence of future tranquillity and the mutual benefits of intercourse.

The same disclaimer was repeated by Mr. Hughes on the 26th April, 1928, at Washington, in an address² delivered there, after the Havana Conference had finished its labours, to the American Society of International Law:

An . . . illusion that should be dispelled is that the United States is seeking to dominate Latin America. To one who knows the sentiment of the American people, such an idea seems fantastic.

But it is fostered by writers at home and elsewhere, and is encouraged by an appreciation of our enormous resources and power. The 'Colossus of the North' is pictured to the imagination as a ruthless giant, without conscience and with unrestrained lust.

We make no apologies for our prosperity and power. But the conception of the giant takes no thought of the limitations of its organism.

The policy of the United States is in the control of the American people, acting through representative institutions. Executive and Congress must bow to public opinion. The dominant spirit of the American people is generous, liberal, instinct with love of independence and respect for it.

We are jealous of our rights and I trust that we shall always have the stamina to maintain them with self-respect and with proper regard for the rights of others. But the notion that we are looking for opportunities to intervene in the concerns of our neighbours and to take upon ourselves the burdens of managing Latin America, is due to vague and unfounded fears and especially to an utter misconception of public opinion in this country.

¹ Text in *The United States Daily*, 4th February, 1928.

² Text *ibid.*, 28th April, 30th April, and 1st May, 1928.

These public declarations of policy from the lips of Mr. Hughes bore the stamp of sincerity; and this North American statesman, who had just come to grips with the question of alleged United States 'imperialism' in his dealings at Havana with his Latin American colleagues, was certainly able to point to several specific cases in which the United States, having intervened in the affairs of a Central American or a West Indian republic, had afterwards withdrawn.¹ What, then, was the motive force which had caused the United States Government latterly to intervene with increasing frequency in the affairs of Latin American countries, and in some places—as, for instance, in Nicaragua²—after withdrawing once to intervene again? The answer to this question is to be found in another political doctrine which was enunciated, no less emphatically than the doctrine of the independence and equality of all American republics, by the same North American statesmen during the same years.

President Coolidge, for instance, spoke as follows in an address³ delivered in New York City to the United Press Association on the 25th April, 1927:

While it is well-established international law that we have no right to interfere in the purely domestic affairs of other nations in their dealings with their own citizens, it is equally well established that our Government has certain rights over and certain duties toward our own citizens and their property, wherever they may be located.

The person and property of a citizen are a part of the general domain of the Nation, even when abroad. On the other hand, there is a distinct and binding obligation on the part of self-respecting Governments to afford protection to the persons and property of their citizens, wherever they may be. This is both because it has an interest in them and because it has an obligation toward them.

It would seem to be perfectly obvious that if it is wrong to murder and pillage within the confines of the United States, it is equally wrong outside our borders. The fundamental laws of justice are universal in their application. These rights go with the citizen. Wherever he goes these duties of our Government must follow him.

It is all right to say that when our citizens enter a foreign country they should do so with the understanding that they are to abide by the laws of that country. They should, and they do, and our Government would be the last to interfere in the just application of the law of his domicile to our citizens. But this is only a partial statement of the case. The admission of our citizens within their territory is a voluntary act of foreign Governments.

It is a tacit invitation. When we permit foreigners to come here, and when other countries admit our citizens, we know and they know that

¹ Address delivered on the 21st January, 1928, cited above.

² See the present volume, Part IV B, Section (iv) below.

³ Text in *The United States Daily*, 26th April, 1927.

such aliens come and go not only under the rights and duties imposed by domestic law, but also under the rights and duties imposed by international law. There is nothing unfair, nothing imperialistic, in this principle. It has been universally adopted and recognized as right and just and is the only reasonable method by which enlightened humanity can safeguard friendly intercourse among the citizens of different nations. This policy has been adopted in furtherance of the humanitarian desire for a universal reign of law.

These principles are involved in some of the difficulties that we have recently been trying to work out with foreign nations, especially with Mexico.

Even more significant was the extempore enunciation of the same doctrine which was made by Mr. Hughes at Havana on the 18th February, 1928, in a plenary session of the Sixth Pan-American Conference itself, when the vexed question of intervention by one American state in the affairs of another¹ had been reopened unexpectedly:

So far as I am personally concerned, I have never had a moment's desire to escape a discussion of this question. There is nothing to conceal. There are no hidden motives. There are no desires or ambitions which my country entertains which are opposed to the desires and aspirations of our sister Republics.

We yield to none in the establishment of the ideal of sovereignty and independence for every one of the American Republics from the greatest to the smallest. And I have the right, speaking here on behalf of the Delegation of the United States, to declare the policy of my country. I joined readily in the resolution of the Delegation of Mexico against aggression. We want no aggression. We want no aggression against ourselves. We cherish no thought of aggression against anybody else. We desire to respect the rights of every country and to have the rights of our country equally respected. We do not wish the territory of any American Republic. We do not wish to govern any American Republic. We do not wish to intervene in the affairs of any American Republic. We simply wish peace and order and stability and recognition of honest rights properly acquired, so that this hemisphere may not only be the hemisphere of peace but the hemisphere of international justice. Much has been said of late with regard to Nicaragua. There sits the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, a Delegate of his country to this Conference. He can tell you the situation in Nicaragua and I can tell you that we desire nothing more than the independence and peace of his country and that we are there simply to aid them in obtaining free elections, in order that they may have a sovereign and independent government. I mention that merely because I speak in a spirit of frankness. Now what is the real difficulty? Let us face the facts. The difficulty, if there is any, in any one of the American Republics, is not of any external aggression. It is an internal difficulty, if it exists at all. From time to time there

¹ For the history of this question at the Havana Conference of the 16th January-20th February, 1928, see pp. 437-9 below.

arises a situation most deplorable and regrettable in which sovereignty is not at work, in which for a time in certain areas there is no Government at all—in which for a time and within a limited sphere there is no possibility of performing the functions of sovereignty and independence. Those are the conditions that create the difficulty with which at times we find ourselves confronted. What are we to do when government breaks down and American citizens are in danger of their lives? Are we to stand by and see them killed because a Government in circumstances which it cannot control and for which it may not be responsible can no longer afford reasonable protection? I am not speaking of sporadic acts of violence, or of the rising of mobs, or of those distressing incidents which may occur in any country however well administered. I am speaking of the occasions where Government itself is unable to function for a time because of difficulties which confront it and which it is impossible for it to surmount.

Now it is the principle of international law that in such a case a Government is fully justified in taking action—I would call it interposition of a temporary character—for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of its nationals.¹

The foregoing passages from public speeches made by President Coolidge and by Mr. Hughes have been quoted at some length because they appear to give the key to United States policy towards other American countries during the years here in question. The concatenation of cause and effect was explained by an American observer as follows:

Step by step we have been pushed over a course which begins with the Monroe Doctrine and ends with our trying to impose free and fair elections upon countries which are theoretically sovereign and independent. The links in the chain have been as follows: under the Monroe Doctrine we alone can intervene in this hemisphere; because the Central American countries are too immature to conduct elections they have chronic revolutions; because they have revolutions they have disorder; because they have disorder we are compelled to intervene; because we do not wish to intervene we have in effect forbidden revolution; to enforce our prohibition we have to intervene; because we intervene we are in the morally unpleasant position of always supporting the existing régime; because we think that some change of government must be allowed, because no change can take place peaceably, because we won't permit changes that are not peaceable, we have to intervene again to compel the natives to submit to peaceable elections. What lies beyond that, I do not know. But it looks very much as if, having imposed a free election, we should have to keep the marines abroad to see that nobody demands a recount. We are finding it very difficult to impose self-government upon the natives.²

¹ Text quoted from Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 4, p. 71.

² W. Lippmann: 'Second Thoughts on Havana' (in *Foreign Affairs* of New York, July 1928, p. 549).

A Continental European observer, contrasting the declarations of faith in independence and equality with the actual acts of intervention, might come to the conclusion that New England had inherited the vice of 'British Hypocrisy'. An Englishman, interpreting the course of the imperial expansion of the United States in the light of the history of the British Empire as seen from within, would rather remark that North American statesmen at this time were apparently groping towards some practical compromise between two principles of action in both of which they believed sincerely: an old established principle of respect for the sovereignty and equality of other states, and another principle to the effect that a state must provide protection, if required, for the lives and property of its nationals abroad. The problem of reconciling these two principles in practice had only recently arisen in the foreign policy of the United States because the second principle—concerning the protection of nationals abroad—had only recently become a burning question for the United States Government; and this was so because, as has been pointed out above, American foreign investment and American foreign trade on the grand scale was itself a recent phenomenon. In fact, the United States had now just entered upon a chapter in the history of her foreign relations upon which Great Britain had entered nearly a century earlier, when the rights of the *Civis Britannicus in partibus peregrinis* had been championed by Lord Palmerston with the same energy that President Coolidge and Mr. Hughes were now displaying in their championship of the *Civis Americanus*.

The recent expansion of the financial and economic activities of the United States beyond the frontiers, which had brought these momentous political developments in its train, was itself a movement of vast dimensions.¹

The last half of the century [President Coolidge reminded his audience in an address delivered to the Third Pan-American Commercial Conference on the 3rd May, 1927],² has seen a very material reallocation of the commerce of the Western Hemisphere. In its beginning we were all largely dependent on Europe for a market for our raw materials and for a considerable supply of manufactured articles.

¹ For statistical details see the Foreign Policy Association of New York: *Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 23, 20th January, 1928, Appendix. As far as the statistics cited in the present section suggest comparisons between 'pre-war' and 'post-war' years, it should be remembered that in the interval the dollar had depreciated greatly in purchasing power, so that the increases in the volume of United States trade and investments were not really so great as, in terms of dollars, they would appear to be. This caution does not apply to comparisons between one 'post-war' year and another, as between which the fluctuation in the purchasing power of the dollar was comparatively slight.

² Text in *The United States Daily*, 4th May, 1927.

This condition is very much changed. The United States has become the chief market for the raw materials of the southern republics, while on their part they have turned to us for a supply of manufactured commodities.

During the twelve years ending with 1925, the only years for which complete statistics are available, this country's share of their exports has averaged nearly 40 per cent. This is more than 200 per cent. of the portion taken by Great Britain, the nearest competitor, and nearly 30 per cent. above that taken by Great Britain, France, and Germany combined, the three next most important purchasers. In the import trade of the southern republics the United States has also, though more recently, come to occupy the leading position. In 1900 the imports of all these countries, collectively considered, from Great Britain were about equal to their imports from the United States and Germany combined, which last two countries were on about an even footing. From 1900 to 1910 the United States gained rapidly, and since 1913 has remained in the lead in the collective imports of all Latin America.

Further details of this same process of the transfer of Latin American trade from European countries to the United States were made public in an analysis of the trade between the United States and Latin America during the year 1926 by Dr. J. Klein, the Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce at Washington, which was published in February 1927,¹ and again in a report² compiled by Mr. G. J. Eder, of the Latin American Section of the Division of Regional Information in the Department of Commerce at Washington, which was published in May 1927, a fortnight after President Coolidge's address:

The United States imported \$1,044,526,000 of goods in 1926 from the twenty Republics comprising Latin America, an increase of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. over 1925. Our leading competitors in Latin American trade, the United Kingdom and Germany, both showed a decline in this period, the former purchasing \$571,661,000 in 1926, or 11·2 per cent. less than in 1925, and the latter \$266,115,000, which is a drop of 1·2 per cent. Apparently the United States now purchases from Latin America more than our two leading European rivals combined, and is daily increasing this proportion, while Europe is as steadily dropping behind. This ratio is of recent origin, as in 1913, the year before the war, although the United States ranked first in Latin American export trade, it was far from outdistancing the European countries as it now does, our imports in that year amounting to \$443,453,000, as against \$370,387,000 taken by the United Kingdom and \$300,336,000 by Germany.

In 1926 the United States sold \$836,592,000 worth of goods to Latin America, compared with \$295,965,000 for the United Kingdom and \$189,645,000 for Germany—nearly double the amount sold by these two countries combined. The gain since 1913 is striking. In that year the Latin American Republics purchased goods valued at \$323,832,000

¹ Text *ibid.*, 14th February, 1927.

² Text *ibid.*, 17th May, 1927.

from the United States, at \$270,223,000 from the United Kingdom, and at \$185,197,000 from Germany. Analysis of our export figures and of those of our chief European competitors shows, too, that in South America alone our trade in 1926 increased 10.2 per cent. over the previous year, to a total of \$440,138,000, whereas the trade of the United Kingdom declined 17 per cent. to \$259,386,000, and that of Germany showed the slight increase of 4.2 per cent., making the total \$162,102,000. Germany's increase in trade with Latin America as compared with the decline in Latin American purchases from the world in general is accounted for almost entirely by a 22 per cent. increase in German sales to Central America, as in both the West Indies and Mexico there was a notable decline in German trade, and in South America the increase was small.

Just how far the increased importance of our position in Latin American trade in 1926 is traceable to our growing investments in those countries is impossible to determine. Estimates of our total investments in Latin America range from slightly over \$4,000,000,000 to somewhat under \$5,000,000,000, and these investments are increasing. In 1926, the United States loaned \$354,987,700 to Latin American countries, of which nearly \$70,000,000 was to industrial and private corporations, the remainder being to governments, states, and municipalities, and largely destined for the construction of railways, highways, and similar public works.

The tremendous growth in our commerce since 1913, and more particularly the proportionate gains made in 1926 in the face of the almost general decline in trade, are encouraging indices to future inter-American relationships.¹

Later and presumably more exact figures were quoted by Mr. Hughes on the 21st January, 1928, in his address² to the American Chamber of Commerce at Havana:

In 1910-1914 exports from the United States to Latin America had already reached a value of over \$302,000,000 a year. But the steadily increasing demands of the Latin American countries have now pushed the total far above that level.

The total exports from the United States to Latin America in 1926 were over \$872,000,000, or more than two and one-half times the value a quarter of a century earlier, showing an absolute gain over the pre-war years of \$570,000,000.

But the growth of purchases by the United States in Latin America has been more remarkable. In 1910-1914 these purchases had a value of \$435,000,000; but the purchases of the United States in Latin America rose in 1926 to \$1,094,000,000, an increase of over 250 per cent. and a gain in total of \$659,000,000.

These figures give some impression of the scale and speed of the change in the economic relations of the American Continent which

¹ Eder, *op. cit.*

² Text in *The United States Daily*, 4th February, 1928. For yet further figures see *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th February, 1928.

had now placed the economic as well as the political hegemony of the American World in the hands of the United States. Inevitably, this overwhelming combination of powers aroused certain misgivings in the countries subjected to it; and an attempt to allay these misgivings was made in a remarkable address¹ which was delivered at the opening of the Third Pan-American Commercial Conference at Washington, on the 2nd May, 1927, by the United States Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Herbert Hoover:

This conversion of our country from a borrowing to a lending country has taken place in any essential sense within the last fifteen years. Prior to that time the whole Western Hemisphere was dependent upon the older countries of Europe for its supplies of capital. Yet our American States, each and all of them, are in that stage of upbuilding of their natural resources where they are still in need of the supply of external capital for those purposes, except for the United States alone. Due to the impoverishment of Europe as the result of the World War it has ceased, temporarily, to be a source of capital supply to the Western Hemisphere. In fact almost every country of Europe has been compelled to come to the great reservoir in the United States for assistance during these past eight years, and it seems to me, therefore, a great good fortune that through the whole of the Western Hemisphere the economic strength of the United States should have become so great that we would have been able to supply this essential capital without restraint and without restriction. Had this not been the case the development of our southern neighbours must have been slowed down or even stifled for a long period of years, until Europe could recover its prosperity.

Latin America has only been able to borrow from Europe approximately \$200,000,000 in the whole of the last eight years since the Great War. During this period we have been able in the United States to respond to their requests in an undiminished supply to the extent of over \$1,200,000,000, and I believe we may take it as a certainty that with the upbuilding of economic structure each American state will in turn at some time begin to produce that surplus which will, when converted into capital, soon relieve it of the necessity of external borrowing. In time one by one of the other American countries will become centres for the export of capital. In other words, these periods of borrowing during the development of states are but temporary. They have no meaning of a permanent mortgage or a permanent obligation levied on the people, provided always one essential principle dominates the character of these transactions; and it is this particular essential that I wish on this occasion to emphasize to you for your consideration. That is that no nation should itself, or should permit its citizens, to borrow money from foreign countries, and no nation should allow its citizens to loan money to foreign countries unless this money is to be devoted to productive enterprise.

Out of the wealth and the higher standards of living created from enterprise itself must come the ability to repay the capital, together with

¹ Text in *The United States Daily*, 3rd May, 1927.

the net gain, to the borrowing country. Any other course of action creates obligations impossible of repayment except by a direct subtraction from the standards of living of the borrowing country and the impoverishment of their people.

In fact, if this principle could be adopted between nations of the world, that is, if nations would refuse to allow the lending of money for the balancing of budgets, for purposes of military equipment or war purposes, or even that type of public works which do not bring some direct or indirect productive return, a great number of blessings would follow to the entire world.

In this reassuring statement, the weak point was that 'the essential principle' postulated by the United States Secretary for Commerce did not in fact dominate the 'transactions' which were actually being carried out or controlled by the Government of which he was a member.¹ In that very year, for example, a Government in Nicaragua which had been recognized by President Coolidge had been permitted to negotiate a loan with a New York firm of bankers for the eminently unproductive purpose of carrying on a civil war.²

In virtue of an arrangement inaugurated after consultation between President Harding and a number of representative United States bankers in the summer of 1921,³ the State Department also exercised a measure of control over private investments abroad, by stating whether or not it had any objection to proposed transactions on which its opinion was sought. Under this arrangement, bankers were under no obligation, explicit or tacit, to consult the State Department; nor—in case they did consult it and failed to secure an expression of its approval—were they legally bound to follow its wishes. Moreover, the State Department never approved a proposed loan but simply stated that, in the light of the information before it, it offered no objection to it; and this opinion had no reference to the merits of the proposed transactions as business propositions but solely to their political bearing in the State Department's eyes.⁴ Nevertheless, in practice, this form of control was exceedingly strong, since a public expression of disapproval on the State Department's

¹ After Mr. Hoover had delivered his address, the State Department appears to have gone so far as to make a public intimation that while his 'essential principle' did represent the policy of the United States Government in Europe, it did not represent its policy on the American Continent (*The Times*, 7th May, 1927).

² See Part IV B, Section (iv) below.

³ For the text of an official statement of the 3rd March, 1922, regarding this arrangement, which was issued at the time by the State Department, see *The United States Daily*, 15th October, 1927.

⁴ These facts are taken from an official statement made public on Mr. Kellogg's behalf on the 14th October, 1927 (text *ibid.*)

part would have a disastrous effect upon the prospects of any proposed transaction on the New York money market. On the 13th October, 1927, this arrangement was criticized in a public statement¹ by a former Secretary of the Treasury, Senator Glass (Democrat), as 'a plain usurpation of authority by the Federal Government' which was 'exceedingly dangerous', in as much as 'the exercise of such power at best and in the cleanest way inevitably would draw the Government of this country into sanctions and moral obligations which would be, as they already have been, misleading and dangerous'. This criticism was taken so seriously by the Administration that official statements on the matter were made next day on behalf of both President Coolidge and Mr. Kellogg.² The tone of both statements was defensive, but nevertheless it was announced that the State Department expected to continue the existing practice, at least for the time being.³

Thus, in its dealings with other American Governments, the Government of the United States now held in its hands an economic lever of vast potency, and the Latin Americans had so far failed to find any effective means of counteracting its operation. The measure of their helplessness is given by the feebleness of their attempts. President Calles's veto upon state purchases of goods from the United States in retaliation for President Coolidge's veto upon the export of arms and munitions from the United States to Mexico for the Mexican Government's benefit, is recorded in another section below.⁴ Even less effective was a manifesto, issued in Mexico City in the spring of 1927 by 'The Bureau of the Union of Central and South America and the Antilles', in which Latin Americans were urged to boycott goods from the United States so long as any United States soldier or sailor occupied the soil of any sister republic, or United States citizens refused to accept any republic's laws which other people obeyed, or the United States Government refused to renounce existing treaties imposed upon Haiti, San Domingo, Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba, Peru, and Bolivia.⁵

The expansion of the financial and economic activities of United States citizens beyond the frontiers of the United States, which was thus proceeding virtually unchecked, exerted its pressure upon all

¹ Text *ibid.*, 14th October, 1927.

² Texts of both these statements, *ibid.*, 15th October, 1927.

³ There were, of course, devices by which the practice could be defeated. On one occasion, for example, when the State Department disapproved a proposed 'Coffee Loan' to Brazil, the promoters simply issued the loan on the London market.

⁴ Part IV B, Section (i).

⁵ *The Times*, 3rd March, 1927.

other American countries; but the effect of this pressure upon the relations of the various countries with the United States, and also upon their internal life, differed profoundly according to the different situations of these countries themselves. The first and most obvious factor of difference was their situation in the literal geographical sense of the term; but the differences in their economic, political, and cultural conditions at the time when they had to meet the economic impact of the United States were still more potent factors in determining the issue.

From this point of view, the American sisters of the United States may be classified into three main groups: one in the northern temperate zone, a second in the southern temperate zone, and a third in the tropics.

The first group was represented by two self-governing communities of the British Empire, the Dominion of Canada and the island of Newfoundland; and in the external trade of Canada the same tendency as in other parts of the American Continent was apparent.¹ For example, Canada's trade with the United Kingdom² and with the British Empire as a whole, which in 1896 had accounted for 31.1 and 33.3 per cent. respectively of her imports and for 57.1 and 60.8 respectively of her exports, had shrunk proportionately during the next thirty years until in 1926 it accounted for only 17.6 and 22.4 per cent. respectively of her imports and 39.0 and 45.5 per cent. respectively of her exports. During the fiscal year ended the 31st March, 1926, the relative volumes of Canadian trade with the United Kingdom, the British Empire as a whole, and the United States may be seen from the following table:

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Imports for Consumption.</i>		<i>Exports (Canadian).</i>	
	<i>Value.</i>	<i>Percentage of total Canadian imports.</i>	<i>Value.</i>	<i>Percentage of total Canadian exports.</i>
United Kingdom	\$163,710,431	17.6	\$508,249,576	38.6
British Empire as a whole	\$207,696,963	22.4	\$598,593,254	45.5
United States	\$609,825,350	65.7	\$474,890,028	36.1

It will be seen that while the value of Canadian exports to the British Empire and to the United States respectively stood in the proportions of about 5 to 4, and while the exports to the United

¹ The following figures are taken from *The Canada Year Book*, 1926.

² The Irish Free State is here reckoned in with the United Kingdom in 1926 as well as in 1896.

States were slightly exceeded even by those to the United Kingdom apart from the rest of the British Empire, on the other hand the imports into Canada from the United States were nearly three times as great in value as those from the British Empire as a whole and not far short of four times as great in value as those from the United Kingdom.

Nor could the extent of the economic interpenetration between Canada and the United States be measured adequately in terms of mere trade figures. It was inherent in the geographical situation. Geographically, Canada was a long narrow belt of territory stretching along the northern border of the United States; and each of the four sections of which this Canadian belt was composed had closer natural connexions with the corresponding section of the United States than with the other sections of Canada itself. The most intimate geographical tie between the two countries was constituted by their bi-partite ownership of the Great Lakes—the centre and source of a vast unit of economic energy which was developing fast and at the same time developing more and more on unitary lines. The genesis and early history of the International Joint Board established by the two Governments in order to assist them in dealing with these great water problems have been recorded in a previous volume;¹ and the further history of some of the principal specific questions at issue between them in this sphere at this time has also been followed out in the same place.² In this place it is sufficient to note that the expansion of the financial and economic activities of United States citizens into Canada, though a more important factor in the economic life of the United States than their expansion into any other of the American countries, did not appear to be depriving, or even threatening to deprive, Canada of her economic and political self-determination. Some of the reasons for Canada's ability to hold her own against the United States were obvious. Politically, her position was incomparably stronger than that of the Latin American republics in virtue of her membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Economically, she happened to possess the more important key positions in the basin of the Great Lakes both for the improvement of navigation and for the generation of hydraulic power. Her chief strength, however, was probably derived from less obvious factors of a social and cultural order. The Canadian people had, broadly speaking, the same outlook on life as the people of the United States, and the same standards of conduct and of living; and this psychological parity probably did more than any external factor to maintain on

¹ *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*, Section (iv) (a).

² *Op. cit.*, Appendix.

a footing of equality the political and economic relations between the two countries in spite of their great disparity in population and wealth.

The group of American countries in the southern temperate zone consisted of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil (as represented by the relatively small corner, south of latitude 20°, which contained the greater part of the developed wealth and existing population of that immense country). These Latin American states were less stable politically than Canada and had not the same similarity to the United States in their social conditions and their culture. Yet if in these respects they were less well equipped than Canada for resisting the economic impact of the United States, that deficiency was made up by the advantage which they derived from the accident of geography. Whereas Canada was nearer to the economic and political centres of gravity of the United States than any other American country and was bound up geographically with her neighbour by the bipartite ownership of the Great Lakes, the American republics of the southern temperate zone were separated from the southern border of the United States by the whole breadth of the tropics; and although the force of expansion in the United States was so great that it made itself felt right down to the extremity of the American Antipodes, the pressure which it exerted at Santiago de Chile or at Buenos Aires was inevitably less powerful than that which it exerted at Mexico City or Havana, or again at Vancouver, Winnipeg, or Toronto.

When the respective relations of these two groups of American countries with the United States are compared directly with one another, the differences between them strike the eye. Yet certain common features appear as soon as they are both compared with the contemporary relations between the United States and the intervening group of American countries in the tropical zone. For example, some of the food-stuffs and raw materials which were staple exports of both Canada and Argentina were likewise produced in areas with a similar soil and climate in the United States, so that, in attempting to find a market in the United States, the Canadian and Argentinian producers had to contend with the opposition of the American producer as translated into terms of tariff barriers or quarantine regulations. The annual value of the exports of Canadian agricultural products to the United States was reported to have sunk from \$159,498,000 in 1921 to \$64,427,000 in 1927 in consequence of the Fordney Tariff which had been imposed for the benefit of the American farmer in 1922;¹ and the obstacles encountered by the Argentinian stockbreeder in his attempts to place his beef upon the market of the

¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, 23rd November, 1927.

United States partially accounted for the political hostility towards the United States which was manifested on certain occasions during the years 1927 and 1928 by the Argentinian Government or its accredited representatives.¹ In Argentina, at any rate, there was a feeling (which, whether reasonable or not, was certainly strongly expressed) that the course of trade with the United States was being influenced unfairly to Argentina's disadvantage by deliberate manipulations of the United States tariff; and Dr. Klein thought it worth while to combat this suggestion in his survey of the trade between the United States and Latin America which has been cited above.² On the other hand, no such suspicion of United States fiscal policy could arise in the tropical American countries, whose market in the United States was substantially assured because their products were such as the United States was incapable, for lack of the necessary climatic conditions, of producing within her own frontiers. It may be noted that in this respect two out of the three 'ABC' states of the Antipodean group were in the same favourable position as the tropical countries in respect of particular products: Brazil, who was partly a tropical country, in respect of her coffee, and Chile in respect of her nitrates, which, though not a tropical product, were in the nature of a monopoly. From the Caribbean countries, the total imports of the United States in 1926 'were valued at about \$730,000,000 as against a value of \$287,000,000 during 1910-14, an increase of more than 150 per cent.'³ The most striking case of all was that of Cuba,⁴ which in 1926 (a bad year) exported to the United States commodities valued at \$250,000,000 as compared with \$235,000,000 worth of exports to the United States from Brazil and only \$88,000,000 and \$81,000,000 from Argentina and Chile respectively. The amount of United States capital invested in Cuba was said to have risen 500 per cent. between 1912 and 1928.⁵ By the latter year, Cuba had also 'developed per capita imports exceeded by few countries in the world and equalled by no other Latin American country'.⁶ In the year 1928, when the Pan-American Conference

¹ See this part of the present volume, Section (ii) below.

² He reverted to the point on the 11th October in an address to a Foreign Trade Conference at New Orleans which is quoted below.

³ Statement by Dr. J. Klein in an address delivered on the 11th October, 1927, at New Orleans to a Foreign Trade Conference (Text in *The United States Daily*, 12th October, 1927).

⁴ For relations between the United States and Cuba, see the Foreign Policy Association of New York: *Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 23, 20th January, 1928, pp. 364-5.

⁵ *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th February, 1928.

⁶ Statement by Mr. Hughes in his address of the 21st January, 1928, cited above.

was holding its sixth session at Havana, it is probable that the average wealth per head of the population was greater in Cuba than in any other country in the world, not excepting the United States itself.¹

Economic prosperity of this degree might reconcile a nation to considerable inroads upon its political independence; and this was fortunate for the relations between the Latin American countries north of the Isthmus of Panama and the United States, since these countries, owing to their political instability and their strategic importance, were particularly exposed, in consequence of the economic expansion of the United States, to the danger of becoming victims of 'economic imperialism'.

From this standpoint, a distinction has to be drawn between Mexico on the one hand and the Central American and West Indian republics on the other. Up to a certain point, the position of Mexico resembled that of her Latin American neighbours north of the South American mainland. She was in close geographical proximity to the United States; her strategic position was commanding; her politics were unstable; and her wealth was great. Indeed, the Mexican oil-fields exercised a stronger attraction upon the United States business man² than the sugar-plantations of Cuba or the mahogany forests of Nicaragua. On the other hand, Mexico was a large country with a population which numbered over 14,000,000 in 1928 (the third largest population, at that date, of all the countries on the American Continent);³ in her configuration she was as admirably equipped as Turkey or Afghanistan for sustained guerrilla warfare against an invading army of regular troops; such warfare was congenial to her people by temperament and tradition; and the instability of her politics was not a perpetual malady like the recurrent cycle of revolutions which had afflicted some of her Central American neighbours for more than a century, but rather a deliberate movement with specific social and economic objectives, in the attainment of which it might be expected to find its natural end. On the whole, these elements of greater resisting power which Mexico possessed by comparison with her Central American neighbours more than counter-balanced the magnetic attraction which her greater wealth exerted upon the United States business man. During the years here in

¹ The actual distribution of the national wealth of Cuba was so unequal that, in spite of this high average, the mass of the peasantry were living in poverty.

² An even stronger attraction was beginning to be exercised by the oil-fields of Venezuela. See the figures, given on p. 420 below, of the trade of the United States with Venezuela and Colombia in 1926.

³ The leaders, of course, were the United States with over 132,000,000 (including her insular possessions), and Brazil with over 33,000,000.

question, relations between the Mexican and the United States Government were not infrequently strained, as will appear from the record which is given below.¹ Nevertheless, during these years, as during the whole preceding period since the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910, the United States Government usually paused each time when it found itself on the brink of armed intervention in Mexico, and only went over the edge in the naval expedition to Vera Cruz in 1914 and in General Pershing's operations on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande in 1916.

In striking contrast to this usual avoidance of intervention in Mexico was the frequency with which the United States had intervened and still continued to intervene in the Central American and West Indian Republics, ever since the Spanish-American War of 1898. The history of her intervention in Cuba, Panama, Haiti, and San Domingo has been noticed in a previous volume of this survey.² A greater impression upon public opinion, first and foremost in Latin America but to some extent throughout the world, was made by her intervention—not for the first time—in Nicaragua in the course of the year 1926.³

In the Caribbean, of course, the partly automatic operation of the processes of 'economic imperialism' was reinforced by a deliberate policy, and the existence of this motive, in addition to the desire to protect the lives and property of United States citizens, was frankly avowed by the United States Government.

We are not making war on Nicaragua [President Coolidge maintained in an address which has been quoted above]⁴ any more than a policeman on the street is making war on passers-by. We are there to protect our citizens and their property from being destroyed by war and to lend every encouragement we can to the restoration of peace. While the destruction of life and property has been serious enough, had it not been for the presence of our forces it would undoubtedly have been much worse.

But the President immediately added the following declaration which sounded ominous for the political future of the countries to which it applied:

Toward the governments of countries which we have recognized this

¹ Part IV B, Sections (i)–(iii).

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part IV, Section (i). See further the Foreign Policy Association of New York: *Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 23, 20th January, 1928, pp. 360–5.

³ For the antecedents and consequences of this intervention in Nicaragua, see Part IV B, Section (iv) below.

⁴ Address delivered to the United Press Association on the 25th April, 1927 (Text in *The United States Daily*, 26th April, 1927).

side of the Panama Canal we feel a moral responsibility that does not attach to other nations. We wish them to feel that our recognition is of real value to them and that they can count on such support as we can lawfully give when they are beset with difficulties.

At the date when President Coolidge delivered this address there was one important question, raised by this last doctrine, which still awaited an answer: Would this special sense of moral responsibility which the Government of the United States had come to feel for Latin American countries north of the Isthmus of Panama remain confined to those bounds? Or would it become extended to the Caribbean countries on the South American mainland or even perhaps to all the South American countries in the tropical zone as far as the northern frontiers of the 'ABC' Powers? It is probable that, at this date, neither the President himself nor his permanent officials in the State Department could have predicted what the answer to this question was likely to be; but the figures displaying the growth of the financial and economic relations of the United States with Colombia and Venezuela were more eloquent than the unclarified thoughts of statesmen. Colombian exports to the United States rose from \$63,000,000 in 1925 to \$90,000,000 in 1926; Venezuelan exports from \$20,000,000 in the former to \$23,000,000 in the latter year;¹ and this expansion of trade was in both directions. 'In 1926 the value of our exports to these northern South American republics was \$89,000,000. The average of the five-year period 1910 to 1914 was \$10,000,000. Our exports to these rapidly progressing countries, therefore, registered the incredible increase of nearly 800 per cent. in twelve years'.² Moreover, the export of United States capital to Colombia ('where are some of the richest oil-fields in the world') was reported to have increased since 1912 by 6,000 per cent. and that to Venezuela by 5,300.³

This titanic expansion of the financial and economic activities of the United States from end to end of the American Continent exercised upon the imagination of the European observer an effect almost akin to the awe inspired by some great natural phenomenon: a Niagara Falls or a rushing prairie fire.

¹ Dr. Klein's analysis of the 14th February, 1927, quoted above.

² Dr. Klein's address of the 11th October, 1927, quoted above.

³ *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th February, 1928.

*Investments in Latin America*¹

	<i>Foreign Capital Invested.</i>	<i>U.S. Capital Invested.</i>	<i>Percentage of U.S. Capital.</i>
Argentina	\$4,000,000,000	\$350,000,000	9
Bolivia	145,000,000	70,000,000	48
Brazil	2,750,000,000	300,000,000	11
Chile	1,000,000,000	400,000,000	40
Colombia	90,000,000	45,000,000	50
Costa Rica	65,000,000	28,500,000	44
Cuba	1,610,000,000	1,360,000,000	85
Dominican Republic	—	18,000,000	—
Ecuador	—	30,000,000	—
Guatemala	66,000,000	15,000,000	23
Haiti	—	23,000,000	—
Honduras	—	40,000,000	—
Mexico	3,400,000,000	1,280,000,000	37
Nicaragua	—	23,000,000	—
Panama	—	12,000,000	—
Paraguay	50,000,000	15,000,000	30
Peru	320,000,000	100,000,000	31
Salvador	—	25,000,000	—
Uruguay	300,000,000	45,000,000	15
Venezuela	175,000,000	75,000,000	43

*Total American Trade and Percentage of Total Trade
with United States*

	<i>Total Foreign Trade 1925.</i>	<i>Total Trade with United States, 1925.</i>	<i>Percent. of Total.</i>	<i>Total Trade with United States, 1926.</i>
Argentina	\$1,692,434,000	\$269,537,000	15.9	\$231,633,000
Bolivia	73,067,000	10,972,000	15.0	5,443,000
Brazil	889,920,000	318,989,000	35.9	330,756,000
Chile	377,426,000	120,382,000	31.9	130,485,000
Colombia	165,087,000	112,000,000	67.6	139,533,000
Costa Rica	30,237,000	14,511,000	48.0	13,362,000
Cuba	648,146,000	448,231,000	69.2	421,088,000
Dominican Republic	52,109,000	22,110,000	42.4	22,703,000
Ecuador	62,085,000	26,779,000	43.2	11,419,000
Guatemala	53,056,000	28,578,000	53.9	25,579,000
Haiti	39,641,000	17,886,000	45.2	12,237,000
Honduras	24,736,000	20,763,000	84.2	16,260,000
Mexico	536,740,000	395,679,000	73.7	304,300,000
Nicaragua	22,736,000	15,243,000	67.1	12,240,000
Panama	17,388,000	11,358,000	65.3	37,470,000
Paraguay	32,333,000	2,597,000	8.0	1,446,000
Peru	194,514,000	71,138,000	36.5	51,150,000
Salvador	33,498,000	13,000,000	38.8	13,794,000
Uruguay	200,594,000	38,193,000	19.0	41,517,000
Venezuela	121,000,000	43,000,000	35.5	63,006,000

¹ This and the following table are reproduced by kind permission of the Foreign Policy Association of New York, from Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 23: 'Mexico, the Caribbean and Tacna-Arica: Current Relations with the United States.'

(ii) The Pan-American Organization from the Close of the Fifth International Conference of American States held at Santiago de Chile (25th March–3rd May, 1923) to the Close of the Sixth Conference held at Havana (16th January–20th February, 1928).

The Pan-American Organization¹ had been inaugurated by the First International Conference of American States which had sat at Washington from the 2nd October, 1889, to the 10th April, 1890, and had been attended by delegates of all the republics then existing in the New World with the exception of San Domingo. At the request of this First Conference, the Secretary of State of the United States had established at Washington, in 1890, a Commercial Bureau of the American Republics; and the next three conferences had successively enlarged the scope of this secretariat's work and raised its status. The Second Conference transferred the responsibility for its administration 'from the United States Secretary of State to a Governing Board composed of the "Secretary of State of the United States of America, who shall be its chairman, and the diplomatic representatives of all the Governments represented in the bureau and accredited to the Government of the United States of America"'.² The Third Conference commissioned this Governing Board to make the arrangements for the next conference—a task with which the Board was entrusted again by the Fourth and Fifth Conferences. The Fourth Conference changed the title of the Commercial Bureau to 'Pan-American Union'.³ The Fifth Conference, as has been recorded in a previous volume of this series,⁴ passed a resolution on the organization of the Pan-American Union which made important changes in its constitution. In this resolution it was laid down that the American Governments enjoyed representation in the Union 'as of right', and it was provided that any American state which did not happen to have a diplomatic representative accredited at Washington to the Government of the United States might appoint a special representative on the Governing Board of the Union. It was also laid down that thenceforward the offices of President and Vice-President of the Board should be elective.

¹ For the past history of the Pan-American Organization see Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 19 (New York, 25th November, 1927).

² Foreign Policy Association: *op. cit.*, p. 282.

³ It should be noted that 'the Pan-American Union' was a secretariat, not an association of states. It stood to the states supporting it in much the same relation as that in which the Secretariat of the League of Nations stood to the States Members of the League, while its relation to the periodical international conferences of American states rather resembled the relation of the League Secretariat to the League Assembly.

⁴ *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 410.

During the interval between the Fifth and Sixth International Conferences of American States, several technical conferences were held under the auspices of the Pan-American Union.

The Third Pan-American Commercial Conference, attended both by representatives of Governments and by private business men, sat at Washington from the 1st to the 5th May, 1927, and was addressed by Mr. Kellogg, Mr. Hoover, and President Coolidge.¹ A significant incident at this conference was an attack by a private Argentinian member, Señor Duhan, the President of the Argentinian Rural Society, upon the protectionist policy of the United States Government. 'It is not possible,' he declared, 'to imagine how political and spiritual ties between American countries can be strengthened if the commercial differences derived from customs restrictions that hamper their economic approach still exist and multiply.'² Consideration of this embarrassing question was postponed, and the Conference contented itself with passing two resolutions³—one recommending a statistical study of tariffs and the other recommending a reduction of excises on non-luxury goods.⁴

The second Pan-American Standardization Conference sat at Washington from the 9th to the 11th May, 1927.⁵

In accordance with a resolution of the Fifth International Conference of American States, an inter-American Commission of Commercial Aviation was convened by the Pan-American Union and duly sat at Washington from the 2nd to the 19th May, 1927. This commission, which was composed of delegates of sixteen Governments, adopted a draft convention⁶ for submission to the forthcoming Sixth International Conference of American States.⁷ The

¹ For the proceedings of this Conference see *The United States Daily*, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th May, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 5th May, 1927.

³ Text *ibid.*, 6th May, 1927.

⁴ Argentinian resentment against the protectionist policy of the United States had been exacerbated by an embargo on the entry of chilled and frozen Argentinian beef into the United States which had been imposed on hygienic grounds. The lifting of this embargo was announced by the United States Government on the 10th March, 1927 (*The Times*, 12th March, 1927). The grievance against the protectionist policy remained; and on the 2nd April, 1927, the Argentinian Ambassador in the United States, Señor Pueyrredón, made a protest, in a public speech, against the effect of the Fordney Tariff of 1922 upon the course of Argentinian trade with the United States.

⁵ Announcement as reported in *The United States Daily*, 5th May, 1927.

⁶ Text *ibid.*, 20th May, 1927.

⁷ Out of the sixteen states represented on the Commission, three—Chile, the United States and Uruguay—had already signed the International Air Convention of 1919, and in June 1926 the State Department at Washington had submitted that convention to the Senate for ratification (*The Times*, 17th May, 1927).

final draft, as modified at the instance of the Argentinian delegate,¹ differed notably from the International Air Convention of 1919 in laying down (Article 8) that aircraft should have the nationality of the state in which they were registered, without imposing any condition that might limit the discretion of any Government to grant registration to any aircraft that it pleased—except that aircraft could not be registered validly in more than one state. The draft also prohibited, in international navigation (including under this term navigation by foreign aircraft between two points in one and the same state), the carriage of explosives, arms, and munitions (Article 16). This clause was carried by a majority vote against the opposition of Cuba, the United States, and Venezuela, with Panama abstaining.²

On the recommendation of the Third Pan-American Commercial Conference, a Pan-American Commission on the Simplification and Standardization of Consular Procedure sat at Washington from the 10th to the 13th October, 1927, and adopted, on the 24th October, eighteen draft resolutions for submission to the forthcoming Sixth International Conference of American States.³ This Commission adopted Spanish as the official language for its proceedings.⁴

The most important of the technical conferences held during the interval between the two general conferences of 1923 and 1928 was the session of an International Commission of Jurists, which was held at Rio de Janeiro from the 18th April to the 20th May, 1927,⁵ in order to consider several projects, including a draft code of international law prepared by the American Institute of International Law (an international organization composed of the national societies in each country).⁶ After examining the materials placed before it, the Commission drew up twelve projects of international law under the following heads: 'The fundamental bases of international law; States, their existence, equality, and recognition; status of aliens; treaties; exchange of publications; interchange of professors and students; diplomatic agents; consuls; maritime neutrality; asylum; duties of States in case of civil war; and pacific solution of international

¹ *The United States Daily*, 11th May, 1927; *The Times*, 17th May, 1927.

² *The Times*, 17th May, 1927.

³ Texts of these draft resolutions in *The United States Daily*, 25th October, 1927. See further, *ibid.*, 24th October, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 11th October, 1927.

⁵ This was the second session of the International Commission of American Jurists. The first had been held, likewise at Rio de Janeiro, in 1912, in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the Third International Conference of American States in 1906 (*ibid.*, 1st November, 1927).

⁶ See the Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 4, p. 64.

conflicts.’¹ The texts of these projects were published by the Pan-American Union on the 31st October, 1927, and were placed on the agenda of the forthcoming Sixth International Conference of American States.²

Although this Commission of American Jurists was a technical body, the proceedings at the Rio de Janeiro session of April 1927 took a political turn.³ At the first session, the Brazilian chairman read a telegram from the diplomatic representative of Nicaragua at Mexico City asking the Commission to pass a resolution condemning the policy of the United States in Nicaragua. The reply was that the Commission was ‘of an exclusively juridical character’ and had no authority to take the action requested; but the question of intervention gave rise nevertheless to a political debate. The organizing committee of the Commission attempted to exclude from discussion a provision in the draft code of international law, submitted by the American Institute of International Law, which prohibited the occupation, even temporary, of any part of the territory of an American Republic by another state for the purpose of exercising sovereignty therein, even with the consent of the said republic.⁴ The attempt to suppress this provision was contested on the Commission, and the result was that the committee provoked, by their action, the very discussion which they had hoped to avert. A non-intervention clause, reintroduced by a representative of Costa Rica, was approved by acclamation, and the Commission eventually adopted the formula: ‘Ninguno Estado puede intervenir en los asuntos internos de otro.’ The representatives of the United States, who were anxious to avoid any clash at Rio which might prejudice the prospects of the forthcoming conference at Havana, seem to have acquiesced in this

¹ *The United States Daily*, 1st November, 1927.

² A large part of these texts was non-controversial, and this provided the basis for certain of those conventions, motions, agreements and resolutions which were eventually passed at the Sixth International Conference of American States (see p. 433 below). In particular, the Sixth International Conference performed interesting work in the matter of codifying private international law (see the Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 9, pp. 205-7).

³ For a summary of these proceedings see the Foreign Policy Association: *ibid.*, No. 4, pp. 64-6.

⁴ Text of this provision in *op. cit.*, p. 64. This was the final draft submitted to the Commission of Jurists. It is significant that an earlier draft used the words ‘a non-American state’ instead of ‘another state’. The difference between the two drafts was important. The first represented an attempt to ‘continentalise’ the Monroe Doctrine and had no bearing on the relations of American States with one another; whereas in the second draft those relations were covered—presumably with an eye to the case of intervention by the United States.

formula—apparently in the belief that ‘internos’ meant ‘domestic’ and that therefore the formula did not exclude intervention when and where foreign lives and property were in danger.¹ On the other hand, the United States delegates made reservations in regard to four other anti-intervention propositions—one from the Haitian delegation, one from the Argentinian, one from the Paraguayan, and one from the Mexican and Dominican delegations jointly²—with the result that the Commission left all these propositions on one side, on the ground ‘that some of them did not have that degree of maturity necessary for incorporation in the codification, and others, being drafted in the terms in which they were, might be considered as manifestations of a means of obtaining the Commission’s views regarding pending American political questions’.³

This was the situation on the eve of the opening of the Sixth International Conference of American States on the 16th January, 1928, at Havana. It will be noted that the current of opposition to the United States, which had already been noticeable during the Fifth Conference in 1923, had grown perceptibly stronger during the intervening five years. The ultimate reason for this was the formidable increase in the financial and economic ascendancy of the United States over her sister republics. The principal immediate stimulus was the action which the United States Government had been taking in Nicaragua since 1926.⁴ These events in Nicaragua focussed in a single burning point the alarm and resentment which the policy of the United States Government had been arousing for some time in the Latin American world, and so rendered sharp and articulate a state of mind which had previously been only half formed and tentatively expressed.

On the eve of the Conference, it even seemed as though the United States delegates might have to meet something like a concerted attack from their Latin American colleagues, in which the lead might be taken either by Argentina or by Mexico. Argentina aspired to play a part in international politics commensurate with the progress which she had made on the road towards national maturity;⁵ and this ambition was reinforced by that dissatisfaction with the ‘economic imperialism’ of the United States which had been expressed by Señor Pueyrredón at New York in April 1927 and by Señor Duhan

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

² Texts of all four resolutions in *The United States Daily*, 1st and 17th November, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 1st November, 1927.

⁴ See Part IV B, Section (iv), below.

⁵ On the foreign policy of Argentina at this time see Part IV C, Section (ii), below.

at Washington in May.¹ Mexico, who had won sympathy from her Latin American sisters by the posture of defiance which she had repeatedly assumed under the uplifted arm of 'the Colossus of the North', was now entitled to participate in the Conference, whether or not she happened at the time to be in diplomatic relations with the United States, owing to the change in the constitution of the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union which had been made at Santiago in 1923.² As for the Latin American countries on which the arm of the Colossus had already descended, Haiti and San Domingo had already indicated their sentiments in the anti-intervention propositions which they had brought forward in April 1927 in the Commission of Jurists at Rio de Janeiro. A telegram addressed to the Conference by General Sandino³ served as a reminder that the representative at Havana of Señor Diaz's Government, towards whom Mr. Hughes made a gesture in the course of a speech which has been quoted above,⁴ was not unchallenged in his claim to represent his country. Indeed, it was in homage to the cause which General Sandino was upholding that the Nicaraguan flag was greeted with special acclamation at the opening of the Conference when it was hoisted among the flags of the twenty-one countries participating.⁵ Another telegram was addressed to the Conference by two Porto Rican nationalist leaders, claiming freedom for their country, which had had the status of a Territory of the United States since its cession by Spain at the end of the Spanish-American War of 1898.⁶ In Cuba itself President Machado's Government thought it advisable, while the Conference was sitting, to take energetic measures for restraining manifestations of hostility towards the United States in the Cuban press; and on the 16th January the same Government refused entry into Cuba to two distinguished Haitians who had desired to report the Conference for the Haitian Press.⁷ Perhaps the most significant symptom of all was the extreme sensitiveness, on the point of their titular sovereignty and independence, which was displayed by Latin American Governments, like that presided over by

¹ See p. 423 above.

² See p. 422 above.

³ Text in Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 4, p. 62, from *The New York Herald-Tribune*, 15th March, 1928.

⁴ See the Introduction to this Part, p. 406 above.

⁵ *The Times*, 19th January, 1928; *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th February, 1928.

⁶ Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 4, p. 63. For the agitation in Porto Rico at this time in the cause of self-government, see *The United States Daily*, 6th, 7th and 11th April, 1927; 20th May, 1927.

⁷ Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 4, pp. 62-3 and 76; *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th and 23rd February, 1928.

Señor Machado, over which a virtual protectorate was actually exercised by the Government at Washington. The storm in a tea-cup which arose, on this point, between Cuba and Uruguay is recorded in another place.¹ The revolt of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Deputies against the 'McCoy Bill'² and that of the Panamanian Chamber against the new treaty between the Panamanian and United States Governments³ were expressions of the same distress of mind. In March 1927 the President of the Republic of Haiti found an opportunity for asserting the sovereignty and independence of his country by refusing permission to land on the island to a United States Senator, Mr. W. H. King (Democrat), on the ground that he was an undesirable alien. The Senator had in truth made himself obnoxious to President Borno by criticizing his régime and demanding the withdrawal from Haiti of the United States marines, on whose presence the maintenance of that régime depended. By the same protests, he had made himself obnoxious to the State Department at Washington; and it was therefore not surprising that the Department's 'intercession' at Port au Prince on the Senator's behalf was peremptorily rebuffed by the sovereign independent Government which ruled there. It was seldom granted to the State Department to advertise its scruples against coercing another American Government by giving a backhanded blow to one of the leading adversaries of United States 'imperialism' in the United States itself.⁴

The seriousness with which the United States Government regarded the possibility of opposition at the Sixth International Conference of American States may be measured by the fact that President Coolidge himself arrived at Havana on board a battleship on the day before the Conference opened in order to deliver an inaugural address and leave for Washington on the following day. On this flying visit, the President was accompanied by the Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, and by the Secretary for the Navy; and the United States Delegation which he left in charge at Havana was headed by Mr. Charles Evans Hughes—a former Secretary of State, who, at the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1921–2, had established his title to be regarded as one of the most distinguished statesmen of his time in the domain of international affairs. Moreover, the delegation included Mr. Dwight Morrow, a partner in the firm of J. P. Morgan, who had recently been appointed United

¹ See Part IV B, Section (vi), below.

² See Part IV B, Section (iv), below.

³ See Part IV B, Section (v), below.

⁴ For this amusing incident see *The United States Daily*, 14th March, 1927; *The Times*, 15th March, 1927.

States Ambassador in Mexico;¹ Mr. N. B. Judah, the new Ambassador to Cuba; Dr. James Brown Scott, an international lawyer with a world-wide reputation; President Ray Lyman Wilbur of Stanford University; and Dr. Leo S. Rowe, the Director-General of the Pan-American Union.² Mr. Hughes and his colleagues certainly found scope for the use of their abilities before the Conference came to an end; but the opposition which they encountered was only sporadic and therefore far less formidable than the concerted opposition which they had feared.

When it came to the point, almost every Latin American delegation found good reasons for not joining battle. The Mexicans, having just yielded on their own ground in their long trial of strength with the State Department over the Petroleum Law,³ were not in the mood for leading a forlorn hope at Havana.⁴ 'It' was 'understood that the delegations of Nicaragua, Chile, Peru, Cuba, and Brazil were instructed not to stand out against the United States on any important issue. Both Peru and Chile were more or less bound to follow the United States because of the incidents connected with the Tacna-Arica arbitration.'⁵ A second motive for complacency towards the United States which may have influenced Chile, and also Brazil,⁶ was the consideration that their rival Argentina was assuming the role of protagonist in the campaign on behalf of Latin American liberty; for, as Mr. Hughes observed in retrospect,⁷ it was an illusion to imagine that there was 'an entity known as Latin America on the one side, dealing with an entity known as the United States on the

¹ See p. 464 below.

² At the Conference, the inclusion of Dr. Rowe in the United States Delegation was criticized on the ground that he was a permanent official of a secretariat which belonged jointly to all the states represented. Mr. Hughes defended the appointment on the ground that there was at present no constitutional means of paying for Dr. Rowe's attendance out of the funds of the Pan-American Union. A provision that henceforward the Director-General should attend conferences in an advisory capacity and at the expense of the Union was introduced into the new Convention on the Pan-American Union on the motion of Mr. Hughes himself. (See Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 4, p. 54.)

³ See Part IV B, Section (ii), below.

⁴ On the policy of the Mexican Delegation at Havana, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th January, 1928. While refraining from leading a forlorn hope against the strongly entrenched position of the United States, the Mexican Delegation did not fail to make itself felt at Havana. In many matters it took the initiative.

⁵ Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 4, p. 76.

⁶ Brazil was traditionally friendly towards the United States.

⁷ Address delivered at Washington on the 26th April, 1928, to the American Society of International Law, as reported in *The United States Daily*, 28th April, 1928.

other . . . There is, properly speaking, no concert of Latin American States. . . . The sentiment of national independence is a very real sentiment in all the Latin American states. It means independence of other Latin American states as well as independence of the United States'—and the common fear of losing their independence to the 'Colossus' was still not sufficiently strong to induce the various Latin American states to co-operate effectively and continuously with one another.¹ Even the common experience of the increasing impact of the United States upon their financial and economic life cut two ways. While it was arousing alarm and resentment in some Latin Americans' minds, it was binding other Latin Americans to the chariot wheels of the United States by golden chains; for though the process of 'economic imperialism' might award a disproportionate share of the profits to the aggressive country, still some individuals in the penetrated countries were bound to find the process to their personal advantage. There were such individuals, in Cuba itself, where the Conference was holding its session;² and similar considerations of personal self-interest must have weighed with a portion of the citizen body of other Latin American states from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn.³ Thus it came to pass that when Señor Pueyrredón, the Argentinian Ambassador at Washington, who was also head of the Argentinian Delegation at Havana, made a frontal attack upon Mr. Hughes, he was left unsupported by his Latin American colleagues and was quickly driven off the field.⁴

This Conference, which sat at Havana from the 16th January to

¹ The most striking demonstration of this was the invitation which the United States had received from Peru and Chile to intervene in a feud which had existed between those two countries for almost half a century (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part IV, Section (iv) (a)). There were, of course, also occasional efforts to settle Latin American quarrels within the family. In 1927, for example, Bolivia and Paraguay accepted the good offices not of the United States but of Argentina for the settlement of a frontier dispute between them; and in the same year, when the civil war in Nicaragua was opening the door to intervention by the United States, the other Central American republics sought (though without success) to close that door, before it was too late, by offering their mediation to the two Nicaraguan parties (see Part IV B, Section (iv), below).

² While the Havana Conference was sitting, the Cuban Government was working for a reduction in the United States sugar duties—a question with which the economic prosperity of Cuba was bound up (Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 4, p. 76).

³ For the balance of considerations in the Latin Americans' minds see *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th and 23rd February, 1928.

⁴ For an acute appraisal of the attitudes of the various Latin American delegations at Havana by an eye-witness, see W. Lippmann: 'Second Thoughts on Havana' (in *Foreign Affairs* of New York, July 1928), Part (i).

the 20th February, 1928, was attended by twenty-one delegations: ten from states in South America, ten from states in Central America and the Caribbean, and a delegation from the United States.¹ The relative strength of the participant states may be measured by their financial contributions in support of the Pan-American Union for the year ending June 1929, since these quotas were based on the respective populations of States Members (including the populations of dependencies). On this basis, out of a total fund of \$227,594.86, the United States contributed \$132,256.00 and the other twenty members \$95,338.86 between them. Out of this latter amount, again, Brazil contributed as much as \$33,767.34 and Panama as little as \$446.10.²

¹ The Santiago Conference of 1923 had been attended by delegations from only eighteen of these twenty-one states, the absentees on that occasion being Peru and Bolivia (who at that time were unwilling to meet Chile in friendly intercourse) and Mexico (who at that time was ineligible because she had no diplomatic representative at Washington to serve on the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union). It will be noted that, in 1928, the Continent north of the Rio Grande and the Gulf of Mexico was represented by the United States alone. The question of admitting Canada to membership in the Pan-American Organization appears to have been discussed in April 1927 by the Commission of Jurists at Rio de Janeiro, and afterwards informally at a meeting of the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union, and further during the Sixth International Conference of American States (Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 4, p. 51; *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th February, 1928). On the Canadian side, the question was discussed in the Senate at Ottawa in March 1927 (*The Times*, 14th March, 1927; cf. *The Times*, 10th December, 1926). Under the constitution of the Pan-American Union as it stood before the changes introduced at the Santiago Conference of 1923, Canada, as an American state represented diplomatically at Washington, would presumably have become eligible for representation on the Governing Board when Mr. Massey presented his credentials to President Coolidge on the 18th February, 1927 (see *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*, p. 66); and the new provision that American states not represented at Washington diplomatically might appoint special representatives on the Governing Board of the Union (see above) would certainly not appear to weaken Canada's title. The point open to question was whether Canada was 'an American State' in the same sense as were the United States and the twenty Latin American republics, or whether her membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations placed her in a different category. On this point the view of the United States Government seems to have been that Canada was eligible for membership in the Pan-American Union inasmuch as she had been accepted as a Member of the League of Nations. Moreover, the United States Government seems to have looked with favour upon the possibility of Canada being admitted. Nevertheless, the Havana Conference closed without the question having been raised in any formal way. It was understood that, in the absence of a request from the Canadian Government, the United States Government did not feel it advisable to take the initiative in moving for Canada's admission, but that it instructed its delegates to second a motion in this sense if such were made at the Conference by any Latin American state.

² These figures are taken from Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 4, p. 81.

The agenda of the Conference¹ were grouped under eight heads: the organization of the Pan-American Union; matters of an inter-American juridical nature; problems of communications; intellectual co-operation; economic problems; social problems; reports on treaties, conventions, and resolutions; and future conferences. When the Conference met, it entrusted the organization of its work to a 'Commission on Initiatives' and distributed the agenda among eight commissions as follows:

Commission No. 1—Pan-American Union.

Commission No. 2—Public International Law and Police of Frontiers.

Commission No. 3—Private International Law and Legislative Uniformity.

Commission No. 4—Problems of Communications.

Commission No. 5—Intellectual Co-operation.

Commission No. 6—Economic Problems.

Commission No. 7—Social Problems.

Commission No. 8—Report on Treaties, Conventions, and Resolutions.

These Commissions, each of which had a Latin American as chairman, were composed of representatives of each delegation.²

On the motion of Señor Pueyrredón (Argentina), which was promptly seconded by Mr. Hughes,³ it was agreed that the meetings of the Commissions 'should be held in public, unless otherwise decided. In practice, all of the Commission meetings and also the plenary sessions were open to the public. Meetings of Sub-Commissions, however, were held in private'.⁴ 'I was grateful for the publicity of proceedings at the Havana Conference', Mr. Hughes observed in retrospect. 'On the whole, it was helpful. But it must be recognized that publicity, not of action but in the discussions which must precede action, sometimes prevents reasonable adjustments.'⁵

Discussions were usually carried on in Spanish, which was the language of 67 out of the 83 delegates of whom the Conference was

¹ Full text in the *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union*, January 1928.

² Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

³ See *The Times*, 18th and 19th January, 1928.

⁴ Some journalists stated that the chief effect of holding the Commission meetings in public was to transfer delicate business to the Sub-Committees, or to informal meetings of the 'Ponentes' (*rapporteurs*).

⁵ Address delivered on the 26th April, 1928, at Washington to the American Society of International Law, as reported in *The United States Daily*, 28th April, 1928.

composed.¹ Utterances in English or Portuguese were translated into Spanish, but utterances in Spanish were not usually translated officially,² and this procedure may have occasionally caused misunderstandings.³

'The Conference held seven plenary sessions and adopted eleven conventions, eight motions, three agreements, and sixty resolutions. The Conventions were as follows:

1. Convention Accepting and Putting into Effect the Code of Private International Law.
2. Convention on Commercial Aviation.
3. Convention on the Pan-American Union.
4. Convention on the Revision of the Copyright Convention of Buenos Ayres of 1910.
5. Convention on the Status of Foreigners.
6. Convention on Treaties.
7. Convention on Diplomatic Officers.
8. Convention on Consular Agents.
9. Convention on Neutrality.
10. Convention on the Right of Asylum.
11. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in case of Civil War.'⁴

These acts of the Sixth International Conference of American States imposed a number of fresh tasks, some temporary and others permanent, upon its secretariat, the Pan-American Union. For example, there were fourteen technical conferences to be convened; seven duties of an educational and cultural nature; eleven special investigations to be made; and a standing obligation to receive the deposits of ratification of diplomatic instruments signed at Pan-American conferences.⁵

These voluminous activities were mostly of a non-political and non-controversial character; and the cardinal aim of Mr. Hughes and his colleagues on the United States delegation at Havana was to keep

¹ That is, all delegates except the two from Haiti, the five from Brazil, and the nine from the United States.

² Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

³ For an alleged incident of this kind see Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.

⁴ Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, p. 52. For a summary of the motions, agreements, and resolutions see a Report of the Director-General of the Pan-American Union to the Governing Board dated the 7th March, 1928 (Appendix 'C').

⁵ See Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-2, and, for details, a Report of the Director-General of the Pan-American Union to the Governing Board dated the 3rd May, 1928.

the work of the Conference in particular and of the Pan-American Organization in general upon this plane. The raising of political questions would be likely to lead to formal definitions of the relations between American States, and this in turn would be likely to hamper the United States in her political dealings with her sister republics. For this very reason, some of the Latin American delegations sought to give the Conference the turn which the United States delegation sought to avoid, and this was the essential point upon which a conflict of wills arose.

This conflict was fought out over three issues: the status of the Pan-American Union; the question of intervention on the part of one American state in the affairs of another; and the problem of aggression and arbitration.

As regarded the status of the Pan-American Union, the Conference had on its agenda a project of convention¹ which the Governing Board had caused to be drafted in pursuance of a resolution of the Fifth International Conference of American States held at Santiago in 1923. The intention was to place the constitution of the Union, which hitherto had rested merely on the resolutions of successive conferences, upon a permanent basis. When this matter came up for discussion at Havana, the Mexican delegation put forward the following six proposals:

1. The Governing Board should be composed of the representatives whom the Governments may deem it convenient to appoint.

2. The appointment of Chairman and Vice-Chairman should be renewed annually, according to alphabetical order.

3. A Director-General should be appointed annually and the position should rotate between the countries.

4. The Director-General should not accept, from the Government of any country, other offices or commissions than those of a purely educational nature.

5. The Pan-American Union should not be assigned any political functions.

6. The Governing Board should decide which posts on the staff of the Pan-American Union it deems convenient to be held by Latin American nations.²

Of these proposals, which were all intended to reduce the influence of the United States, the second and the third were defeated, while the rest were partially or wholly adopted in some form. It may be noted that the proposal for debarring the Pan-American Union from exercising political functions, which seems to have been put forward by

¹ Text in *The United States Daily*, 3rd October, 1927.

² Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-4.

the Mexican delegation in order to prevent the Union from becoming a forum for the discussion of Mexican affairs,¹ was welcomed by the United States delegation—presumably on the consideration that the United States already enjoyed a plenitude of political power on the American Continent *de facto*, and therefore had nothing to gain and possibly something to lose by any international agreement which regulated the political relations between American states in any way. On the same consideration but with a contrary aim, a Uruguayan delegate proposed, as an amendment to the Mexican proposal, that the veto upon the exercise of political functions by the Pan-American Union might be overruled by the unanimous consent of the States Members of the Pan-American Organization in view of the possibility that several states might concur in desiring the assistance of the Union for the settlement of a dispute. This amendment, however, was defeated.

As a result of this discussion, the Conference altered the status of the Pan-American Union both in principle and in substance. In principle, the constitution of the Union, which had hitherto rested merely upon the resolutions of successive Conferences, was now embodied in a convention, as had been contemplated. In substance, this convention effected the following important modifications of the constitution as it had left the hands of the Fifth Conference in 1923:

(1) A provision that the Governing Board should be composed of the representatives that the Governments of the American republics may wish to appoint; it being provided, however, that the appointments may devolve upon the diplomatic representatives of the respective countries at Washington.

(2) A specific declaration that neither the Governing Board nor the Pan-American Union shall exercise functions of a political character.

(3) A provision that the instruments of ratification of the treaties, conventions, protocols, and other diplomatic instruments signed at the International Conferences of American States shall be deposited at the Pan-American Union, which shall communicate notice of the receipt of such ratifications to the other States.

(4) That, wherever possible, the Governing Board shall establish relations of close co-operation between the Pan-American Union and other official Pan-American organizations.

(5) That the Governing Board shall fix the status of the members of the staff of the Union, determining their salaries and conditions of retirement.

(6) That the member states may withdraw from the Pan-American

¹ The Mexican Government probably had in mind the discussion of Mexican affairs which had taken place between the United States and various Latin American States in 1915.

Union at any time, but shall pay their respective quotas for the period of the current fiscal year.¹

It was also provided (Article 6) that the Governing Board of the Union should derive its power solely from the convention (and not alternatively from resolutions of Conferences, from which its powers had been derived solely hitherto).

It was further provided (Article 14) that the convention should not be opened for ratification until it had received the signatures of all the twenty-one American Republics; that it should not become effective until all the states represented at the Conference had received notice that all the ratifications had been deposited with the Pan-American Union; and that (Article 12) it should not be subject to modification except in the same manner as that in which it was adopted.

Since, in view of the procedure thus laid down, it seemed improbable that the new convention would come into force in the near future, the Conference also passed a resolution to the effect that the Pan-American Union should continue in the meantime to be governed by the resolutions in force, with five modifications corresponding to the principal innovations embodied in the convention.²

On the 23rd January, when a preamble to the Convention on the Pan-American Union was being drafted in the First Commission—in order to put on record ‘the juridical equality of the Republics of the Continent’ and ‘the mutual respect of the rights inherent in their complete independence’ on which their ‘moral union’ rested—Señor Pueyrredón (Argentina) demanded that there should also be embodied in the preamble a declaration in regard to the reduction of economic barriers and that this should be translated into three specific provisions in the main body of the instrument. Otherwise, he declared, the Argentinian delegation would feel itself unable to sign the convention. In taking this stand Señor Pueyrredón received some support from the Paraguayan, Bolivian, Mexican, and Colombian delegations;³ but, on his own showing, the ground which he had chosen for his offensive against the United States was not favourable for a demonstration of Latin American solidarity. ‘High tariffs did

¹ Report of the Director-General of the Pan-American Union, dated the 7th March, 1928, sheets 2-3 of the roneographed text.

² The text of the convention on the Pan-American Union will be found in Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, Appendix II; in the Report of the Director-General of the Union, dated the 7th March, 1928, Appendix ‘A’; and in *The United States Daily*, 15th March, 1928. The text of the interim resolution will be found in the Director-General’s Report, Appendix ‘B’, and in *The United States Daily*, *loc. cit.*

³ Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

not affect the commerce of American states equally, because of different characteristics and classes of products. Countries which were in tropical or sub-tropical zones had no difficulty in selling their products to countries having a different climate. He implied that the products of Argentina—a temperate country competing with the United States—were in a much more unfavourable condition.’¹ On the 10th February, the sub-commission to which the matter had been referred recommended the adoption of a preamble which did not include Señor Pueyrredón’s proposal, and on the same date another member of the Argentinian delegation cabled to the Argentinian Government asking that Señor Pueyrredón should be instructed to sign the convention as it stood. The Argentinian Government thereupon cabled instructions to that effect, but these did not reach Havana before Señor Pueyrredón had returned to the attack on the 13th February and had drawn an answer from Mr. Hughes, who had no difficulty in presenting his opposition to Señor Pueyrredón’s proposal as a defence of the sacred principles of the sovereignty and independence of states. After Mr. Hughes’s speech, the preamble, in the form recommended by the sub-committee, was adopted in the First Commission on the 13th February without debate; and on the 15th Señor Pueyrredón sent in his resignation, not only as head of the Argentinian delegation at Havana but as Argentinian Ambassador to the United States.²

The issue of non-intervention was raised in the Second Commission, which had referred to Señor Maurtua (Peru), as *rapporteur*, the project entitled ‘States: Existence—Equality—Recognition’, in which the Commission of Jurists, during their session at Rio de Janeiro in April 1927, had embodied the formula (recorded above): ‘Ninguno estado puede intervenir en los asuntos internos de otro.’ On the 4th February, Señor Maurtua presented a report ‘which in effect discarded the above-mentioned non-intervention proposal’ in favour of a declaration of the rights and duties of nations made by the American Institute of International Law in 1916, in which a loop-hole was left open for intervention against a state which, in the exercise of its right of independence, violated the just rights of another state.³

¹ Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

² The President of the Argentinian Republic, Señor de Alvear, in a letter accepting Señor Pueyrredón’s resignation, was reported to have expressed regret at the uncompromising attitude which he had adopted (*The Times*, 20th February, 1928).

³ Text of this declaration in Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, p. 67. The crucial paragraphs were the first and the second. The word ‘intervention’ did not occur in the text.

Mr. Hughes spoke in support of Señor Maurtua; but strong declarations in favour of the principle of non-intervention as accepted by the jurists were made by representatives of thirteen states;¹ a sub-committee, to which Señor Maurtua's report was then referred in the hope of reaching a compromise, failed to produce a draft owing to the insistence of Señor Pueyrredón (Argentina) and Señor Guerrero (Salvador) that intervention should be prohibited absolutely; and it was accordingly agreed that consideration of the two Rio de Janeiro projects entitled 'States' and 'Fundamental Principles' should be postponed until the Seventh Session of the Conference. However, at the plenary session which was held on the 18th February for the approval of resolutions passed in committee, Señor Olascaoga, the new head of the Argentinian delegation in succession to Señor Pueyrredón, read a declaration reaffirming the 'irrevocable convictions' of his Government in regard to non-intervention; delegates of seven other states adhered, in the names of their Governments, to this Argentinian declaration; Mr. Hughes appears to have intimated that he concurred with Señor Olascaoga in regretting that the question of intervention remained unsettled and that he was always willing to discuss it; five more delegations then ranged themselves with Argentina; and others expressed regrets that agreement had been impossible. In deference to these pronouncements the President of the Conference, Señor Bustamante (Cuba), asked the Salvadorean delegate to find a 'formula'; and after an adjournment Señor Guerrero duly presented a motion to the effect that 'No state has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another.' This unexpected reopening of the debate on an issue which had been regarded as closed elicited from Mr. Hughes a very vigorous and very frank speech which was perhaps the most important pronouncement made by any delegate in the course of the Conference. Since the vital passages of this speech have been quoted already in the introduction to this Part, they need not be recapitulated here. It is sufficient to record that, when Mr. Hughes sat down, Señor Guerrero withdrew his motion and the plenary session ended by adopting the proposal of the Second Commission that consideration of the two projects entitled 'States' and 'Fundamental Principles' should be postponed until the Seventh Conference, which was to meet in Montevideo in 1932.

The Sixth Conference did, however, adopt, on the 18th February, a resolution declaring that 'all aggression is considered illicit and as such is declared prohibited' and that 'the American States will

¹ See *op. cit.*, pp. 68-9.

employ all pacific means to settle conflicts which may arise between them'. This resolution had been introduced in the Second Commission by Señor Roa (Mexico) on the 16th February and had received a warm welcome from Mr. Hughes.¹

In the matter of arbitration and conciliation, at least five projects came under the consideration of the Second Commission and failed to secure adoption. On the other hand, the Conference did adopt a resolution accepting compulsory arbitration in principle and providing for action to be taken in the matter within a year. The most important passages in this resolution ran as follows:

The Sixth International Conference of American States resolves:

Whereas: The American Republics desire to express that they condemn war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations; and

Whereas: The American Republics have the most fervent desire to contribute in every possible manner to the development of international means for the pacific settlement of conflicts between States:

1. That the American Republics adopt obligatory arbitration as a means which they will employ for the pacific solution of their international differences of a juridical character.

2. That the American Republics will meet in Washington within the period of one year in a conference of conciliation and arbitration to give conventional form to the realization of this principle, with the minimum exceptions which they may consider indispensable to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the States, as well as matters of a domestic concern, and to the exclusion also of matters involving the interest or referring to the action of a State not a party to the convention.²

Thus, on almost all the issues on which a conflict of wills occurred, the United States delegation, under the accomplished leadership of Mr. Hughes, emerged substantially victorious; and if Mr. Hughes's cardinal aim at Havana was to retain a completely free hand for the United States in inter-American affairs on the political plane, he could congratulate himself that this aim had been achieved. Yet diplomatic, like military, victories may be too dearly bought; and, if they actually arouse the discomfited opponent to a mood of more defiant opposition than before, they are in danger of stultifying themselves. Accordingly, Mr. Hughes's diplomatic victory over

¹ 'It is my happy privilege', Mr. Hughes declared on this occasion, 'to say for the United States of America that we would join most heartily in a declaration that there should be no war of aggression in America.' This whole-hearted acceptance of a text containing the formula 'war of aggression' presents a curious contrast to the decisive rejection of this selfsame formula by the State Department at Washington when it was suggested to them by Monsieur Briand in the negotiations for 'the outlawry of war'. (This will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1928*.)

² Foreign Policy Association, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-6.

Señor Pueyrredón at Havana in February 1928 must be judged in the light of the following statement which was made in March 1928 at Geneva by Señor Cantilo, the Argentinian representative on the Security Commission of the League of Nations:

The Monroe Doctrine is a political declaration made by the United States. The policy which it embodies was at the time of its origin extremely useful to us, for, being in opposition to the tendencies of the Holy Alliance, it eliminated the danger of European attempts at the reconquest of America. We gladly recognize the service thus rendered by the United States, whose history contains so many fine pages, recording work done for liberty and justice.

It would, however, be inaccurate to confer upon the Monroe Doctrine the style of a regional agreement, as does Article 21 of the Covenant of the League. The Monroe Doctrine is a one-sided political agreement which never has been to my knowledge explicitly approved by other American countries.

Nevertheless, on the morrow of the Havana Conference, there was no warrant for regarding the mood expressed in this statement as a portent of grave future trouble between the United States and the Latin members of the Pan-American Union. This very statement would appear, under close examination, to imply objection to the Monroe Doctrine, not in respect of its substance and purpose as a means of securing American States against political interference on the part of non-American Powers, but simply in respect of the unilateral character of the sanction by which the Doctrine had been maintained hitherto. As far as this statement went (and it was evidently drafted with care), there was nothing to show that the Argentinian Government would object to the Monroe Doctrine if it were transformed into a true regional agreement or 'continentalized' (to use the current American phrase) by being placed under the joint sanction of all States Members of the Pan-American Union; and if there was no evidence that the Doctrine would offend the *amour-propre* of Argentina on that basis, *a fortiori* it would have been rash to infer that it was incapable of being made palatable to other Latin American states.

The Monroe Doctrine, moreover, was the most contentious matter in the most contentious field—that is, the political field—of inter-American relations; and just because the political issues aroused the strongest feelings, they were apt to attract an undue share of public attention, with the result that the development of inter-American relations in the economic and cultural fields was apt to be ignored. For that very reason, however, the Pan-American Union, like the League of Nations, was able to accomplish a relatively large

amount of constructive work in these two fields, where the participating states were able to co-operate on a more or less equal footing instead of finding themselves inevitably divided into the invidious political categories of Great and Lesser Powers. In these non-political fields, the participants in the Havana Conference could congratulate themselves, in particular, upon certain notable achievements in the domain of Law. For example, a convention giving effect to a code of private international law (conflict of laws) consisting of 437 articles was signed by twenty out of twenty-one states (the United States abstaining on account of constitutional difficulties) with certain declarations and reservations on the part of fifteen of the signatories. Again, the Havana Conference had to its credit the first specimens of codification, consciously undertaken and completed, in the sphere of public international law—an achievement which had almost immediate repercussions in Europe. Thus, while distant observers, with their attention focussed on the political plane, might discern in the Havana Conference the presages of a coming storm, a number of delegates, belonging to Latin American countries as well as to the United States, who had taken an active part in the constructive work of the Conference on other planes, were inclined rather to regard it as the first in a new series of conferences in which the Pan-American Union, definitively extricated from the dangerous entanglements of politics, would be free to devote its energies to economic and cultural work with a long view and an enlightened outlook, in an atmosphere of common sense and goodwill.

PART IV

THE AMERICAN CONTINENT (1926-7)

B. CENTRAL AMERICA

(i) The Situation along the Border between the United States and Mexico.

DURING the period under review, the respective situations along the southern and northern borders of the United States presented a striking contrast under almost every aspect. The boundary between the United States and Canada, though a large section of it was demarcated not by a mere imaginary line but by the 'natural frontier' of the Great Lakes, separated two peoples which closely resembled one another in race, language, standard of living, social and political institutions, and moral and intellectual outlook.¹ On the other hand, the boundary between the United States and Mexico constituted the American sector of the line of demarcation between the 'Teutonic' and the 'Latin' divisions of Western society; and this line was drawn far more sharply in the New World than in the Old.

On the European Continent, the boundary between 'Teuton' and 'Latin' did not even coincide, as it did along the Rio Grande, with a political frontier, but cut across the territories of Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, and Italy; and though the diversity of population within these countries might, and did, produce local political tensions² which sometimes made themselves felt very acutely in the field of international affairs, the degree of intensity of these local stresses was limited by the broad conditioning fact that the European 'Teutons' and 'Latins' were associated through the bond of a common civilization which had been inherited from a remote past and had been developed by joint efforts at close quarters over the course of many centuries. No such historical safeguards were present in the relations between the 'Latins' of Mexico and the 'Teutons' (or 'Anglo-Saxons', as they preferred to call themselves) of the United States. To begin with, these two peoples had been in

¹ The French population in Canada, which did of course represent a 'Latin' and a Catholic element, did not march with the international boundary except along a few sections between the right bank of the St. Lawrence and the north-western corner of the Canadian Maritime Provinces.

² For the Flemish Question since the peace settlement see the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 71-4; for the South Tirolese Question see the present volume, Part II C, Section (iii). The Alsatian Question will be dealt with in a future volume.

contact for hardly more than one century, and their first encounter had been of a hostile character—entailing the transfer from Mexican to United States sovereignty of Texas through the secession of the 'American' settlers in that Mexican state and of New Mexico and California through the conquest of those Mexican territories by the United States in the War of 1846–7.¹ In the second place, these 'Latins' and 'Teutons' of the New World differed far more radically than those of the Old World in their racial composition. The 'American' people (as the people of the United States had come to be styled *par excellence*) was derived from European stocks, with the one exception of the negro minority; and although a century of vigorous immigration had broadened the racial basis, the overwhelming majority of the new racial elements which had been thrown into 'the melting-pot' were still of European origin.² On the other hand, the great majority of the Mexican people was derived from indigenous stocks which had been in occupation of the country at the time of the Spanish conquest and which had afterwards suffered the complete eradication of their native culture and the progressive replacement of their native languages by Spanish without themselves being supplanted by their conquerors.³

Thus, while the 'Anglo-Saxon' people of the United States were a new nation of almost wholly European (though by no means wholly 'Anglo-Saxon') origin which had been planted, by colonization, on American soil, the 'Latin' people of Mexico, who marched with the 'Americans' along a land-frontier 1,810 miles in length, were an almost wholly indigenous population with a small infusion of

¹ The frontier between the United States and Mexico, as it existed in the years 1926 and 1927, was not entirely the result of conquest. The imaginary line which the frontier followed between the Rio Grande and the Pacific had been rectified in favour of the United States pacifically by the 'Gadsden Purchase' of 1853. The territories acquired from Mexico through secession, conquest, and purchase by the United States eventually provided room for seven new states in the Union (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado), and all these states were on the large scale.

² See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 86 *seqq.*

³ The difference between the respective fates of the North American Indians south and north of the Rio Grande was to be accounted for partly by the differences in their standards of civilization at the time of their collision with the European invaders (south of the Rio Grande, the majority of them had been sedentary agriculturists with a certain density of population, while further north the majority had been thinly scattered nomadic hunters). A second factor was the difference in the 'race-feeling' of the Spaniards and the English. The Spaniards imposed themselves as a ruling race which condescended to mix its blood with that of its native subjects by intermarriage. The English colonists exterminated the indigenous peoples without miscegenation.

European blood and a thin veneer of Western civilization in its 'Latin' form. In other words, the superficial distinction between 'Anglo-Saxon' and 'Latin' here masked a racial and historical diversity which was much more profound;¹ and, in studying the relations between the United States and Mexico, this deep underlying gulf had always to be borne in mind, as a factor which aggravated the cleavage between the 'Anglo-Saxons' of the United States and the politically conscious and active minority in Mexico who could claim, by virtue of their European or partly European descent, to be 'Latins' in the racial sense of the term.

The second period of friction between the two countries—which was separated by a quiescent period of more than half a century from the first collision which had ended in the peace settlement of 1847—began with the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910; and that revolution was akin to those which broke out in China in 1911 and in Russia in 1917, rather than to any contemporary revolutions in countries that belonged historically to the Western World. In Mexico, as in China and in Russia, the revolution took a course which reflected the distinction between the Westernized or partly Westernized surface of society and the submerged native mass. The revolutionary leaders were men of Western education, and in many cases of European or partly European blood, who imposed on the revolution a sophisticated outward form ultimately derived from 'the Ideas of 1789'. The inner reality of the revolution—a movement which was first released and thereafter partly exploited and partly guided by the sophisticated revolutionaries, but which had not been generated by them—was an uprising of the masses against a prolonged Western ascendancy. For the first three centuries after the Spanish conquest, this Western ascendancy had been represented by the joint domination of the Spanish Crown and the Roman Catholic Church. Within the century ending in the outbreak of the revolution of 1910, this domination had been shaken off. The sovereignty of the Spanish Crown in Mexico had been extinguished altogether—almost entirely by the efforts of the Spanish colonial oligarchy—and the Church had been shaken and thrown upon the defensive. The Church, however,

¹ A cleavage of this profundity did not divide the whole of 'Latin America' from the whole of 'Anglo-Saxon America', for there were several Latin American countries in the southern temperate zone—e.g. Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and the Southern States of Brazil—in which the majority of the population was of European origin. The difference between these 'Latin' countries on the one hand and the United States on the other was of the same order as the difference between 'Latins' and 'Teutons' in Europe; and so, of course, was the difference between the French- and English-speaking elements in Canada.

had not ceased to be a great power in the land; and under the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876–80 and 1884–1910), a despot of native Indian blood, Western ascendancy had asserted itself further in an economic form. Since 1890 the ancestral common lands of the native peasantry had been enclosed in order to swell the *latifundia* (*haciendas*) of a ring of great landowners (*hacendados*) whose number according to the official census of 1910 amounted to no more than 834;¹ since 1884 the subsoil deposits of minerals had been assigned automatically to the owners of the surface; and the capitalistic exploitation of the agricultural and mineral wealth of the country, thus facilitated, had passed to a large extent into the hands of foreigners. The uprising of the masses which, from 1910 onwards, gave the sophisticated revolution of the Westernized intelligentsia its driving power, was a social and economic upheaval which was 'anti-Western' and 'anti-foreign' in its effect in so far as the economic exploitation of the country, against which this upheaval was directed, was in Western and foreign hands. While the political revolution on the surface tended to degenerate in Mexico, as in China and Russia, into a personal struggle for power between a few idealists and adventurers (a phase which, in Mexico, lasted in an acute form from 1910 to 1920, when a condition of relative political stability was restored), the mass revolution gradually made headway and more and more compelled the politicians to serve its purposes as the condition of their tenure of power. A continuity of Government policy, imposed by the steady pressure of the mass revolution, could be traced as far back as 1917, while since 1920 this policy had been taking effect in a gradual but unmistakable process of national reconstruction on new and more enlightened lines.

In Mexico, as in China and Russia, this revolutionary movement had an element of impetuosity and extravagance which bore hardly upon the vested interests of foreigners and evoked diplomatic intervention, on behalf of these interests, from foreign Powers.² The leading part in this intervention, at least after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914,³ was taken by the United States—partly because

¹ C. W. Hackett: 'The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 1910–26' (*World Peace Foundation Pamphlets*, vol. ix, No. 5, 1926), p. 340.

² It should be noted that in Mexico—just as in Russia, China, and a number of other non-Western countries—foreigners played an abnormally large part in the country's economic life; and at the same time the foreign residents remained socially aloof from the native Mexicans. It is evident that in this situation misunderstanding and friction readily arose.

³ Between 1910 and 1914 the British Government pursued a policy of its own, in which it was followed by other European Governments whose nationals had interests in Mexico—the policy being to support Victoriano Huerta. This

American interests had become considerably the largest foreign interests in Mexico and partly because the existence of the Monroe Doctrine would have debarred any other Power except the United States itself from pushing its intervention home in the last resort—and this diplomatic conflict between the revolutionary Government of Mexico and the State Department at Washington was conducted in an atmosphere somewhat resembling that which enveloped the conflicts between the Kuomintang and Great Britain and between Soviet Russia and all the Western Powers. The State Department refused to admit the revolutionary postulates of the Mexican Government and argued the case of its nationals on severely legal lines, while certain private individuals in the United States—whose influence on public opinion was probably small—went so far as to denounce the Mexican revolution as a subversive force. This attitude may be illustrated by the following passage from a speech delivered in the House of Representatives in Washington on the 16th December, 1927, *à propos* of the struggle then taking place in Mexico between the Government and the Church¹:

The Mexican question is more than a rivalry between the Catholic bishops and priests of Mexico and the Government of President Calles; it is more than a contest between the Catholic Church and the Mexican Government; the Mexican constitution and laws are a challenge to our institutions.

No one who has a love for the free institutions which we have inherited can look with complacency upon this movement. Through fifty consulates maintained by the Government of Mexico in continental United States, through a press that is owned or subsidized, and through other agencies, the advocates and defendants of this system are attacking our own institutions and seeking to engender national hatred, the evil consequences of which no man can foresee. We are interested not only in defending the persons and property of American citizens in Mexico; it is our patriotic duty to defend our institutions against the attacks to which they are subjected.²

An illustration of the same attitude of mind in more responsible policy was abandoned owing to the conjunction of the War in Europe with the strong line, unfavourable to Huerta, which was taken by President Wilson.

¹ See this part of the present volume, Section (iii).

² Speech by Representative William P. Connery, Jr., as reported in the *United States Daily*, 17th December, 1927. It should be noted that Mr. Connery was a Catholic, and that therefore presumably his attitude towards the Calles régime in Mexico was influenced by the conflict between the Mexican Government and the Catholic Church, which is dealt with in Section (iii) below. Among non-religious organizations of an 'anti-Mexican' complexion in the United States the most effective seems to have been 'The Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico'—an organization which was arraigned by its opponents in the United States as being the creature of the oil interests and of the Hearst Press.

quarters is the readiness with which the State Department suggested that Mexican intrigue was behind the opposition which American policy was encountering during the years 1926 and 1927 in Nicaragua.¹

There was thus a certain resemblance between this American attitude towards revolutionary Mexico and the contemporary attitude towards revolutionary Russia throughout the Western World; and hence it is not surprising that it should have been sometimes roundly asserted by the American Press, and more cautiously and occasionally intimated by the State Department, that the Mexican revolutionaries were 'Reds' or 'Bolsheviks'; but if this was intended to imply that the leaders of the Mexican revolution were in league with Moscow, it was an unsubstantiated charge. In fact, the Mexican Federation of Labour (*Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana* or C.R.O.M.) attacked the Russian Minister in Mexico City on the ground that he had been assisting a group of Mexican extremists to work against the Federation and the Government; and the Minister in question was certainly recalled in the following autumn.² It seems more probable that the points of similarity between the Russian and the Mexican revolution were to be accounted for, not by a hypothetical collusion between their respective leaders, but by an undoubted resemblance between the situations out of which these two revolutions, as well as the Chinese revolution, arose.

In any case, the problems created for the United States by the Mexican revolution were even more difficult than those created by the Russian and Chinese revolutions, and by the simultaneous upheavals or ferments in the Islamic World and India, for Great Britain and other European Powers. The Mexican revolution not only threatened to embarrass the United States as a 'colonial Power' in the Caribbean, as the Russian and Chinese revolutions embarrassed Great Britain in Asia; it also touched her much nearer home, as the Russian revolution touched the border states of Eastern Europe. In fact, the border between Europe and the U.S.S.R., from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, was the European frontier which at this time had most features in common with the frontier between the United States and Mexico from the Pacific to the mouth of the Rio Grande. It will be convenient to discuss briefly the local problems of the Mexican-American border before taking up the controversy between

¹ See this part of the present volume, Section (iv) below. This suggestion does not seem to have been accepted by public opinion.

² For the recall of Monsieur Piatkovsky, see *The Times*, 20th September, 1926; for the arrival of Madame Kollontay at Mexico City as his successor, see *The New York Times*, 9th December, 1926.

the Mexican and United States Governments over American vested interests in Mexico from the point down to which the record has been carried in the *Survey for 1925*.¹ The frontier problems may be considered under the several heads of migration, smuggling, the arms traffic, and the activities of Mexican political *émigrés* on the United States side of the line.

The essential fact in regard to migration was that the tide had turned.² From the beginning of contact between the American and Mexican peoples down to about the year 1890 the flow had all been from the American side. According to the United States census of that year, there were then only 77,853 natives of Mexico among the foreign-born population of the United States, whereas the vast area on the United States side of the frontier which had belonged to Mexico before the Gadsden Purchase, the peace settlement of 1847 and the secession of Texas had been effectively occupied by an American population, running into millions, within a period of half a century. On the other hand, during the thirty years between 1890 and 1920 the number of Mexican-born inhabitants of the United States rose from 77,853 to 486,418, and during the seven and a half years between the 1st January, 1920, and the 30th June, 1927, the net increase of aliens of Mexican race through immigration, as far as recorded (that is, without allowing for any who may have made their way surreptitiously across this immensely long frontier), was 439,165. In other words, the increase recorded during these seven and a half years was greater than that recorded during an immediate antecedent period of four times that length; and the estimated figure for the total Mexican population resident in the United States at the close of the first half of the year 1927 was 925,583.

The great acceleration in the rate of increase after 1920 was of course to be accounted for by the operation of the United States Immigration Restriction Acts of 1921 and 1924,³ in as much as foreign states situated on the American continent or on adjacent islands had not been brought under the quota system—mainly from a sentimental sense of Pan-American solidarity, but also to some extent, at any rate in the cases of Mexico and Canada, owing to a recognition of the fact that it would be no easy task to control the

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part IV, Section (iii).

² The following figures are taken from oral statements made on the 19th July, 1927, by the United States Commissioner General of Immigration and by the second Assistant Secretary of Labour (as reported in the *United States Daily*, 20th July, 1927) and from a public letter written by the Commissioner General (as reproduced in the *United States Daily*, 24th September, 1927).

³ See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 86–102.

flow of migration effectively along two immense land-frontiers.¹ Since the immediate effect of the sudden restriction of the total volume of immigration into the United States was to produce a shortage of labour and a rise in wages, the exemption of Mexico and Canada from the quota system placed a premium upon immigration into the United States from these two countries—especially from Mexico, which was able to furnish larger supplies than Canada of that cheap unskilled labour that had been drawn previously from Southern and Eastern Europe and that had been designedly penalized, by the United States Immigration Restriction Acts of 1921 and 1924, as compared with labour of more skilled and expensive kinds. Consequently, American employers of labour turned their attention to the Mexican supply, with the result that, within a few years, the tide of Mexican immigration into the United States passed the border states of the Union and spread as far north as the Dakotas and as far east as Eastern Pennsylvania.² A survey of the industrial cities of the north central part of the United States which was carried out by the Bureau of Labour Statistics of the Department of Labour during the winter of 1926–7 showed that there were at that time approximately 63,700 Mexicans in this section of the country and that this total was swelled to about 80,000 during the summer months by an inflow of seasonal and transient labourers from the south-west.³ It was found that the majority of these Mexicans had entered the United States on their own initiative, and it was estimated that half of them had originally crossed the frontier surreptitiously—an estimate which indicated that the real figure for the total Mexican-born population in the United States would be substantially larger than the recorded figure of 925,583 which has been mentioned above. From the economic point of view, the industrial output of these Mexican immigrants

¹ The control of trans-oceanic immigration was facilitated by the two facts that the whole inflow was canalized through a few great ports and that a trans-oceanic immigrant had to be conveyed by a steamship company upon which the United States Government was in a position to impose responsibilities. On the other hand, an individual might cross the Mexican-United States or the Canadian-United States frontier on foot at any unguarded point without having to record his act automatically by taking a ticket. See a series of six articles on Mexican immigration into the United States published by *The Christian Science Monitor* of Boston, 19th–24th March, 1928.

² If Mexican labour did not penetrate into the industrial districts of New England, this was partly, no doubt, owing to the extreme remoteness of that corner of the United States from Mexico, and partly owing to the fact that New England had an alternative source for the supply of cheap labour much nearer to hand in the French population of Canada.

³ See an extract from the official report of this survey, printed in the *United States Daily*, 22nd July, 1927.

appears on the whole to have compared not unfavourably with that of the South and East European immigrants whose places they had taken, though the Mexicans were more changeable in passing from one job to another.¹ Socially, they were not found to be particularly vicious. On the other hand, they were not readily assimilable. Sixty-five per cent. of them omitted to acquire even a smattering of English; and they tended to live in close communities, with their own religious and provident organizations, and to send home large remittances.²

In these circumstances the House of Representatives Committee on Immigration considered, during the year 1927, the question of extending the quota system to Mexico and other American countries and examined several alternative bills which were laid before them by individual members.³ This suggestion, however, was opposed by certain Chambers of Commerce and other organizations representing business interests in the border states of the Union.⁴

Meanwhile the Mexican Government, on its part, took various steps towards the regulation of migration⁵ which culminated in the promulgation of a comprehensive Act on the 12th March, 1926.⁶ In this Act, which came into force on the 1st June, 1926, freedom of emigration and immigration was laid down in principle; but at the same time a number of provisions were enacted for bringing the movement of emigration, as well as that of immigration, under Government control. It remained to be seen how far the Mexican Government would prove able to enforce these provisions along the Mexican-United States frontier; for the border states of Mexico were thinly populated, ill-supplied with means of communication, and frequently subject to outbreaks of disorder.

In the matter of smuggling, a convention between the United

¹ *The United States Daily*, loc. cit.

² Survey of cost of food and living expenses among Mexican workers in the United States, by the Bureau of Labour Statistics of the Department of Labour, quoted in the *United States Daily*, 26th July, 1927. According to this survey, very few Mexicans applied for charitable assistance from American charitable organizations, as they assisted one another. On the other hand Mr. Box, a Texan member of the House Committee on Immigration, declared, in a public statement issued on the 23rd July, 1927, that in the border states the Mexican immigrants took a disproportionate toll from public charity and public social services, and that in these states outbreaks of racial conflict between Mexicans and Americans were on the increase (*United States Daily*, 25th July, 1927).

³ *Ibid.*, 21st September, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 18th April and 21st September, 1927.

⁵ See International Labour Office: *Monthly Record of Migration*, No. 41 of February 1926 and No. 49 of October 1926.

⁶ See *Monthly Record of Migration*, No. 51 of December, 1926.

States and Mexico was signed at Washington on the 23rd December, 1925,¹ and ratifications of this instrument were exchanged at the same place on the 18th March, 1926. The convention covered not only the smuggling of goods across the frontier but the migration of persons, as well as questions relating to fisheries and to the mutual supply of documents required for the administration of justice in either country. Politically, the most important provision was the agreement in Article 1 that the appropriate officials of either country should give such information as the appropriate officials of the other country might request concerning the transportation of cargoes or the shipment of merchandise across the international boundary line.

This convention was made to run for one year in the first instance; and on the 21st March, 1927, the State Department at Washington gave notice for its termination. In a statement on the subject, issued on the 22nd March, the State Department gave the following explanation of its action:

It may be pointed out in this connexion that the United States has no commercial treaty with Mexico, and that in the circumstances it is not deemed advisable to continue in effect an arrangement which might in certain contingencies bind the United States to co-operation for the enforcement of laws or decrees relating to the importation of commodities of all sorts into another country with which this Government has no arrangement, by treaty or otherwise, safeguarding American commerce against possible discrimination.²

This statement appeared to convey an indirect invitation to the Mexican Government to enter into negotiations with the State Department for the conclusion of a commercial treaty. Presumably the Mexican Government was not inclined to take that step at this time, for fear that it might afford the State Department an opportunity for reopening, from a new angle, its attacks on the Alien Land Law and the Petroleum Law which had been passed by the Mexican Congress at the close of the year 1925;³ and hence it was conjectured that the denunciation of the smuggling convention was intended by the State Department to induce the Mexican Government to fall in with American desires in the matter of a commercial treaty for fear that worse things might befall it. Certainly, so long as the provision in Article 1 of the smuggling convention, cited above, remained in force and was duly observed on the American side, President Calles's Government would have less reason than otherwise to dread a lifting

¹ Text in the United States official paper *Treaty Series No. 732* (1926).

² Text of this statement in the *United States Daily*, 23rd March, 1927.

³ For the international controversy which arose out of these two Mexican laws, see this part of the present volume, Section (ii) below.

of the existing embargo on the importation of arms into Mexico from the United States; since, so long as the Mexican Government was entitled to demand from the United States Government a declaration of any arms that might be consigned from the United States to a destination in Mexico, it would not be difficult for the Mexican Government to prevent such consignments from coming into counter-revolutionary hands. On the other hand, the lapse of this right through the termination of the smuggling convention would make it comparatively easy for counter-revolutionaries in Mexico to obtain arms from across the border if ever the United States Government's embargo on the export of arms to Mexico were lifted; and this would make any threat, on the United States Government's part, to lift the existing embargo once more tantamount to a threat to pass sentence of death upon the Calles régime.¹

The control of the arms traffic across the border was, indeed, a sword of Damocles which the United States Government had long held suspended over the Mexican Government's head; and it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the life of the Calles régime depended upon the continuance in force, and the manner of execution, of a proclamation made on the 7th January, 1924, by President Coolidge in virtue of a joint resolution of the Congress of the United States which had been approved on the 31st January, 1922.² In this proclamation, the export of arms and munitions of war to Mexico from the United States was prohibited with the exception of

such exportations of arms or munitions of war as are approved by the Government of the United States for shipment to the Government of Mexico which has been recognized by the United States.

It was evident that, under these conditions, it was in the power of the United States Government to take either of two alternative lines of action which would both be distasteful to the Mexican Government, though in different degrees. It might lift the embargo and so make it possible for the Mexican counter-revolutionaries to arm themselves; or, short of lifting the embargo, it might restrict or even suspend the exercise of the clause of exception in favour of the Mexican Government and so indirectly strengthen the Mexican opposition by diminishing the opportunities at the disposal of the party in power for obtaining military supplies. For example, an absolute embargo was placed upon the export to Mexico of all types of aircraft, military

¹ For the elucidation of these points see *The Times*, 23rd and 24th March, 1927.

² For the text of this proclamation see the *United States Daily*, 28th December, 1927.

and non-military alike. Afterwards, by a Treasury Decision of the 29th July, 1926, this embargo was lifted as regarded non-military aeroplanes; and thereupon the Mexican War Department placed an order in the United States for several hydroplanes which were to be used, according to the Mexican Government, for patrolling the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the Republic with a view to the prevention of gun-running.¹ Before these planes had been delivered, however, the United States Government's embargo on the export to Mexico of aircraft of all types was reimposed from January 1927 onward² until the close of that year, when, on the 27th December, it was announced on President Coolidge's behalf that a relaxation was again contemplated.³ Meanwhile, towards the end of May, President Calles had issued an order prohibiting, until further notice, the purchase of goods in the United States by Mexican public departments,⁴ on the ground that the United States Government had imposed a systematic embargo on the delivery of merchandise already purchased by various branches of the Mexican Government. On the Mexican side it was explained that this did not amount to a boycott, since American goods might still be purchased freely by private persons in Mexico, private commercial transactions remaining unaffected;⁵ and President Calles revoked his order on the 28th October.⁶ On the American side, the motive for the reimposition of the embargo on non-military aeroplanes, even when ordered by the Mexican Government for its own use, may have been a fear that aeroplanes imported into Mexico from the United States might be re-exported from Mexico to Nicaragua;⁷ but neither this nor any other explanation of its action in the matter was given by the United States Government, and the incident illustrated the importance of the trans-frontier traffic to Mexico and the manner in which the control of it enabled the stronger of the two states which marched with one another along this frontier to put pressure upon the weaker.

It remains to consider the activities of Mexican insurgents in the vicinity of the border and of Mexican *émigrés* on the United States side of the line—activities which had a direct bearing upon relations between Mexico and the United States as well as upon the destinies of Mexico itself. With the accession of General Obregón to the Presidency on the 5th September, 1920, at the close of the first decade

¹ *The Times*, 6th September, 1926.

² *The United States Daily*, 29th January, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 28th December, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 2nd June, 1927.

⁵ Statement by the Mexican Embassy in Washington (*United States Daily*, 6th June, 1927).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 31st October, 1927.

⁷ *The Times*, 2nd June, 1927.

of the Mexican revolution, the chaotic phase of the revolution had been succeeded by a more stable régime under which first President Obregón and then President Calles had begun to consolidate the gains which the revolution had made; but the position of President Calles, while relatively stable, was still precarious and indeed still frequently challenged by force of arms, and the zone on either side of the Mexican-United States border was the quarter from which many of the counter-revolutionary movements came. The disorder fomented by the counter-revolutionaries in this zone was increased on the Mexican side of the line by the non-political activities of brigands in search of a livelihood and of unsubjugated and exasperated Indian tribes whose hand was against every man's.¹ On the 13th September, 1926, for example, in the Mexican State of Sonora, ex-President Obregón was besieged in a railway train by Yaqui Indians from 11.0 a.m. till 4.0 p.m., when a column of Federal troops came to his rescue;² and in November 1926 another encounter in the same district between Federal troops and Yaqui Indians was reported.³ Even in regions not adjacent to the border, crimes of violence continued to occur with such frequency that American and other foreign residents in Mexico, as well as Mexican citizens, were numbered among the victims. While these 'incidents' affecting foreigners appear seldom or never to have been committed from political motives, there was on each occasion a danger (as in the case of the similar 'incidents' of which foreigners were victims, during the same period, in China)⁴ that serious political consequences might follow.

As for the Mexican counter-revolutionaries, the activities in which certain of them engaged in their asylum on United States territory provoked the intervention of the United States Government more than once during the years 1926 and 1927. For example, on the 15th August, 1926, in California, General Estrada—a Mexican *émigré* who had led an unsuccessful rising against the Obregón régime in 1924⁵—was arrested, together with his 'staff', by the United States Federal authorities when he was on the point of launching a raid across the border; and 150 of his followers, as well as a quantity of arms and munitions of war, were rounded up next day.⁶

¹ For a description of conditions along the border see an article, dated the 20th May, 1927, by Mr. Francis McCullagh, published in *The Manchester Guardian*, 7th July, 1927.

² *The Times*, 15th September, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 16th November, 1926.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, Section 8 (xii) (d).

⁵ For a denunciation of the Calles régime which General Estrada published at Los Angeles on the 12th March, 1926, see *The New York Times*, 13th March, 1926.

⁶ *The Times*, 17th August, 1926.

It was reported that preparations for a simultaneous rising had been concerted in several Mexican States and also in Mexico City itself; and a number of arrests and seizures were made by the Mexican authorities after the United States authorities had taken action on the other side of the border.¹ In November 1926 the Mexican Government was reported² to be reinforcing its garrisons on the border for fear of a raid by ex-provisional President Adolfo de la Huerta, who was likewise living as an *émigré* in United States territory, at Los Angeles. At Tucson, Arizona, on the 5th December, 1926, General Adolfo de la Huerta declared that he was waiting for the Mexican counter-revolutionaries to capture a border point, so that he could return to Mexico—under the aegis of a local *de facto* Government of his own party—without violating the laws of the United States.³ Thereafter, on the 18th May, 1927, charges of conspiracy against the United States and of exporting arms and munitions to Mexico in violation of the Presidential embargo were lodged against General de la Huerta and four of his associates in the Federal Court at Tucson by the United States Department of Justice.⁴ In the course of the trial officials of the United States Government admitted that Señor de la Huerta had kept them constantly informed as to his connexion with Mexican affairs, and on the 14th February, 1928, the General and his associates were acquitted of the charges brought against them.⁵

It will be seen that the Mexican *émigrés* in the United States caused the same kind of embarrassment to the Government of the country in which they had found asylum as the Italian, Catalan, and Spanish *émigrés* were causing during the same years in France.

(ii) **The Controversy over Foreign Interests in Mexico between the Mexican Government and the Governments of the United States and other Powers.**

In the controversy over foreign interests in Mexico, the United States took the lead on the foreign side, and this for more than one reason. First, there was the special interest of the United States in the foreign relations of a country which was her immediate neighbour; second, there was the Monroe Doctrine, which constrained other foreign Governments to leave the championship of foreign

¹ *Ibid.*, 17th and 18th August, 1926; *Le Temps*, 18th August, 1926; *The New York Times*, 21st August, 1926.

² *The Times*, 16th November, 1926. Cf. *The Times*, 20th November, 1926.

³ *The New York Times*, 6th December, 1926; *The Times*, 7th December, 1926.

⁴ *The Times*, 20th May, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 15th February, 1928.

interests in Mexico in American hands in the last resort; and third there was the vast volume of American investments in Mexico. On the 15th December, 1926, the State Department at Washington estimated¹ the aggregate value of American holdings and investments in Mexico at \$1,389,061,000, of which oil-fields accounted for \$318,638,000, mines for \$317,427,000, railways for \$248,158,000, and rural property for \$166,047,000—to mention only the four largest of thirteen heads. Thus, in recording the history of the controversy over foreign interests in Mexico during the years 1926 and 1927, it will be well to begin by taking up again the history of the controversy as it was conducted between the Governments of Mexico and the United States.

In a previous volume² it has been noted that, from the signature of the two claims conventions of September 1923 down to the autumn of 1925, the relations between the United States and Mexico were relatively good; and this was no doubt one of the factors in the stabilization of the Calles régime; but the purpose for which General Calles had been placed in office to succeed General Obregón was the consolidation of the work of the Mexican revolution, and as soon as he set about the fulfilment of his political mission, General Calles came into sharp conflict with American interests in Mexico and with the State Department at Washington.

The conflict again arose out of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917.³ In order to implement the provisions of this article, as far as they affected foreign interests in Mexico, President Calles initiated two pieces of legislation towards the end of the year 1925: a Petroleum Law, which was passed on the 18th December, 1925, and was promulgated on the 31st of the same month; and an Alien Land Law, which was passed by the Mexican Congress on the 23rd December, 1925, and was promulgated on the 21st January, 1926. The effect of the Petroleum Law was to give congressional sanction to a series of Presidential decrees, in execution of Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917, which had already been issued.⁴ The legislation, in execution

¹ See *The United States Daily*, 25th January, 1927.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 424.

³ For the provisions of this Article and for the earlier international controversy that arose out of it, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 417 *seqq.* For the text of the Article see *op. cit.*, Appendix, pp. 452–6.

⁴ This congressional sanction could perhaps hardly be said to carry any moral authority (as contrasted with the technical fulfilment of constitutional forms), inasmuch as the congressmen were not freely elected and independent-minded representatives of the Mexican people but nominees of a revolutionary group, like the President himself. The formal parallel between President Calles and Señor Sáenz's relation to the Mexican Congress and President

of Article 27, which was enacted in the Alien Land Law was entirely new.¹ The passage of these two Mexican laws gave rise to a fresh diplomatic controversy between the United States and Mexico which opened with an inquiry from the United States Government regarding the Alien Land Bill (then under consideration by the Mexican Congress) on the 29th October, 1925, and concluded with a Mexican note of the 27th March, 1926.² The results of this correspondence will appear from the following summaries by two American authorities.

According to Mr. J. Reuben Clark, Jr.,³ 'The particular matters which crystallized out of the diplomatic controversy during this period were as follows:

1. Those provisions of the Petroleum Law and Regulations which seem to provide for the granting of a new right for fifty years, instead of confirming an acquired right in perpetuity.

2. The possible legal inability of American companies to secure confirmatory concessions for lands lying within prohibited zones.

3. The curtailment of the 'positive acts' as defined by the Mexican Commissioners at the Bucareli Conference on August 2, 1923.

4. The requirement of a Calvo Clause [i.e. a clause requiring foreigners to waive diplomatic protection from their own Governments in so far as their property in Mexico was concerned] from American citizens (individuals and corporations).

5. The operation, as a 'positive act', of the 'manifesting' of lands under Circular 11 of January 15, 1915, thus 'tagging' such lands.

6. The exact character of the rights and titles possessed by aliens

Coolidge and Mr. Kellogg's relations to the United States Congress did not reflect a corresponding parallelism in political fact.

¹ For these facts about the Petroleum Law and the Alien Land Law of 1925 see C. W. Hackett: 'The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 1910-1926' (*World Peace Foundation Pamphlets*, vol. ix, No. 5), p. 376. For the respective texts of the Petroleum Law and the Alien Land Law, see *op. cit.*, pp. 414-22 and pp. 425-31. Articles 14 and 15 of the Petroleum Law are reprinted on p. 465 below. For the historical antecedents of the Petroleum Law and for the course of the controversy between the Mexican and the United States Governments down to the *détente* of 1927-8, see J. Reuben Clark, Jr.: 'The Oil Settlement with Mexico' (in *Foreign Affairs* of New York, July 1928). See also the Foreign Policy Association of New York: *Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 23, 20th January, 1928, pp. 349-54. In regard to the Land Law, it was reported in the spring of 1928 that over six million hectares (mostly arable) had been distributed as compared with a total of twelve million arable hectares in the territory of the Republic. By the Land Law of 1925, the allotments were compulsorily entailed.

² Texts of this correspondence in *The United States Daily*, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th April, 1926, and in *Senate Document No. 96, 69th Congress, 1st Session*. For a full summary of the arguments interchanged, see Hackett, *op. cit.*, pp. 377-95.

³ *Foreign Affairs* of New York, July 1928, p. 608.

(individuals and corporations) holding interests in lands—'fee or leasehold'—which were acquired prior to May 1, 1917, both when the lands are 'tagged' and when they are 'untagged'.

Mr. C. W. Hackett¹ summarized the points as follows:

'*First.* The most persistently controverted point was with reference to the provision in each law which requires foreigners to waive their nationality and to agree not to invoke diplomatic protection in so far as Mexican-owned property is concerned. In the last four communications to the Mexican Foreign Office the United States Government consistently declined to admit that such a waiver can annul the relations of a citizen to his own Government or that it can nullify the obligation of a Government to accord diplomatic protection to one of its nationals in case of a denial of justice. In reply the Mexican Government was equally as insistent in defending the requirement in the two laws that an alien must consider himself a Mexican with respect to Mexican-owned property on the ground that such an obligation was "assumed individually . . . between the contracting party and the Mexican Government", and in no wise infringed "upon any of the rights of a foreign state". The Mexican Foreign Minister did admit, however, that "an individual may not compel the state of which he is a citizen to refrain from asserting a right that belongs to it".

'*Second.* A very significant admission, and one most heartily appreciated by the Mexican Government, was made by Secretary Kellogg in his note of January 28, 1926, as follows: "Every sovereign state has the absolute right within its own jurisdiction to make laws governing the acquisition of property acquired in the future. This right cannot be questioned by any other state."²

'*Third.* An equally significant explanation, and one which was promptly followed up by the United States Government, was made by Minister Sáenz in his note of February 12, as follows: "The entire question is reduced to determining whether or not the laws under consideration are retroactive in their application or whether they assail or respect rights previously acquired."

'*Fourth.* The two last-cited statements made possible, as already noted, the mutual understanding that both Governments upheld the principle of the non-retroactivity of laws with respect to alien rights legally acquired. It was on the basis of this common understanding

¹ *World Peace Foundation Pamphlets*, vol. ix, No. 5, pp. 395-6.

² The principle thus explicitly admitted does not appear to have been ever contested in terms by the State Department, but the explicit admission was of course valuable from the Mexican Government's point of view.—A.J.T.

that Minister Sáenz in his final note asserted that the controverted articles in the land law were not retroactive and gave assurances that the petroleum regulations, when issued by the Executive, would confirm the "rights to the subsoil held by American citizens who had performed" the required "positive acts".

'*Fifth.* The formal correspondence, while controversial in character, is, somewhat in contradistinction to the several statements issued to the press by the two secretariats, altogether friendly in tone.'

Meanwhile, unofficial negotiations had been taking place between the Mexican Government and representatives of the American oil interests concerned, but on the 25th March, 1926, these broke down.¹ Thereafter, the regulations² governing the Alien Land Law were promulgated by President Calles on the 29th March, 1926, and those governing the Petroleum Law on the 8th April. Neither set of regulations had been accepted by the State Department at Washington or by the private American interests concerned; but it may be noted that, in the regulations (Article 18) governing the Alien Land Law, it was expressly laid down that 'none of the provisions of this law or of these regulations will have retroactive effect to the prejudice of anyone.' Wide powers for the execution of the regulations governing the Petroleum Law were conferred upon the Minister of Industry and Commerce by a Presidential Decree of the 8th June, 1926;³ and the promulgation of regulations governing the new Mining Law of the 3rd May, 1926, followed on the 12th August, 1926.⁴ In regard to the Petroleum Law, the Mexican Minister of Industry issued a circular on the 19th September announcing that permits to drill wells on lands to which companies had not fully established their rights would be provisional and subject to two conditions—first, that the company should give a bond in Mexican currency for each well drilled, and second, that owners and holders must legally prove their rights within a time limit which was to expire on the 31st December, 1926, at the latest.⁵ Further powers for dealing with the private interests concerned were conferred upon the Oil Branch of the Ministry of Industry by a Presidential Decree of the 26th September.⁶ These measures evoked from the United States Government a vigorously worded note (dated the 30th October, 1926, and delivered on the 10th November) in which it accused the Mexican Government of applying

¹ *The New York Times*, 22nd, 24th, and 26th March, 1926.

² Text in Hackett, *op. cit.*, pp. 417–22.

³ *The Times*, 4th September, 1926.

⁴ *The New York Times*, 13th August, 1926; *The Times*, 14th August, 1926.

⁵ *The New York Times*, 20th September, 1926.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 27th September, 1926.

its legislation retroactively, contrary to the agreements of September 1923.¹ On the 17th November² the Mexican Government returned an unaccommodating reply; and for a moment it seemed as though the United States Government might decide to retaliate upon the Calles régime by lifting the embargo on the importation of arms from the United States into Mexico,³ even if it did not go to the length of formally breaking off diplomatic relations (which had been restored at the time of the negotiation of the 1923 agreements). Nevertheless, on the 25th November, the Mexican Ministry of Industry issued a statement warning all oil companies that they must apply before the 31st December for confirmation of their titles to all concessions granted before the existing constitution came into force on the 1st May, 1917, and that the Government would regard omission to file applications by that date as tantamount to the renunciation of the concessions aforesaid.⁴ In thus holding his ground, President Calles had the support of the Mexican Congress,⁵ whereas the action taken by the United States Government was publicly criticized by Senator Borah, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate at Washington.⁶ Meanwhile, a number of American oil interests decided to accept the Mexican Government's conditions; and the position taken up by the United States Government and by other American oil interests was further weakened when the Mexican Government's conditions were likewise accepted by British oil interests in Mexico towards the end of November⁷—notwithstanding the fact that the protest of the United States Government against the Petroleum Law and the Alien Land Law had been supported diplomatically by the British Government in the previous January.⁸ In these circumstances the State Department at Washington (according to an official communication of the 16th February, 1927, from the Secretary of State to the Senate)⁹ 'supplied interested American citizens or their counsel with full information regarding the general position of the Government of the United States with respect to the rights of American nationals owning property in Mexico, so that any action taken by such nationals might be based upon a complete understanding of the position of the Government of the United States in

¹ *The New York Times*, 11th, 13th, and 24th November, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 24th November, 1926.

³ *The Times*, 25th and 27th November, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 27th November, 1926.

⁵ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*; *The New York Times*, 11th December, 1926.

⁶ *The New York Times*, 25th November, 1926.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 27th November, 1926; *The Times*, 30th November and 3rd December, 1926.

⁸ *The Times*, 14th January, 1926.

⁹ Text in *The United States Daily*, 17th February, 1927.

the premises,' but did not give 'any advice or instructions to any American persons or corporations' with regard to the Mexican Petroleum Law. On the 2nd December, 1926, a conciliatory statement, declaring that no confiscatory retroactive measures would be taken, was issued by the Mexican Embassy in Washington.¹ Further, during the course of December the Mexican Minister for Industry, Commerce, and Labour, Señor Luis Morones, exchanged views with representatives of American coal interests² and oil interests,³ and on the 20th December he communicated to them drafts of the new concessions which were to be issued to companies applying for confirmation of existing concessions originally acquired before the 1st May, 1917. The grant of a new concession was to follow from the proof that some 'positive act'⁴ had been performed by the concessionaire before the date just mentioned; and the duration of such new concession was to be the lifetime of the individual or the period of the company's existence as indicated in the terms of its incorporation or the period required for exploiting the concession exhaustively—subject, presumably, to a maximum term of fifty years (Article 14, Paragraphs i and ii of the Law of 1925).⁵ There was no stipulation in these drafts that foreign companies operating in Mexico must renounce the diplomatic protection of their home Governments. On the other hand, a concession was to lapse *ipso facto* if transferred to a foreign Government or to a private corporation of another foreign nationality.⁶ On the 29th December, the eleventh hour discussions between the private American oil interests and the Mexican Government were closed by a telegram from President Calles refusing a request that the period of grace for compliance with the Mexican Government's requirements should be prolonged beyond the expiration of the calendar year.⁷

¹ *The New York Times*, 3rd December, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 4th December, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 17th, 18th, and 20th December, 1926.

⁴ For the earlier history of the controversy over this formula see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 421.

⁵ It may be noted that, while, in the case of concessions to be granted in consideration of pre-existing rights, the maximum term was specified, in Article 14 of the Law of 1925, as 50 years, to be computed, according to the circumstances, either from the time when the exploitation works began or from the date at which the contracts were made, it was also stated in the same article that concessions were to be 'granted in conformity with the law', and in a previous clause (Article 8, Paragraph vii) it was laid down that 'the life of a concession shall be not more than 30 years'. Presumably the maximum of 50 years was only applicable when the pre-existing rights had already been enjoyed for 20 years or upwards.

⁶ *The Times*, 22nd December, 1926.

⁷ Texts of the American oil companies' request and of President Calles's reply in *The New York Times*, 30th December, 1926.

At this critical moment a still further strain was put upon the relations between the Governments of Mexico and the United States by a report that the Mexican Government was making active efforts to frustrate the policy of the United States Government in Nicaragua;¹ but by the 16th January, 1927, the crisis produced by this report was stated, at Washington, to be over;² and it became evident that even the remote prospect of war with Mexico had aroused, in the United States, a strong popular reaction in favour of a pacific policy.³ On the 21st January, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate at Washington approved a resolution for submitting controversies with Mexico regarding property rights of American nationals and corporations in that country to arbitration; and on the 25th this resolution was adopted unanimously by the Senate as a whole.⁴

Meanwhile, the Mexican Government refrained from taking drastic action against the companies which had omitted to comply with its requirements by the stipulated date of the 31st December, 1926. On the 30th, Señor Morones had announced that the Government would not accept applications from third parties for the concessions which, through non-compliance of the existing holders, would legally lapse according to the Mexican Government's own contention. As a measure of coercion against the recalcitrant companies, the Mexican Government contented itself with revoking drilling permits for wells on which work had not been started by the 31st December.⁵ Even this moderate measure of coercion, however, recoiled upon the Government's head, since the immediate result was that Mexican labour was thrown out of work⁶—a result which threatened to undermine the popularity of the Government's policy⁷—while the decline in the production of oil threatened to produce a serious diminution in the public revenue derived from royalties.⁸ Already, the production during the year 1926 was reported, by the Acting Commercial

¹ For this report, see this part of the present volume, Section (iv) below.

² *The Times*, 18th January, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 20th January, 1927.

⁴ *The United States Daily*, 22nd and 26th January, 1927. Text of the resolution in the issue of the 22nd January, 1927. See further *ibid.*, 23rd February, 1927, for evidence favourable to Mexico which was submitted, on the 21st February, 1927, to a special subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

⁵ *The United States Daily*, 17th January, 1927; *The Times*, 26th and 27th January, 1927.

⁶ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

⁷ The more so, inasmuch as the relations between Mexican labour and foreign employers in Mexico were distinctly improving at this time.

⁸ *The Times*, 7th February, 1927. An appreciable proportion of the Mexican Government's revenues was derived from foreign individuals and foreign capital employed in the country.

Attaché in Mexico City of the United States Department of Commerce,¹ to have declined by 21 per cent. as compared with the production in 1925.² There was thus a growing desire on either side for some accommodation, and happily its growth was not checked by any serious 'incident'. In Mexico itself, the contest between the Government and the oil companies remained confined to a guerilla warfare of injunctions and counter-injunctions in the courts,³ while in the diplomatic field it subsided into an academic controversy over the respective numbers of the companies which had been compliant and recalcitrant. On the 23rd January, 1927, the Mexican Ministry of Industry was reported to have stated that 125 out of 147 companies had already complied.⁴ On the 24th, President Calles himself, in reply to a telegram from Senator Borah, gave the figures as 380 out of 402.⁵ At the beginning of March, the Mexican Embassy in Washington published an elaborate statement in which they declared that 'the oil production from lands operated by the companies which failed to comply with the Mexican Law represented for 1925 the 41·6 per cent. of the total production, and during the months of January to November 1926 the 44·6 per cent.'⁶ On the other hand, the United States Senate was informed by the Secretary of State that only 4 out of 47 American companies and individuals owning oil property in Mexico had complied; that 11 companies, American or foreign to Mexico, all operating through Mexican holding companies, had refused to accept the new law; and that these companies controlled about 90 per cent. of the petroleum lands and accounted for about 70 per cent. of the petroleum production of Mexico.⁷

¹ *The United States Daily*, 1st February, 1927.

² The Mexican petroleum industry had not started until 1901 and not found a foreign market until 1911. The 'peak' of production had been reached in 1921, but during all the years 1918 to 1926 inclusive Mexico had been second to the United States in oil production among all the countries of the world. In 1927 Mexico was just beaten by the U.S.S.R. and Venezuela as well as by the United States. It seemed probable, however, that Mexican production would gradually increase again. The fluctuations in the Mexican petroleum industry were out of relation to those in other departments of Mexican economic life.

³ In May the Mexican Supreme Court quashed certain injunctions against the Mexican Government's action which had been granted by local Mexican courts to some of the oil companies (*The Times*, 6th and 20th May, 1927).

⁴ *Le Temps*, 24th January, 1927.

⁵ Texts of telegrams in *The United States Daily*, 1st March, 1927. According to the Foreign Policy Association of New York (see the passage quoted, footnote 7 below) the total number of companies or individuals was variously estimated at from 147 to 442.

⁶ Text *ibid.*, 2nd March, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 17th February, 1927. The Department of State at Washington suggested that the discrepancy between its own figures and those of the

The situation remained in suspense, without any drastic step being taken on either side, until the close of the year 1927. Meanwhile, a diplomatic incident occurred which may have had at least an indirect bearing upon the *dénouement*. In March, it was rumoured that the Mexican Government had become possessed of photostatic copies of certain compromising documents in the office of the military *attaché* at the United States Embassy in Mexico City. The documents were said to include correspondence between the Ambassador, Mr. Sheffield, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, which displayed a strong animus against President Calles;¹ while, according to one account, they actually contained instructions from the State Department to its representatives in Mexico to encourage revolutionary movements against the existing régime.² In regard to these allegations the State Department appears to have kept its own counsel; but the military *attaché*, Colonel Davis, after being summoned to Washington in April to report, was transferred to another post on the 20th June.³ The Ambassador himself, after a visit to Washington in June,⁴ sent in his resignation on the 8th July;⁵ and in September, Mr. Dwight W. Morrow, a partner in the firm of J. P. Morgan, was appointed by President Coolidge as Mr. Sheffield's successor.⁶ This appointment was confirmed by the Senate on the 17th December;⁷ but Mr. Morrow had already arrived at his post before the end of October⁸ and had lost no time in entering into cordial personal relations with the President to whom he was accredited.⁹

Mexican Embassy might be due to the fact that the Embassy counted in Mexican companies as well as foreign companies (*ibid.*, 18th March, 1927). According to the Foreign Policy Association of New York, the position was as follows: 'Of all the companies or individuals (variously estimated from 147 to 442 in number) claiming petroleum titles, only about twenty-two (twenty were American, one was Dutch, and one English) failed to accept the Mexican petroleum law and have their titles confirmed. The non-conforming companies occupy only a small per cent. of the total acreage for which oil concessions have been asked, but they produce a disproportionately large share of the total amount of petroleum produced.' (*Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 23, 20th January, 1928, p. 350.)

¹ *The Times*, 7th May, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 30th March, 1927.

³ *The United States Daily*, 21st June, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 5th March, 1927.

⁵ *The United States Daily* and *The Times*, 9th July, 1927. There seems to have been no suggestion that Mr. Sheffield resigned under pressure. At the same time, it seems clear that he lacked either the temperament or the experience for performing his difficult diplomatic functions at Mexico City successfully, and that his replacement by Mr. Morrow was a not unimportant factor in that improvement in the relations between the Mexican and the United States Governments which followed.

⁶ *The Manchester Guardian*, 21st September, 1927.

⁷ *The United States Daily*, 19th December, 1927.

⁸ *The Times*, 25th October, 1927.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 4th November, 1927.

While these changes, followed up by a flying visit from Colonel Lindbergh and a facetious tour by the comedian Mr. Will Rogers, were producing a *détente* in Mexican-United States relations on the personal plane, the determining factor was probably the inexorable economic fact of the decline in oil production. In face of this fact, the Mexican Government seems to have made up its mind to abandon its attitude of intransigence and take the path of conciliation; and when once this change of policy had been settled behind the scenes, a juridical avenue of escape from the diplomatic *impasse* was offered to the Mexican Government by the Mexican Supreme Court. On the 17th November, 1927, the Supreme Court rendered a decision to the effect that Articles 14 and 15 of the Petroleum Law, in which the most contentious provisions of the law were comprised, were unconstitutional.¹ On the 26th December President Calles sent a message to the Mexican Congress asking for an amendment of the articles in question in the sense demanded by the decision of the Supreme Court which has just been mentioned; a bill to this effect passed its first reading the same evening;² and by the 28th this bill had been approved by the Senate as well as by the Chamber of Deputies and had gone back to the President, whose approval was, of course, assured in advance and was duly given on the 3rd January, 1928. The amendments actually came into force on the 11th January.³

¹ *The United States Daily*, 19th November, 1927; *The Times*, 19th November, 1927. For the constitutional import of this decision see Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 609-10.

² *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th December, 1927; *The United States Daily*, 29th December, 1927.

³ Articles 14 and 15 of the Law of the 31st December, 1925, were as follows (English translation of the text reprinted from Hackett, *op. cit.*, p. 429):

Art. 14. The following rights will be confirmed without any cost whatever and by means of concessions granted in conformity with this law: (i) Those arising from lands in which works of petroleum exploitation were begun prior to May 1, 1917; (ii) Those arising from contracts made before May 1, 1917, by the superficiary or his successors in title for express purposes of exploitation of petroleum. The confirmation of these rights may not be granted for more than 50 years computed in the case of Sec. (i) from the time the exploitation works began, and in the case of Sec. (ii) from the date upon which the contracts were made; (iii) To owners of pipe lines and refiners who are at present operating by virtue of a concession or authorization issued by the Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor, and as to what has reference to said concessions or authorizations.

Art. 15. Confirmation of the rights to which Arts. 12 and 14 of this law refer, shall be applied for within the period of one year, computed from the date of the going into effect of this law; that date having passed, said rights shall be considered as renounced and the rights, confirmation of which has not been applied for, shall have no effect whatever against the Federal Government.

The amendments of these articles which were approved by the President on

Certain questions still left open in this text were afterwards settled amicably.¹ For example, on the 9th January, 1928, in reply to a specific inquiry, from a representative of one of the oil companies operating in Mexico which were owned by United States nationals, as to 'whether an application for confirmatory concession by a foreign company' involved 'surrender of any rights held prior to May 1, 1917', Señor Morones stated officially that, in the opinion of the Mexican Ministry of Industry, the answer was in the negative. Further, the Mexican Ministry of Industry proceeded to amend the Petroleum Regulations—in consultation first with representatives of United States and other foreign private interests and thereafter with the United States Embassy in Mexico City—in a manner which was accepted by the parties consulted as bringing the Regulations into harmony with the amended law. In these amended Regulations the term 'positive acts' was given, *ipsissimis verbis*, the wide interpretation which had been placed upon it by the Mexican Commissioners at the Bucareli Conference² on the 2nd August, 1923. It was further noteworthy that the draft concession, attached by way of illustration to the amended Regulations, contained no 'Calvo Clause' requiring the concessionaire, if of non-Mexican nationality, to renounce the diplomatic protection of his own Government. The amended Regulations were signed by President Calles on the 27th March and promulgated on the 28th.

This series of conciliatory steps on the Mexican side promised to settle the long controversy over the Petroleum Law of the 31st December, 1925. On the 30th December, 1927, a statement was made at the White House, on President Coolidge's behalf, to the effect that,

the 3rd January, 1928, were as follows (English translation of the text reprinted from *Current History* of New York, March 1928).

Art. 14. There shall be confirmed without any expense and by means of concession the following rights: (i) Those derived from lands on which petroleum exploitation work commenced before May 1, 1917; (ii) Those derived from contracts closed before May 1, 1917, by owners of surface rights or parties under contract to them for the express purpose of oil exploitation; and (iii) to those constructing pipe lines and refineries under concessions or authorizations issued by the Department of Commerce.

Art. 15. Confirmation of rights referred to in the preceding article must be sought within one year from publication of this law if such rights have not already been the subject of confirmation petitions. After one year these rights (rights for which confirmation has not been sought under the amended law) will be renounced and will be without effect against the Mexican Government. Oil rights acquired by owners of surface lands (before 1917) will be confirmed without time limit. Rights acquired by contracts with owners of surface lands will be confirmed for the period of those contracts.

¹ For these settlements see Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 611–14.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 420–1.

according to the President's information, the legislation would provide for a settlement of all questions relative to the petroleum dispute, and that, although there appeared to have been no reference to the Mexican land laws, which he considered as also important, he believed that the land question might be adjusted by some other means.¹ On the 28th March, 1928 (the date on which the new Mexican Petroleum Regulations were promulgated), both the State Department at Washington and Mr. Morrow, the United States Ambassador at Mexico City, issued statements to the effect that, in view of the action taken by the Mexican authorities, the diplomatic controversy over oil rights might now be regarded as satisfactorily closed.² The gist of the settlement was that the Mexican Government had renounced the time-limit which, in the original version of the Petroleum Law, had been attached to concessions, and had also waived the 'Calvo Clause' (though this clause had been written into the Mexican Constitution of 1917). On the other side, the United States Government had agreed that freehold titles held by United States citizens should be confirmed by concessions and had also accepted the doctrine of 'positive acts'—an admission which might affect American interests, not merely in Mexico, but indirectly, as a precedent, in other Latin-American countries.

While the controversy over the Petroleum Law and the Alien Land Law had occupied the foreground throughout the years 1926 and 1927, other controversies of older standing between Mexico and the United States were still dragging on in the background and doing their part to maintain a state of tension in Mexican-United States relations.

For example, the General Claims Commission and the Special Claims Commission, which had been set up by the Conventions of the 8th and the 10th September, 1923, respectively,³ were still in session. Of the two, the Special Claims Commission had the more delicate task, since it had to deal with claims brought against the Mexican Government by American citizens for losses or damages suffered 'through revolutionary acts' during a period running from the 20th November, 1910, to the 31st May, 1920.⁴ In February 1926 there was a crisis over the interpretation of the Commission's terms of reference;⁵ and in April the Commission broke up in a storm over the test case of fifteen American mining engineers who had been killed in 1916 at Santa Ysabel by the troops of General Villa. The Brazilian

¹ Text of statement in *The United States Daily*, 31st December, 1927.

² Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 614.

³ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 421.

⁴ See Hackett, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

⁵ See *The New York Times*, 9th, 10th, and 12th February, 1926.

umpire of the Commission, Dr. R. Octavio, and the Mexican member, Señor F. G. Roa, had concurred in rejecting the United States claim in this case, whereupon the United States member, Judge E. B. Perry, appears to have accused Dr. Octavio of having acted in improper collusion with his Mexican colleague.¹

The General Claims Commission, which had to adjudicate upon all cases that had occurred between the 4th July, 1868, and the date of its own expiry, with the exception of cases falling within the province of the Special Claims Commission, had a less stormy career. By the 30th August, 1927, the date appointed for its expiry by the original convention of the 8th September, 1923, it had decided thirty-six out of fifty-one American claims against Mexico in favour of the claimants, awarding to them an aggregate of \$2,221,659 as against an aggregate claim, in the fifty-one cases, of \$3,790,796. It had also decided five out of nine Mexican claims against the United States in favour of the claimants, awarding to them an aggregate of \$39,000 as against an aggregate claim in the nine cases of \$440,910.² On the initiative of the United States Government,³ the life of the General Claims Commission was extended for two additional years, from the 30th August, 1927, to the 30th August, 1929, by a new convention signed in Washington on the 16th August, 1927;⁴ but the period with which the Commission was empowered to deal, which, according to the original convention, was to terminate on the 30th August, 1927, with the life of the Commission itself, was not extended under the new instrument.

On the 19th November, 1926, the Mexican Government concluded a convention with the British Government,⁵ on the pattern of the Mexican-United States Convention of the 10th September, 1923, for setting up a Special Claims Commission to adjudicate upon claims of British subjects against the Mexican Government in respect of losses caused by revolutionary action in Mexico during the period 20th November, 1910, to 31st May, 1920. Indirect claims (i. e. claims in respect of losses sustained by non-British companies in which the

¹ *The New York Times*, 27th April, 1926; cf. *The New York Times*, 6th and 7th March, 1926.

² For these figures, as well as a schedule of the United States claims, see *The United States Daily*, 17th August, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 16th February, 1927.

⁴ Text *ibid.*, 17th August, 1927. The Dutch chairman of the Commission, Professor van Vollenhoven, resigned in the autumn of 1927. He had informed the State Department at Washington some time earlier that he would not be able to remain in office after the 30th August, 1927 (See *The United States Daily*, 3rd October, 1927).

⁵ Text in British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2876 of 1927.

total British interest amounted to at least 51 per cent.) were to be entertained as well as direct claims. The British Government undertook not to present to the Mexican Government, otherwise than under this convention, any claims for losses or damages arising in the manner and during the period specified in the convention. The Anglo-Mexican Special Claims Commission started work on the 22nd August, 1928.¹

The signature of the Anglo-Mexican Convention on the 19th November, 1926, was one symptom of an improvement in Anglo-Mexican relations which declared itself in other ways as well. For instance, the Anglo-Mexican Commercial Treaty of the 27th November, 1888, which had been denounced by the Mexican Government on the 6th March, 1926, was after all maintained in force provisionally—first by an agreement of the 10th January, 1927, under which the date when the denunciation was to take effect was postponed from the 22nd December, 1926, to the 22nd June, 1927, and then again by an exchange of notes on the 26th May and the 5th June, 1927, which provided for a further postponement until the 22nd December, 1927. At the end of January 1928 it was announced that the denunciation had been suspended for a third period of six months.²

There was also a noteworthy improvement, during the years 1926 and 1927, in the relations between the Mexican Government and its foreign creditors. After the acute phase of the Mexican revolution had come to an end in 1920, a first agreement between the Government and its foreign creditors had been made in 1922, and under this agreement the service of the debt had been duly met for the single year 1923. Thereafter the Government had defaulted again—according to its own plea, in consequence of the unforeseen and abnormal set-back to the reconstruction of Mexico which was caused by General Adolfo de la Huerta's revolt against the Obregón régime.³ In October 1925 a fresh agreement was made between the Government and an international committee of bankers under the chairmanship of Mr. Thomas W. Lamont—the chief change being that the Mexican Government now separated the State Debt from the Railway Debt and declined to reassume responsibility for the latter, but at the same time handed back the railways (which had been taken over by the State during the revolution) to private management as from the expiration of the calendar year 1925.⁴ For the year 1926,

¹ *The Times*, 23rd August, 1928.

² *Ibid.*, 1st February, 1928.

³ See a statement by the financial agent of the Mexican Government in New York, Mr. A. M. Elias, in *The New York Times*, 21st June, 1926.

⁴ See *The Times*, 14th January, 9th February and 30th June, 1926.

the Mexican Government duly made the payments necessary to cover the service of the State Debt under the new agreement¹ as well as a full year's interest on the guaranteed Railway Debt and six months' interest on railway bonds not guaranteed. The necessary payments towards the service of the State Debt seem likewise to have been made for the first half of the year 1927;² but by this time Mexico was experiencing an economic and financial depression, and the service for the second half of 1927 was not met when it fell due at the end of the year. *A fortiori*, there seemed little prospect that, for 1928, Mexico would be able to resume full payments on her foreign debt, as the agreement of October 1925 required her to do. Accordingly, in January 1928, President Calles sent emissaries to New York to discuss the situation with the international committee of bankers with a view to the negotiation of a new agreement to be based upon an estimate of the Mexican Government's capacity to pay.³

On the whole, however, the controversy over foreign interests in Mexico had become considerably less acute by the end of 1927 than it had been at the beginning of the preceding year.⁴

(iii) The Conflict between the Mexican Government and the Catholic Church (1926-7).

The conflict with the Catholic Church, upon which the Mexican Government engaged in the year 1926, was an international affair in the technical sense, inasmuch as the Catholic Church was an international institution under the authority of a Papacy which had not ceased to maintain diplomatic relations with Governments even after the loss of its own temporal power. Equally, the conflict was an international affair in virtue of its practical effect upon the relations between Mexico and her formidable neighbour, the United States; for, though the majority of the foreign ecclesiastics whom the Mexican Government expelled were Spanish and not United States nationals, the Catholic community in the United States took up the cause of the Catholic Church in Mexico with fervour and urged the

¹ *The Times*, 4th February, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 3rd December, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 25th January, 1928.

⁴ For the concurrent improvement both in economic conditions in Mexico and in the relations between the Mexicans and those foreign individuals and companies that were working in Mexican territory, see the impressions of a visit paid to Mexico in April and May 1928 by Mr. Vincent W. Yorke, the Chairman of the (British-owned) Mexican Railway Company, Ltd. (Report of the proceedings of the one hundred and twenty-sixth ordinary general meeting, held at Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, on the 27th June, 1928.) In this report, the part played by Ambassador Morrow in promoting better relations between Mexicans and foreigners is emphasized.

Administration at Washington to intervene in the conflict on the Mexican Catholics' behalf. Since the Catholic community in the United States was well organized, it was able to press its views upon the attention of the Administration—partly through individual members of Congress, partly through the episcopate, and partly through a private association, 'the Knights of Columbus'. On the other hand, among the Protestant majority of the nation, the Council of Churches worked vigorously for a policy of non-intervention in Mexico; the Congregational Church sent a mission to Mexico City; and the Young Men's Christian Association, which had workers in the field in Mexico as in many other foreign countries, was friendly to the Calles régime.¹ Yet, while these important and influential Protestant organizations threw their weight into the scales against the Catholic *bloc*, there were other circles in the Protestant community which tended to coincide with the Catholics in their point of view, because they regarded the Mexican Government's policy as being not so much anti-Catholic as anti-religious.² The Mexican laws which had brought the Calles Administration into conflict with the Catholic Church were, in fact, applicable to all Churches; and the philosophical views, as distinct from the political motives, which had inspired this legislation were perhaps anti-religious in the general sense, though the Catholic Church was the only ecclesiastical organization in Mexico which was at once so powerful and so reactionary as to be politically obnoxious to the revolutionary Government.

The conflict between the revolutionary Government of Mexico and the Catholic Church arose out of the same situation as the conflict between the Soviet Government and the Orthodox Church and the conflict between the Turkish Republican Government and Islam. In all three cases, a radical régime, which ultimately depended for its existence upon winning the support of the ignorant mass of the population, found itself confronted by a Church with a strongly conservative or even reactionary tradition and with an inherited influence over the masses which amounted to an *imperium in imperio*.

¹ This friendship appears to have been reciprocated. In the summer of 1928 there was being organized in Mexico a central training college for Y.M.C.A. workers to supply not only Mexico itself but all the Latin-American countries, and this institution received President Calles's blessing because its aim was to be, not religious conversion, but the promotion of social welfare. In August 1928 President Calles appointed a Mexican Protestant Minister, Dr. Moises Sáenz, who was head of the Mexican Y.M.C.A., to be Mexican Minister of Education.

² Compare the attitude of American and British Protestants towards the conflict between the Soviet Government and the Orthodox Church and even towards that between the Turkish Republican Government and Islam.

In such circumstances, a trial of strength between the established Church and the revolutionary State was perhaps inevitable. Indeed, in Mexico, where the first revolution had begun a century before the outbreak of the revolution of 1910, the conflict of Church and State had already had a long history.¹ By successive acts of legislation which had been passed, not without civil disorder, between the years 1856 and 1859, the Catholic Church had been deprived in Mexico of temporal (e.g. judicial) powers and property rights, and a ban had been placed upon religious orders. This legislation had been reiterated in 1873 and consolidated in 1874, and under the Diaz régime, when it had been allowed to remain a dead letter, it had not been repealed. Thus the leaders of the new revolution which began in 1910, and which was directed in part against the Catholic Church as well as against the foreign concessionaire and the foreign and native landlord, found the legislation which corresponded to their ecclesiastical policy already on the statute book. Their object was rather to enforce the law than to alter it; and in fact a law of the 22nd August, 1916,² re-establishing Government machinery for executing the existing ecclesiastical laws effectively, was the only new legislative departure which they made in this field before the promulgation of the new constitution on the 5th February, 1917.

Among the relevant provisions of the Constitution of 1917 were the following:

Art. 3. Instruction is free; that given in public institutions of learning shall be non-sectarian. Primary instruction, whether higher or lower, given in private institutions shall be likewise non-sectarian.

No religious corporation nor minister of any religious creed shall be permitted to establish or direct schools of primary instruction.

Private primary schools may be established only subject to official supervision. . . .

Art. 5, par. 3. . . . The law does not recognize the establishment of monastic orders, of whatever denomination, or for whatever purpose contemplated.³

Art. 24. Every man is free to embrace the religion of his choice and to practice such ceremony, devotions or observances of the respective creed, either in places of public worship or at home, provided they do not constitute an offence punishable by law.

Every religious act of public worship shall be performed strictly within the places of public worship, which shall be at all times under Governmental supervision.

Art. 130. The Federal authorities shall have exclusive power to exercise in matters of religious worship and outward ecclesiastical

¹ For a summary of this history see Hackett, *op. cit.*, pp. 440-6.

² Text in Hackett, *loc. cit.*

³ This re-enacts art. 5 of the law of September 25, 1873.

forms such intervention as is by law authorized. All other officials shall act as auxiliaries to the Federal authorities.

The Congress shall not enact any law establishing or forbidding any religion whatsoever.¹ . . . Marriage is a civil contract.

The law recognizes no corporate existence in the religious associations known as churches.

The ministers of religious creeds shall be considered as persons exercising a profession and shall be directly subject to the laws enacted on the subject.

The state legislatures shall have the exclusive power of determining the maximum number of ministers of religious creeds according to the needs of each locality. Only a Mexican by birth may be a minister of any religious creed in Mexico.

No ministers of religious creeds shall, either in public or private meetings, or in acts of worship or religious propaganda, criticize the fundamental laws of the country, the authorities in particular or the Government in general; they shall have no vote, nor be eligible to office, nor shall they be entitled to assemble for political purposes.

Before dedicating new temples of worship for public use, permission shall be obtained from the Department of the Interior (*Gobernación*); the opinion of the Governor of the respective State shall be previously heard on the subject. Every place of worship shall have a person charged with its care and maintenance, who shall be legally responsible for the faithful performance of the laws on religious observances within the said place of worship, and for all the objects used for purposes of worship. . . .

The law governing religious property was laid down in Article 27.²

Thus the Mexican ecclesiastical legislation of the 'fifties' and 'seventies' of the nineteenth century was reasserted and reinforced in the Constitution of 1917; but in this matter, as in that of the conditions imposed upon foreign enterprise in Mexico, the revolutionary leaders were contented at first to assert their thesis on paper and waited to put the provisions of the Constitution into practice until they felt themselves strong enough to face the struggle which that step was certain to precipitate. On this account, the new conflict between State and Church in Mexico did not break out until the first months of 1926, when the Constitution had been nominally in force for no less than nine years, though as far back as 1924 Señor Calles, in his election address as candidate for the presidency, had denounced the Church in the same breath as the capitalists and the foreigners.³

¹ This re-enacts art. 1 of the law of September 25, 1873.

² The full text of all the relevant clauses, except Article 27, will be found in Hackett, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-6, and the full text of Article 27 in *op. cit.*, pp. 407-12. Article 27 is also reprinted in the Appendix to the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii.

³ *The Times*, 10th August, 1926. In the course of the year 1925 relations between Church and State in Mexico became strained to an extent sufficient

An occasion for enforcing the ecclesiastical provisions of the Constitution was offered by certain abortive risings against the Government in January 1926, in which ecclesiastics were implicated—for instance, the Archbishop of Guadalajara, who was accused of having personally initiated a rising in the State of Jalisco.¹ In the second week of February the Government opened its anti-ecclesiastical campaign by deporting or expelling foreign priests and nuns from the country and closing a number of churches, convents and convent schools. Though chiefly directed against Spanish nationals, who, in spite of the law, still occupied a number of high positions in the Catholic hierarchy in Mexico, these measures were also applied to ecclesiastics of other nationalities and other denominations.² This was in pursuance of a clause (quoted above) in Article 130 of the Constitution; and in the last week of February the Government took measures to put into effective execution Article 3, relating to education, and Article 27, relating to ecclesiastical property.³ New regulations for private schools were issued by the Ministry of Education on the 24th April. They included a comprehensive prohibition of religious instruction (including indirect allusions to religious matters) and of the display of religious emblems in school buildings. The latter prohibition recalled the Turkish regulations of 1924 which likewise led to a conflict between the Catholic Church and a revolutionary Government.⁴ The Mexican Government had already (no doubt unconsciously) followed the example of the Turkish Government in encouraging the formation of a Mexican 'National Church' with the Catholic doctrine and ritual but with its own independent Church government⁵—an exotic plant to which the 'Turkish Orthodox Church' of Papa Eftim⁶ offered perhaps the closest analogy.

These measures evoked resistance in Mexico itself and protests abroad. On the 23rd February, 1926, for instance, there was a serious encounter, in which at least one life appears to have been lost, in the Church of the Holy Family, one of the principal places of worship in

to evoke a reference in the Pope's Consistorial Allocation of the 14th December of that year (see the Pope's circular letter of the 5th July, 1926, mentioned below).

¹ *The Times*, 13th, 18th, and 19th January, 1926.

² *The New York Times*, 12th and 14th February, 1926; *The Times*, 17th February, 1926.

³ *The New York Times*, 25th February, 1926; *The Times*, 1st March, 1926.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 79.

⁵ Reference in the Pope's Apostolic Letter to the Mexican Episcopate, dated the 2nd February, 1926, and published on the 19th April (English translation in *The New York Times*, 20th April, 1926).

⁶ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 268.

Mexico City, when the congregation resisted an attempt by the authorities to arrest foreign priests in the building during a religious exercise.¹ There were also disturbances on the 6th March at Oaxaca, when the authorities closed a Catholic seminary;² a few days later at Jalisco, in the district of Nayarit, where a mob killed three representatives of the State Government who were attempting to close a church because the priest had failed to comply with the law;³ and on the 19th March at San Luis Potosi, where an order to close all the churches, for the same reason, was only carried out after a fight between the Federal troops and the local population;⁴ while on the 27th April, 1926, two lives were lost at Zitacuaro, in the State of Michoacan, in a collision between Federal troops and a crowd which was demonstrating in favour of the repeal of the new religious laws.⁵ In the United States, a simultaneous attack upon the State Department at Washington for its inaction was delivered on the 18th February by Representative J. J. Boylan in the House and by Archbishop Michael J. Curley of Baltimore in a public statement.⁶ From the Vatican, in April, there came two communications from the Pope: first, a letter dated the 5th April and addressed to the Cardinal Vicar, in which the Mexican Government's action was described as 'a real and actual persecution' and Catholics in the Diocese of Rome and throughout the world were exhorted to offer up a common and universal prayer for their persecuted brethren;⁷ and then an Apostolic Letter, dated the 2nd February, but not made public until the 19th April,⁸ which was addressed to the Mexican Episcopate. In this latter communication, the Mexican Government was censured particularly for having excluded from Mexico the Apostolic Delegate Monsignore Seraphim Cimino and for having patronized the so-called Mexican 'National Church'. At the same time, the Mexican clergy were admonished to hold aloof from politics, were forbidden to establish any political party bearing the name of Catholic, and were exhorted to devote themselves to the promotion of religion, morals, and culture and to the betterment of economic and social conditions (activities which the Catholic Church in Mexico was accused, by its opponents, of having neglected).

¹ *The Times*, 25th February and 21st April, 1926.

² *The New York Times*, 7th March, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 13th March, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 20th March, 1926.

⁵ *The Times*, 30th April, 1926.

⁶ *The New York Times*, 18th and 19th February, 1926. See the counter-statement by the Mexican Consul-General in New York, Señor A. M. Elias, in a letter dated the 13th February, 1926, and published in *The New York Times*, 21st February, 1926.

⁷ Italian text of this letter in the *Corriere della Sera*, 6th April, 1926.

⁸ English translation in *The New York Times*, 20th April, 1926.

In May and June, relations between Mexico and the United States were further strained by the deportation from Mexico of Bishop George J. Caruana of Porto Rico—an American citizen who had been appointed representative of the Vatican in Mexico City. The Mexican Government declared that Bishop Caruana had made a false declaration to the Mexican immigration authorities when he had entered Mexico on the 4th March—a charge which the bishop categorically denied. Appeals from the United States Government on Bishop Caruana's behalf were of no avail.¹ The expulsion of Monsignore Tito Crespi, Bishop Caruana's successor, who was also an American citizen, was ordered by the Mexican Government at the end of July.²

After these preliminary engagements, a pitched battle was brought on by the promulgation, on the 3rd July, 1926, of a Government decree defining offences against Article 130 of the Constitution of 1917 (from which passages have been quoted above) and prescribing penalties.³ This decree was to come into force on the 31st July, and in the course of the month it became apparent that it would meet with organized and vigorous resistance. On the 5th July, the Pope sent an encyclical, through his Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, to the representatives of the Holy See throughout the world, calling upon Catholics to unite, on the 1st August, in special prayers for the Church in Mexico.⁴ Towards the middle of the month, the Mexican National League for the Defence of Religious Freedom issued a circular calling upon all good Catholics to bring economic pressure to bear upon the Government by refraining from spending money except for bare necessities of life, by withdrawing deposits from the banks, and by refusing to send their children to state schools;⁵ and on the 25th July a pastoral letter,⁶ signed by an imposing number of Mexican archbishops and bishops,⁷ was posted on the church doors, announcing that, after consultation with the Vatican, the Mexican Episcopate had decided to order the suspension of all church services which required the participation of priests from the 31st July onwards until the Government withdrew its decree. The Government retorted by taking steps to institute legal proceedings against the signatories;⁸ by arresting a number of prominent Catholic laymen;⁹ and by pre-

¹ For this incident see *The New York Times*, 18th and 19th May, 1926; 14th and 15th June, 1926.

² *The Times*, 2nd August, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 5th July, 1926.

⁴ English translation of this letter in *The New York Times*, 7th July, 1926.

⁵ *The Times*, 19th July, 1926.

⁶ *The New York Times*, 26th July, 1926; *The Times*, 27th July, 1926.

⁷ Thirty-eight, according to one version, forty-seven according to another.

⁸ *The Times*, 27th July, 1926.

⁹ *The New York Times*, 27th July, 1926; *The Times*, 29th July, 1926.

paring to take possession, on behalf of the state, of all churches which might be left without responsible guardians.¹ At the same time, the Mexican Confederation of Labour stepped into the arena on the Government's side.²

During the last week of the month the tension mounted rapidly. Every day the churches were crowded; masses were said every half hour; and there seemed to be a danger of serious disorders on the 31st, when the Government's decree and the episcopal interdict were to come into force simultaneously.³ The Government, however, took extensive military precautions;⁴ and the critical 31st July, as well as the 1st August, on which an anti-clerical labour parade took place in Mexico City,⁵ passed off, not indeed without disturbance and loss of life in Mexico City and in other parts of the country,⁶ but at any rate without any catastrophe on a large scale.

The contest of wills which thus began on the 31st July, 1926, was long drawn out. It was still continuing, with gradually diminishing violence, but with no decision in favour of either party, during the year 1928. Both parties were obstinate, and neither showed itself willing to negotiate for a settlement except on condition that their opponents should first withdraw from their position. By the middle of August 1926 only fourteen priests had conformed to the Government's decree and so obtained permission to resume possession of their churches, and every one of these had been excommunicated for coming to terms with the enemy.⁷ On the other hand, the economic boycott, though it produced a considerable effect during the first few weeks,⁸ failed to bring the Government to its knees and gradually abated as the conflict dragged on. A conference which was held on the initiative of the Episcopate on the 21st August between President Calles and a group of Catholic leaders came to nothing. The Government declined the suggestion that the bishops should be allowed to present their case personally before Congress, or else that the questions at issue should be submitted to a referendum; and on the 23rd the Episcopate broke off negotiations.⁹ The Vatican was reported to have given the Mexican Episcopate a 'free hand' in dealing with the

¹ *The Times*, 29th July, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 26th July, 1926.

³ For descriptions of the scenes in Mexico City on these days see *The New York Times*, 26th, 27th, 29th and 30th July, 1926; *The Times*, 30th July, 1926.

⁴ *The Times*, 31st July, 1926.

⁵ For descriptions see *The New York Times* and *The Times*, 2nd August, 1926; *The Times*, 3rd August, 1926.

⁶ For such disturbances see *The Times*, 2nd and 6th August, 1926.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 16th August, 1926.

⁸ See *ibid.*, 5th August, 1926.

⁹ For this conference see *The New York Times*, 19th, 21st, 23rd and 24th August, 1926; *The Times*, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, and 25th August, 1926.

Mexican Government.¹ When the Mexican Congress reassembled on the 1st September, 1926, Señor Calles referred to the struggle with the Catholic Church in his presidential message in terms which evoked a denunciation from the bishops.² A petition from the bishops was rejected by Congress on the 24th September by 171 votes to one.³ It may be noted that, in the United States, President Coolidge had refused, on the 11th August, 1926, to receive a delegation of 'the Knights of Columbus' which had sought to make representations to him regarding the Mexican situation,⁴ and that on the same date the American (i.e. United States) Federation of Labour, while disclaiming solidarity with the Mexican Federation of Labour in respect of the religious conflict, had at the same time proclaimed its own neutrality on the ground that this conflict was a Mexican domestic affair.⁵ Nor was the deadlock broken by occasional arrests and imprisonments of ecclesiastics at the hands of the Mexican Government,⁶ or by another papal encyclical which was published in November,⁷ or by a pastoral letter from the Catholic Episcopate in the United States which was made public on the 15th December.⁸

On the 25th November, 1926, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies passed a clause in the regulations for the execution of Article 130 of the Constitution whereby all foreign communities in Mexico, except the Spanish community, were permitted, as a concession, to retain the services of foreign ecclesiastics for a period of six years.⁹

The situation, as it was at the close of 1926, had not perceptibly changed by the spring of 1928. There were periodical raids by the police upon convents, schools and private houses (the usual purpose being to surprise worshippers illegally celebrating the Mass), and periodical arrests—in most cases not for long terms—of persons suspected of defying the law.¹⁰ It was also reported that death sentences

¹ *The New York Times*, 24th August, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, and *The Times*, 3rd September, 1926.

³ *The New York Times*, 24th September, 1926; *The Times*, 25th September, 1926.

⁴ *The Times*, 12th August, 1926.

⁵ *The New York Times*, 12th August, 1926.

⁶ e.g. an archbishop, 10 priests and 25 Catholic laymen in October 1926 (*The New York Times*, 14th October, 1926; *The Times*, 15th October, 1926).

⁷ See the *Corriere della Sera*, 21st November, 1926.

⁸ *The New York Times*, 16th December, 1926; *The Times*, 17th December, 1926.

⁹ *The New York Times*, 26th and 27th November, 1926.

¹⁰ For example, six bishops were arrested on the 10th January, 1927 (*The Times*, 11th January, 1927); a number of bishops, including the Archbishop of Mexico City, were deported to the United States on the 22nd April, 1927 (*ibid.*, 25th April, 1927). On the other hand, all the Catholic laymen who were in prison for sedition were released by President Calles's orders in July 1927

had been executed upon a certain number of priests. On the other side, there were periodical disturbances of the peace¹—though it was not always easy to estimate how far these were due to religious feeling and how far to political and economic causes.² There seems to have been no evidence of any religious element in the military revolt which was nipped in the bud by President Calles's Government and punished by wholesale executions in October 1927.³ During the last weeks of 1927, parties of Federal troops were attempting to hunt down, in the States of Jalisco and Aguascalientes, the Archbishop of Guadalajara,⁴ who appears to have been more or less openly in rebellion against the Government since January 1926.

Thus the religious opposition to the revolutionary régime was gradually driven below the surface, where it added another element of instability to those which already threatened to shake the position of President Calles and his supporters.

(iv) The United States, Mexico and Nicaragua⁵ (1926–8).

Nicaragua was one of the five republics into which the former Spanish Dominion in Central America, south of Mexico, had eventually resolved itself after the overthrow of Spanish rule in 1821; and by the year 1926, when she had the misfortune to become the principal focus of international relations in the Caribbean area, she had enjoyed, or endured, a century of independence. During this century

(*ibid.*, 16th July, 1927). For notices of arrests and releases during the first four months of 1928 see *ibid.*, 28th January, 9th and 22nd February and 4th April, 1928.

¹ e.g. at Cocula in the State of Jalisco in January 1927 (*The Times*, 12th January, 1927) and at Leon in the State of Guanajuato in the same month (*ibid.*, 5th January, 1927).

² e.g. in the cases reported in *The Times*, 20th January, 10th February and 5th May, 1927.

³ For the history of this military revolt see *ibid.*, 7th, 8th, 12th, 13th and 31st October, and 7th November, 1927. ⁴ *Ibid.*, 7th December, 1927.

⁵ For the background of the events recorded in this section see I. J. Cox: 'Nicaragua and the United States, 1909–1927' (*World Peace Foundation Pamphlets*, vol. x, 1927, No. 7); the Foreign Policy Association of New York: *Information Service*, vol. ii, No. 24, 2nd February, 1927: 'United States Policy in Nicaragua'; an article on 'The United States and Nicaragua' in *The Round Table*, March 1927; also articles in *The Times*, 14th December, 1926, and 7th January, 1928. For authoritative statements of the case from the official standpoint of the United States Government, see President Coolidge's Message to Congress of the 10th January, 1927 (text in *The United States Daily*, 11th January, 1927), and *American Policy in Nicaragua* by Henry L. Stimson (New York, 1927, Scribner). Mr. Stimson's book should be read together with the review of it in *The Times*, 27th January, 1928, in which attention is drawn to certain relevant and important points to which Mr. Stimson does not refer.

her history, both external and internal, had perpetually repeated itself with little sign of any genuine change—either for worse or for better. Externally, an early and ephemeral political connexion with Mexico and several subsequent attempts at federation or union with some or all of her Central American sister-republics¹ had been defeated, one after another, by local particularism; and internally the same spirit of particularism had made Nicaraguan politics a prey to the never conclusive and therefore never ceasing struggles of provincial factions. Though these factions were disguised under the names of a Liberal and a Conservative Party, and though the constitution under which the party in power at any given moment was supposed to govern was modelled on the democratic constitutions of modern France and the United States, the theory and the practice of Nicaraguan politics remained separated by a great gulf which showed little tendency to diminish with the passage of time. Republicanism, constitutionalism, and democracy were a façade, and the real structural elements in Nicaraguan political life were dictatorship and revolution—elements inseparable from one another, since a dictator could only be overthrown by force, and power seized by force could only be held by arbitrary rule.²

This monotonous round of force, rather than the exotic forms borrowed from the progressive nations of the Old and New Worlds, seemed to be the natural level of Nicaraguan politics, above which the Nicaraguan people were incapable of rising by their own efforts. In its favour, it might perhaps be said that the mass of the Nicaraguan people had little positive desire for that self-government which in practice they had never exercised, and that on the other hand the revolutions and dictatorships which constituted Nicaraguan politics for the most part passed harmlessly over their heads without affecting the fortunes of more than a small governing minority. Under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine, which precluded any non-American Power from filling political vacua in the New World, this state of affairs in Nicaragua, which had already lasted for a century, might have continued for an indefinite period if the United States itself had not intervened in Nicaraguan internal affairs. The growing activity of the United States in the Caribbean was the factor which brought Nicaragua out of her long isolation and obscurity and made

¹ For the latest of these attempts see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 412–15.

² On this vicious circle in Nicaraguan politics see Stimson *op. cit.*, pp. 9–11: 'It is the literal truth that Nicaragua has never known a free election in our sense of the term . . . no Nicaraguan election has ever produced a result which was contrary to the wishes of the man or party which was in control of the Government.'

her a centre of international interest during 1926 and the following years.

This development in the policy of the United States, which dated approximately from the Spanish-American War of 1898, was the combined effect of three distinct causes: first, the development of naval competition in the Pacific, which dated from the victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5; second, the growing use of tropical raw materials in industry; and third, the Mexican revolution which had begun in 1910.

The development of naval competition in the Pacific had made it a matter of importance for the United States to be able to concentrate her naval strength rapidly, at will, on either of her two coastlines, and this need had led her to cut and control an inter-oceanic canal—in the first instance across the Isthmus of Panama. The Isthmus, however, was not the only sector of Central America across which the cutting of an inter-oceanic canal was feasible. A possible alinement for a second canal was to be found across the southern end of Nicaragua, where a lake (which gave its name to the country) ¹ discharged into the Atlantic and was only separated from the Pacific by a ridge a few miles broad. After the cutting of the Panama Canal it became a maxim of United States policy that if ever that waterway were to be supplemented by a Nicaragua Canal, the second as well as the first of these inter-oceanic routes must be under United States control.² The cutting of the Panama Canal had had as its political corollary the erection of the Republic of Panama, which had started on its career of nominal sovereignty and independence under the political ascendancy of the United States. In Nicaragua the existence of a possible alinement for another canal was leading by anticipation to a similar political result.³

¹ 'Lake Nicaragua, the largest body of fresh water between Lake Superior and Lake Titicaca in Peru.'—Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

² See the Foreign Policy Association of New York: *Information Service*, vol. iv, No. 6, 25th May, 1928: 'The United States and the Nicaragua Canal', where figures are given in support of the two following propositions: (i) that the Panama Canal would not be utilized up to its maximum carrying capacity until about the year 1960; (ii) that further demands could be met by widening the Panama Canal itself, and this not only adequately but very much more cheaply than by constructing a new canal across Nicaragua.

³ It may be noted that both the Panamanian and the Nicaraguan inter-oceanic routes had been used by the Government and the citizens of the United States during an earlier period, that is, between the year 1847, when the United States acquired California by conquest from Mexico, and 1869, when the completion of the first trans-continental railway in North America established direct communication by land between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States. Before the latter date, it had been quicker, as well as

The growing use of tropical raw materials in industry, which had led, in the Old World, to the partition of Tropical Africa between half a dozen European Powers, had led simultaneously, in the New World, to the penetration of Tropical America by the one Great Power of that hemisphere. In opening up Tropical America economically, the people of the United States eschewed the outward visible signs of political control in the shape of 'spheres of influence', 'protectorates', and annexations. Such signs were in fact superfluous in a field from which all possible competitors were permanently and effectively warned off. Yet, although the United States did not paint the political map of Tropical America with her own colours, the undercurrent of events in Tropical America and in Tropical Africa was much the same. In both regions, economic penetration brought political intervention in its train.¹

The Mexican revolution was the third, and perhaps the most direct, cause of the renewal and intensification of United States intervention in Nicaragua in 1926 and the following years. As has been explained in a preceding section,² this revolution was in part a reaction against 'economic imperialism'; and since in Mexico, as in other Tropical American countries, the protagonists in the movement of foreign economic penetration were citizens of the United States, the principal effect of the revolution upon the foreign relations of

cheaper and safer, for passengers and goods to travel from New York to San Francisco by one of the two trans-isthmian routes (although these involved, at that time, a disembarkation on one coast of Central America and a re-embarkation on the other) than to attempt the journey overland. In fact, control of the inter-oceanic routes in Central America might not unreasonably be said to have been more vital to the national security of the United States during the years 1847-69 than it was at any time during the next half century. After the opening of the trans-continental railways, the United States was no longer dependent upon the Central American routes for communication between different parts of United States territory; and the possibility of concentrating the strength of the United States Navy in either ocean (which did, of course, depend upon the control of an inter-oceanic canal or canals in Central America) could hardly be said to be essential for the national security of the United States in the strict sense of the term, i.e. for the defence of the Pacific coastline of Continental United States from overseas attack. The principal and effective defence against such attack was the breadth of the Pacific Ocean. The strategic value of the Canal to the United States was that it enabled her to throw her whole naval strength, not into home defence on her Pacific coast but into the balance of naval power in the Ocean beyond that coast. At most, the inter-oceanic waterway might be said to be vital to the security of the insular dependencies of the United States in the Pacific Ocean, as distinct from the security of her home territory on the North American mainland.

¹ For an estimate of the investments of United States citizens in Nicaragua, see Foreign Policy Association: *Information Service*, vol. ii, No. 24, 2nd February, 1927, p. 294.

² Section (i), of this part.

Mexico was to bring her into diplomatic conflict with her formidable northern neighbour. In this conflict between Mexico and the United States, Mexico was so far outmatched in strength that, in the last resort, she could not venture to defy her antagonist in a front-to-front encounter; and accordingly the contest of wills over the questions of the land and of the sub-soil deposits in Mexico, though it was long drawn out, ended on the whole in the United States' favour.¹ In this extremity, the Mexicans might be tempted to look for a field in which they could carry on their struggle against the United States on less unequal terms; and Central America might appear to offer them exactly the field that they wanted. Here was a region of growing importance to the United States in which her ascendancy was not yet impregnably established but was still in process of establishment by the indirect method of giving diplomatic and financial support to one local faction against another. This was a game which Mexico could play as well as the United States, and in many ways better. For instance, she could influence her Central American neighbours through the channels of race and language, which were not at the United States' disposal; she also had the advantage of the United States in the matter of geographical proximity; and her relative size and strength as compared with the Central American countries gave her, in her dealings with them, something of the prestige of a Great Power, while at the same time it was not so overwhelming as to make them fear a Mexican as the alternative to a United States hegemony. Thus Mexican diplomacy might hope to find in Central America the Achilles' heel of the Colossus who overshadowed her on her northern border; and the situation which arose in Nicaragua in 1926 offered the Mexican Government an opportunity for making the experiment. The actual manner and degree of Mexican intervention in Nicaraguan affairs in this and the following years was a matter of controversy between the Mexican and United States Governments on which it was difficult for outside observers to learn the true facts. It seems probable that the Mexican Government did intervene at this time in Nicaragua to some extent, though questionable whether it would have intervened at all if the policy of the State Department at Washington towards Nicaragua and towards Mexico itself had been other than what it actually was. It seems certain, however, that the possibility of Mexican intervention weighed upon the mind of 'official circles' in the United States; and possibly this was the factor which most directly induced the United States Government to commit

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 418-21, and the present volume, Section (ii), of this part.

itself to a 'forward policy' in Nicaragua and to persist in that course in spite of the opposition which it aroused in Congress and in the Press.

In order to understand the history of United States intervention in Nicaragua from 1926 onwards it is necessary to bear in mind the antecedent relations between the two countries.

The first attempt to cut an inter-oceanic canal across Nicaraguan territory was made by private American enterprise during the years 1889 to 1893; and though this attempt was abortive, American enterprise interested itself increasingly in Nicaragua in other activities, while American statesmanship never abandoned the policy of ensuring that the future Nicaragua Canal should be under the control of the United States. In fact, the private enterprise of American citizens in Nicaragua and the public policy of the State Department at Washington seem to have worked together to realize the 'manifest destiny' of the United States in this Central American Republic. The Conservative Revolution of 1909-10, which put an end to the Liberal Dictatorship that had been maintained since 1863, was promoted by a Nicaraguan (or Costa Rican) clerk in the employment of an American oil company, who made to the revolutionary campaign fund a contribution six hundred times as large as the annual stipend which he was receiving from his American employers; and, after the revolution had started, the triumph of the Conservatives was materially assisted by the intervention of United States naval forces.¹ Services to the Conservative cause naturally did not go unrewarded, and the ex-employee of an American firm, whose name was Adolfo Diaz, became Vice-President of the Nicaraguan Republic in 1910 and President soon afterwards. 'In 1912 the Diaz Government sought a loan from the United States and in so doing brought about a situation which threatened a new revolution in Nicaragua. The United States intervened with gun-boats and a large force of marines and prevented or put down the revolution. From that time until 1925 a legation guard of American marines was kept in the capital of Managua "to protect American lives and property". This is stated to have been with the "consent" of the Nicaraguan Government. It was under these circumstances, with a Nicaraguan Government which probably could not have been held in power in any other way, kept in power by American marines,

¹ For details of the United States intervention on this occasion, see Cox, *op. cit.*, Appendix I. It is instructive to compare the fortunes of the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1909-10, when the United States was supporting the revolutionaries, with the fortunes of the Revolution of 1926-7, when the United States was opposing the revolutionaries.

that the United States negotiated with Nicaragua the treaty of 1914.¹

Under this instrument²—which was signed by Secretary William Jennings Bryan, on behalf of the United States, on the 5th August, 1914, and (after ratification by the Senate) was duly proclaimed by President Woodrow Wilson on the 24th June, 1916—Nicaragua granted to the United States in perpetuity the exclusive right to construct and maintain an inter-oceanic canal across Nicaraguan territory (Article 1)³ and leased to the United States for 99 years (with the option of renewal for a second term of equal length) the Corn Islands in the Caribbean Sea and a site for a naval base to be selected by the United States Government on the Pacific coast of Nicaragua bordering on the Gulf of Fonseca (Article 2). In return, the United States undertook to pay for the benefit of the Republic of Nicaragua \$3,000,000 United States gold coin to be expended subject to the approval of the Secretary of State at Washington (Article 3). 'Honduras and Salvador, whose interests in the Gulf of Fonseca were at least equal to Nicaragua's, protested against the treaty to the Central American Court of Justice, which sustained their opposition. But nobody bothered about the opinion of the Central American Court of Justice, which soon afterwards went out of existence.'⁴ As for the three million dollars, 'at the time of the payment of this money a financial plan was drawn up between the Nicaraguan Government and its creditors which provided for the consolidation of Nicaragua's obligations.'⁵ The essence of this arrangement was that the foreign bondholders agreed to a reduction of interest on condition that a United States citizen, approved by the Secretary of State at Washington, should be appointed Collector-General of the Nicaraguan customs and be made responsible for the service of the Nicaraguan external debt, with power to take over the collection of the internal revenue as well if the internal revenue should fall below a specified

¹ *The Round Table*, March 1927, pp. 297–8.

² The English text is reprinted, in the appendix to the present volume, from *British and Foreign State Papers*. The text is also printed in *The United States Daily* of the 6th January, 1927. For a French text see *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 22nd January, 1927. For details regarding the negotiation of the treaty, see Cox, *op. cit.*, Appendix II.

³ President Zelaya, the incumbent of the Liberal dictatorship which was overthrown by Adolfo Diaz and his Conservative associates in the Nicaraguan revolution of 1909–10, was said to have played with the idea of leasing the canal route to Japan.—A.J.T.

⁴ *The Round Table*, *loc. cit.* For the Central American Court and its demise see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 400 and 413.

⁵ President Coolidge's Message of the 10th January, 1927 (Text in Cox, *op. cit.*, Appendix IV, 1).

figure. This plan was adopted by an act of the Congress of Nicaragua on the 31st August, 1917.¹ It should be mentioned that, down to the year 1928, the circumstances in which the Collector-General's control was to be extended to the internal revenue had never yet arisen, and that the finances of Nicaragua had so far prospered that 'the Nicaraguan National Bank and the National Railroad, controlling interests in which were formerly owned by American bankers, were repurchased by the Nicaraguan Government in 1920 and 1924.'²

In October 1924 an election was held in Nicaragua for President, Vice-President, and Congress 'under the supervision of a disinterested American citizen';³ and this resulted in the return of a coalition—a Conservative, Dr. Carlos Solorzano, being elected President and a Liberal, Señor Juan Sacasa, Vice-President. 'It had been the intention of the United States to withdraw the marines' (who had been stationed in Nicaragua since 1912) 'immediately after this election, and notice was given of the intention to withdraw them in January 1925. At the request of the President of Nicaragua this time was extended to September 1, 1925. Pursuant to this determination and notice, the marines were withdrawn in August 1925, and it appeared at that time as though tranquillity in Nicaragua was assured.'⁴ Within two months, however, an unsuccessful Conservative candidate at the recent elections, General Emiliano Chamorro, made a *coup d'état*, whereupon Vice-President Sacasa was obliged to flee the country, while President Solorzano conceded to the victor first a number of seats in the Cabinet and an indemnity to cover the costs of insurrection, then the expulsion of eighteen members of Congress, and finally, on the 16th January, 1926, the presidency itself.⁵ In consideration of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity which had been concluded by the five Central American Republics on the 7th February, 1923, at Washington, under the auspices of the United States,⁶ and which had been signed on behalf of Nicaragua precisely by

¹ The Collector-General, Colonel C. D. Ham (previously an official in the Philippine Customs Service), had been already at his post since the autumn of 1911, when the Diaz Government had received a small advance on a loan which had been arranged, contingently, with the two New York financial houses of Brown and Seligman. For details regarding the financial side of the relations between Nicaragua and the United States, see Cox, *op. cit.*, Appendix III.

² President Coolidge, *loc. cit.*

³ *The Round Table*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ President Coolidge, *loc. cit.* On the other hand, the Nicaraguan Liberals apparently asserted that they had foreseen the Chamorro revolution (which, according to them, had support from Wall Street) and had requested the United States authorities, in vain, to extend the maintenance of the marines in Nicaragua for a still further period.

⁵ *The Times*, 18th January, 1926.

⁶ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 414–15.

General Chamorro, the United States Government refused to recognize General Chamorro¹ and was followed in this refusal by the four parties to the treaty other than Nicaragua.

The inevitable Liberal revolution against the Chamorro régime broke out on the 2nd May, 1926,² when Liberal insurgent forces captured the towns of Bluefields and Rama on the Atlantic seaboard.³ Within four months the civil war had crossed the watershed and was moving down upon the sole railway in the country, which connected the Pacific port Corinto with the capital Managua.⁴ By that time, these internal disorders were already leading to international complications.

On the 27th August, 1926, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, of which Nicaragua was a member, received a telegram from

¹ Text of the United States Government's note of the 22nd January, 1926, quoted by President Coolidge, *loc. cit.*

² *The New York Times*, 5th May, 1926.

³ It may be noted that although four out of the five Central American Republics possessed Atlantic seaboard, they all faced towards the Pacific slope, which in all of them was the best developed part of the national territory and the principal centre of population. The Atlantic coast of Central America was a 'back door'; and large sections of this coast had had closer associations with the West Indies than with the adjoining parts of Central America on the Pacific slope of the watershed. This had been the case with the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, where, after an unsuccessful attempt to found a Puritan colony had been made in 1630, the English Government had claimed a protectorate over the local Mosquito Indians from 1655 to 1850. This claim had been renounced in the latter year under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, by which both Great Britain and the United States pledged themselves not to fortify, colonize, or exercise dominion over any part of Central America. Thereafter, by a treaty signed on the 28th January, 1860, Great Britain transferred to Nicaragua the suzerainty over the Atlantic coast between the southern frontier of the Republic of Honduras and the northern frontier of Costa Rica, on condition that autonomy should be granted to a Mosquito Reserve. Thus it was not till 1860 that Nicaragua acquired an Atlantic coast at all; and, after that, it was not till the 20th November, 1894, that the Mosquito Reserve, which included the whole of this coast except the two extremities, was assimilated in status to the ordinary territories of Nicaragua by a voluntary surrender of its special privileges. Even so, the Atlantic and Pacific slopes of Nicaragua remained virtually isolated from one another. For example, when Mr. Stimson was at Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, in 1927, he found that 'the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua was distant from us much less than 200 miles as the crow flies, but it takes longer to get there than to go from New York to San Francisco, and the only way of going was by sea through the Panama Canal, unless one was willing to travel on foot through the jungle or to follow down a tropical river in a canoe'. (Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 47). Thus the Atlantic littoral of Nicaragua provided an ideal 'jumping-off ground' for every successive Liberal or Conservative Revolution; and in a country where revolution was the only practical method of obtaining a change of Government, it would be hard to say whether this geographical facility for getting revolutions under way was a curse or a blessing.

⁴ *The Times* and *The New York Times*, 20th August, 1926.

General Chamorro's Government alleging that 'on the 17th instant the Mexican auxiliary warship *Concon*' had 'set sail from Salina Cruz on a freebooting expedition against the peace of Nicaragua,' and that 'it was equipped, armed and manned . . . by the Mexican Government for the purpose of assisting Nicaraguan revolutionaries.'¹ The Mexican Government denied the charge;² replied to the Secretariat of the League—which forwarded to it a copy of the Nicaraguan communication with a request for information—that Mexico was not a member of the League;³ and closed the Mexican consulate at Managua.⁴ On the other hand, the same charge was afterwards publicly made by President Coolidge in his message of the 10th January, 1927:

I have most conclusive evidence [he wrote in that message] that arms and munitions in large quantities have been, on several occasions since August 1926, shipped to the revolutionists in Nicaragua. Boats carrying these munitions have been fitted out in Mexican ports, and some of the munitions bear evidences of having belonged to the Mexican Government. It also appears that the ships were fitted out with the full knowledge of and, in some cases, with the encouragement of Mexican officials, and were in one instance, at least, commanded by a Mexican naval reserve officer.

Arms and munitions [wrote Mr. Stimson, who went to Nicaragua as President Coolidge's special representative in April 1927],⁵ were shipped from Mexico to the revolutionists even before Mexico had recognized Sacasa as president.⁶ These were carried from Mexico to Nicaragua by four successive vessels, the steamships *Foam*,⁷ *Concon*, *El Tropical*, and *Superior*, the first of these ships proceeding in August and the last in December.⁸

Whether these charges were justified or not,⁹ it can hardly have been a coincidence that, on the 24th August, 1926, the Secretary of State at Washington asked the Secretary of the Navy to send the 'Special Service Squadron' as soon as possible to the Nicaraguan

¹ *The New York Times*, 28th August, 1926.

² *Le Temps*, 30th August and 1st September, 1926.

³ *The Times*, 2nd September; *Le Temps*, 3rd September; *The New York Times*, 2nd September, 1926.

⁴ *The Times*, 2nd September, 1926.

⁵ For Mr. Stimson's mission see p. 499 below.

⁶ See p. 490 below.

⁷ According to *The New York World*, 15th January, 1927, the *Foam* sailed for Nicaragua on the 30th July, 1926, not from a Mexican port but from New York.

⁸ Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁹ 'There was little to justify the charge or the appeal [made by Señor Diaz to the Government of the United States]. There was some gun-running from Mexico—more or less countenanced, it was clearly established, by the Government of that country—but this involved a question of expediency rather than a technical violation of international law.' (Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 784).

ports of Corinto and Bluefields 'for the protection of American and foreign lives and property'.¹ Before the end of August, Rear-Admiral Julian L. Latimer had duly landed 200 men at Bluefields² and proclaimed the place a neutral zone 'with the consent of both factions';³ and General Chamorro had received a note from the State Department pressing him to relinquish office.⁴ The two possibilities that the Liberal insurgents might overthrow the Chamorro régime by force of arms supplied to them from Mexico or that General Chamorro might succeed in averting disaster by obtaining the intervention of the League of Nations were both, no doubt, unpalatable to the United States Government. If the United States intended to make its will prevail, there were no less than three recalcitrant parties on whom that will must be imposed: General Calles in Mexico City, General Chamorro at Managua, and the Nicaraguan Liberal insurgents on the Mosquito Coast. The State Department took active steps for dealing with all of them.

On the 12th September, 1926, the United States *chargé d'affaires* at Managua was instructed to use his good offices to bring the two contending factions in Nicaragua to an agreement.⁵ The Liberals, who had been suffering some reverses since the beginning of the month,⁶ accepted the armistice terms proposed by General Chamorro;⁷ and in October, on the initiative and under the auspices of the naval and diplomatic representatives of the United States, a conference was actually held between delegates of the two factions at Corinto, in a neutral zone established, at the request of both parties, by a landing-party of United States marines.⁸ This conference failed—according to President Coolidge, through the Liberals' fault. 'Dr. Sacasa was invited to attend the conference but refrained from doing so and remained in Guatemala City. . . . According to our reports, the Sacasa delegates on this occasion stated freely that to accept any Govern-

¹ Text of this letter in President Coolidge's message of the 10th January, 1927. In May 1926, after the original seizure of Bluefields by the Liberal Revolutionaries, a U.S. Cruiser had been sent to the spot and had temporarily established a neutral zone there—the provocation being that the Liberals had raided the local branch of the Nicaraguan National Bank, which was chartered in the United States. (Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 780).

² *The Times*, 30th August, 1926.

³ President Coolidge's message of the 10th January, 1927; Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁴ *The New York Times*, 31st August, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 13th and 14th September, 1926.

⁶ *The Times*, 3rd and 10th September, 1926.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 24th September; *Le Temps*, 25th September, 1926.

⁸ President Coolidge's message of the 10th January, 1927. Compare Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 25, where the conference is stated to have taken place on board the U.S.S. *Denver*.

ment other than one presided over by Dr. Sacasa himself would be a breach of faith with their Mexican allies. Hostilities were resumed on October 30, 1926. On the same date General Chamorro formally turned over the executive power to Sebastian Uriza, who had been appointed designate by the Congress controlled by General Chamorro.¹ The United States Government withheld recognition from Señor Uriza on the same juridical grounds on which it had withheld it from General Chamorro. Señor Uriza, however, summoned an extraordinary session of Congress for the election of a new President and invited the eighteen members expelled by General Chamorro to resume their seats. Three of them did so, and six more were said to have been represented by duly qualified *remplaçants*;² but there seems to be no doubt that this Congress was 'packed'. When the session opened on the 10th November, 1926, fifty-three members were present out of a total of sixty-seven, and, of these, two voted for Dr. Solorzano (the Coalition President whom General Chamorro had overthrown) and forty-four for Señor Adolfo Díaz (the Conservative President of 1912, under whose régime Nicaragua had concluded the Bryan-Chamorro treaty of 1914). The remaining seven members present abstained from voting. Señor Díaz took over the executive power from Señor Uriza on the 11th November, 1926, was inaugurated President on the 14th, and was recognized as such, on the 17th,³ by the United States.⁴ There was no reason to suppose, however, that he was *persona grata* to the majority of his countrymen, and his claim to the presidency did not remain long unchallenged. On the 1st December, Señor Sacasa landed at Puerto Cabezas, at the northern end of the Atlantic coastline of Nicaragua, near the frontier of Honduras, and was proclaimed 'Constitutional President' by his Liberal supporters. His claim was recognized on the 7th December by Mexico.⁵

Since the United States Government had acknowledged 'a moral obligation to apply the principles'⁶ of the Five Power Central American Treaty of Peace and Amity of the 7th February, 1923, and

¹ President Coolidge, *loc. cit.*

² Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-6.

³ Text of the U.S. note in *The New York Times*, 20th November, 1926.

⁴ These facts are taken from President Coolidge's message of the 10th January, 1927. According to Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 781, 'with respect to the *coup d'état* of the preceding October, Díaz was . . . "as deep in the mire as Chamorro was in the mud", but he had avoided the open acts that rendered the latter unavailable.'

⁵ Texts of the notes exchanged between Señor Sacasa's Government and the Mexican Government, on the 2nd and the 7th December, 1926, in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 29th January, 1927.

⁶ President Coolidge, message of the 10th January, 1927.

since, in this treaty, the contracting parties had bound themselves not to recognize as president, in any Central American republic, any claimant whose title was not constitutionally valid, it is relevant to consider here a question which might otherwise have been dismissed as academic: namely, which of the two claimants to the Nicaraguan presidency in December 1926 had the better title in constitutional law. This question turned upon Article 106 of the Nicaraguan Constitution of the day, which provided that *en caso de falta absoluta ó temporal* of the President the chief executive power should devolve upon the Vice-President, and *en defecto* of the Vice-President upon an emergency candidate designated by Congress. How were these words to be interpreted? Señor Díaz and the State Department at Washington appear to have contended that Señor Solorzano and Señor Sacasa were both disqualified in virtue of these words because, at the time of the emergency election of the 10th November, 1926, both those gentlemen were abroad. Señor Sacasa and the Mexican Government, on the other hand, appear to have contended that Señor Solorzano's resignation of the Presidency on the 16th January, 1926, did indeed constitute a *falta absoluta* so far as he was concerned—albeit he had resigned under duress—but that there had been no *defecto* in the case of Señor Sacasa—who, as Vice-President, would automatically succeed to the presidency if and when Señor Solorzano was eliminated—inasmuch as Señor Sacasa had never recognized General Chamorro's unconstitutional dictatorship but had merely been prevented from exercising his lawful authority within the national frontiers, between the 25th October, 1925, and the 1st December, 1926, by unconstitutional *force majeure*; and this, they argued, did not constitute a *defecto* within the meaning of the constitution. The rights and wrongs of this juridical controversy might be difficult for a constitutional lawyer to decide; but it was not difficult for even a layman to discern why the United States Government persuaded itself that Señor Díaz was constitutionally in the right while the Mexican Government arrived at the same conclusion in regard to Señor Sacasa. Díaz and Sacasa had become pawns in the hands of these two Powers in their competition for influence in Nicaragua, and neither player had any intention of surrendering a piece which might enable him to win the game.

In fact, Señor Díaz proved himself as exemplary a pawn in 1926 as in 1914. He did not even wait for his recognition to be notified to him on the 17th November, but on the 15th, in anticipation of favours to come, he took the exact step which was required of him by United States policy. He reiterated General Chamorro's protest against the

alleged action of the Mexican Government in support of the Nicaraguan Liberal insurgents, but he addressed his appeal, with greater tact, not to Sir Eric Drummond at Geneva but to President Coolidge at Washington.

Upon assuming the presidency I found the Republic in a very difficult situation because of the attitude assumed without motive by the Government of Mexico in open hostility to Nicaragua. It must be clear to you that, given the forces which that Government disposes of, its elements of attack are irresistible for this feeble and small Nation. This condition places in imminent risk the sovereignty and independence of Nicaragua, and, consequently, the continental equilibrium on which the Pan-Americanism is founded which the United States has fostered with such lofty spirit.

Naturally the emergency resulting from these conditions places in peril the interests of American citizens and other foreigners residing in our territory and renders it impossible for a Government, so rudely attacked, to protect them as is its duty and as it desires.

For these reasons and appreciating the friendly disposition of the United States toward weak Republics and the intentions which your Government has always manifested for the protection of the sovereignty and independence of all the countries of America by morally supporting legitimate Governments in order to enable them to afford a tranquil field of labor for foreigners which is needed for the stimulation of the growth of the prosperity of these countries, I address myself to you in order that, with the same good will with which you have aided in Nicaraguan reconciliation, you may solicit for my government and in my name the support of the Department of State in order to reach a solution in the present crisis and avoid further hostilities and invasions on the part of the government of Mexico.

I desire to manifest to you at the same time that whatever may be the means chosen by the Department of State, they will meet with the approval of my absolute confidence in the high spirit of justice of the Government of the United States.¹

In this note, the State Department were offered opportunities for making every move which they might conceivably desire to make in continuation of the game ²—a game which seems to have been con-

¹ The text of this note from President Diaz to President Coolidge is quoted by the latter in his message of the 10th January, 1927.

² It may be noted that Señor Diaz followed up his note of the 15th November, 1926, with other *démarches*. For instance, he was reported (*The New York Times*, 10th December, 1926) to have asked more than once for an American military mission; in a proclamation addressed to his Liberal opponents, he publicly denounced President Calles and all his works (*The Times*, 13th December, 1926); and he appealed a second time to the Government of the United States before the end of the month (*The New York Times*, 24th December, 1926). For a detailed statement of the complaints against the Mexican Government, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Señor Diaz's Government, see *The New York Times*, 31st December, 1926. Thereafter, Señor Diaz seems to have made overtures for a treaty between Nicaragua and the United States

ceived by 'official circles' in Washington as a match between the United States and Mexico with Nicaragua as their chess-board.

As early as the 15th September, 1926, three days after the offer of good offices to the two Nicaraguan factions which had resulted in the abortive conference of Corinto, President Coolidge had made his first move against his Mexican opponent by placing an embargo on the shipment of arms and ammunition to Nicaragua, informing the four other Central American Republics and Mexico of his action, and suggesting that they should do the like.¹ The four Central American Republics promised their co-operation; the Mexican Government did not adopt the suggestion, 'but informed the American Ambassador at Mexico City that, in the absence of manufacturing plants in Mexico for the making of arms and ammunition, the matter had little practical importance.' There followed the further dispatch of arms and munitions from Mexico to the Liberal camp in Nicaragua, and the recognition of Señor Sacasa by the Mexican Government; and for a few weeks at the turn of the year it seemed as though these Mexican operations in the indirect conflict between Mexico and the United States on the Nicaraguan front might produce a direct and dangerous breach between the two protagonists. There was even talk of the possibility of war; but, in the event, the United States Government confined its counter-offensive against the Mexican Government to the Nicaraguan theatre of operations, where it now began to take energetic steps—still stopping short of the overt use of naval and military force—to support Señor Diaz and to hamper his opponents.

The power which restrained the United States Government from resorting to the open employment of force either against Mexico herself or against her henchmen in the insurgent camp in Nicaragua was American public opinion, which tolerated economic and strategic 'imperialism' on the strict condition that, even at the cost of being handicapped, it should always go decently clothed and should never parade itself naked. Even as it was, the State Department had come within an inch or so of exceeding the licence traditionally allowed; and from the close of 1926 onwards every movement which it made in this affair, however gingerly it might try to walk, drew down upon it a fire of criticism from Congress and from the Press. Thus, while manœuvring against the Mexican Government on the Nicaraguan

under which the latter Power would assume responsibility in Nicaragua for the regulation of public finance and for the maintenance of public order (*The Times*, 25th February; *The New York Times*, 26th February, 1926).

¹ President Coolidge's message of the 10th January, 1927; *The Times*, 16th September, 1926.

front, the United States Government had to devote a considerable part of its attention and energy to defensive operations on the home front. On the 18th November, 1926, for example, the American Press was furnished with an inspired statement to the effect that, 'for the moment, the question of Mexican interference in Central American countries, presumably for the purpose of fostering radical propaganda and Bolshevik philosophy,' had 'swept off the stage other questions pending between Mexico and the United States, such as the oil and the land laws and the claims controversies.'¹ On the 4th January, 1927, the 'White House spokesman' announced that United States policy in Nicaragua was 'prompted not only by a desire to protect the lives and property of American citizens there, but also by the fact that the United States Government has a lease on a prospective canal route through Nicaragua and a prospective naval base on Fonseca Bay.'² On the 10th January, President Coolidge sent to Congress the message already quoted above, and in the peroration of this document he submitted that 'if the revolution continues, American investments and business interests in Nicaragua will be very seriously affected, if not destroyed'. This presidential message was followed up two days later by a statement from the Secretary of State to the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs on the theme of 'Bolshevik Aims and Policies in Mexico and Latin America.'³

Meanwhile, the operations in Nicaragua went forward. In reply to the Mexican Government's import of arms into Nicaragua for the benefit of the Liberal insurgents, President Coolidge, at the request and for the benefit of Señor Diaz, lifted, on the 5th January, 1927, the embargo which had been proclaimed on the preceding 15th September;⁴ and on the 7th January it was announced that Admiral Latimer had been given a free hand to intercept any arms imported into Nicaragua by unauthorized persons.⁵ At the same time, the United States had begun to intervene more directly than hitherto in the Nicaraguan civil war.⁶

¹ *The Times*, 19th November, 1926.

² *The United States Daily*, 5th January, 1927. In reply to this announcement, Señor Sacasa's representative in Washington issued a public denial that United States interests in the Canal Zone under the treaty of the 5th August, 1914, were threatened by the military operations of the Nicaraguan Liberals (text of this denial in *The United States Daily*, 7th January, 1927).

³ See *The Round Table*, March 1927, for a critique of this statement and of the documents appended to it, two of which, at least, would appear to disprove the thesis in support of which they are cited.

⁴ *The United States Daily*, 6th January, 1927.

⁵ *The Times* and *The United States Daily*, 8th January, 1927.

⁶ See *The United States Daily*, 5th March, 1928, for 'the complete record of

On the 23rd December, 1926, 'sailors and marines from the U.S.S. *Denver* and *Cleveland* landed at Puerto Cabezas'—the place at the northern extremity of the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua where Señor Sacasa had established his Government on the 1st of the month—'without incident, and established a neutral zone which comprised the district within rifle range of property of Americans and and foreigners.'¹ A United States censorship² of wireless was established in this zone, and Señor Sacasa and his forces were given the choice of evacuating the zone at a day's notice or laying down their arms.³ Simultaneously, another neutral zone (the third, counting Bluefields) was set up by a United States naval landing party at Rio Grande,⁴ a point on the Atlantic coast, between Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas, which, according to Señor Sacasa, was at that time 'the principal place for the deposit of' the war materials of the Liberal forces.⁵

The establishment of these neutral zones in December 1926, and of others later on in other areas, evoked protests from Señor Sacasa and his supporters,⁶ who declared that the effect—and the deliberately intended effect—was to hamper their military operations against their Conservative opponents. This allegation was never admitted by the United States Government, which maintained that the zones were established with the sole purpose of protecting American and foreign lives and property.⁷ In regard to the Puerto Cabezas Zone, in particular, it was pointed out that Señor Sacasa himself, in his capacity as head of a would-be civil administration, was allowed to

engagements and movements of American forces in Nicaragua since the first troops were landed on December 23rd, 1926, to February 5th, 1928,' given by the U.S. Secretary for the Navy to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate at Washington on the 11th February, 1928, and made public on the 3rd March. For a list of encounters, covering the period 25th March to 18th December, 1927, which was supplied by the Commanding General's Office, U.S. Marine Corps, see Cox, *op. cit.*, Appendix V.

¹ Secretary Wilbur's statement of the 11th February, 1928, cited above (cf. *The Times*, 28th December, 1926).

² This censorship was afterwards remitted (announcement by the State Department at Washington on the 30th December, 1926, reported in *The New York Times*, 31st December, 1926).

³ United States Naval notification to Dr. Sacasa as reported by the latter (text, as reported by Dr. Sacasa, in *The New York Times*, 31st December, 1926). Cf. *The Times*, 28th December, 1926.

⁴ *The Times* and *The New York Times*, 24th December, 1926.

⁵ Statement by Señor Sacasa in *The New York Times*, 31st December, 1926.

⁶ e.g., statement by Señor Sacasa himself in *The New York Times*, 31st December, 1926; official protest addressed, on the 28th December, 1926, by Señor Sacasa's representative at Washington, Dr. Vaca, to Mr. Kellogg, in *The New York Times*, 29th December, 1926.

⁷ See, for example, Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-9.

remain in residence there in a house provided by an American lumber company.¹

Whatever may have been the intention of the United States authorities in establishing the neutral zones at Puerto Cabezas and at Rio Grande, the Nicaraguan Liberals were not prevented thereby from winning a victory over their Conservative opponents at Las Perlas, another point on the Atlantic coast, during the last week of the year 1926.² Nor were they prevented from advancing westwards, over the hills and through the jungles, towards the watershed leading down to the Pacific slope, by the establishment of yet more neutral zones on the Atlantic littoral, first at Las Perlas itself and then along the Bluefields River and the Wawa River.³ Indeed, the Liberal forces made such rapid progress that by the first week in January 1927 they were threatening the political and economic heart of the country between the Pacific port of Corinto and the town of Granada at the north-western end of Lake Nicaragua; and in these circumstances the United States Government received requests for protection, not only from United States citizens resident in Nicaragua but from several foreign Governments on behalf of their respective nationals.⁴ 'On January 3, Mr. Patteson, his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Managua, requested the United States Minister to extend to British subjects the benefit of any measures taken by the United States Government to protect United States citizens in Nicaragua. Similar protection had been forthcoming on the last occasion of disturbances in Nicaragua. On January 28, on the inquiry of the United States Government, his Majesty's Ambassador at Washington confirmed this request. On February 17, Mr. Patteson telegraphed that conditions were very menacing, and that the United States Minister could give no guarantee for the safety of British life and property in three of the principal towns. In these circumstances his Majesty's Government judged it their duty to order H.M.S. *Colombo* to proceed at once to Corinto, to serve as a base of refuge for British refugees if need arose.'⁵ H.M.S. *Colombo* duly arrived off

¹ Stimson, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*; *The New York Times*, 29th December, 1926.

² See *The Times*, 29th December, 1926, for a report of this fighting which, though on a small scale, appears to have been stubborn and sanguinary.

³ The establishment of these three neutral zones, reported in *The Times* of the 11th and 13th January, 1927, is not mentioned in the United States official record of the 11th February, 1928.

⁴ President Coolidge, in his message of the 10th January, 1927, mentioned such requests from the British and Italian Governments. According to Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 35, a similar request was received from the Belgian Government.

⁵ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain on the 2nd March, 1927, in the House of Commons at Westminster in answer to parliamentary questions.

Corinto on the 26th February, 1927,¹ and did not leave until the 5th March.²

These *démarches* on the part of foreign Powers either forced the hand of the United States Government or gave it a handle (according as the policy of President Coolidge and his advisers may be interpreted by observers who were not in their confidence)³ for intervention on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic littoral, and this time on a larger scale. On the 6th January, 1927, a combined landing force of sailors and marines from the U.S.S. *Galveston* was sent up from Corinto to Managua—the capital of Nicaragua and the seat of Señor Díaz's Government—as a 'legation guard'. On the 24th January a whole battalion of U. S. marines from the U. S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba arrived at Corinto via the Panama Canal, short of one company left at Bluefields on the voyage. On the 13th February Admiral Latimer requested the marine force to keep open the railway between Corinto, Managua, and Granada, and for this purpose he landed additional forces on the 20th February.⁴ On the same date Señor Díaz made a proposal, through the U. S. Minister at Managua, for a treaty of alliance between Nicaragua and the United States.⁵ Further batches of United States reinforcements arrived at Corinto on the 21st and 26th February and the 7th March, the aggregate strength of the three batches being 94 officers and 1,572 men. On the 9th March Brigadier-General Logan Feland arrived at Corinto and proceeded to Managua in command of all United States forces ashore in western Nicaragua; and with these enlarged forces he promptly extended the field of United States operations. On the 11th March he occupied Masaya, between Managua and Granada; and on the 12th he occupied the Managua–Granada railway and sent other troops to occupy the route from Managua to Matagalpa, as well as the latter place itself, which was situated north of Managua, about half way towards the Honduran frontier, on the Atlantic slope of the watershed. This latter force came to close quarters with the front line of

¹ *The Times*, 28th February, 1927.

² Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain on the 16th March, 1927, in the House of Commons at Westminster in answer to a parliamentary question. For texts of notes exchanged on the subject between the Governments at Westminster and at Washington see Cox, *op. cit.*, Appendix IV, 2.

³ The State Department intimated that it did not regard the dispatch of H.M.S. *Colombo* to Corinto 'as an act of opposition to the policy of the United States in Nicaragua' (*United States Daily*, 25th and 26th February, 1927; *The Times*, 25th February, 1927).

⁴ Official statement published in *The United States Daily*, 3rd March, 1927.

⁵ Text of a statement (dated Managua, 24th February, 1927) on this proposal by Señor Díaz himself in Cox, *op. cit.*, Appendix IV, 3. The proposal was not taken up by the State Department at Washington.

the Nicaraguan Liberal forces, which had arrived at the neighbourhood of the watershed in its advance from the Atlantic coast; and on the 18th April Admiral Latimer declared Matagalpa a neutral zone at a moment when the Liberals were preparing to attack the town.¹ In general, from the close of March onwards, the Liberal advance was brought more or less to a standstill—whether by the resistance of the Conservative forces or by the manœuvres of the United States forces which have been recorded above²—and the resulting situation was not without danger. Between the 25th March and the 12th May, when the leaders of the Liberal forces, with the exception of General Sandino, agreed to lay down their arms,³ United States Marine Force aeroplanes were fired upon on eleven occasions, and six attacks were made on marine outposts or patrols. In one of these attacks—at La Paz on the 1st May—two marines were killed.⁴ Down to the 12th May, however, the marines successfully avoided being drawn into belligerency. The fire directed against the aeroplanes appears to have been returned only once, and in the six skirmishes on terra firma the total United States casualties during this period were two marines killed and one naval rating slightly wounded. On the other side, two of the attackers in one skirmish were known to have been killed.⁵ The total casualties suffered by the attackers in these encounters were in the nature of the case unknown to the United States authorities; but it was evident that, in such fighting as had taken place between Americans and Nicaraguans down to that date, neither side had suffered losses which would be likely to cause serious or lasting embitterment; and thus, at the moment when the settlement of the 12th May, 1927, was concluded, it seemed as though the element of danger in the situation had been successfully eliminated.

Indeed, the United States authorities had been so clearly conscious of that element of danger that, while the main body of the reinforcements of marines which were being dispatched to the Pacific coast of Nicaragua in February 1927 was still on the high seas, they had set to work to bring the Nicaraguan civil war to an end by mediation. On the 1st March, on the initiative of the United States Minister at Managua and with the approval of Señor Diaz, a party comprising

¹ *The Times*, 20th April, 1927.

² Unless otherwise stated, the record of these movements has been taken from the U.S. official statement of the 11th February, 1928.

³ For this settlement and the negotiations leading up to it, see below.

⁴ *The United States Daily*, 24th October, 1927.

⁵ The above figures are taken from the U.S. official record of the 11th February, 1928, and from official statements published on the 24th October, 1927.

two 'Liberal sympathisers', one 'non-partisan Nicaraguan' and two United States officers left Managua for Matagalpa in the hope of getting into touch with the commander of the Liberal forces, General Moncada.¹ The resulting negotiations failed—partly because the Liberals believed that, but for the presence of United States armed forces, they would be able to overthrow their Conservative opponents, and partly because they objected to the suggestion that the settlement should include the raising of a Nicaraguan reconstruction loan in New York. They were reported to have declared that they would accept any Government in Nicaragua administered by the United States for the next eighteen months in preparation for guaranteed fair elections in 1928, but that they would not consider any proposal which involved the maintenance of Señor Diaz in the presidential office.² Thereafter, notwithstanding the movements of the United States forces which have been recorded above, the Nicaraguan civil war went on—on the whole, in the Liberals' favour—with an increasing danger of bloodshed between Nicaraguans and Americans as well as between Nicaraguans and Nicaraguans. Accordingly, on the 31st March, 1927, President Coolidge dispatched a special representative to Nicaragua in the person of Mr. Henry L. Stimson.³

Mr. Stimson arrived in Nicaragua during the third week in April; conferred with the United States naval and diplomatic representatives on the spot, with Señor Diaz at Managua, with leading Conservatives at their local centre Granada, and with leading Liberals at their local centre Leon; and formed his own opinions as to the conditions essential for a settlement.

The first condition was that the elections for the Presidency, the Senate, and the Chamber of Deputies, which were due in October 1928, should be carried out under United States supervision; and 'in applying the problem of holding a fair election to existing conditions in Nicaragua, certain requirements were clear: There must first be peace and general amnesty. There must be then a complete disarmament, so far as possible, of the entire population, in which at the time every man was going about with his hand metaphorically on his pistol pocket. Finally a new and impartial police force must be created to take the place of the forces which the Government was in

¹ *The Times*, 2nd March, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 8th and 9th March, 1927. See further an official statement issued on the 8th March, 1927, by the State Department at Washington (text in *The United States Daily*, 9th March, 1927).

³ For Mr. Stimson's own account of his mission see Stimson, *op. cit.*, Chapter II (pp. 42–89). See also Foreign Policy Association of New York: *Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 23, 20th January, 1928, pp. 343–8.

the habit of using to terrorize and control elections.’¹ This last condition was suggested by the recent experience of the United States in attempting to compose another quarrel between Latin-Americans; for Mr. Stimson ‘had made a personal study of the American attempt to supervise the plebiscite in Tacna-Arica and was thoroughly familiar with the way in which the patient and earnest efforts of General Pershing and General Lassiter to hold a fair election had been thwarted by the fact that the police power over the territory was in the hands of one of the parties, and that the American commissioner had not sufficient authority to maintain order and prevent intimidation.’² In Nicaragua, ‘an effort had been made, two years ago, to establish an impartial national constabulary under the instruction of a retired American officer recommended by our Government. The effort had failed, and under the Chamorro régime the constabulary had been debauched and diverted from its non-partisan status largely because the power of the American officer had been limited to instruction and not command. Under the existing situation it was clear that to render impartial and effective service in protecting the polls such a constabulary must be created, instructed, and temporarily commanded by Americans who, being members of our active military forces, had their future record to consider and were above local temptation. This meant practically that it should be so instructed and officered temporarily by men of our Marine Corps. . . .

These conditions were drastic, but they were demanded by a drastic situation.’³

On the 22nd April, Mr. Stimson obtained from Señor Diaz a memorandum of peace terms which he was willing to see presented to his Liberal opponents. It will be observed that Señor Diaz’s proposals, which were summarized by Mr. Stimson as follows, did not conflict with Mr. Stimson’s own views:

1. Immediate general peace in time for the new crop and delivery of arms simultaneously by both parties to American custody.
2. General amnesty and return of exiles and return of confiscated property.
3. Participation in Diaz’s cabinet by representative Liberals.
4. Organization of a Nicaraguan constabulary on a nonpartisan basis commanded by American officers.
5. Supervision of election in 1928 and succeeding years by Americans who will have ample police power to make such supervision effective.

¹ Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

² Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 58. For the history of the Tacna-Arica controversy see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 425–9, and the present volume, pp. 524–31 below.

³ Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–60.

6. Continuance temporarily of a sufficient force of marines to make the foregoing effective.¹

Finally, Mr. Stimson formed the opinion that one of the conditions essential for a settlement was that, until the elections of October 1928 had been held, Señor Diaz should continue to occupy the presidency. This condition was likely to be crucial, in view of the intensely personal character of Nicaraguan politics; and in fact it proved to be the chief stumbling-block in the negotiations between Mr. Stimson and the Nicaraguan Liberals which followed. Mr. Stimson's insistence upon it was therefore remarkable—the more so inasmuch as 'Mr. Diaz himself, in one of his conferences with' Mr. Stimson, had 'expressed his own readiness to retire voluntarily if such retirement were essential to a peace-settlement.'² In explanation of his insistence, Mr. Stimson, in his published account of his stewardship, set forth a number of reasons³—some of a negative and some of a positive character. The negative reasons were that since, under the Nicaraguan constitution, Señor Diaz was ineligible to be a candidate in the election in 1928 for his own succession, 'the situation in his case could not be complicated by personal ambitions'; that 'the retention of Diaz did not really constitute a source of danger of oppression to the Liberals' (a contention which seems, on the whole, to have been borne out by the sequel); and that the suggestion that Señor Diaz and Señor Sacasa should both retire in favour of some neutral substitute was 'based upon complete ignorance of Nicaraguan conditions' inasmuch as 'no such neutral existed or could possibly exist in Nicaragua', so that the only alternative to the maintenance of Señor Diaz in office would be 'the establishment of what would amount to a foreign receivership of the Government'. These negative reasons were less substantial, or at any rate less well substantiated, than the positive reasons for the retention of Señor Diaz which were set forth by Mr. Stimson as follows:

He was so convinced of the necessity of American supervision for that election that in order to make it entirely fair he was ready to surrender all the traditional power of the presidency which had been heretofore used to influence and control election results. He was willing to disband the army; he was willing to take the necessary executive and financial steps to establish an impartial constabulary and to appoint as the officers thereof Americans recommended by our president. He was ready to advocate legislation—and in Nicaragua presidential advocacy of legislation usually means the enactment thereof—to provide for boards of election with American chairmen who should preside over the ballot

¹ Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-4.

² Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

³ Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-70.

boxes and command the services of the constabulary to prevent disorder and intimidation. In other words, in order to secure a fair election, he was ready to withhold the traditional powers of his office and make himself a virtual figurehead in respect to election control.

All these matters had been fully discussed with him, and his intelligent approval and co-operation were assured. His record in international relations with us showed that his word could be relied upon. We could be sure of these essential conditions in no other way than through Diaz remaining in office.¹

In short, Señor Diaz was the one Nicaraguan politician who offered to execute the policy of the United States in Nicaragua without reserve, and whose offer could be trusted because he had proved himself the faithful servant of the United States in the past—for example in 1914, when the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty was signed during his first term of office.

Having thus determined upon his course of action, Mr. Stimson set out to secure the compliance of Señor Sacasa and his supporters. On the 30th April and the 1st May, 1927, he conferred at Managua with representatives of Señor Sacasa who had been conveyed under safe conduct from Puerto Cabezas to Corinto via the Panama Canal in a United States torpedo boat destroyer. 'They asserted that their party recognized that the United States had a legitimate zone of interest and influence extending as far south as Panama and that they considered this fact natural and beneficial in its results to Nicaragua. But they were absolutely silent as to the single point of President Diaz's unexpired term, and at the close of two days' Mr. Stimson 'came to the reluctant conclusion that they would not or could not expressly agree to that indispensable condition.'² At their suggestion, the discussion was then extended to include the commander of the Liberal forces, General Moncada, whom Mr. Stimson met, in their company, on the 4th May at Tipitapa under a forty-eight-hour armistice arranged for the purpose. Here, again, the condition in regard to Señor Diaz proved the stumbling-block. General Moncada 'had read the peace terms and fully approved them—all except the unexpired term of Diaz, which he said he could not in honour ask his army to accept'; but if Mr. Stimson would assure him that the United States Government 'insisted on Diaz as a necessary condition to' their 'supervision of the election, he would not fight the United States.' If Mr. Stimson 'would give him a letter to that effect, he would use it to persuade his army to lay down its arms.' Accordingly, Mr. Stimson at once furnished him with the following document:

¹ Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-6.

² Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

Dear General Moncada:

Confirming our conversation of this morning, I have the honour to inform you that I am authorized to say that the President of the United States intends to accept the request of the Nicaraguan Government to supervise the election of 1928; that the retention of President Diaz during the remainder of his term is regarded as essential to that plan and will be insisted upon; that a general disarmament of the country is also regarded as necessary for the proper and successful conduct of such election; and that the forces of the United States will be authorized to accept the custody of the arms of those willing to lay them down, including the government, and to disarm forcibly those who will not do so.

Very respectfully,
Henry L. Stimson.¹

In his published account of the negotiations Mr. Stimson afterwards observed that he included the last sentence in this letter 'not as a threat to Moncada's organized and loyal troops . . . but as a needed warning to the bandit fringe who were watching for any sign that' the United States Government 'was not in earnest'.² This calculation on Mr. Stimson's part was upset, a week later, by General Sandino's recalcitrance.

Meanwhile, on the 5th May, General Moncada promptly yielded to this show of *force majeure*,³ and simultaneously Señor Sacasa's representatives, on their part, announced 'that Sacasa would not resist the action of the United States'.⁴

On the same day, the 5th May, Señor Diaz likewise began to carry out his part of the bargain. 'He proclaimed an immediate general amnesty and permitted all his political enemies to return freely to the country. He proclaimed the freedom of the press and gave to Moncada express permission to issue through the press a general proclamation to the Liberals. He gave public notice that the membership of the supreme court, which had been illegally disrupted by his predecessor, General Chamorro, would be restored to its original status. He agreed to appoint Liberal *jefes políticos*, or prefects, at the heads of the six Liberal provinces of the country in place of the Conservatives who then occupied those positions.'⁵

Within a few days, General Moncada informed Mr. Stimson that

¹ Text printed in Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-9. ² Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

³ This was the impression which was evidently intended to be conveyed by General Moncada's proclamation of that date to his army (text in Cox, *op. cit.*, Appendix IV, 6), in which Mr. Stimson's letter of the 4th was quoted *verbatim*. On the other hand, the Liberal 'Die Hards' declared that General Moncada was really a renegade, and that Mr. Stimson's show of force, which was made on General Moncada's own suggestion, was a transparent attempt 'to save his face'.

⁴ Stimson, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

he had been invested by his army with full authority to conclude the negotiations; and, after assurances on certain points raised by the Liberal army had been given to him by Mr. Stimson in a further letter of the 11th May,¹ a telegram of acceptance—‘signed by him and by all his chieftains except Sandino’—was received by Mr. Stimson on the 12th. The signatories formally agreed to lay down their arms and asked that United States forces should be sent forthwith to receive them and to ‘guarantee order, liberty and property’. On the 12th May, also, an officer of the U.S. Marine Corps was appointed head of the new Nicaraguan non-partisan constabulary (*guardia nacional*) and forthwith entered upon his duties.² Thereupon, in the belief that his diplomatic task was accomplished, Mr. Stimson left matters in the hands of Admiral Latimer and sailed from Corinto for the United States on the 16th May.³

It remains to indicate the extent to which the intentions of the United States Government in imposing this settlement on Nicaragua were actually fulfilled in the course of the next year.

The principal points in Mr. Stimson’s terms of settlement were the termination of the civil war, the economic reconstruction of the country, the reconciliation of the two factions which had been fighting one another, and the holding of fair elections in October 1928 with a view to placing the political life of Nicaragua on a genuinely constitutional basis. It is evident that all these objects were beneficent in themselves; the United States authorities on the spot appear to have been prompt, energetic, and conscientious in endeavouring to put them into effect; and, although in almost every point these measures failed, during the first twelve months, to attain complete success, the degree of success actually achieved might have been held to justify the somewhat high-handed methods by which the settlement had been imposed if the objects in question had been the sole aim of United States policy in Nicaragua. Political dissension and civil war had been the bane of Nicaragua during the century of her existence as an independent state; and the civil war which had

¹ Text in Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–2. In this letter, points 4 and 6 of the terms put forward by Señor Díaz on the 22nd April, 1927, were added to the conditions laid down in Mr. Stimson’s letter of the 15th May. President Coolidge, General Moncada was now informed, ‘has also consented to assign American officers to train and command a nonpartisan national constabulary for Nicaragua which will have the duty of securing such a fair election and of preventing any fraud or intimidation of voters. He is willing also to leave in Nicaragua until after the election a sufficient force of marines to support the work of the constabulary and insure peace and freedom at the election.’

² Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 802.

³ *The United States Daily*, 18th May, 1927.

been dragging on for a year by the time when it was brought to an end through Mr. Stimson's intervention had been waged with great bitterness and barbarity. Civilians—including boys and women—had been forcibly pressed into both armies; quarter had seldom been given; there had been little provision for the care of the wounded; the numerous deserters from both camps had been taking to banditry; and the fields had been going out of cultivation.¹ It is probable that the majority of the population, who had no personal stake or interest in the fortunes of the contending factions, were anxious for peace on almost any terms and through almost any agency; so that the United States Government might claim that the imposition of peace in Nicaragua was not only a beneficent act but a popular one. In fact, there can be little doubt that, on the whole, Nicaragua was a more prosperous and a less unhappy country in May 1928 than she had been in May 1927. At the same time, she had come far more fully under the control of the United States—a control which, after a year of the new régime, was indeed virtually complete, except for the armed resistance that was still being maintained by General Sandino²—and the fact of this close control, thrown into relief by General Sandino's militant protest against it, suggested a doubt whether the beneficent acts of the United States Government might not, after all, have been subservient to ulterior motives of a less disinterested kind. Mr. Stimson's diplomatic intervention had certainly brought the civil war to an end; but might it not equally well have been ended, within a shorter period than twelve months, by a Liberal victory in the field if the United States Government had recognized Señor Sacasa, or, short of that, if Admiral Latimer had not begun to intervene at an early stage in an indirect but not therefore ineffective manner? When this question is put, it is only fair to put the further question whether this particular civil war would ever have been started at all if the Liberal insurgents had not received material support from Mexico in their early operations on the Atlantic sea-board. The common answer to both these questions may be that in 1926 and 1927 the little Central American Republic of Nicaragua had been the victim of the quarrel between her two great North American neighbours; that her territory had been turned into an arena for the contest between these outsiders; and that, in renewing their traditional warfare on their native soil, the Nicaraguan Liberals and Conservatives had this time served

¹ For a description of the civil war and its effects see Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–2.

² For the fighting between General Sandino's forces and the United States Marine Corps, see below.

as pawns¹ in the hands of players whose paramount concern was not the chessboard nor the chessmen but the game. In this game, the players were not evenly matched, and it was evident that, as soon as President Coolidge chose to put forth his strength, he could drive President Calles into a corner. This was, indeed, the effect of Mr. Stimson's moves on President Coolidge's behalf; and if these moves had been crowned by check-mate, the diplomacy of the State Department might have enjoyed a notable triumph, for in that event the United States would probably have obtained full credit for a constructive policy in Nicaragua, while the fact that these constructive measures were incidental to a diplomatic contest with Mexico might have been ignored or forgotten. Having once taken drastic action, however, the United States could ill afford to fall short of complete success; and as time passed and the omens began to point to stale-mate rather than check-mate, the statesmen at Washington found their acts subjected to a more and more critical and embarrassing scrutiny on the part of public opinion—first and foremost at home, in the second degree in Latin America, and in some degree throughout the world. This was the international importance of the resistance to their measures for the supervision of the forthcoming elections which the United States authorities encountered in the Nicaraguan Congress, and of the resistance to their measures for a general disarmament of Nicaragua which they met with from General Sandino in the field.

It remains to record the actual sequel to the Stimson settlement in the several spheres of financial and economic reconstruction, the reconciliation of the rival Nicaraguan factions, the preparations for the elections of 1928, and the pacification of the country.

In the financial sphere, the New York banking firm of J. and W. Seligman and Co. had made a 'pacification loan' of \$1,000,000 (approximately £200,000 sterling) to Señor Diaz's Government as early as November 1926, presumably in the well-grounded belief that the United States Government would not countenance any form of pacification in Nicaragua which would involve Señor Diaz's overthrow or withdrawal. They were reported to have lent an additional

¹ In so far as it was possible to estimate the relative strength of the pawns, it seems probable that the Nicaraguan Liberals were stronger than their Conservative opponents in the sense that they had a larger number of supporters among such elements of the Nicaraguan people as were politically conscious and active. Speculations on this matter, however, were of little or no value pending a genuinely free and fairly conducted general election—and it remained to be seen whether the conditions necessary for this could be created.

\$300,000 in the spring of 1927 to enable Señor Diaz to carry on the civil war—their security being the entire stock of the Nicaraguan National Bank.¹ In March 1927, Señor Diaz was reported to have appointed a special commission, including a representative of the United States Government, to authorize expenditure from the Seligman loan; and 'the Commission's first act was the sanctioning of the immediate payment of 2½ dollars to every Conservative soldier, with a payment hereafter of 50 cents daily.'² On the 22nd September, 1927, the U.S. *chargé d'affaires* at Managua reported³ that this loan would probably be paid off by the 1st July, 1928. In the same report, and again in a public statement made by the U.S. Department of Commerce on the 18th March, 1928,⁴ the general financial and economic situation in Nicaragua was declared to be showing a marked improvement—a reiterated assurance which revealed the sensitiveness of United States 'official circles' regarding their policy in Nicaragua on this as well as on the political side.

On the 1st July, 1927, there was established a Nicaraguan Claims Commission consisting of one Nicaraguan Conservative, one Nicaraguan Liberal, and one representative of the State Department at Washington. The functions of the Commission were to terminate at the end of one year, and the period within which claims might be presented was to expire on the 1st December, 1927. All damages arising from the acts of either party to the civil war were to be considered as grounds for indemnification, and Nicaraguans and foreigners were to have equal rights in respect to their claims, but the right to indemnification was not to be extended to foreign corporations or persons known to have taken part in the Nicaraguan civil war or to nationals of countries which had provided arms for the Liberal insurgents.⁵ The American and other foreign claims which were entitled to presentation were said to amount to \$10,000,000.⁶

On the 9th November, 1927, it was reported that a further loan, this time of \$2,000,000 or \$2,400,000, was being negotiated with Messrs. Seligman & Co. on behalf of the Nicaraguan Government for various purposes, including the settlement of minor and non-delayable civil war claims, the upkeep of the non-partisan constabulary (*guardia nacional*) instructed and commanded by United States officers which was being organized according to the terms of the Stimson settlement, and the continuation of a survey for an inter-

¹ *The Times*, 10th November, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 31st March, 1927.

³ *The United States Daily*, 24th September, 1927; *The Times*, 24th September, 1927.

⁴ Text in *The United States Daily*, 19th March, 1928.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 26th October, 1927.

⁶ *The Times*, 10th November, 1927.

oceanic railway across Nicaraguan territory.¹ Simultaneously it was announced² that Dr. William W. Cumberland, who since 1923 had been financial adviser to and official receiver on account of the Government of Haiti, had been appointed by the State Department to proceed to Nicaragua at the United States Government's expense and to make a financial and economic survey of the country with a view to giving advice in regard to the proposed loan. In the *communiqué* from the State Department it was added that any comprehensive financial programme would have to be approved by both political parties in Nicaragua and that Señor Diaz's Government had already suggested that the proceeds of any loan contracted in the near future should be spent 'under bi-partisan control.'³

In the matter of reconciliation of the rival factions, six Liberal leaders were duly appointed *jefes políticos* (prefects) of the six Liberal provinces in accordance with the understanding between Señor Diaz and Mr. Stimson.⁴ On the other hand, in March 1928, Señor Diaz reconstituted his Cabinet by dropping out certain members who 'were only indifferently supporting his policy of co-operating with the United States' and taking in certain partisans of General Chamorro with an eye to presenting a united Conservative front at the forthcoming presidential and congressional elections.⁵

In regard to these elections, it had been agreed in correspondence of the 15th May and the 10th June, 1927, between Señor Diaz and Mr. Coolidge⁶ that the chairman of the National Board of Elections should be nominated by the President of the United States and appointed by the President of Nicaragua, and on the 2nd July, 1927, President Coolidge nominated a friend of Mr. Stimson's, Brigadier-General Frank R. McCoy.⁷ On the 24th October, 1927, the State Department at Washington announced that on the strength of Article 2 of the Central American Treaty of Peace and Amity of the 7th February, 1923,⁸ it would not recognize General Chamorro if he were to offer himself as a candidate, while two days later Mr. Kellogg stated that he did not regard General Moncada as being disqualified.⁹

¹ *The Times*, loc. cit.

² *The Times*, loc. cit.; text of the official announcement, which followed on the 15th November, 1927, in *The United States Daily*, 16th November, 1927.

³ The Assistant Secretary of State was questioned in regard to this loan in the House of Representatives at Washington on the 5th January, 1928.

⁴ *The United States Daily*, 10th and 14th June, 1927.

⁵ *The Times*, 30th March, 1928.

⁶ Text of Señor Diaz's letter of the 15th May, 1927, and Mr. Coolidge's of the 10th June in *The United States Daily*, 23rd March, 1928.

⁷ *The Times*, 4th July, 1927.

⁸ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 414.

⁹ *The United States Daily*, 24th, 25th and 27th October, 1927.

In fact, General Moncada was nominated as Liberal candidate in February 1928.¹ Meanwhile, municipal elections which were held on the 6th November, 1927, under the joint auspices of United States marines and of the new American-trained constabulary (*guardia nacional*) resulted in a heavy defeat for the Conservatives.²

On the 17th January, 1928, there was introduced into the Nicaraguan Congress an electoral bill providing not only that the Chairman of the National Board of Elections should be a citizen of the United States but that there should be a citizen of the United States, either a marine or a civilian, on every local electoral board.³ This bill passed the Senate as it stood but was criticized in the Chamber of Deputies as unconstitutional and was sent back for revision.⁴ Meanwhile, on the 9th March, 1928, in the Senate at Washington, the power of the President of the United States under the United States constitution to use the armed forces of the United States in order to supervise an election in a foreign country was called in question in a resolution introduced by Senator Norris (Republican) of Nebraska. On the 13th March, at Managua, a revised version of the electoral bill which had been ascertained to be acceptable to the United States Government as well as to Señor Díaz's Government was voted upon by the Nicaraguan Chamber of Deputies and thrown out.⁵ On the 16th March, however, the Nicaraguan Congress adjourned *sine die*, after failing to carry, over the President's veto, by the necessary two-thirds majority, a bill for extending its own life to the 31st December.⁶ On the 16th March it was officially announced at Washington that, on the recommendation of the Commander of the Special Service Squadron of the U. S. Navy, Rear-Admiral Sellers, 1,000 more marines were being sent to Nicaragua expressly in order to insure 'the orderly carrying out of the elections', and not to assist their 2,700 comrades in arms, already in Nicaragua, in 'rounding up' General Sandino.⁷ On the same date it was also officially announced that, in President Coolidge's opinion, the ratification of his agreement with Señor Díaz by the Nicaraguan Congress, though desirable, might not be absolutely necessary.⁸ On the 17th March there was a conference at Washington between the U. S. Under-Secretary of State

¹ *The Times*, 21st February, 1928.

² *The Times* and *The United States Daily*, 9th November, 1927.

³ *The Times*, 18th January, 1928.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 21st February, 1928. The opposition was led by General Chamorro (*ibid.*, 19th January, 1928).

⁵ *The United States Daily* and *The Times*, 15th March, 1928.

⁶ *The Times*, 19th March, 1928.

⁷ Announcement by the Secretary of the Navy (*The United States Daily*, 17th, 19th and 20th March, 1928).

⁸ *Ibid.*, 17th March, 1928.

and the then Chairman of the Nicaraguan National Board of Elections, Señor Joaquín Gómez,¹ whereupon Señor Gómez resigned in order to become Minister for Foreign Affairs at Managua,² while on the same date General McCoy was appointed Chairman of the National Board of Elections in his stead by act of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court.³ On the 21st March Señor Díaz published a presidential decree⁴ investing the National Board of Elections—as now constituted under the Electoral Law of the 20th March, 1923, with General McCoy as Chairman—with full and general authority to supervise the elections of 1928; suspending the said Electoral Law, and all subsequent laws and decrees relating to elections, in all other respects; and granting the Chairman of the Board extraordinary powers. For instance, he was empowered to require the removal of any of his colleagues or their proxies; to constitute a quorum by his presence alone, at his own discretion; and, also at his own discretion, to declare any action or determination an emergency measure and then pass it, at twenty-four hours' notice, over his colleagues' heads. No action or decision of the Board was to be valid unless the Chairman concurred, and in case of a tie he was to have a casting vote.

At Washington 'the Acting Secretary of State, when questioned regarding the constitutionality of the decree, stated orally that it would be improper to criticize or comment upon the act of the head of another Government and that the United States was more concerned with whether or not the decree gave sufficient power to General McCoy to conduct free and fair elections.'⁵

In regard to the pacification of Nicaragua, the acceptance of Mr. Stimson's conditions by General Moncada on the 12th May, 1927, was followed by prompt action on both sides.

On the part of the United States, Admiral Latimer published, on the 12th May itself, a proclamation, prepared beforehand,⁶ in which he announced the decision of the United States Government in favour of a general disarmament; cited the fact that Señor Díaz's Government had expressed its willingness to deliver the arms under its control; explained that delivery of these arms would be taken in proportion as deliveries of arms were received from the Liberal forces; notified the grant of a general amnesty by Señor Díaz's Government; and offered 'ten *cordobas* to each and every individual delivering a serviceable rifle or machine-gun to the custody of the

¹ *The United States Daily*, 20th March, 1928. ² *The Times*, 30th March, 1928.

³ *The United States Daily*, 20th March, 1928.

⁴ Text *ibid.*, 27th March, 1928.

⁵ *The United States Daily*, loc. cit.

⁶ Text *ibid.*, 12th May, 1927.

United States forces'. By the 16th May, 6,200 rifles, 272 machine-guns, and 5,000,000 rounds of ammunition had been handed over;¹ and before the end of the month the figures had risen to 11,600 rifles, 303 machine-guns, and 5,500,000 rounds.² The United States Government designated a lieutenant-colonel of marines as chief of the new Nicaraguan constabulary (*guardia nacional*) on the 14th June, 1927,³ and the first detachment of the new force, consisting of seventy-eight men under the leadership of five United States officers, entered upon active duty on the 3rd August.⁴

On the Nicaraguan side a numerically small but militarily active opposition to the Stimson settlement was equally quick to declare itself. One of General Moncada's lieutenants, General Augusto Sandino, who had served an apprenticeship in guerrilla warfare in Mexico, declined or omitted to sign the telegram accepting Mr. Stimson's terms to which his colleagues set their names on the 12th May, 1927, and marched off with his personal followers—at that time probably less than 200 strong—in the direction of the Honduran frontier.

From that moment, the fighting in Nicaragua changed its character. Until then, it had been a civil war between the Nicaraguan Liberals and Conservatives; and although the armed forces of the United States had presented themselves on Nicaraguan territory in immediate proximity to the war-zone and over an ever-extending area, and although the Liberals believed that these manœuvres were hampering and were deliberately intended to hamper their own operations against their Conservative opponents, nevertheless the Liberal leaders had anxiously restrained their followers from coming into collision with these United States troops, in the conviction that such a collision would be immediately fatal to their cause. Indeed, it was Mr. Stimson's declaration that the United States forces would disarm forcibly those Nicaraguans who would not lay down their arms willingly that had eventually brought General Moncada and the majority of his lieutenants to the point of unconditionally accepting Mr. Stimson's terms. General Sandino parted company with General Moncada not in order to carry on the civil war—which was in fact no longer possible, since both Nicaraguan parties were surrendering their arms simultaneously—but in order to fight the United States marines and the new American-trained Nicaraguan constabulary,

¹ Telegram received on the 16th May from Mr. Stimson by the State Department at Washington (text in *The United States Daily*, 17th May, 1927).

² *Ibid.*, 28th May, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 15th June, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 8th August, 1927.

who were now the only other armed forces in being in Nicaragua except his own. Thus the United States marines, who in the Nicaraguan civil war had played the part of Athena at the combat between Achilles and Hector, unexpectedly found themselves in the position of Ares challenged by Diomedes. By their bloodless manoeuvres from the 23rd December, 1926, to the 12th May, 1927, they had played to all appearance—whether intentionally or not—a decisive role in the struggle between the Nicaraguan Liberals and Conservatives, by baulking the Liberals on the verge of victory and so enabling Mr. Stimson to bring the Nicaraguan civil war to an end on his own terms. Yet by an irony of Fortune this Stimson settlement, which was intended to confer upon Nicaragua the blessings of disarmament and pacification, condemned the United States marines in Nicaragua, who had been instrumental in bringing it about, to exchange the role of ‘brilliant seconds’ for that of laboriously-engaged belligerents.

On the 13th May, 1927, the very day on which General Moncada’s army began the delivery of its arms and on which General Sandino broke away, a marine patrol was fired upon at El Paso; and on the following day there were three attacks upon detachments of marines, at three different places. On the 16th May a band of three hundred Nicaraguans attacked the town of La Paz which the marines were occupying, and in driving them out the marines lost two killed.

On the 12th July, 1927, the commander of the marine force in Nicaragua sent an ultimatum to General Sandino requiring him to surrender his arms at El Ocotal (a place on the Honduran border, in the neighbourhood of Sandino’s lair) by 2 o’clock on the morning of the 14th July, under pain of being attacked.¹ On the 16th Sandino returned a defiant answer,² and on that very day the thirty-nine marines and forty-seven Nicaraguan national guards at Ocotal were themselves attacked by about four hundred of Sandino’s men. The attackers were beaten off with the help of aeroplanes and were believed to have suffered heavy losses;³ but this action was the beginning of a guerrilla war.

The full details of this guerrilla warfare, which became incessant, need not be recorded here. It will be sufficient to mention the principal operations and engagements.

In August, proclamations offering an amnesty to Sandino were dropped over his lair from aeroplanes;⁴ and in September an ulti-

¹ *The Times*, 13th July, 1927.

² *Ibid.*, 18th July, 1927.

³ For details, see the text of Rear Admiral Sellers’s report in *The United States Daily*, 20th July, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 18th August, 1927.

matus was sent to one of his companions in arms, Salgado;¹ but the reply was an attack, led by Salgado himself, on the night of the 18th–19th September, upon the marines and national guards who were garrisoning Telpaneca. On the 8th October a United States aeroplane fell in no-man's-land, and next day a patrol sent out to rescue the airmen, who had come safely to earth, fell into an ambush and extricated itself with some difficulty. The missing airmen were believed to have been killed.² On the 30th December, 1927, a marine patrol *en route* from Matagalpa to Quilali was ambushed, with a loss of five killed and twenty-four wounded, and had to be extricated by a relief column at the cost of one more marine killed and five more wounded. The Sandinistas engaged on this occasion were reported by the United States military authorities to be well organized and well disciplined; and this was the most serious engagement in which the marines had been involved so far. Their wounded were evacuated from the battlefield by air, under fire, with considerable difficulty.³ In consequence of this engagement the United States marine force in Nicaragua was strongly reinforced with a view to assaulting Sandino on his mountain stronghold El Chipote. Meanwhile, on the 8th January, 1928, nine Nicaraguan national guards mutinied at Somotillo, were joined by about twenty civilians, and carried off a Lewis gun and other arms into the jungle. After another ultimatum had been addressed to Sandino by Admiral Sellers on the 20th January,⁴ the marines, by this time reinforced from home, occupied El Chipote on the 24th and 25th January under cover of aeroplanes⁵—only to find that the bird had flown. Sandino replied to Admiral Sellers's ultimatum on the 3rd February;⁶ within a few days he was reported to be advancing upon Matagalpa; and on the 8th February reinforcements of marines were rushed up to Matagalpa from Managua, in motor-cars commandeered for them by the Nicaraguan Government, in response to appeals for protection from the British Vice-Consul in the threatened town⁷—a move to which Sandino retorted by challenging the marines to a pitched battle. The new lair from which this challenge was written baffled attempts at detection by United States aeroplanes.

¹ *The United States Daily*, 6th and 8th September, 1927.

² *The Times*, 9th November, 1927.

³ For details, see *The Times*, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th January, 1928; *The United States Daily*, 3rd and 4th January, 1928.

⁴ Facsimile in *The New York Nation*, 21st March, 1928.

⁵ For details, see *The Times*, 28th January, 1928.

⁶ Facsimile of his reply in *The New York Nation*, 21st March, 1928.

⁷ For details, see *The Times*, 9th and 11th February, 1928; *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th February, 1928.

Thus the guerrilla warfare in Nicaragua between the U. S. Marine Corps and General Sandino went on.¹

In this warfare the losses suffered by the marines were very small, and those of their opponents relatively heavy. From their first landing down to the middle of October 1927 the marines appear to have lost only five killed, while 'approximately 540 Nicaraguans' had 'been killed, and more than 150 wounded, since May 15, when American marines started their pacification program, according to reports of casualties made public by the Departments of State and the Navy.'² These figures, however, hardly give a measure of the seriousness of the affair. A better measure is given by the movements of United States forces. On the 24th June, 1927, when there were approximately 3,100 marines in Nicaragua, it was announced officially that half of them were to be withdrawn.³ By the end of the year their number had in fact been reduced to 1,415; but on the 3rd January, 1928, after the serious fighting of the 30th December and the following days, it was announced that reinforcements of 1,000 men were to be sent to Nicaragua immediately,⁴ and 73 officers and 1,094 men were actually landed at Corinto between that date and the occupation of El Chipote on the 25th and 26th January.⁵ These were soon afterwards followed by an aircraft squadron;⁶ and thus there were already 2,700 marines in Nicaragua on the 16th March, 1928, when the Secretary of the Navy announced that 1,000 more were to be sent, not to take part in 'rounding up' General Sandino, but to assist General McCoy in supervising the elections.⁷

The longer the operations in Nicaragua were drawn out and the more the numerical strength of the United States forces there was increased, the more insistent became the criticism which the United States Government had to face both at home and abroad. In the Senate at Washington it is true that a resolution requesting the President to withdraw the United States forces from Nicaragua forthwith was rejected on the 7th March, 1928;⁸ but on the 16th April the Senate adopted a resolution, introduced by Senator Blaine (Republican), calling for a statement of expenditures incurred by reason of maintaining United States marines in Nicaragua and for

¹ The above record of operations from the 12th May, 1927, to the 5th February, 1928, inclusive, is taken throughout from the U. S. official statement of the 11th February, 1928, except where other specific references are given. See also a series of articles in *The New York Nation*, 22nd February, 1928, *seqq.* by Mr. Carleton Beals, entitled 'With Sandino in Nicaragua'.

² *The United States Daily*, 24th October, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 25th June, 1927.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 4th January, 1928.

⁵ Official statement of the 11th February, 1928.

⁶ *Op. cit.*

⁷ See p. 509 above.

⁸ *The United States Daily*, 8th March, 1928.

details of casualties, both American and Nicaraguan, in connexion with American intervention there;¹ and on the 18th April the same Senator introduced an amendment to the Naval Appropriation Bill forbidding the use of any money appropriated in the Bill in order to pay expenses incurred 'in connexion with acts of hostility against a friendly foreign nation, or any belligerent intervention in the affairs of a foreign nation, unless war has been declared by Congress or unless a state of war actually exists under recognized principles of international law.'² Although this amendment was not carried, it served as a demonstration that the policy of the Administration was not unreservedly endorsed by Congress or by public opinion.

Equally significant was the line taken by certain of Nicaragua's sister-republics in Central America. In January 1927 the Governments of Guatemala and Costa Rica, after communicating their intention to Mr. Kellogg on the 30th December, 1926, made offers of mediation to Señor Diaz and to Señor Sacasa.³ These offers were rejected by Señor Diaz on the 22nd January on the ground that neither of these Governments had recognized his régime;⁴ and after receiving two rebuffs the Guatemalan Government withdrew its diplomatic representative from Managua on the ground that Señor Diaz's régime was unconstitutional.⁵ This action was embarrassing for the State Department at Washington, which had not only recognized Señor Diaz but had taken the dogma that he had been constitutionally elected as the basis of United States policy in Nicaragua. In March 1927, when the determination of the United States to take the settlement of Nicaraguan affairs into its own hands had become apparent, the Governments of Nicaragua's four sister-republics felt it prudent to decline a request for mediation which was addressed to them by Señor Sacasa.⁶ On the other hand, in May 1927, after Mr. Stimson had imposed his settlement upon the Nicaraguans, the Foreign Ministers of the four sister-republics met in conference at San Salvador and agreed that Mr. Stimson's terms were irreconcilable with those of the Central American Treaty of Peace and Amity which had been signed at Washington, under the auspices of the State Department, on the 7th February, 1923.⁷ Accordingly the four Governments persisted in withholding their recognition from Señor Diaz; and though this mark of disapprobation did not diminish the material power of a Nicaraguan ruler who was supported by the

¹ *The United States Daily*, 17th April, 1928.

² *Ibid.*, 19th April, 1928; *The Times*, 25th April, 1928.

³ *The United States Daily*, 17th January, 1927.

⁴ *The Times*, 24th January, 1927.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 26th March, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 19th February, 1927.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 27th May, 1927.

whole strength of the United States, it did diminish the moral prestige of Señor Díaz's mighty protectress.

This diplomatic protest against President Coolidge's action in Nicaragua on the part of four adjacent Latin-American republics, reinforcing the protest which General Sandino was making in Nicaragua itself by force of arms, was not without effect upon public opinion in more distant Latin-American countries over which the ascendancy of the United States was not yet so overpowering. The Nicaraguan question did not find a place on the agenda of the Pan-American Conference which met at Havana—the capital of one Latin-American satellite of the United States—from the 16th January to the 20th February, 1928;¹ and it was not difficult for the diplomacy of the United States to prevent the question from being discussed without notice. Yet at Havana, on this occasion, facts were more potent than forms, and the unspoken knowledge, in the minds of all the delegates, of the events which were actually taking place in Nicaragua at the time when the Conference was sitting, made their silence more eloquent than words.

(v) The Signature of the New Treaty between the United States and Panama.²

On the 28th July, 1926, a treaty was signed at Washington between the United States and Panama.³ Relations between these two countries had hitherto been based on the 'Hay-Bunau Varilla Agreement' of 1903, which secured to the United States the use, occupation and control of the lands required for the Panama Canal Zone. Negotiations for a revision of this treaty had begun in Washington in 1922. The principal questions in dispute were the property valuation of the Canal Zone, the establishment of a free port and arrangements for docking privileges. Panama contended that the United States had not acquired the Canal Zone in fee simple and claimed the right to exercise fiscal jurisdiction in the zone. In particular Panama seems to have objected to the American Government's practice of leasing cold storage plants and warehouses in the zone to private individuals, on the ground that this alienated her sovereignty. The American Government, on the other hand, contended that full sovereign rights over the Canal Zone had been conferred on it by the

¹ This Conference has been dealt with in Part IV A, Section (ii), above

² See the Foreign Policy Association of New York: *Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 23, 20th January, 1928, pp. 354-9.

³ *The New York Times*, 29th July, 1926. A Claims Convention was signed at the same time for the adjustment of claims in respect of damage done to property by fire at Panama City in 1885.

1903 treaty. In July 1924 the negotiations were suspended, on the understanding that the *status quo* should continue for the time being. The discussions were subsequently renewed, however, and resulted in the signature of the treaty of the 28th July, 1926.

Both parties seem to have intended to keep the terms of the new treaty secret until ratification had taken place, but in the middle of December 1926 a version was published by the Havana press¹ and on the 20th December the text was officially made public at Washington.²

The most important provisions were contained in Article 2:³

The Republic of Panama agrees to co-operate in all possible ways with the United States in the protection and defense of the Panama Canal. Consequently, the Republic of Panama will consider herself in a state of war in case of any war in which the United States should be a belligerent, and in order to render more effective the defense of the canal will, if necessary in the opinion of the United States Government, turn over to the United States in all the territory of the Republic of Panama, during the period of actual or threatened hostilities, the control and operation of wireless and radio communication, aircraft, aviation centres and aerial navigation.

The civil and military authorities of the Republic of Panama shall impose and enforce all ordinances and decrees required for the maintenance of public order and for the safety and defense of the territory of the Republic of Panama during such actual or threatened hostilities, and the United States shall have the direction and control of all military operations in any part of the territory of the Republic of Panama.

For the purpose of the efficient protection of the canal, the Republic of Panama also agrees that in time of peace the armed forces of the United States shall have free transit throughout the republic for manœuvres or other military purposes, provided, however, that due notice will be given to the Government of the Republic of Panama every time armed troops should enter her territory. It is understood that this provision for notification does not apply to military or naval aircraft of the United States.

Other articles⁴ contained detailed provisions for American control of wireless and cable communications and of aircraft. Manzanillo Island, off the Atlantic end of the canal, was to be ceded to the United States in perpetuity, and Panama and Colon were to be free ports of entry and available for use by the United States in times of emergency. Trade between the Canal Zone and Panama was to be free, and the operations of private American enterprises in the Canal Zone

¹ *The Times*, 16th December, 1926.

² *The New York Times*, 21st December, 1926.

³ Quoted from *The New York Times*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ For summaries of the treaty see *The New York Times*, *loc. cit.*; *The Times*, 16th December, 1926. For the full text see *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 29th January, 1927.

were to be regulated. Liquor was to be carried through the Panama Canal only under seal.¹

Under the 1903 treaty Panama had merely undertaken to give the United States the greatest possible access for the movements of troops in an emergency. The new treaty therefore appeared to mark a considerable tightening of United States control over Panama. In view of contemporary events in Nicaragua² and of the suspicion with which United States policy in the Caribbean was widely regarded, the published terms of the treaty of the 28th July aroused anxiety in Europe as well as in Latin America. The new treaty, it was pointed out,³ reduced Panama's independence to a shadow and raised the whole question of the position of American states which were members of the League of Nations. The treaty committed Panama to following the United States into any war in which the latter country might become engaged, and it was felt that this understanding might conflict with Panama's obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations. At the close of the year 1926 it looked as though the Panamanian-American Treaty would provide a test case for any state that might wish to open the question of the exact relations between the Covenant and the Monroe Doctrine.

It was true that the European members of the League were likely to prefer the issue not to be raised. There were a number of reasons, for instance, why Great Britain should be reluctant to discuss the position of Panama vis-à-vis the United States and the League of Nations. Apart from the historical relation of Great Britain to the Monroe Doctrine⁴ and the analogy between the United States interest in the Panama Canal and the British interest in the Suez Canal, opinion in the United States had recently shown itself extremely sensitive on the subject of a concession granted to a British company by the Panamanian Government,⁵ and the time would therefore hardly have been opportune for any exhibition of British concern in the question of Panama's international status. Other European States Members of the League might be expected to follow the British lead, so that as far as they were concerned the case seemed likely to go by default; but it was by no means impossible that one of

¹ A special liquor convention between Panama and the United States had been signed on the 6th June, 1924 (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 438).

² See Section (iv) of this part above.

³ See *The Times*, 22nd December; *The New York Times*, 23rd December, 1926. For an exposition of the United States point of view, see *The New York Times*, 23rd December, 1926.

⁴ See Part IV, Section (i) above.

⁵ See *The New York Times*, 5th, 8th and 18th June, 1926; *The Times*, 5th and 7th June; *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th June.

the other states of Latin America—where the ‘encroachment’ of the United States upon Central America was watched with growing suspicion and resentment—might seize the opportunity to initiate a new discussion on the implications of the Monroe Doctrine.¹

If any Government had intentions of this kind, its action was anticipated by the emergence in Panama itself of that same state of mind which induced other Latin-American nations to make gestures of defiance against the United States. By the beginning of 1927, a feeling of hostility towards the United States was making itself felt in Panama, especially in the rural districts, and this hostility took the practical form of opposition to the ratification of the treaty of the 28th July, 1926.² On the 26th January, 1927, the Panamanian National Assembly referred the treaty back to the Executive for modification³ and on the 28th January the State Department at Washington was notified of the rejection of the treaty in its existing form.⁴ It was understood at Washington that the changes desired were of a minor character, and the United States Government declared itself willing to enter into further negotiations; but the Panamanian Government refrained from presenting any formal proposals for modification of the treaty. Washington appears to have been aware of only one point of difficulty—namely, the establishment of American commercial enterprises in the Canal Zone⁵—and on this matter the United States Government was ready to meet Panama’s views. The Panamanian Government, however, took no steps to initiate new discussions on details, apparently because it hoped that it might yet be possible to come to some arrangement by which its sovereignty over the Canal Zone would be recognized not to have been alienated by the 1903 treaty.⁶ A direct approach to the United States Government on this question was obviously not likely to meet

¹ For previous attempts to secure a definition of the Monroe Doctrine and for a general discussion of the relations between the United States, the Latin-American republics, and the League of Nations, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part IV, Section (i). ² See *The Times*, 11th and 20th January, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 28th January, 1927.

⁴ *The United States Daily*, 29th January, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 25th August, 1927.

⁶ See *The Times*, 25th August, 1927. According to *The Times* (*loc. cit.*) Panama, in the hope of securing recognition of her sovereignty over the Canal Zone, took the line that the 1926 Agreement replaced the Hay-Bunau Varilla Agreement, whereas the United States Government held that the new provisions were merely supplementary and in no way affected the basis of American control over the Canal Zone. It may be noted, however, that at the time of signature of the 1926 Agreement the United States press referred to it as having been concluded ‘in place of’ the 1903 Agreement (see *The New York Times*, 29th July, 1926).

with success, and the Panamanian Government seems to have pinned its hopes on the support of international public opinion. On the 10th September, 1927, Señor Morales, the Panamanian Finance Minister, who was representing his country at the eighth session of the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva, took occasion to explain to the Assembly the origin of the treaty of the 28th July, 1926, and to defend it against the criticism that it violated the Covenant of the League. In the course of his speech, Señor Morales suggested that if the United States Government should not prove willing to accept Panama's view on the subject of sovereignty over the Canal Zone, the question might be submitted to arbitration. In making this suggestion Señor Morales seems to have acted on his own initiative and not on direct instructions from Panama, but it was not denied that his action reflected the views of the Government.¹ His speech was not commented on in the Assembly, and its only result, apparently, was to elicit from the State Department at Washington, on the 12th September, the emphatic statement that, as between Panama and the United States, there was nothing to arbitrate.² In commenting on the State Department's announcement Senator Swanson of Virginia expressed what was probably the generally accepted view in the United States in the following words: 'The United States possesses absolute sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone, and it does not propose to surrender that sovereignty to any nation nor to submit the matter to arbitration of any tribunal.'³

The controversy does not seem to have been carried any farther at this time. At the end of 1927, Panama showed no signs either of ratifying the 1926 treaty or of making formal suggestions for its modification.

(vi) The Incident between Cuba and Uruguay over the Question of Cuban Sovereignty.

On the 18th September, 1926, a Cuban newspaper published the report (which had already appeared in other Latin-American papers)⁴ that Señor Guani, the delegate of Uruguay to the seventh session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, had raised the question of the status of Cuba on the occasion of the election of non-permanent members of the League Council, which had taken place at Geneva on the 16th September.⁵ According to the accounts in the press,

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th September, 1927.

² See *The United States Daily*, 13th September, 1927.

³ *The United States Daily*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See *The Times*, 20th November, 1926. ⁵ *Ibid.*, 27th November, 1926.

Señor Guani had expressed the opinion that Cuba's sovereignty was restricted by the terms of the 'Platt Amendment'—the treaty concluded between Cuba and the United States in 1903, by which the United States had acquired control over Cuba's foreign and financial policy, the right of intervention, and the right to lease certain naval stations.¹

This alleged statement by Señor Guani touched a sore spot, for Cuba, like Panama,² was becoming increasingly sensitive on the subject of her theoretical sovereignty.³ The Cuban Government, however, does not appear to have taken any immediate steps to vindicate its national honour and it was not until the beginning of November 1926 that it asked the Uruguayan Government for an explanation.⁴ On the 15th November, the Cuban State Department announced that unless an answer to the Cuban note were received from Uruguay during the day, the Cuban Minister at Montevideo would be instructed to ask for his passports.⁵ Since no note had been received from Uruguay by nightfall, instructions were sent to the Cuban Minister to leave Montevideo and proceed to Paraguay, to which country he was also accredited.⁶ The Cuban Minister, therefore, does not seem to have been formally recalled, but the Uruguayan Government, on hearing of his coming departure, decided to withdraw its own Minister from Havana. Before leaving, however, the Uruguayan Minister presented to the Cuban Government Uruguay's reply to the Cuban note.⁷ The Uruguayan note seems to have been handed in just before midnight on the 15th November,⁸ too late to stop the departure of the Cuban Minister from Montevideo on the 16th. The Cuban Government, however, decided that it could accept the Uruguayan explanation as satisfactory,⁹ and it accordingly instructed its Minister to return at once to Montevideo.¹⁰ Thereupon, the Uruguayan Government ordered its Minister also to return to his post at Havana.¹¹

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 399 and 435.

² See this part, Section (v), above.

³ On the implications of this sensitiveness, see Part IV A, Section (ii), p. 427 above.

⁴ See *The Times*, 26th November, 1926.

⁵ *The New York Times*, 16th November, 1926.

⁶ Statement by the Cuban Minister in London (see *The Times*, 26th November, 1926).

⁷ *The Times*, 20th November, 1926.

⁸ *The New York Times*, 17th November; *The Times*, 18th November, 1926.

⁹ According to the Uruguayan Legation in London, the Uruguayan Government had established the fact that Señor Guani had not made the statement attributed to him and that the information published in the press was incorrect. (See *The Times*, 20th November, 1926.)

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, 17th November, 1926.

¹¹ *The Times*, 27th November, 1926.

The incident which was thus satisfactorily settled had little significance in itself; but it was a symptom of a growing disposition on the part of Latin-American states which stood in special relations to the United States to assert their juridical rights in face of what appeared to be the 'forward policy' of the United States in the Caribbean; and at the same time it was an illustration of that traditional proneness to family quarrels which made it difficult for the Latin-American states to meet the 'forward policy' of the United States in the only effective way—that is, by presenting a united front to it.

PART IV

THE AMERICAN CONTINENT

C. SOUTH AMERICA

(i) The Failure of the Tacna-Arica Plebiscitary Commission.¹

IN a previous volume,² the history of the dispute between Chile, Peru and Bolivia over the provinces of Tacna and Arica has been carried down to the 5th August, 1925, the date on which the first meeting took place at Arica of the Plebiscitary Commission that had been set up to determine the future of the disputed districts, in accordance with an arbitral decision given by the President of the United States on the 4th March, 1925.

The decision to hold a plebiscite had been welcomed by Chile, which was in *de facto* occupation of the territory concerned, but had been received with protests by Peru. At the meeting on the 5th August, 1925, the Chilean delegate, Señor Edwards, pledged his Government to 'unconditional co-operation' with the Plebiscitary Commission. The Commission, however, had 'hardly begun its work before a series of unfortunate incidents aroused bitter feelings and recriminations on both sides. The Peruvians alleged that the Chilean policy of intimidation and deportations was being continued in spite of assertions to the contrary and that unless real guarantees were furnished it would be impossible for Peru to participate in the plebiscite.'³

A list of guarantees drawn up by General Pershing, the head of the Plebiscitary Commission, and submitted by him to the Commission for discussion, was at first rejected by the Chilean delegate, but on the 2nd November, 1925, the resolution proposed by General Pershing was approved by the Commission.

¹ Except where otherwise stated, the information given in this section is taken from a history of the Tacna-Arica dispute by Professor Graham H. Stuart of Stanford University, California, which was published by the World Peace Foundation of Boston, as vol. x, No. 1, of their pamphlets. See further the Foreign Policy Association of New York: *Information Service*, vol. iii, No. 23, 20th January, 1928, pp. 366-9; and W. J. Dennis: *Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica Dispute* (University of Iowa: *Studies in the Social Sciences*, vol. viii, No. 3, 1st January, 1927).

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part iv, Section (iv).

³ This and other passages in the text in quotation marks are reproduced from Stuart, *op. cit.*

‘The resolution declared that the following requisites were essential preliminaries to carrying out a free plebiscite in Tacna and Arica: the reduction of the Chilean military forces, the carabineers, and the secret service force to a number not in excess of that maintained in the territory on the 20th July, 1922; the removal of members of the army, carabineers, police and secret service from positions as sub-delegates of districts, inspectors and other civil administrative posts during the period of the plebiscite and their replacement by Chilean civilians; the removal from office of any public official in the plebiscitary territory whom [*sic*] the commission judged might use his position in a manner to suppress or impede a free expression of opinion; the removal from within the boundaries of the plebiscitary territory of every official removed from office if not a native of the territory; the repeal of all restrictive regulations regarding entrance into, departure from, and travelling within the plebiscitary territory which might hamper the liberty essential to the holding of a true plebiscite; the granting of equal opportunities and equal protection against annoyance and interruptions for public assemblies, meetings, speeches or other legitimate form of public propaganda in regard to the plebiscite or display of the flags of either country; the lifting of the censorship on messages by cable, express, radio, telegraph, or telephone into, from and within the territory; and finally the return to the plebiscitary territory by and at the expense of Chile of every man claiming the right to vote who proved that he left the territory involuntarily prior to the 13th April, 1924.’¹

On the 21st November, 1925, Señor Edwards, the head of the Chilean delegation, withdrew from participation in the Plebiscitary Commission’s work. He declared that his Government had instructed him to abstain from all proceedings which did not relate strictly to regulations for registration and voting and presented a resolution condemning the dilatory proceedings which delayed the holding of the plebiscite. A week later, Señor Edwards attended another meeting of the Commission, and on this occasion he accused General Pershing of partiality in favour of Peru and, in effect, of frustrating the plebiscite.²

¹ Text translated from *La Prensa* (New York) by the *Advocate of Peace*, January 1926, pp. 36–59.

² The Chilean case was presented in a memorandum submitted to the Secretary General of the League of Nations on the 2nd December, 1925, and to various Governments. The memorandum claimed that Chile had always accepted General Pershing’s decisions, that the delay in holding the plebiscite was due to Peruvian duplicity, that Chile was willing to give all the guarantees required and that further postponement of the plebiscite would be dangerous politically, financially, and economically.

On the 9th December, 1925, the Plebiscitary Commission, by a majority vote, passed a resolution which severely censured the Chilean authorities in Tacna and Arica on the ground that they had used their powers

unlawfully to reduce, by means of expulsion and deportation, the number of Peruvian voters in the plebiscitary territory and to place and continue Peruvian voters remaining in that territory in a state of fear and subjection inconsistent with the free exercise of electoral rights.¹

This resolution also quoted passages from a letter sent by General Pershing to Señor Edwards on the 27th November, in reply to the latter's notification of withdrawal from the Commission, in which the Chilean Government was warned that its delegate's statements appeared to be 'inconsistent with any intention to abide by the Treaty of Ancon, the protocol of arbitration, the award of the arbitrator and the decisions of the Plebiscitary Commission,' and that if it persisted in this attitude

the commission will be left with no alternative except to report to the arbitrator the failure of its efforts to carry out the plebiscite under the award owing to the refusal of the Chilean Government to permit the commission to function.²

The resolution concluded by recording the Plebiscitary Commission's decision that registration of voters in the plebiscite area should begin on the 15th February, 1926, or as soon as possible thereafter, and that the vote should be taken on the 15th April, 1926. This decision was based on the assumption that both parties would give full effect to the regulations adopted by the Commission to ensure the holding of a fair and orderly plebiscite, and Señor Edwards was asked to state whether or not the Chilean Government would co-operate effectively with the Commission.

Señor Edwards presented a dissenting opinion to the resolution of the 9th December, and, on the 16th December, the Commission agreed to refer the dissenting opinion to President Coolidge for such action as he might deem proper. On the 9th January, 1926, Chile withdrew certain of her objections to the Commission's resolution, but she still protested against the date of the plebiscite being made dependent on her giving effect to the Plebiscitary Commission's regulations. On the 15th January President Coolidge notified his decision that the objections raised by Chile were not valid.

¹ Quoted by Stuart, *op. cit.*, from *The American Journal of International Law*, July 1926.

² Quoted by Stuart, *op. cit.*, from *The American Journal of International Law*, *loc. cit.*

At the end of December it had been announced that General Pershing was about to return to the United States for reasons of health, and on the 12th January President Coolidge appointed General William Lassiter to succeed General Pershing as head of the Plebiscitary Commission. General Lassiter arrived at Arica on the 21st January, and General Pershing left a week later. On the 27th January, just before General Pershing's departure, the Plebiscitary Commission adopted the rules which were to govern the plebiscite.¹ The electoral law, a comprehensive document of twelve chapters and 133 articles,² was promulgated on the 15th February, 1926. It provided for registration to begin on the 15th March and for the voting to take place on the 15th April, but these dates were subsequently changed to the 27th March and the 27th May respectively. On the 8th February both Peru and Chile appealed against the qualifications of voters laid down in Article V of the Electoral Law, but their appeals were rejected by President Coolidge on the 25th February. On the 10th March the Peruvian delegate complained that sufficient protection for Peruvian voters had not yet been ensured and demanded the indefinite postponement of the date of registration. He submitted a list of grievances to prove that the guarantees required by General Pershing had not yet been made effective.

In the meantime the United States Government had offered its good offices for a friendly adjustment of the dispute without a plebiscite. Both parties agreed in principle, but Chile insisted that the arrangements for the plebiscite should continue, whereas Peru wished all plebiscitary activities to be suspended while another solution was being sought, and Peruvians in the disputed provinces refrained from presenting themselves on the 27th March, the date fixed for registration of voters.

Negotiations were now transferred to Washington, where on the 15th April, 1926, Secretary Kellogg made two proposals to the plenipotentiaries of Peru and Chile:

(1) The territory of Tacna and Arica shall be constituted a neutralized state, either independent or under the protectorate of South American states as may be agreed, or

(2) the provinces of Tacna and Arica shall be transferred (upon an apportionment of equitable compensation and appropriate economic arrangements, to be agreed upon) to a South American state not a party to these negotiations.³

¹ Separate drafts were presented by the Chilean and Peruvian delegates, and the final draft was drawn up by the American member.

² The text was published in *The United States Daily*, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th March, 1926.

On the 10th May, the State Department announced that a third solution—the division of the territory between the two states—was also under consideration.

While these negotiations were in progress at Washington, General Lassiter had been engaged in drawing up a report on the conditions existing in the plebiscite area. On the 9th June, he presented to the Plebiscitary Commission at Arica a resolution declaring

(1) That a free and fair plebiscite, as required by the award, is impracticable of accomplishment.

(2) That the plebiscitary proceedings be, and they are, hereby terminated, subject, however, to the formulation and execution of such measures as may be required for the proper liquidation of the affairs of the Commission and the transmission of its records and final report to the Arbitrator.

This resolution was adopted by a majority of the Commission on the 14th June, and, on the same day, the publication of General Lassiter's report made clear the reasons which had led him to decide in favour of the abandonment of the plebiscite. General Lassiter's investigations had convinced him 'that suitable conditions for the plebiscite, if they have existed at any time within recent years, did not exist when the commission began its labours in August 1925, that they do not now exist, and that there is no prospect of their being brought into existence'.

'The work of the commission was threefold: (1) To provide the machinery for holding a duly organized and regulated plebiscite with such electoral regulations as should eliminate all ballots which were not entitled to be cast; (2) to create reasonably suitable conditions so that persons entitled to vote should have due opportunity to do so; and (3) to ascertain whether such suitable conditions had been attained, and if not whether they were attainable.

'As to the first of these conditions, the chairman felt that a satisfactory measure of success had crowned the work of the commission.

'As to the second, the commission's powers were strictly limited; it could properly do no more than exhort the Chilean Government to create and maintain suitable conditions. Such appeals had failed utterly to bear fruit. Officials condemned by the commission for activities inimical to a fair plebiscite, whose removal was demanded and obtained, were rewarded by better positions elsewhere in the territory where their opportunities to help defeat a fair plebiscite were not impaired. . . .

'In regard to the third task, namely whether suitable conditions had been obtained or were obtainable, the chairman was particularly

concerned. Although he noted upon his arrival that the lack of suitable conditions for holding the plebiscite was "flagrant and conspicuous", he kept hoping that they might improve, and for that reason voted against any interference with the arrangements for beginning registration. But he was finally fully convinced that the Chilean authorities would never provide the Peruvians free and equal opportunity for the exercise of plebiscitary rights.¹

The report gave details of a number of cases of attacks on Peruvians and of expulsions or deportations from the plebiscite area and summed up the position as follows:

The inescapable conclusions must be arrived at: that the Peruvian electorate has been physically reduced below its proper figure by such measures as forcible deportations, departures induced by violence or threats, unexplained disappearances, discriminatory military conscription, and even assassination; that Peruvians who have been driven or frightened out of the plebiscitary territory have not been given, by the Chilean authorities, due opportunity or facilities to return to register and vote; that there has been a systematic, widespread and effective terrorization of Peruvians, brought about through violence to persons and property, through threats, oppression and persecution; . . . that Peruvian official plebiscitary personnel has been impeded, and even subjected to assaults, in the effort to discharge necessary or appropriate plebiscitary duties; that there have been general and deliberate misrepresentation and suppression of the real facts by the local Chilean authorities and by the local Chilean press; and that the conditions above outlined have been brought about, not only with the knowledge and implied approval of the Chilean authorities, but, in many cases, with their connivance as evidenced by failure to restrain the criminal activities of certain so-called patriotic or political organizations whose operations have been accompanied by unmistakable evidence of official support and approval.

The Chilean Government denied the accusations made against it by General Lassiter and, in a communication circulated to its representatives abroad on the 21st June,¹ which gave the Chilean version of the affair, it announced that, since the plebiscitary proceedings had been illegally terminated, it was useless to continue the negotiations at Washington. Nevertheless, further discussions between Mr. Kellogg and the Chilean and Peruvian delegates seem to have taken place during August and September 1926, and on the 30th November a memorandum containing the United States' final proposals for a settlement was handed to the Chilean and Peruvian Ambassadors at Washington. In this memorandum the Secretary of State summarized the various solutions hitherto proposed, 'noting that all proposals based upon awarding the territory either in whole

¹ A second and fuller account was apparently circulated on the 2nd July.

or part to either country seemed to present such insurmountable difficulties as to render further consideration useless. There only remained the possibility of some arrangement which would involve a joint as distinguished from a mutual sacrifice. Such a solution would depend upon the co-operation of a third power, Bolivia.

‘The memorandum then proposed on the part of Chile and Peru a voluntary cession of all their rights and interests in the provinces of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia, subject to appropriate guarantees for the protection of the personal and property rights of all the inhabitants of the provinces of whatever nationality.

‘As an integral part of the transaction provision was to be made for adequate compensation by Bolivia for the cession, including public works, railways and improvements in the territory transferred, such compensation to be determined by direct negotiations between the three states. Furthermore, Chile and Peru were to agree in direct negotiations upon the equitable apportionment between them of any cash compensation. The Secretary of State here agreed to place at the disposal of the Governments concerned his good offices if required to fix and apportion the compensation.

‘The memorandum further proposed that the promontory known as the Morro of Arica be reserved from the transfer and be placed under an international commission to be maintained as an international memorial to the valor of Peru and Chile, and that there be erected here a lighthouse or monument to commemorate the friendly settlement of the Tacna-Arica question.

‘In conclusion it was suggested that the entire territory of Tacna and Arica be perpetually demilitarized, the city of Arica be made forever a free port, equality of treatment be guaranteed to the three states in respect to all the transportation facilities of the region, and suitable treaties of friendship be entered into between Chile and Peru covering the resumption of diplomatic and consular relations, commerce, navigation and other matters necessary to re-establish friendly intercourse between the two countries.’

This proposal was accepted immediately and unconditionally by Bolivia. It was also accepted in principle by Chile, with reservations relating to certain parts of the proposal. ‘The Peruvian Ambassador on the 3rd December asked whether the transfer was to be made without taking into consideration the wishes of the inhabitants. On the 11th December Secretary Kellogg replied that the paragraph in the memorandum which provided that the cession should be made subject to appropriate guarantees for the protection and preservation without discrimination of the personal and property rights of all the

inhabitants, would secure every protection to the interests of the inhabitants possible under the circumstances.'

On the 12th January, 1927, the Peruvian Government rejected Mr. Kellogg's proposal, principally on the ground that Peru could not sacrifice the rights of her citizens in Tacna and Arica in return for a monetary consideration. Although the Peruvian note declared that the rejection of this proposal did not imply any intention of obstructing other possible solutions,¹ a deadlock appeared to have been reached. Chile, which remained in possession of the disputed territory, issued instructions in April 1927 to the official in charge of the province of Tacna recommending him to do his best to 'nationalize' the province.² This action elicited a protest from Peru³ but not apparently from the United States, and it looked as though the arbitrator, whose efforts to find an equitable solution had met with so little success, would finally be driven to recognize the *status quo*. In June 1927, however, it was announced that the Plebiscitary Commission expected shortly to be able to present to President Coolidge a report on their activities, which would contain recommendations for a settlement.⁴ At the end of March 1928 it was announced that, although the report had not yet been completed, discussions were proceeding 'in the most friendly manner' between the Chilean and Peruvian delegates on the Commission.⁵

During the next three months the attitude of the two states towards each other continued to change for the better, and early in July the United States Secretary of State decided that the time had come to make a fresh advance. On the 9th July, 1928, Mr. Kellogg addressed notes⁶ to the Chilean and Peruvian Governments expressing his gratification at 'the mutual growth of a more friendly feeling between Chile and Peru' during the last few months; declaring that he had come to the conclusion 'that an accommodation of mutual interests would be promoted should the Governments of Chile and Peru re-establish diplomatic relations through the appointment of diplomatic representatives at Lima and at Santiago'; and suggesting

¹ The note intimated that Peru would be willing to agree to a tripartite division of the disputed territory, provided she retained Tacna and the port and mole of Arica.

² Text of the Chilean Government's communication of the 18th April in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 2nd July, 1927. See also *The United States Daily*, 25th April, 1927.

³ See the circular addressed on the 22nd April, 1927, to Peruvian diplomatic representatives abroad. (Text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, *loc. cit.*).

⁴ *The United States Daily*, 24th June, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 31st March, 1928.

⁶ Text of the note to Chile *ibid.*, 14th July, 1928.

that either Government should signify its willingness to appoint a diplomatic representative *auprès* the other at an early date. This new move met with success, and Mr. Kellogg's suggestion was accepted unconditionally by both Chile and Peru on the 11th July.¹ This decision to renew the diplomatic relations which had been broken off in 1910 was clearly an important step forward. It was followed on the 10th October, 1928, by the announcement that the Governments of Chile and Peru had agreed to the suspension for a period of four months of the operations of the Plebiscitary Commission 'in order to give time to permit of negotiations between the Governments for a settlement'.² This announcement was interpreted to mean that the Plebiscitary Commission would in fact be dissolved and that the United States would cease to concern itself directly with the Tacna-Arica Question. It remained to be seen whether the Governments of Chile and Peru would be able, by means of direct negotiations conducted without the intervention of a mediator, to discover any satisfactory means of settling the long-standing dispute between them.

(ii) The Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic.

The Argentine Republic, the second largest of the states of South America, had by the close of the year 1927 attained to a large measure of national prosperity, and the favourable geographical and climatic conditions which she enjoyed held the promise of future development on a vast scale. As a mainly agricultural country whose staple products were meat and grain, Argentina had a formidable competitor in the United States of America, and it was therefore natural that she should constitute herself the leader of the Latin-American countries in the movement for independence of the United States which was gaining impetus during the decade after the General War of 1914-18. The resentment felt by Argentina and her sister countries in Latin America against the 'economic imperialism' of the United States and certain of the manifestations in which that resentment found expression have been discussed in other sections of the present volume.³ Some account has also been given in an earlier volume⁴ of the rivalry between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, which led those three states, after the virtual dissolution of the 'A.B.C.

¹ Text of their notes in *The United States Daily*, *loc. cit.*

² *The Times* and *The United States Daily*, 11th October, 1928.

³ See Part IV A, Sections (i) and (ii) above.

⁴ *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part IV, Section (i), especially pp. 408-10.

Alliance' between them,¹ to adopt a policy of naval expansion, and which may also have been one of the reasons for the abstention of Argentina from the proceedings of the League of Nations Assembly after the first session in 1920.² If, however, the Argentine Republic was not entirely free from a feeling of rivalry with her neighbours, that feeling had not found vent of recent years in disputes over frontiers such as were still common amongst Latin-American states.³ The definitive settlement of the Argentinian-Bolivian frontier by treaty in 1925⁴ enabled Argentina to offer her services in 1927 as mediator in a dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay.⁵

The relations of Argentina with European countries were governed by two main considerations: the need for a supply of suitable immigrants to develop the vast territories of the Republic, and the need for markets for Argentine products.

In 1924 Argentina, with an area of 1,153,119 square miles, had a population of less than 10,000,000. The Argentinian Government was fully alive to the necessity of encouraging the desirable kind of immigrant, and while legislation dealing with the selection of immigrants was reported to be under consideration in the summer of 1924,⁶ the Argentinian Minister of Agriculture, who represented his Government at the Conference on Emigration and Immigration which was held in Rome in May 1924,⁷ seized the opportunity to discuss the prospects for settlers in Argentina with the representatives of various countries of emigration.⁸ The Argentinian Government seems to have hoped that the flow of immigrants would increase as a result of the restrictive legislation which came into force in the United States in 1924,⁹ but this hope was not fulfilled. The net figure for immigration in 1924 (i.e. the excess of arrivals over departures) was 114,053, and this fell to 76,038 in 1925¹⁰ and to about 79,000 in 1926.¹¹ By the beginning of 1926 the Government was considering a scheme for encouraging immigration by providing land suitable for agricul-

¹ This occurred while the General War of 1914-18 was being fought in Europe.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 404-5. See also the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 58 and 469.

³ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part IV, Section (iv), and the preceding section of the present volume.

⁴ *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 433.

⁵ See *The Times*, 30th May, 1927.

⁶ See the *Corriere della Sera*, 22nd June, 1924.

⁷ See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 123-7.

⁸ See *The Times*, 16th August, 1924.

⁹ See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 147 *seqq.*

¹⁰ International Labour Office: *Monthly Record of Migration*, November 1926.

¹¹ *The United States Daily*, 22nd July, 1927.

ture in the neighbourhood of the railways.¹ A year later the scheme was worked out in detail in a conference between the President of the Republic, Señor de Alvear, and the representatives of nine railway companies,² and an Argentinian Railway Colonization Company was formed. With the assistance of the Government, this new company was to select areas of fertile land near the railways and provide agricultural machinery and, in some cases, farm buildings. Colonists were to be allowed to purchase the land and equipment at cost price on an instalment system.³

Until about 1921 the Spanish element had preponderated among the immigrants, but in that year the contingent from Italy practically equalled that from Spain, and thereafter the proportion of Italians increased until in 1925 they came to number 55,557 out of a total of 125,366 immigrants. The Spanish contingent in this year numbered 35,852, and Poland and Germany came next with 9,122 and 4,933 respectively. The only other countries which sent more than 2,000 emigrants to Argentina during this year were Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.⁴

The importance of the Italian factor in the national composition of the Argentinian people led naturally to close cultural relations between Italy and Argentina. So long as the policy of the Italian Government was to promote emigration (that is until the spring of 1927),⁵ Italy exerted herself to cultivate friendly relations with Argentina. In 1924, for instance, the Italian Crown Prince visited Buenos Aires. He was followed later in the same year by an Italian Special Ambassador; and this envoy arrived in the naval vessel *Italia*, which had been fitted up as a floating exhibition of the products of Italian industry and art.⁶ In 1924, also, it was arranged, apparently on Signor Mussolini's initiative, that the Legations of Italy in Argentina and of Argentina in Italy should be raised to the rank of Embassies.⁷ Even in 1927, after the Italian Government had adopted the policy of discouraging emigration,⁸ Signor Mussolini

¹ International Labour Office: *Monthly Record of Migration*, March 1926. See *loc. cit.* for a summary of a circular issued by the Argentinian Ministry of Agriculture describing the prospects of agricultural settlement in the country.

² *The Times*, 31st April, 1927.

³ See an account of the scheme given by the Argentinian Minister in London (*ibid.*, 26th May, 1927).

⁴ See International Labour Office: *Monthly Record of Migration*, November 1926.

⁵ See the present volume, Part II B, Section (ii).

⁶ See *The Times*, 16th August, 1924.

⁷ See the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3rd June, 1924; *The Times*, 16th August, 1924.

⁸ The adoption of the new policy did not result in an immediate reduction

thought it worth while to give a cordial reception to the Argentinian Foreign Minister, Señor Gallardo, who was visiting Rome; and at a banquet held in Señor Gallardo's honour at the beginning of October, he referred to the forthcoming inauguration of a monument to General Belgrano (an Argentinian national hero of Italian origin) as a symbol of the fraternal relations between the two nations.¹ Nevertheless, the new Italian policy of discountenancing emigration, coupled with the activities of local Fascists and the threatened boycott of certain Argentinian newspapers which criticized Fascist policy, was arousing some resentment in Argentina by the autumn of 1927, and this resentment found expression in the press at the beginning of November, on the occasion of the sinking of the Italian vessel *Principessa Mafalda*.²

With the decrease in the number of Italian immigrants which followed the change of policy in Italy, it looked as though a relatively more important place in the list of countries of emigration would be taken by Germany. It has been mentioned above that nearly 5,000 Germans entered Argentina in 1925, and this figure showed a significant increase compared with previous years.³ Germany remembered with gratitude the neutrality of Argentina during the war, and by the beginning of 1926 the possibilities of Argentina as an outlet for Germany's surplus population were receiving serious consideration.⁴ The actual numbers of German immigrants into Argentina in 1926 and 1927 were 5,112 and 5,155 respectively.⁵

From the point of view of foreign trade, Argentina's most important relations were with Great Britain, since her exports to the United Kingdom greatly exceeded those to any other country.⁶ In addition to direct commercial exchanges, railway construction and other developments in Argentina had been financed to a large extent by British capital and the bulk of the Argentinian export trade was

in the number of emigrants to Argentina—in fact the total for 1927 (69,360) showed a marked increase over the total for 1926 (58,598). See the *Monthly Record of Migration* for March 1925.

¹ The *Corriere della Sera*, 7th October, 1927.

² See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 2nd November, 1927.

³ See International Labour Office: *Monthly Record of Migration*, November 1926.

⁴ See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 4th and 29th January, 1926.

⁵ *Monthly Record of Migration*, March 1928.

⁶ In 1925 Argentinian exports to the United Kingdom were valued at 207,774,738 gold pesos, whereas the value of goods sent to Germany (the second largest importer) was only 88,817,540 gold pesos and that of goods sent to the United States 71,607,051 gold pesos. The United States was the largest exporter to Argentina, with Great Britain as a good second (see *The Statesman's Year Book*, 1928).

carried by British vessels.¹ The friendship between the two countries dated from 1825, for on the 2nd February of that year a British Government of which Canning was Foreign Minister signed with the Government of 'the United Provinces of the River Plate' a treaty of friendship and commerce—the first diplomatic instrument to which the Government of the nascent Republic set its hand. In signing this treaty and thus officially recognizing one of the new states of South America, Great Britain gave the lead to the other countries of Europe and inaugurated a policy of the most far-reaching importance. The centenary of the signature of this epoch-making treaty fell in 1925, and was marked by a visit of the Prince of Wales to Argentina—a visit which returned that paid by Señor de Alvear (then President-Elect) to Great Britain in 1922.

The good relations which had been maintained for a hundred years were almost as valuable to Great Britain as to Argentina, for out of the ten states with which the United Kingdom had the largest trade in 1924, Argentina occupied the second place on the list of importers and the fourth place on the list of exporters. With the development of the country, the capacity of the Argentinian market to absorb imports might be expected to increase, but in 1926 and 1927 there were indications that British firms were likely to be thrust out of the field by rivals in the United States and even in Germany.² In spite of Argentinian resentment against the economic policy of the United States³ the greater expertness of American firms in selling their wares in Latin-American countries stood them in good stead and even made headway against the longer experience of their British competitors.

At the end of May 1927 it was announced that His Britannic Majesty had decided to raise the status of his representative in Argentina to Ambassadorial rank.⁴ The change took place on the 9th July, 1927, when Sir Malcolm Robertson, who had acted as British Minister at Buenos Aires since 1925, presented his credentials as Ambassador to the President of the Republic. Señor de Alvear announced his intention on this occasion of recommending Congress to raise the Argentinian Legation in London and also that in Paris to

¹ See the special Argentine number issued by *The Times* on the 17th August, 1925.

² The value of British exports to Argentina rose from just over £27,000,000 in 1924 to about £29,000,000 in 1925, but in 1926 it fell to £23,000,000. In 1927 it rose again to just under £27,000,000. For an analysis of the reasons for the loss to Great Britain of Argentinian markets see a speech by Sir Malcolm Robertson, the British Minister to Argentina, reported in *The Times*, 5th March, 1927. See also *ibid.*, 1st January, 1927.

³ See pp. 417, 423, 436–7 above.

⁴ *The Times*, 27th May, 1927.

the rank of Embassy.¹ It has already been recorded that a similar change in the status of their diplomatic representatives had been arranged between Italy and Argentina in 1924. At that time the only countries which possessed permanent Embassies in Argentina had been Brazil and Chile (the Argentine Republic's former fellow-members in the 'A.B.C. Alliance'), the United States of America and Spain. The step taken by Italy in 1924 and by Great Britain in 1927 indicated a recognition of the growing importance of the part played by Argentina in world affairs, and the message sent by President de Alvear to King George on the occasion of the presentation of his credentials by the British Ambassador showed that the significance of the gesture was appreciated on the Argentinian side.² It was perhaps a sense of what was due to their national importance which led the Argentinian Congress, on the 30th September, 1927, to approve the change from a Legation to an Embassy, not only in the cases of Great Britain and France, but also in those of Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and the Vatican.³

In the case of the Vatican, the Argentinian Government's decision to appoint an Ambassador signified the healing of a breach that had threatened at one time to develop into a conflict almost as acute as that which raged between the Mexican Government and the Catholic Church from the beginning of 1926 onwards.⁴ In Mexico, the conflict in its active form was the outcome of deep-seated causes which had been gradually gaining strength over a period of years; but although the immediate occasion for the dispute between the Argentinian Government and the Holy See appeared to show that there also the civil power was in revolt against ecclesiastical authority, various circumstances which helped to embitter and prolong the feud in the case of Mexico were absent in Argentina, and the Argentinian Government showed itself less intransigent than the Mexican Government. Thus, though relations between the Vatican and Argentina were strained for nearly three years, the religious life of the country does not seem to have been affected to any great extent, and a solution was ultimately found which enabled the parties to come to an agreement without much loss of prestige on either side.

The dispute arose over the appointment to the Archbishopric of Buenos Aires. The Argentinian Congress, on the recommendation of

¹ *The Times*, 1st October, 1927. The French Government appointed an Ambassador to Argentina in January 1928 (*Le Temps*, 27th January, 1928).

² See *The Times*, 11th July, 1927.

³ *Ibid.*, 1st October, 1927. In March 1928 the change from a Legation to an Embassy was also arranged between Germany and the Argentine Republic (*Le Temps*, 18th March, 1928).

⁴ See Part IV B, Section (iii) above.

the President, approved the appointment of Mgr. d'Andrea to the vacancy, but the Vatican, on the ground that the nomination of bishops was a Papal prerogative, although nominees were customarily selected in consultation with the civil power, refused to ratify the appointment. In order to prove that it was the principle that was at stake and not the Argentinian candidate in person to whom objection was taken, the Vatican appointed Mgr. d'Andrea in 1924 to the post of Apostolic Visitor for South America. It seemed at first as though this conciliatory gesture might open the way to a settlement, but before the end of the year the Vatican had appointed an Apostolic Administrator of the diocese of Buenos Aires, and this dignitary, Mgr. Boneo, added fuel to the flames by refusing to hand over his credentials to the Government.¹

In September 1924 the Argentinian Senate had under consideration proposals for informing the Vatican that the Papal Nuncio, Mgr. Beda, had ceased to be *persona grata* and for withdrawing the Argentinian Minister accredited to the Vatican.² These proposals do not appear to have been put to the vote,³ but in November the Budgetary Commission of the Chamber was reported to have declared itself in favour of the suppression of the Legation to the Vatican.⁴ The Argentinian Minister does not seem actually to have been recalled, but the Government was said to have refrained from communicating with him for several months, apparently in the hope that he would resign of his own accord.⁵

In January 1925 the Argentinian Government seems to have asked the Vatican to recall the Papal Nuncio,⁶ but Mgr. Beda did not actually leave for Rome until August 1925 (after another motion had been introduced into the Senate in July calling for his immediate expulsion)⁷ and he retained the title of Nuncio.⁸ With his departure the last chance of a settlement of the dispute seemed to disappear, and a year later, in August 1926, the two parties were reported to be as determined as ever not to retreat from their respective standpoints.⁹

¹ See the *Corriere della Sera*, 27th December, 1924. See also *Le Temps*, 21st April, 4th May, 5th June, and 3rd July, 1924.

² The *Corriere della Sera*, 24th September; *Le Temps*, 25th September, 1924.

³ The *Corriere della Sera*, 26th September, 1924.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 2nd November, 1924.

⁵ The *Corriere della Sera*, 8th August, 1926.

⁶ See *ibid.*, 17th January, 1925.

⁷ This motion also proposed the suspension and trial of the Apostolic Administrator of Buenos Aires, Mgr. Boneo, and of another Bishop, on the ground that they had exercised ecclesiastical authority without the Government's *exequatur* (*ibid.*, 4th July, 1925).

⁸ *Ibid.*, 29th August, 1925, and 8th August, 1926.

⁹ See *ibid.*, 8th August, 1926.

The announcement in October 1926 that a solution had been found therefore came as a surprise. The Argentinian Government had been induced to submit the names of three new candidates for the Archbishopric of Buenos Aires, and with the selection by the Vatican of one of these candidates, Father Bottaro, the dispute closed. At the same time the Vatican nominated Mgr. Cortesi to succeed Mgr. Beda as Papal Nuncio at Buenos Aires, and this appointment was accepted by the Argentinian Government.¹

Though the battle was not decided until both combatants had yielded ground, the Vatican was entitled to claim the victory, for the Argentinian Government, when it agreed to submit a list of new candidates for the vacant archbishopric, was in effect recognizing the Papal prerogative which it had previously contested. If the resolutions introduced into the Argentinian Senate in September 1924 and July 1925 indicated any widespread desire on the part of the Argentinian public to throw off the ecclesiastical yoke, it is to be presumed that the movement of revolt had exhausted itself by the end of 1926. The decision of the Argentinian Government in 1927 to replace its Minister to the Vatican by an Ambassador appeared to prove that the official policy, at all events, was to maintain and strengthen the good relations which had been re-established.

¹ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 13th October; *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 14th October, 1926.

APPENDICES

(i) Treaty of Friendly Understanding between France and Yugoslavia, signed at Paris on the 11th November, 1927.¹

The President of the French Republic and His Majesty the King of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, being equally desirous of maintaining in Europe that state of peace and political stability which is essential for the social advancement and economic prosperity both of France and of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom;

Being firmly attached to the principle of respect for international undertakings, a principle which has been solemnly confirmed by the Covenant of the League of Nations;

Being desirous, within the framework of the aforesaid Covenant, of ensuring, in advance, the adoption of a common attitude in the event of the order established by the treaties which they have signed being endangered;

And being convinced that it is the duty of modern Governments to prevent a return to war by providing for the pacific settlement of any disputes which may arise between them;

Have resolved, for this purpose, to give each other renewed pledges of peace, understanding and friendship, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries the following [names omitted]

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Art. 1. France and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes reciprocally undertake to refrain from all attacks or invasions directed against one another and in no circumstances to resort to war against one another.

Nevertheless, the stipulation shall not apply:

(1) To the exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to say, the right of resisting a violation of the undertaking given in paragraph 1 of the present Article;

(2) To action undertaken in application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

(3) To action undertaken in virtue of a decision by the Assembly or Council of the League of Nations, or in application of paragraph 7 of Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that, in the latter case, such action is directed against a State which was the first to attack.

Art. 2. Taking into consideration their respective obligations under Article 1 of the present Treaty, France and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertake to settle by pacific means and in the following manner all questions whatever which may divide them and which it may not have been possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy; all

¹ Text, as translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, reprinted from *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. lxviii.

questions regarding which the Parties may be in dispute as to their respective rights shall be submitted to judges, with whose decisions the Parties undertake to comply; all other questions shall be submitted to a Conciliation Commission, and if the arrangement proposed by that Commission is not accepted by both Parties, the question shall be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which shall decide in accordance with Article 15 of the League Covenant.

The procedure in regard to these methods of pacific settlement is laid down in special conventions which have been signed on this day.

Art. 3. The Government of the French Republic and the Royal Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom undertake to give joint consideration, subject to any resolutions adopted by the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations, to questions which are of such a nature as to endanger the external security of France or the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, or to impair the order established by treaties which they have both signed.

Art. 4. If, in spite of the sincerely pacific intentions of the French and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments, either France or the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes should be attacked without provocation, the two Governments shall without delay confer with one another as to the measures which each shall take, within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, in order to safeguard their legitimate national interests and to uphold the order established by the treaties of which they are both signatories.

Art. 5. The High Contracting Parties agree to take counsel together in the event of any modification, or attempted modification, of the political status of European countries and, subject to any resolutions which may be adopted in such case by the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations, to come to an understanding as to the attitude which they should respectively observe in such an eventuality.

Art. 6. The High Contracting Parties declare that nothing in this Treaty is to be interpreted as contradicting the stipulations of the treaties at present in force which have been signed by France or the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and which concern their policy in Europe. They undertake to exchange views on questions affecting European policy in order to co-ordinate their efforts in the cause of peace, and for this purpose to communicate to each other henceforward any treaties or agreements which they may conclude with third Powers on the same subject. Such treaties or agreements shall invariably be directed to aims which are compatible with the maintenance of peace.

Art. 7. Nothing in the present Treaty may be interpreted or applied in such a way as to prejudice the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Art. 8. The present Treaty shall be communicated for registration to the League of Nations in conformity with Article 18 of the Covenant.

Art. 9. The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Paris as soon as possible.

It shall enter into force immediately upon the exchange of ratifications and shall remain in force for five years, after which it may be renewed in virtue of previous notice, which may have been duly given at the end of the fourth year, and for a period to be determined.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries duly authorised for this purpose, have signed the present Treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

(ii) **Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration between Hungary and Italy, signed at Rome on the 5th April, 1927.**¹

His Majesty the King of Italy and His Most Serene Highness the Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary, having noted the concordance of numerous interests common to both nations, and being desirous of establishing a basis of sincere friendship between their States and of combining their efforts with a view to the maintenance of peace and order, so as to give to the two peoples a fresh guarantee of future development, have agreed to conclude for this purpose the present treaty of friendship, conciliation and arbitration, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries [names omitted]

Who, having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Art. 1. There shall be constant peace and perpetual friendship between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Hungary.

Art. 2. The High Contracting Parties undertake to submit to a procedure of conciliation, or, if necessary, to arbitration, all disputes of any nature whatever which may arise between them and which it may not have been possible to settle within a reasonable time by the methods of diplomacy.

This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events prior to the present Treaty and belonging to the past.

Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is laid down in other conventions in force between the High Contracting Parties shall be settled in conformity with the provisions of those conventions.

Art. 3. Failing conciliation, each of the High Contracting Parties may request that the dispute be submitted to arbitration, provided that the dispute is of a legal nature.

Art. 4. The rules regarding the procedure of conciliation and arbitration are laid down in a protocol² of procedure annexed to the present Treaty.

Art. 5. The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Rome as soon as possible.

The Treaty is concluded for a period of ten years from the date of the exchange of ratifications. Unless denounced at least one year before the expiration of this period, it shall remain in force for a further period of ten years, and similarly thereafter.

In faith whereof, the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

¹ Text as translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, reprinted from *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. lxvii.

² This protocol is not reprinted here. The text will be found in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, loc. cit.

(iii) *Italo-Albanian Treaty, 22nd November, 1927.*¹(1) TREATY OF DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN ALBANIA AND ITALY,
SIGNED AT TIRANA ON THE 22ND NOVEMBER, 1927.

Italy and Albania, being desirous of solemnly re-affirming and strengthening the solidarity which happily exists between the two States, and of devoting all their efforts to the removal of any causes which might disturb the peace between them, and between them and other States,

Recognizing the benefits of close co-operation between the two States,

And once more confirming the fact that the interests and the security of each are bound up with those of the other,

Have decided to conclude a defensive alliance by this Treaty, with the sole object of stabilising the natural relations which happily exist between the two States and thus ensuring a policy of peaceful development,

and have accordingly appointed as their plenipotentiaries [names omitted]

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Art. 1. All previous treaties concluded between the two High Contracting Parties since the admission of Albania to the League of Nations shall be exactly and faithfully observed within the limits laid down in the text of the same, so that there shall be sincere and perfect friendship between the two peoples and between the two Governments, and that each shall assist the other, it being understood that each of the High Contracting Parties shall uphold the interests and advantages of the other with the same zeal as it displays in upholding its own.

Art. 2. Between Italy, of the one part, and Albania, of the other part, there shall be for twenty years an unalterable defensive alliance, which may be denounced during the eighteenth or nineteenth year of its duration. Should no such denunciation take place, the alliance shall be understood to be renewed by tacit consent for a like period. The two High Contracting Parties shall employ all their diligence and all the means at their command to ensure the security of their respective countries, and to defend and safeguard each other against any attack from without.

Art. 3. As a result of the undertakings given in the foregoing Articles, the two High Contracting Parties shall act in concert to maintain peace and tranquillity, and, should one of them be threatened with war which it has not provoked, the other Party shall employ the most effectual means at its command, not only to prevent hostilities, but also to secure just satisfaction for the threatened Party.

Art. 4. Should every means of conciliation have been exhausted without avail, each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to throw in its lot with the other, and to place at the disposal of its ally all military, financial, and other resources which may be of assistance in terminating the conflict should such assistance be called for by the threatened Party.

Art. 5. In any case covered by Article 4, the two High Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude or enter into negotiations for a peace, armistice, or truce except by common consent.

¹ Text, as translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, reprinted from *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. lxx.

Art. 6. The present Treaty has been signed in four original copies, two in Italian and two in Albanian, both texts being authentic.

Art. 7. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and shall thereafter be registered with the League of Nations. The ratifications shall be exchanged at Rome.

Done at Tirana, this twenty-second day of November, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-seven (1927).

(2) EXCHANGE OF NOTES, TIRANA, 22ND NOVEMBER, 1927.

(a) *The Italian Minister at Durazzo to the Albanian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

With reference to the Treaty of Defensive Alliance signed by us this day, more especially in the contingency—which we trust will not arise—of Article 4 of that Treaty having to be brought into operation, the Italian Government is most anxious to give the Albanian Government the assurances and elucidations which follow:

‘If, after the failure of all attempts to ward off by conciliatory methods a threat from any third State against one of the two allied States, the latter should find itself the victim of an unprovoked attack and should be compelled to call for military assistance from its ally in defence of the territory attacked, the supreme command of the allied forces will be entrusted, in Albania, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Albanian forces, and in Italy, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian forces. Upon the signing of peace, the allied forces which have come to the assistance of the other State will return to their own country by using their own resources within the period allowed them by the Commander-in-Chief under whom they have served in the allied territory.’

This letter forms an integral part of the Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Italy and Albania, and is to be ratified and thereafter registered with the League of Nations conjointly with that Treaty.

(b) *The Albanian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Minister at Durazzo.*

I have the honour to take note of the letter of this day's date in which Your Excellency is good enough to give the Albanian Government certain elucidations and assurances with reference to the Treaty of Defensive Alliance signed by us this day, and more especially with regard to the contingency—which we trust will not arise—of Article 4 of that Treaty having to be brought into operation. I must offer you my heartiest thanks for these spontaneous declarations made by you in the name of the Royal Government, and I have pleasure in giving the Italian Government the following identical assurances in the name of the Albanian Government: [see (a) above].

This letter forms an integral part of the Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Italy and Albania, and is to be ratified and thereafter registered with the League of Nations conjointly with that Treaty.

(iv) Russo-Lithuanian Treaty, 28th September, 1926.¹

- (1) TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON THE 28TH SEPTEMBER, 1926.

The President of the Lithuanian Republic, of the one part, and The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, of the other part, being convinced that the interests of the Lithuanian people and of the peoples of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics demand constant co-operation based on mutual confidence, have agreed, in order to contribute to the best of their ability to the maintenance of universal peace, to conclude a treaty with a view to strengthening the friendly relations existing between them, and to this end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries [names omitted].

Who having met at Moscow and exchanged their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Art. 1. The relations between the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Lithuanian Republic shall continue to be based on the Treaty of Peace between Lithuania and Russia, concluded at Moscow on July 12, 1920, all the provisions of which shall retain their force and inviolability.

Art. 2. The Lithuanian Republic and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics undertake to respect in all circumstances each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability.

Art. 3. Each of the two Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from any act of aggression whatsoever against the other Party.

Should one of the Contracting Parties, despite its peaceful attitude, be attacked by one or several third Powers, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to support the said third Power or Powers against the Contracting Party attacked.

Art. 4. If, on the occasion of a conflict of the type mentioned in Article 3, second paragraph, or at a time when neither of the Contracting Parties is engaged in warlike operations, a political agreement directed against one of the Contracting Parties is concluded between third Powers, or a coalition is formed between third Powers with a view to the economic or financial boycott of either of the Contracting Parties, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to adhere to such agreement or coalition.

Art. 5. Should a dispute arise between them, the Contracting Parties undertake to appoint conciliation commissions if it should not prove possible to settle the dispute by diplomatic means.

The composition of the said commissions, their rights and the procedure they shall observe shall be settled in virtue of a separate agreement to be concluded between the two Parties.

Art. 6. The present Treaty is subject to ratification, which must take place within six weeks of the date of its signature.

The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place at Kovno.

The present treaty has been drawn up in Lithuanian and Russian.

As regards interpretation, both texts shall be considered as authentic.

¹ Text, as translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, reprinted from *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. ix.

Art. 7. The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for five years, except Articles 1 and 2, the duration of the validity of which is not limited.

The validity of the present Treaty shall be prolonged automatically, on each occasion for one year, until either of the Contracting Parties expresses, at least six months before the expiration of the Treaty, the desire to enter upon negotiations regarding the future form of political relations between the two States.

In faith whereof, the Plenipotentiaries have affixed to the present Treaty their autograph signatures, and their seals.

The original has been done and signed in duplicate at Moscow the twenty-eighth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-six.

(2) EXCHANGE OF NOTES, MOSCOW, 28TH SEPTEMBER, 1926.

(a) *M. Sleževičius to M. Chicherin.*

Your Excellency,

On the occasion of the signature on to-day's date of the Treaty between Lithuania and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, I have the honour to make the following declarations:

(1) The two Governments have examined the questions of principle which are bound up with Lithuania's membership of the League of Nations. As regards this question the Lithuanian Government, both during the negotiations for the conclusion of the Treaty, and at the time of its signature, was guided by the conviction that the principle adopted by the Parties in Article 4 of the Treaty and relating to non-participation in any political agreements directed against one of the Contracting Parties might be concluded between third Powers cannot in any way hinder Lithuania's execution of the obligations laid upon her by the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(2) The Lithuanian Government is convinced that Lithuania's membership of the League of Nations cannot constitute an obstacle to the friendly development of the relations between Lithuania and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

(3) At the same time the Lithuanian Government considers that, in view of Lithuania's geographical situation, the obligations laid upon her by her membership of the League of Nations—an institution whose fundamental purpose is to settle international disputes in a peaceful and equitable manner—cannot constitute an obstacle to the Lithuanian nation's aspirations towards neutrality, which is the policy best suited to her vital interests.

(b) *M. Chicherin to M. Sleževičius.*

Your Excellency,

On to-day's date you have addressed to me a Note to the following effect [see (a) above].

In conformity with my Government's instructions, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Union takes due note of the above declaration.

(c) *M. Chicherin to M. Sleževičius.*

Your Excellency,

On the occasion of the signature on to-day's date of the Treaty between the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Lithuanian Republic, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The Government of the Union, being guided as always by its desire to see the Lithuanian nation, like all other nations, independent—a desire which the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has on several occasions expressed in its declarations—and in conformity with the Note addressed by the Soviet Government on April 5, 1923, to the Polish Government, and with the goodwill with which the public opinion of the workers of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics follow the destinies of the Lithuanian nation, declares that the de facto violation of the Lithuanian frontiers committed against the will of the Lithuanian nation has not shaken its attitude with regard to the territorial sovereignty defined in Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace, concluded between Russia and Lithuania on July 12, 1920, and in the Note annexed to the said Article.

(d) *M. Sleževičius to M. Chicherin.*

Your Excellency,

On to-day's date you have addressed to me a Note to the following effect [see (c) above].

Acting on my Government's instructions, I have the honour to inform you that the Lithuanian Government takes due note of the above declaration.

(v) **Breach of Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.: Exchange of Notes, May 1927.¹**

(1) *Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. Rosenholz.*

Foreign Office, May 26, 1927.

Sir,

The recent examination by the police of the premises of 'Arcos' Limited and of the Russian Trade Delegation has conclusively proved that both military espionage and subversive activities throughout the British Empire were directed and carried out from 49, Moorgate. No ostensible differentiation of rooms or duties was observed as between the members of the Trade Delegation and the employees of 'Arcos', and it has been shown that both these organizations have been involved in anti-British espionage and propaganda.

2. But the matter does not end there. Your Government and you will recognize the messages which were read by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons last Tuesday. I would remind you that your own telegram, in which you request material to enable you to support a political campaign in this country against His Majesty's Government, was despatched within a few weeks of the warning conveyed to your Government in my note to you of the 23rd February last, adducing specific instances of anti-British propaganda and requesting its cessation.

¹ Reprinted from the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2895 of 1927.

3. His Majesty's Government had hoped that the Soviet Government would take that opportunity, given them in accordance with the provisions of article 13 of the Trade Agreement, of 'furnishing an explanation or remedying the default'. They did neither; on the contrary, the hostility of the Soviet Government, together with the subversive propaganda carried on by their associates, the Russian Communist party and the Third International, in the United Kingdom itself and in British overseas territories, has continued unchecked, to culminate in the abuse of diplomatic privilege revealed by your attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of this country.

4. There are, as I warned you in my note of the 23rd February last, limits to the patience of His Majesty's Government and of public opinion here, and these limits have now been reached. In view of the facts stated above, His Majesty's Government in Great Britain must now regard themselves, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 13 of the Trade Agreement of the 16th March, 1921, as free from the obligations of that agreement. The privileges conferred on M. Khinchuk and his assistants in accordance with the agreement are accordingly terminated, and I have to request their departure from this country.

5. His Majesty's Government, while compelled to take this step for the reasons stated above, do not wish to interfere with the ordinary course of legitimate Anglo-Russian trade, and will therefore place no obstacles in the way of genuine commerce between the two countries. They will raise no objection to the continuance of the legitimate commercial operations of 'Arcos' Limited in the same conditions as those applicable to other trading organizations in this country, and with this object they are prepared to allow a reasonable number of Russian employees of the company, whose names will be communicated to you, to remain in this country, provided that they comply with the law of the land and confine their activities to legitimate commerce. But His Majesty's Government cannot suffer the existence here of a privileged organization which, under the guise of peaceful trading, carries on espionage and intrigues against the country in which it is established.

6. Finally, His Majesty's Government have decided that they can no longer maintain diplomatic relations with a Government which permits and encourages such a state of things as has been disclosed. The existing relations between the two Governments are hereby suspended, and I have to request that you will withdraw yourself and your staff from this country within the course of the next ten days. I am instructing His Majesty's representative at Moscow to leave Russia with his staff, and should be glad if you would request your Government to afford to him, to Mr. Preston at Leningrad and to Mr. Paton at Vladivostok, the necessary facilities for the departure of themselves and their assistants.

7. Suitable arrangements, the details of which will be communicated to you in due course, will be made for the departure from this country of yourself and your staff and of the Russian members of the Trade Delegation.

(2) *M. Litvinov to Mr. Peters.*

Moscow, May 28, 1927.

Sir,

I have the honour to request you to convey the following to your Government.

The Soviet Government has acquainted itself with the contents of the note handed yesterday to citizen Rosengolz in which the announcement is made of the denunciation by the British Government of the Trade Agreement of 1921, and of the severance of diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Great Britain.

This decision was no surprise to the Soviet Government. It has already for long been aware that a rupture of relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was being prepared by the whole policy of the present British Conservative Government, which has declined all the proposals of the Soviet Government for the settlement of mutual relations by means of negotiations.

The Soviet Government once again decisively rejects all accusations that it infringed at any time whatever the Trade Agreement of 1921 as quite without proof and entirely groundless. The sole source of these accusations, as has been repeatedly and absolutely incontestably established, is dishonest information drawn from most suspicious White *émigré* sources and forged documents with which the British Government has willingly operated throughout the whole course of the existence of relations between it and the Soviet Government. The lack of results of the search of the Trade Delegation, which was carried out with the utmost thoroughness over several days, is the most convincing proof of the loyalty and correctitude of the official agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet Government passes over with contempt the insinuations of British Ministers regarding espionage by the Trade Delegation and considers it beneath its dignity to reply to them.

The Soviet Government places on record that the British Government had no legitimate grounds either for the first infringement of the Trade Agreement of 1921 in the form of a police raid on the extra-territorial premises of the Soviet official agent or for the second infringement, consisting in denouncing this agreement without the six months' notice provided for therein.

For the whole world it is quite clear that the basic cause of the rupture is the defeat of the policy of the Conservative Government in China and an attempt to cover this defeat by a diversion in the direction of the Soviet Union, while the immediate grounds are the desire of the British Government to distract public attention from the failure of the senseless raid on 'Arcos' and the Trade Delegation and to extract the British Minister of Home Affairs from the dreadful fix into which he has fallen, thanks to that raid.

The Peoples of the Soviet Union and their Government cherish no enmity towards the peoples of the British Empire and wished to maintain with them normal and friendly relations. The peoples of the British Empire undoubtedly desire the same. But the present British Government did not, and does not, want these normal relations and has tried from the very first day of its existence to keep relations with the Soviet Union in a state

of constant stress and to exacerbate them still further. The British Government preferred to a system of normal relations a system of violence and enmity. It has decided on the rupture of diplomatic relations for which it must take the whole responsibility upon itself, taking into full account the shock which this rupture will inevitably cause to existing political and economic international relations. It could not fail to appreciate that the rupture will increase the economic chaos from which Europe has not yet emerged after the world war, and that it will deal a heavy blow to the cause of peace. It decided, however, on this act, sacrificing the interests of the broad masses of the British Empire and even of British industry.

The Soviet Government takes cognizance of this act in the full conviction that it will be condemned not only by the toilers but also by all the progressive elements of the whole world. At the same time it expresses its assurance that the time is near when the British people will find the possibility of realizing without hindrance its strivings for peace and for the establishment of normal friendly relations with the peoples of the Soviet Union.

(vi) **Russo-German Treaty, 24th April, 1926.¹**

(1) **TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, SIGNED AT BERLIN ON THE 24TH APRIL, 1926.**

The German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, being desirous of doing all in their power to promote the maintenance of general peace,

And being convinced that the interests of the German people and of the peoples of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics demand constant and trustful co-operation,

Have agreed to strengthen the friendly relations existing between them by means of a special Treaty and have for this purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries [names omitted]

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Art. 1. The relations between Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics shall continue to be based on the Treaty of Rapallo.

The German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics shall remain in friendly touch in order to promote an understanding with regard to all political and economic questions jointly affecting their two countries.

Art. 2. Should one of the Contracting Parties, despite its peaceful attitude, be attacked by one or more third Powers, the other Contracting Party shall observe neutrality for the whole duration of the conflict.

Art. 3. If on the occasion of a conflict of the nature mentioned in Article 2, or at a time when neither of the Contracting Parties is engaged in war-like operations, a coalition is formed between third Powers with a view to the economic or financial boycott of either of the Contracting Parties, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to adhere to such coalition.

Art. 4. The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Berlin.

¹ Text, as translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, reprinted from *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. liii.

It shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for five years. The two Contracting Parties shall confer in good time before the expiration of this period with regard to the future development of their political relations.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

(2) EXCHANGE OF NOTES, BERLIN, 24TH APRIL, 1926.

(a) *Herr Stresemann to M. Krestinski.*

With reference to the negotiations upon the Treaty signed this day between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, I have the honour, on behalf of the German Government, to make the following observations:

(1) In the negotiation and signature of the Treaty, both Governments have taken the view that the principle laid down by them in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, of reaching an understanding on all political and economic questions affecting the two countries, will contribute considerably to the maintenance of peace. In any case the two Governments will in their deliberations be guided by the need for the maintenance of the general peace.

(2) In this spirit also the two Governments have approached the fundamental questions which are bound up with the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. The German Government is convinced that Germany's membership of the League cannot constitute an obstacle to the friendly development of the relations between Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. According to its basic idea, the League of Nations is designed for the peaceful and equitable settlement of international disputes. The German Government is determined to co-operate to the best of its ability in the realization of this idea. If, however, though the German Government does not anticipate this, there should at any time take shape within the League, contrary to that fundamental idea of peace, any efforts directed exclusively against the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, Germany would most energetically oppose such efforts.

(3) The German Government also proceeds upon the assumption that this fundamental attitude of German policy towards the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics cannot be adversely influenced by the loyal observance of the obligations, arising out of Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant of the League and relating to the application of sanctions, which would devolve upon Germany as a consequence of her entry into the League of Nations. By the terms of these articles, the application of sanctions against the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics would come into consideration, in the absence of other causes, only if the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics entered upon a war of aggression against a third State. It is to be borne in mind that the question whether the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is the aggressor in the event of a conflict with a third State could only be determined with binding force for Germany with her own consent; and that, therefore, an accusation to this effect levelled by other Powers against the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and regarded by Germany as unjustified, would not oblige Germany to take part in measures of any kind instituted on the authority of Article 16. With regard to the question whether, in a concrete case, Germany would be in a position to take part

in the application of sanctions at all, and to what extent, the German Government refers to the Note of December 1, 1925, on the interpretation of Article 16 addressed to the German Delegation on the occasion of the signing of the Treaties of Locarno.

(4) In order to create a secure basis for disposing without friction of all questions arising between them, the two Governments regard it as desirable that they should immediately embark upon negotiations for the conclusion of a general treaty for the peaceful solution of any conflicts that may arise between them, when special attention shall be given to the possibilities of the procedure of arbitration and conciliation.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(b) *M. Krestinski to Herr Stresemann.*

Your Excellency,

In acknowledging receipt of the Note which you have addressed to me with regard to the negotiations on the Treaty signed to-day between the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the German Government, I have the honour, on behalf of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, to make the following reply:

(1) In the negotiation and signature of the Treaty, both Governments have taken the view that the principle laid down by them in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, of reaching an understanding on all political and economic questions jointly affecting the two countries, will contribute considerably to the maintenance of peace. In any case the two Governments will in their deliberations be guided by the need for the maintenance of the general peace.

(2) The Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics takes note of the explanation contained in Sections 2 and 3 of your Note concerning the fundamental questions connected with Germany's entry into the League of Nations.

(3) In order to create a secure basis for disposing without friction of all questions arising between them, the two Governments regard it as desirable that they should immediately embark upon negotiations for the conclusion of a general treaty for the peaceful solution of any conflicts that may arise between them, when special attention shall be given to the possibilities of the procedure of arbitration and conciliation.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(vii) Treaty between the United States and Nicaragua, signed at Washington on the 5th August, 1914, and known as the 'Bryan-Chamorro Treaty'.¹

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Nicaragua, being animated by the desire to strengthen their ancient and cordial friendship by the most sincere co-operation for all purposes of

¹ Text reprinted from *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cviii (1914, Part II).

their mutual advantage and interest, and to provide for the possible future construction of an inter-oceanic ship canal by way of the San Juan River and the great Lake of Nicaragua, or by any route over Nicaraguan territory, whenever the construction of such canal shall be deemed by the Government of the United States conducive to the interests of both countries, and the Government of Nicaragua wishing to facilitate in every way possible the successful maintenance and operation of the Panama Canal, the two Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention to these ends, and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries [names omitted].

Who, having exhibited to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

Art. 1. The Government of Nicaragua grants in perpetuity to the Government of the United States, for ever free from all taxation or other public charge, the exclusive proprietary rights necessary and convenient for the construction, operation, and maintenance of an inter-oceanic canal by way of the San Juan River and the great Lake of Nicaragua, or by way of any route over Nicaraguan territory, the details of the terms upon which such canal shall be constructed, operated, and maintained to be agreed to by the two Governments whenever the Government of the United States shall notify the Government of Nicaragua of its desire or intention to construct such canal.

Art. 2. To enable the Government of the United States to protect the Panama Canal and the proprietary rights granted to the Government of the United States by the foregoing Article, and also to enable the Government of the United States to take any measure necessary to the ends contemplated herein, the Government of Nicaragua hereby leases for a term of ninety-nine years to the Government of the United States the islands in the Caribbean Sea known as Great Corn Island and Little Corn Island; and the Government of Nicaragua further grants to the Government of the United States for a like period of ninety-nine years the right to establish, operate, and maintain a naval base at such place on the territory of Nicaragua bordering upon the Gulf of Fonseca as the Government of the United States may select. The Government of the United States shall have the option of renewing for a further term of ninety-nine years the above leases and grants upon the expiration of their respective terms, it being expressly agreed that the territory hereby leased and the naval base which may be maintained under the grant aforesaid shall be subject exclusively to the laws and sovereign authority of the United States during the terms of such lease and grant, and of any renewal or renewals thereof.

Art. 3. In consideration of the foregoing stipulations, and for the purposes contemplated by this Convention, and for the purpose of reducing the present indebtedness of Nicaragua, the Government of the United States shall, upon the date of the exchange of ratification of this Convention, pay for the benefit of the Republic of Nicaragua the sum of \$3,000,000 United States gold coin, of the present weight and fineness, to be deposited to the order of the Government of Nicaragua in such bank or banks, or with such banking corporation, as the Government of the United States may determine, to be applied by Nicaragua upon its

indebtedness or other public purposes for the advancement of the welfare of Nicaragua, in a manner to be determined by the two High Contracting Parties, all such disbursements to be made by orders drawn by the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Nicaragua and approved by the Secretary of State of the United States, or by such person as he may designate.

Art. 4. This Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective laws, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereunto their seals.

(viii) Chronology of Events and Treaties, 1st January-
31st December, 1927.

Abbreviations.

A.J.I.L.= *American Journal of International Law*; Cmd.= Great Britain, Parliamentary Paper; E.E.P.S.= *European Economic and Political Survey*; E.N.= *L'Europe Nouvelle*; L.N.O.J.= *League of Nations Official Journal*; L.N.T.S.= *League of Nations Treaty Series*.

Afghanistan

1927, April 10. Ratifications exchanged at Kabul of treaty of friendship with Russia signed at Pagnan on Aug. 31, 1926.

Nov. 3. Treaties of friendship with Poland and Turkey signed at Angora.

Nov. 28. Treaty of friendship and security with Persia signed.

Nov. 28. Agreement with U.S.S.R. signed at Kabul regarding air line from Tashkend to Kabul.

Albania

1927, Jan. 14. Provisional commercial agreement with Rumania signed at Tirana. Came into force on Feb. 12.

Jan. 24. Ratifications exchanged of Italo-Albanian Pact signed at Tirana on Nov. 27, 1926. (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lx).

Jan. 29. Ratifications exchanged of extradition treaty with Great Britain of July 22, 1926 (Text: *Cmd.* 2920; *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).

Mar. 19. Italian Government notified British, French, and German Governments that it had received information of preparations in Yugoslavia for incursion into Albania.¹

April 14. Provisional commercial agreement concluded by exchange of notes with Austria. Came into force on July 1.

May 27. Albanian police arrested on charge of espionage M. Jurašević, employed as dragoman at Yugoslav Legation in Tirana.

June 4, Yugoslav chargé d'affaires left Tirana, owing to refusal of Albanian Government to release M. Jurašević. June 16, Albanian Minister to Yugoslavia left Belgrade. July 3, Dispute settled on lines suggested by Great Britain, France, and Italy.²

Nov. 4. Provisional commercial agreement with Hungary signed.

Nov. 22. Treaty of defensive alliance with Italy signed at Tirana and notes exchanged regarding Art. 4 of treaty. Ratifications exchanged on Dec. 23 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix; *E.E.P.S.* 30.11.27; *E.N.* 10.12.27).

¹ See pp. 175-9 above.

² See pp. 179-82 above.

Arabia

- 1927, May 20. Treaty of friendship, superseding treaty of Dec. 26, 1915, signed at Jiddah by Sir Gilbert Clayton for Great Britain and Amīr Faysal for Ibn Sa'ūd. Notes exchanged on May 19–21 regarding Hijāzi-Transjordan frontier, British right of manumitting slaves, &c. Ratifications exchanged on Sept. 17 (Texts: *Cmd.* 2951).
 Nov. 22, Persia protested against treaty.
- June 1. Agreement between Italy and Yaman signed at Hodeida, supplementing that of Sept. 2, 1926 (Text: *E.E.P.S.* 15.4.28; *E.N.* 19.5.28).

Argentina

- 1927, Jan. 26. Agreement with France as to military service signed.
 Oct. 17. Extradition treaty with Norway signed at Buenos Aires.
 Nov. 5. Agreement with Ecuador regarding diplomatic representation signed at Quito.
 Nov. 16. Workmen's compensation convention with Denmark signed.

Austria

- 1927, Feb. 5. Two legal conventions with Germany signed at Vienna.
 Aug. 23, ratifications exchanged at Berlin.
- Feb. 14. Ratifications exchanged with Czechoslovakia of protocol of Sept. 17, 1926, supplementing trade convention of May 14, 1925. Existing tariff convention with Czechoslovakia expired on April 15. New convention signed on July 21. Came into force on Aug. 10.
- Feb. 15. Air convention with Czechoslovakia concluded at Vienna.
- March 1. Notes exchanged with Netherlands on Jan. 25 and March 1 abolishing passport visas as from March 15 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).
- March 11. Protocols regulating legal questions arising out of delimitation of frontier with Hungary signed at Vienna.
- March 15. Convention with Switzerland signed regarding execution of judicial decisions.
- March 23. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of conciliation and arbitration treaty of April 16, 1926.
- March 28. Notes exchanged with Portugal on March 22 and 28 abolishing passport visas as from May 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).
- March 29. Agreement concluded with Netherlands by exchange of notes on March 22 and 29 for reciprocal communication of penal sentences. Came into force on April 15.
- March 29. Ratifications exchanged with Sweden of conciliation and arbitration treaty of May 28, 1926.
- April 2. Ratifications exchanged at Warsaw of arbitration treaty with Poland of April 16, 1926. Came into force May 2.
- April 19. Customs agreement with Switzerland concluded.
- May 23. Ratifications exchanged of protocol of July 7, 1926, additional to commercial treaty of Dec. 14, 1923, with Belgium.
- June 8. Customs agreement with Yugoslavia concluded.
- June 11. Notes exchanged with Denmark on June 9 and 11 abolishing passport visas, as from June 15 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).
- June 30. Notes exchanged with Latvia regarding suppression of passport visas as from July 1.

- July 9. Commercial treaty with United States signed at Vienna.
- July 15-16. Serious rioting in Vienna following acquittal of Fascists charged with killing a Socialist workman and child.
- July 18. Notes exchanged with Great Britain abolishing passport visas as from Aug. 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxviii).
- July 21. Notes exchanged with Finland regarding suppression of passport visas as from Aug. 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvi).
- July 26. Ratifications exchanged with Latvia of commercial treaty of Aug. 9, 1924. Came into force same day.
- July 29. Liquidation Commission responsible for winding up military control in Austria informed Government that proposal of Vienna Municipal Council for permanent maintenance of special armed police force established during riots in July contravened terms of St. Germain Treaty. Aug. 5, Mayor of Vienna notified Government that character of force would be changed as from Aug. 18.
- Aug. 8. Commercial treaty with Finland signed at Vienna (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- Sept. 19. Agreement concluded with Great Britain regarding debt settlement (Text: *Cmd.* 3039).
- Oct. 8. Agreement concluded with Sweden for reciprocal application of Hague Convention of July 15, 1905, regarding civil law.
- Oct. 10. Agreement with Belgium signed at Vienna regarding application of Section 3 of Part X (economic clauses) of Treaty of St. Germain. Agreement of July 28, 1925, regarding Austrian public debt, came into force.
- Oct. 24. Double taxation convention with Switzerland signed.
- Oct. 27. Protocol with Conference of Ambassadors signed in Paris relating to air régime in Austria.
- Nov. 19. Agreement with Rumania regarding debt settlement signed at Bucarest, supplementing that of June 26, 1924.
- Dec. 2. Conference of Ambassadors decided that Liquidation Commission should cease to function on Jan. 31, 1928.
- Dec. 9. Ratifications exchanged of agreement with Italy of Dec. 14, 1926, regarding offices of compensation and verification.
- Dec. 20. Agreement with Sweden for suppression of passport visas as from Jan. 1, 1928, concluded by exchange of notes at Stockholm.
- Dec. 20. Agreement with Italy signed in Rome regarding the execution of Arts. 266 and 273 of St. Germain Treaty. Notes exchanged regarding Teutonic Order.
- See also under *Albania*, April 14.

Belgium

- 1927, Jan. 6. Provisional commercial arrangement with Portugal signed at Lisbon. Came into force May 8.
- Jan. 24. Notes exchanged with Netherlands regarding reciprocal communication of penal sentences. Came into force same day.
- Feb. 5. Treaty of arbitration and conciliation with Switzerland signed. Ratifications exchanged on Nov. 12 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxviii).
- Feb. 8. Consular convention with Estonia signed.
- March 3. Treaty of arbitration and conciliation signed with Denmark. Ratifications exchanged on Sept. 30 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).

- March 3. Two declarations between Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland signed at Brussels (i) for reciprocal recognition of tonnage certificates; (ii) for enforcement of Paris Convention of Nov. 27, 1925, regarding tonnage of vessels in inland navigation.
- March 4. Treaty of arbitration and conciliation with Finland signed. Ratifications exchanged on Nov. 19 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).
- March 24. Treaty of April 3, 1925, with Netherlands regarding Scheldt rejected by Netherlands First Chamber.
- March 24. Convention with Netherlands signed regarding exemption from medical examination of ships.
- March 25. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of amity and commerce with Siam of July 13, 1926. Came into force same day.
- April 15. Passport agreement with United States signed.
- May 6. Notes exchanged with Great Britain for reciprocal notification of particulars concerning persons of unsound mind. Came into force same day (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- May 14. Notes exchanged with France on May 12 and 14 regarding measures against rabies in frontier regions.
- May 21. Ratifications exchanged with Estonia of commercial treaty of Sept. 28, 1926.
- May 24. Ratifications exchanged of frontier traffic agreement with Germany of July 15, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- June 2. Ratifications exchanged of extradition and judicial assistance convention with Latvia of Oct. 11, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- June 14. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Guatemala of Nov. 7, 1924 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).
- June 27. Ratifications exchanged of extradition convention with Estonia of Nov. 11, 1926.
- July 9. Conciliation and arbitration treaty with Portugal signed.
- July 9. Financial agreement with Germany signed at Aix-la-Chapelle. Came into force on Aug. 1.
- July 19. Extradition and judicial assistance conventions with Czechoslovakia signed.
- July 19. Treaty of conciliation, arbitration, and judicial settlement signed with Spain in Brussels.
- July 19-22. Conventions with Portugal regarding Belgian Congo and Angola signed at São Paulo de Loanda: (i) sanitary convention (July 19); (ii) convention regarding road construction, arms contraband and other economic matters (July 20); (iii) convention regarding traffic on Benguela Railway (July 21); (iv) frontier convention, providing for an exchange of territories (July 22).
- Aug. 28. Commercial treaty with Turkey signed at Angora.
- Sept. 3. Ratifications exchanged of agreement with France of Dec. 14, 1923, regarding reparation for war damages.
- Sept. 27. Ratifications exchanged with Sweden of arbitration and conciliation treaty of April 30, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).
- Oct. 6. Establishment convention with France signed in Paris. Ratifications exchanged on Oct. 27 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).
- Oct. 18. Arbitration treaty signed with Luxembourg.

- Oct. 22. Ratifications exchanged with Germany of air navigation convention of May 29, 1926. Came into force same day.
 - Oct. 25. Extradition treaty signed with Netherlands modifying that of May 31, 1889. Ratifications exchanged on Nov. 25 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).
 - Oct. 26. Agreement with Netherlands regarding intellectual relations signed in Brussels.
 - Dec. 15. Ratifications exchanged of industrial treaty with Luxembourg of Oct. 20, 1926.
 - Dec. 22. Agreement with Germany signed in Paris regarding settlement of small debts.
- See also under *Austria*, May 23, Oct. 10; *China*, Jan. 11, Jan. 13, Jan. 14.

Bolivia

- April 22. Protocol with Paraguay signed in Buenos Aires providing for meeting of delegates at Buenos Aires to endeavour to settle dispute regarding ownership of Chaco territory.
- Aug. 31. Ratifications exchanged with Germany of agreement of March 12, 1924, modifying treaty of friendship and commerce of July 22, 1908.

Brazil

- 1927, Feb. 19. Agreement with Poland regarding immigration signed.
- May 21. Protocol delimiting frontier signed with Paraguay.
- July 28. Ratifications exchanged of general arbitration convention with Peru of July 11, 1918.
- Sept. 8. Treaty of friendship with Turkey signed in Rome.
- Oct. 19. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Venezuela of April 13, 1926, regarding conduct of authorities of one country in event of internal disturbances in the other.

Bulgaria

- 1927, Jan. 12. Ratifications exchanged of commercial convention with Poland of April 29, 1925 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lx).
- Feb. 19. Ratifications exchanged of two judicial conventions with Czechoslovakia signed at Sofia on May 15, 1926.
- Feb. 28. Provisional commercial agreement with Greece signed in Athens. Came into force on April 1. Ratifications exchanged on Oct. 14 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).
- March 31. Air navigation agreement signed in Paris with Conference of Ambassadors (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvi).
- May 31. Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control withdrawn.
- June 17. Ratifications exchanged of legal treaty with Germany signed at Sofia on Dec. 22, 1926.
- June 17. Agreement concluded with Great Britain for provisional dissolution of Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (Text: *Cmd.* 2928; *L.N.T.S.* lxxvii).
- July 2. Ratifications exchanged of legal treaty with Germany of Dec. 22, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiv).
- Oct. 7. As result of outrages in Macedonia, Yugoslav Minister in Sofia asked Bulgarian Government to state if it was prepared to

- suppress Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. Oct. 10, Martial law proclaimed in districts of Kustendil and Petrich.¹
- Dec. 9. Agreement regarding financial obligations incumbent on Bulgarian and Greek Governments as result of exchange of populations signed at Geneva by Bulgarian and Greek Finance Ministers and President of Mixed Emigration Commission.

Canada

- 1927, Nov. 21. Provisional commercial agreement concluded with Cuba by exchange of notes.

Chile

- 1927, Jan. 6. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of friendship with Turkey of Jan. 30, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lix).
- Jan. 12. Peruvian Government rejected proposals of U.S. State Department for settling Tacna-Arica controversy with Chile.
- Feb. 8. Treaty of commerce and navigation with Norway signed.
- Feb. 24. Treaty of conciliation and judicial settlement signed with Italy at Rome. Ratifications exchanged on Dec. 2 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).
- May 28. Arbitration treaty signed with Spain. Ratifications exchanged on Dec. 26.

China

- 1927, Jan. 1. Mr. Eugene Chen, Foreign Minister of Nationalist Government, telegraphed to his Government denouncing proposal for levying Washington surtaxes made in British memorandum of Dec. 18, 1926; Canton Government began to collect tax of 2½ per cent. on ordinary goods and 5 per cent. on luxuries. Jan. 3, Sir Francis Aglen, Inspector-General of Customs, left Peking for Shanghai and Hankow to discuss customs affairs with Southern leaders. Jan. 12, Peking authorities issued Mandate levying Washington surtaxes. Jan. 20, Marshal Sun Ch'uan-fang started to levy surtaxes at ports under his control. Jan. 31, Sir Francis Aglen, who, in view of lack of unanimity among Powers, was unable to agree to Chinese proposal that Customs Service should collect surtaxes, and who was at the time in the Yangtse Valley, was dismissed by Peking Government. British Legation protested against Sir F. Aglen's dismissal on Feb. 2. On Feb. 7, representatives of Powers at Peking made joint protest against levying of surtaxes. On Feb. 11, Peking Government decided that Sir F. Aglen should be granted a year's leave with status of Inspector-General, that Mr. A. H. F. Edwards should act in his absence, and that surtaxes should not be collected by Customs Service.
- Jan. 1. Nationalist Government issued mandate consolidating cities of Hankow, Wuchang, and Hanyang into one city named Wuhan, to be Nationalist capital.
- Jan. 1. Mixed Court at Shanghai formally handed over to Chinese. French Mixed Court handed over on Jan. 5.
- Jan. 3. British concession at Hankow attacked by mob. British marines landed and held mob in check for several hours without

¹ See pp. 213-14 above.

- firing a shot. Marines withdrawn on Jan. 4, Mr. Chen having undertaken that Chinese should police concession. Mob returned and overran concession on Jan. 4 and 5. British women and children evacuated and concession left in Chinese hands. On Jan. 24 British business houses reopened.
- Jan. 6. Italian communiqué published embodying reply to British memorandum of Dec. 18, 1926.
- Jan. 6-7. Chinese invaded British Concession at Kiukiang; British subjects evacuated.
- Jan. 11. Belgian Consul-General molested at Hankow.
- Jan. 12. Mr. O'Malley arrived at Hankow to continue Sir M. Lampson's negotiations with Mr. Chen.
- Jan. 13. Belgian Minister at Peking agreed to reopen negotiations for new Sino-Belgian treaty, Belgian Government having suspended application to Permanent Court of International Justice in connexion with Chinese denunciation of treaty of 1865. Belgian representative stated that his Government was prepared to retrocede Belgian concession at Tientsin unconditionally. Feb. 15, Belgium formally withdrew application to Permanent Court, on ground that negotiations were in progress.
- Jan. 14. Foreign missions attacked and looted at Fuchow.
- Jan. 14. Belgian Government published reply to British memorandum of Dec. 18, 1926, approving policy stated therein.
- Jan. 16. Netherlands Government published their reply agreeing in the main with British memorandum of Dec. 18, 1926.
- Jan. 17-22. British Government decided to send 3 brigades of troops under command of Major-Gen. John Duncan to Shanghai. Foreign Office statement of Jan. 21 explained that these precautions were solely to protect British lives, and did not indicate any modification of H.M. Government's treaty revision policy.
- Jan. 21. Negotiations to revise Sino-Japanese Treaty opened.
- Jan. 24. Mr. Chen issued declaration of policy of Nationalist Government at Hankow and formally protested against dispatch of British troops to Shanghai.
- Jan. 26. National Joint Council of British Labour Party telegraphed message of sympathy to Mr. Chen urging him to negotiate a settlement.
- Jan. 27. United States Secretary of State made official statement regarding U.S. policy in China.
- Jan. 27. First British troops reached Shanghai. Mr. O'Malley communicated to Mr. Chen British proposals for treaty modification.
- Jan. 28. British proposals for treaty modification communicated to Peking Government by Sir Miles Lampson.
- Jan. 29. Negotiations regarding future administration of Hankow-Kiukiang Concession between Mr. Chen and Mr. O'Malley resulted in general agreement. On Feb. 1, Mr. Chen informed Mr. O'Malley that Nationalist Government could not sign agreement in view of dispatch of Shanghai Defence Force.
- Jan. 31. Peking Foreign Office protested against dispatch of Shanghai Defence Force.

- Feb. 2. Spanish Government published reply to British memorandum of Dec. 18, 1926, approving its contents.
- Feb. 4. United States Secretary of State transmitted proposals to contending factions in China that International Settlement at Shanghai should be excluded from warlike activities.
- Feb. 4. Further telegram (in reply to message from Mr. Chen) from National Joint Council of British Labour Party urging continuance of negotiations.
- Feb. 7. Chen-O'Malley negotiations reopened at Hankow.
- Feb. 8. British Government communicated to League of Nations statement of British policy in China.
- Feb. 9. Chinese Ratepayers Association at Shanghai put forward demand for 9 Chinese members on International Settlement Municipal Council, in place of the 3 already agreed on.
- Feb. 10. Sir A. Chamberlain stated in House of Commons that troops were going to Shanghai for protection only.
- Feb. 16. Forces of Marshal Sun Ch'uan-fang heavily defeated by Nationalist army at Hangchow.
- Feb. 17. Resolution introduced by Mr. Porter on Jan. 4 proposing independent Sino-American negotiations for treaty revision passed House of Representatives at Washington.
- Feb. 19. Chen-O'Malley agreement regarding future of British concession at Hankow signed. Feb. 20, agreement signed providing for similar settlement at Kiukiang. (Texts of agreements and appended declarations: *Cmd.* 2869.) Final agreement regarding Kiukiang concession signed on March 2. Formal rendition of concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang carried out on March 15.
- Feb. 19. General strike broke out at Shanghai. Strike called off by General Labour Union on Feb. 24, owing to repressive measures by Chinese military authorities.
- Feb. 21. Marshal Sun Ch'uan-fang abdicated his command over the Shanghai area in favour of his ally, Chang Tsung-ch'ang.
- Feb. 22. French settlement at Shanghai shelled by Chinese boats.
- Feb. 24. British and Italian troops moved forward to prearranged line of defence around International Settlement at Shanghai, in view of Marshal Sun's defeat and uncertainty of military position.
- Feb. 25. Diplomatic Body issued declaration appealing to Chinese authorities to observe neutrality of Shanghai.
- Feb. 28-March 4. Forces of Sun Ch'uan-fang holding line south of Shanghai replaced by Shantung troops of Chang Tsung-ch'ang.
- March 1 (about). Breach between Left and Right Wing of Kuomintang Party over holding Conference of Central Executive Committee.
- March 1. Arrest of Mme Borodin and Soviet couriers at Pukow.
- July 11. Mme Borodin released.
- March 4. Retreat of Chang Tsung-ch'ang's troops from Shanghai area to Nanking began.
- March 7. Gen. Chiang Kai-shek at Nanchang issued manifesto against Communism.
- March 8. Serious rioting and looting at Wuhu.

- March 12. Shantung troops prevented by British detachment from entering International Settlement at Shanghai.
- March 14-21. Northerners defended by Nationalists in series of battles south of Nanking.
- March 15 (about). Communists and Kuomintang Left Wing gained ascendancy at Conference of Central Executive Committee at Hankow.
- March 21. Southern suburbs of Shanghai occupied by Nationalist troops under Chiang Kai-shek; whole Chinese city in possession of Nationalists by March 22. General strike for three days proclaimed. Shantung troops on March 22 attempted to rush international cordon but were repulsed. General strike at Shanghai called off by General Labour Union on March 24.
- March 22. British naval force carried out punitive expedition against pirates' headquarters at Bias Bay.
- March 23. Nanking evacuated by Northern forces and occupied by Nationalist forces under Ch'eng Ch'ien. Organized attacks on foreigners and foreign property took place on March 24 and 25; several British, American, French, Italian, and Japanese subjects killed or wounded (*Cmd.* 2953). On April 11, consular representatives at Hankow of five Powers concerned presented identic notes to Mr. Chen demanding reparation for outrages. Mr. Chen replied in five notes on April 14, blaming Northern troops and suggesting joint inquiry.
- April 1. Nationalists beginning to advance northwards from Yangtse; about April 8 Nationalists defeated by Sun Ch'uan-fang's army at Yangchow and Chuchow. Northerners occupied Pukow on April 12.
- April 3. Japanese concession at Hankow attacked by mob; 2 Japanese and about 12 Chinese killed. Japanese landed marines to hold concession by force; anti-Japanese boycott followed.
- April 4. Sino-British negotiations began at Tientsin for modification of administration of British Concession. April 22, joint recommendations initialled.
- April 6. Chinese authorities at Peking, with consent of representatives of Powers signatory of 1901 Protocol, raided Soviet premises in Legation Quarter adjacent to Soviet Embassy, arrested number of Chinese and Russians and seized documents. On April 28, 20 of arrested Chinese, who had been condemned to death by a special court, were executed.
- April 12. Agreement regarding traffic in narcotic drugs concluded with Switzerland at Berne (*Text: L.N.T.S.* lxvi).
- April 12-13. Chiang Kai-shek's forces carried out raid on Communists at Shanghai, which culminated in a battle in the Chinese city and many casualties.
- April 14. General Labour Union at Shanghai dissolved.
- April 16. Li Chai-sum raided Communists at Canton.
- April 18. Chiang Kai-shek inaugurated 'moderate' Nationalist Government at Nanking. May 13, Mr. C. C. Wu appointed Foreign Minister of Nanking Government, in place of Mr. Eugene Chen.

- April 18. Hankow Government declared embargo on silver.
- May 7. Serious fighting at Chumatién in Honan between Chang Tso-lin's forces and those of Nationalist Government at Hankow.
- May 10, fighting in Kiangsi Province between Chiang Kai-shek's army and Hankow troops. May 10 (about), Chang Tso-lin's troops advanced to Hupeh border, but were driven back by Tang Sheng-chih's Hankow troops. May 15, Sun Ch'uan-fang forced to retire and Pukow occupied by Chiang Kai-shek.
- May 17. British diplomatic representative left Hankow.
- May 26. Feng Yü-hsiang captured Loyang. May 26-30, second battle at Chumatién. Northerners defeated Tang Sheng-chih's troops with severe loss but owing to threat by Feng Yü-hsiang's army on right flank, retreated instead of advancing.
- May 28. Japanese Government announced decision to send two battalions to Tsingtao to defend Japanese lives and property. May 29, Nanking authorities protested against decision. May 31, Japanese troops reached Tsingtao. June 1, Peking Government protested. June 3, Mr. Eugene Chen protested. June 18, Japanese representative protested to Nanking Government against preparations for anti-Japanese boycott. July 6, Japanese Government ordered advance of some 2,000 troops from Tsingtao to Tsinan. July 13, Peking Government demanded immediate withdrawal of troops. Aug. 29, Japanese Prime Minister announced that troops would shortly be withdrawn from Tsinan and Tsingtao. Troops had been withdrawn by Sept. 8.
- June 2-9. Reinforcement of foreign garrisons at Tientsin in view of Southern advance.
- June 7. Chiang Kai-shek's forces took Hanchwang on Tientsin-Pukow Railway. June 9, Sun Ch'uan-fang defeated in Kiangsu Province; Nationalists occupied Lincheng and Tsaochuang.
- June 9. Yang Sen's advance on Hankow defeated by Hankow forces.
- June 12-13. Conference at Chengchow between Feng Yü-hsiang and representatives of Hankow Government. June 19-21, Feng and Chiang Kai-shek met at Hsuehowfu. June 24, joint declaration issued by Feng and Chiang demanding expulsion of extremists from Kuomintang, and dismissal of Borodin and other Russians.
- June 18. New administration set up at Peking composed of adherents of Chang Tso-lin. June 19, Chang installed as Commander-in-Chief of Army and Navy. July 3, Chang issued manifesto stating policy of new Government.
- June 27-July 7. Conference of Japanese officials on China held at Tokyo.
- June 30. Nanking Government issued new tariff regulations, enforcing what amounted to tariff autonomy as from Aug. 1.
- June 30. Renewed advance of Nationalists in Shantung.
- July 1. Nanking Government abolished Salt Inspectorate establishments in provinces ruled by it. Order rescinded Oct. 31.
- July 3. Chinese Ratepayers Association at Shanghai refused payment of increased rates, on the ground that Chinese were not represented on Municipal Council.

- July 5 (about). Abortive revolt of one of Sun Ch'uan-fang's generals at Kaomi, Shantung, in interests of Feng Yü-hsiang.
- July 8-14. Northern forces advanced unopposed down the Pukow-Tientsin Railway as far as Hsuchow.
- July 13. Foreign Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai made formal protest to Consular Body against new tariff charges.
- July 15. Nanking Government announced new issue of bonds secured on salt surplus.
- July 18. Martial law proclaimed in Hankow; communists and labour agitators rounded up; Government reorganized on non-Communist basis. July 27, M. Borodin left Hankow for Chengchow. Aug. 19, General Galen left Hankow. Aug. 11 (about), Mr. Eugene Chen resigned office as Foreign Minister and left Hankow; arrived in Moscow on Sept. 7.
- July 18-24. Greater part of Chiang Kai-shek's forces being withdrawn from Shantung to oppose Hankow forces advancing down Yangtse. On July 20, Northerners defeated Nationalists near Lincheng. On July 24, Northerners occupied Hsuchow.
- July 19. Representatives of Chiang Kai-shek arrived at Peking to confer with Chang Tso-lin. Conference broke down.
- July 25. Nanking Foreign Minister informed foreign representatives that his Government had decided to abolish all taxes on goods in transit as from Sept. 1, and put into operation provisional national tariff law. Aug. 28, owing to successful opposition by foreign Powers Nanking authorities announced that new tariff schedule would not be put into force on Sept. 1.
- July 29. Fighting reported between Nanking and Hankow forces below Kiukiang.
- Aug. 2-3. Northerners' advance in Kiangsu checked at Suchow.
- Aug. 14. Northerners reached Yangtse opposite Chinkiang.
- Aug. 8. Negotiations for new Sino-Spanish Treaty began at Peking. On Nov. 12 Peking Government denounced treaty of Oct. 10, 1864. Spanish reply protesting against such action sent on Nov. 14 and further Spanish note on Nov. 17.
- Aug. 12. Nanking Kuomintang decided to deprive Chiang Kai-shek of his command of Nationalist armies. On Aug. 14, Chiang announced his resignation, which was followed by that of several members of Nanking Government.
- Aug. 15. Hankow Government lifted embargo on silver.
- Aug. 16. British aeroplane attached to Shanghai Defence Force made forced landing outside international settlement at Shanghai; Chinese troops prevented British party from retrieving wings of aeroplane. Chinese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs having refused to grant facilities for withdrawal of wings, General Duncan, G.O.C. Shanghai Defence Force, threatened to take action unless wings were returned by 11 a.m. on Aug. 17. Chinese took no action by Aug. 17, and British troops cut loop-line connecting Shanghai-Hangchow and Shanghai-Nanking Railways. On Aug. 18, aeroplane wings were returned and British troops repaired railway line.
- Aug. 17. Sun Ch'uan-fang's advance guard reached Pukow.

- Aug. 22-3. Conference between Nanking and Hankow leaders at Kuling attempted to effect a reconciliation.
- Aug. 24. Japanese Minister at Peking informed Chang Tso-lin of Japan's requirements for fulfilment of Chinese promises regarding her special position in Manchuria. Anti-Japanese demonstrations in Manchuria culminated in disturbances at Mukden on Sept. 5. By Sept. 27 anti-Japanese agitation reported to have been suppressed. Oct. 1, Dr. C. C. Wu, Nationalist Foreign Minister, protested against Japanese 'demands' in Manchuria.
- Aug. 26. Sun Ch'uan-fang's troops crossed Yangtse in two places but were forced to retreat. After severe fighting for several days in attempt to capture Nanking, Sun Ch'uan-fang retreated to Pengpu and Nanking troops reoccupied Pukow.
- Sept. 1. Second punitive expedition against Bias Bay carried out by British naval forces.
- Sept. 15. Kuomintang Conference at Nanking attempted to reconcile Hankow and Nanking Governments. Sept. 20, new Nationalist Government formed at Nanking, under commission of five: Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Tsai Yuan-p'ei, Tan Yen-kai and Li Lieh-chun.
- Sept. 20-1. Disturbances at Hankow between Chinese and Japanese.
- Sept. 25. Swatow captured by 'Red' Army under Yeh Ting and Ho Lung. By Oct. 3, Li Chai-sum's troops had driven out 'Reds'.
- Sept. 27. Yen Hsi-shan (tuchün of Shansi) attacked Chang Tso-lin's troops at Kalgan and forced them to retreat. Oct. 10, Chang Tso-lin counter-attacked near Nankow Pass and defeated Shansi troops, which by end of month had been driven out of Chihli, except Chochow, which held out until Dec. 30.
- Oct. (beginning). Adherents of Tang Sheng-chih established administration at Hankow in opposition to Nanking.
- Oct. 6. Nanking troops withdrew from Pukow; city reoccupied by Sun Ch'uan-fang's forces.
- Oct. 20. British submarine L. 4 in action at Bias Bay against pirates who had seized S.S. *Irene*.
- Oct. 20. Nanking Government ordered expedition against Tang Sheng-chih at Hankow. On Nov. 15, Nanking advance guard entered Wuchang; Tang fled to Japan, and his troops retreated to Hunan.
- Nov. 1. Wang Ching-wei and other Kuomintang leaders held meeting at Canton of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and declared that time had arrived to establish at Canton a National Government based on civilian control.
- Nov. 3. Attempt to renew anti-British boycott at Canton. Nov. 10, Canton authorities promised to suppress boycott.
- Nov. 6. Feng Yü-hsiang advancing along the Lunghai Railway, captured Kweiteh and defeated Chang Tsung-ch'ang's troops.
- Nov. 7. Conflict between 'White' Russians and occupants of Soviet Consulate at Shanghai.
- Nov. 15. Wang Ching-wei and General Li Chai-sum (who with General Chang Fa-kuei had been in joint control at Canton) left

- Canton to attend Kuomintang Conference at Shanghai. Nov. 16, Chang Fa-kuei expelled from Canton troops loyal to Li Chai-sum and established himself in supreme power.
- Nov. 16. Northward advance of Nationalist Army checked at Mingkwang by Sun Ch'uan-fang.
- Nov. 17. Renewed labour and communist agitation at Shanghai; Chinese police fired on mob. Nov. 23, Trial of agitators disclosed evidence that Soviet Consulate-General was inciting trouble.
- Nov. 17. Chiang Kai-shek returned to Shanghai.
- Nov. 26 (about). Chang Fa-kuei's régime finally broke up Hongkong strikers' organization which had existed at Canton since 1925.
- Nov. 29. General Yang Yu-ting, Chang Tso-lin's Chief of Staff, protested in a press interview against proposed American loan to S. Manchurian Railway Co.
- Nov. 30. British steamer *Siangtan* boarded by pirates below Ichang: Captain Lalor held to ransom; released on Dec. 12.
- Dec. 1. International Tariff Revaluation Commission opened proceedings at Peking.
- Dec. 1. Marriage of Chiang Kai-shek to Miss Mei-ling Soong, sister-in-law of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
- Dec. 3. Plenary session of Central Committee of Kuomintang opened at Shanghai.
- Dec. 3. Nanking Government dismissed General Chang Fa-kuei.
- Dec. 10. Chiang Kai-shek again accepted post of Generalissimo.
- Dec. 11. Canton seized by Communists and by 'Red Peasant Army' under Yeh Ting. Dec. 12, foreigners evacuated from suburbs. Dec. 14, city retaken by Li Fuk-lam; large numbers of Communists and Russians (including Soviet Vice-Consul) executed.
- Dec. 13. British Treasury Minute announced Government's intention to surrender to existing lot-holders leases in British concessions at Tientsin, Hankow, Kiukiang, Chinkiang, Amoy and Canton.
- Dec. 14. Nanking Government issued order closing all Soviet consulates in its territory, and on Dec. 15 addressed a note of explanation and protest to Soviet Government.
- Dec. 16. General round-up of Communists and Russians at Hankow.
- Dec. 16 (about). Feng Yü-hsiang's troops occupied Hsuehow junction, thus establishing railway connexion with Nanking.
- Dec. 17. Note from Soviet Government protesting strongly against actions of Nationalist Government. On Dec. 20, Communists executed at Hankow and Russians expelled.
- Dec. 26. Pei Chung-hsi took up military command at Hankow.
- Dec. 30. Li Chai-sum returned to power at Canton: Li Fuk-lam and Chang Fa-kuei left.

Colombia

- 1927, Aug. 20. Treaty of conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration with Switzerland signed.
- Sept. 13. Conciliation treaty with Sweden signed.

Conference of Ambassadors. See under *Austria*, Oct. 27, Dec. 2; *Bulgaria*, March 31; *Germany*, Jan. 31; *Hungary*, March 29, June 19.

Costa Rica

1927, Aug. 25. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Spain of March 3, 1925, regarding intellectual relations.

Cuba

1927, July 15. Commercial treaty with Spain signed in Madrid. Came into force on Nov. 3.

See also under *Canada*.

Czechoslovakia

1927, Feb. 3. Ratifications exchanged of commercial convention with Spain signed at Madrid on July 29, 1925.

Feb. 3. Agreement with Germany regarding frontier in the district of the river Hultschine signed at Berlin.

Feb. 8. Declaration signed with Poland, supplementing legal and financial convention of April 23, 1925, together with three agreements regarding exchange or disposal of various acts (Texts: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).

Feb. 16. Commercial treaty with Switzerland signed at Berne. Ratifications exchanged on June 27 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiv).

Feb. 22. Aviation agreement with Germany signed at Prague.

March 2. Commercial agreement with Finland signed at Helsingfors. Ratifications exchanged on July 16 (Texts: *L.N.T.S.* lxvi).

March 8. Agreement with Italy regarding restitution of railway rolling stock signed in Paris.

March 25. Railway agreement with Germany signed.

March 26. Ratifications exchanged at Rome of insurance convention with Italy of May 4, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi).

April 14. Ratifications exchanged of judicial convention with Latvia of July 6, 1926.

May 31. Commercial treaty signed with Turkey at Angora. Further provisional agreement signed on Sept. 15.

May 31. Commercial treaty with Hungary comprising five conventions dealing with customs and transit matters signed at Prague. Ratifications exchanged on July 24 (Texts: *L.N.T.S.* lxv).

June 3. Agreement with Hungary signed regarding exchange of administrative documents. Ratifications exchanged on Sept. 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).

June 20. Commercial treaty with Estonia signed at Reval.

June 23. Ratifications exchanged of extradition and mutual assistance convention with Estonia of July 17, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).

July 23. Ratifications exchanged at Warsaw of air navigation convention with Poland of April 15, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).

Sept. 23. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration treaty with Denmark of Nov. 30, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).

Oct. 12. Czechoslovak-Polish Frontier Delimitation Commission met in Paris and signed final agreements.

Nov. 16. Ratifications exchanged of judicial assistance convention with Switzerland of Dec. 21, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxviii).

Nov. 23. Extradition and judicial assistance conventions with Portugal signed at Lisbon.

Dec. 17. *Modus vivendi* with Vatican signed in Rome (Text: *E.N.* 18.2.28).

Dec. 17. Ratifications exchanged of judicial assistance convention with Estonia of July 17, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).

See also under *Austria*, Feb. 14, Feb. 15; *Belgium*, July 19; *Bulgaria*, Feb. 19; *Hungary*, March 29; *Little Entente*.

Danube. See under *Permanent Court of International Justice*.

Danzig

1927, Jan. 7. Protocol additional to convention of May 3, 1923, signed at Danzig by representatives of Free City and of France, Great Britain, Italy, and Poland.

Jan. 13. Agreement with Poland regarding insurance of railway employees signed at Danzig. Ratifications exchanged on Dec. 17.

March 31. Convention with Poland regarding establishment of tobacco monopoly in Danzig territory, signed at Danzig.

April 29. Ratifications exchanged of customs agreement with Poland of Sept. 20, 1926.

June 7. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Poland regarding execution of judicial decisions, of Nov. 28, 1925.

See also under *Germany*, Jan. 24.

Denmark

1927, Feb. 19. Notes exchanged with the Netherlands regarding communication of penal sentences. Came into force on April 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lx).

March 8. Commercial travellers' convention with Sweden signed at Stockholm. Ratifications exchanged on May 12 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).

March 9. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Norway of Jan. 15, 1926, for pacific settlement of disputes (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lx).

March 15. Ratifications exchanged of renewal of 1905 arbitration convention with Great Britain of June 4, 1926 (Text: *Cmd.* 2642).

April 4. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration treaty with Poland of April 23, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi).

April 5. Ratifications exchanged of workmen's compensation agreement of Nov. 18, 1925, with Great Britain (Text: *Cmd.* 2851; *L.N.T.S.* lxi).

April 9. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of arbitration and conciliation of June 2, 1926, with Germany (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi).

May 9. Declaration exchanged with Estonia regarding mutual legal assistance.

June 27. Ratifications exchanged of provisional air navigation agreement with the Netherlands of July 23, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvi).

July 7. Ratifications exchanged of conciliation convention with Estonia signed at Reval on Dec. 18, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).

Aug. 11. Double taxation agreement concluded with Iceland.

Oct. 8. Customs agreement concluded with Germany (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).

Oct. 12. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration treaty with Lithuania of Dec. 11, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).

- Oct. 13. Convention with Iceland regarding workmen's insurance for accidents signed (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).
 Oct. 15. Notes exchanged with Japan regarding exemption from taxation on profits of shipping.
 Oct. 26. Notes exchanged with Italy regarding certificates of origin and consular invoices (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxviii).
 Dec. 13. Notes exchanged with Switzerland on Sept. 28 and Dec. 13 regarding unemployment insurance (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).
 Dec. 23. Notes exchanged with U.S.S.R. regarding reciprocal protection of trade-marks (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
 See also under *Argentina*, Nov. 16; *Austria*, June 11; *Belgium*, March 3; *Czechoslovakia*, Sept. 23.

Dominican Republic

- 1927, May 21. Convention regarding circulation of motor traffic with Haiti signed at Port-au-Prince. Ratifications exchanged Sept. 13.

Ecuador. See under *Argentina*, Nov. 5.

Egypt

- 1927, Feb. 16. Commercial convention with Hungary signed at Alexandria.
 May 23. Egyptian Parliamentary Committee on Army Budget reported to be recommending increased army material and personnel and suppression of credits for Sirdarate. May 30, British note presented suggesting agreed settlement of question of British co-operation in Egyptian military affairs. June 3, Egyptian reply delivered. June 13, British note delivered asking for fuller information on ambiguous passages in Egyptian note. June 14, Egyptian reply delivered, accepting principle of close co-operation between British and Egyptian armies.
 June 29. Anglo-Turkish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal declared itself incompetent to adjudicate on claim for damages brought against British Government by Ex-Khedive 'Abbās Hilmi.
 July 4-6. King Fu'ād in Great Britain on state visit. During July conversations took place between Sir A. Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha, who accompanied King Fu'ād. Oct. 30-Nov. 8, Conversations with Sarwat Pasha renewed in London.
 Aug. 23. Zaghlūl Pasha died.

Estonia

- 1927, Jan. 4. Commercial treaty with Greece signed at Tallinn. Ratifications exchanged on Nov. 24 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).
 Feb. 5. Treaty for customs union with Latvia signed at Riga. Additional protocol signed on March 31. Ratifications exchanged on May 10. Came into force same day (Text: *E.N.* 19.3.27).
 Feb. 19. Commercial treaty with Poland signed.
 Feb. 23. Protocol with Latvia signed modifying frontier agreement of Oct. 19, 1920, and supplementary convention of Nov. 1, 1923. Ratifications exchanged on March 30 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi). Protocol embodying final settlement of frontier signed at Riga on March 31 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi).

- April 5. Agreement with Germany regarding narcotics signed at Tallinn. Came into force on July 9 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiv).
- May 17. Agreement concluded by exchange of notes with Finland for suppression of passport visas from June 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvi).
- May 24. Ratifications exchanged of declaration with Switzerland of Oct. 29, 1926, concerning reciprocal application of the Hague Convention on civil procedure (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- May 28. Ratifications exchanged of agreement with Latvia of Nov. 22, 1924, regarding relief of destitute nationals, with additional protocol of March 3, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- June 1. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration treaty with Germany of Aug. 10, 1925. Came into force July 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- July 15. Ratifications exchanged of agreement with Latvia of Feb. 5, 1926, regarding timber floating on frontier rivers (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiv).
- July 22. Convention with Latvia signed regarding transcription of immovable goods.
- July 25. Ratifications exchanged of agreement with Latvia of Feb. 2, 1926, regarding recovery of fines for infraction of railway regulations (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiv).
- Aug. 8. Agreement with Russia signed at Tallinn regarding method of settling frontier disputes (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- Aug. 31. Ratifications exchanged with Latvia and Russia of railway convention of Oct. 29, 1925 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvi).
- Dec. 10. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of friendship with Turkey of Dec. 1, 1924 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- See also under *Belgium*, Feb. 8, May 21, June 27; *Czechoslovakia*, June 20, June 23, Dec. 17; *Denmark*, May 9, July 7.

Finland

- 1927, Jan. 20. Agreement with France relating to 'iudicatum solvi' signed in Paris. Ratifications exchanged on Feb. 21 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi).
- Jan. 24. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Turkey of June 2, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- March 15. Ratifications exchanged at Oslo of convention for pacific settlement of disputes with Norway, of Feb. 3, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lx).
- March 29. Agreement signed at Helsingfors with Russia modifying railway convention of June 18, 1924. Ratifications exchanged on Oct. 24.
- April 1. Agreement with Sweden concluded by exchange of notes at Helsingfors regarding reciprocal advantages to seamen.
- April 28. Notes exchanged with Great Britain extending to British colonies and protectorates extradition treaty of May 30, 1924.
- May 10. Treaty and declarations with Sweden signed regarding fishing and timber floating in Torne and Muonio Rivers. Ratifications exchanged on Dec. 31, 1927 (Texts: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- May 14. Notes exchanged with Germany suppressing passport visas as from June 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvi).

- May 14. Notes exchanged with Latvia suppressing passport visas as from June 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- June 18. Insurance agreement with Germany signed in Berlin.
- June 24. Commercial agreement with Switzerland concluded by exchange of notes. Came into force on Nov. 10.
- Sept. 2. Exchange of notes with Russia modifying convention of June 5, 1923, regarding navigation of Finnish vessels on the Neva (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).
- Sept. 30. Notes exchanged with Norway on Aug. 23 and Sept. 30 regarding free entry for consular requisites (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).
- Oct. 14. Provisional commercial agreement concluded with Turkey by exchange of notes of Oct. 5 and 14.
- Oct. 14. Agreement concluded with Switzerland by exchange of notes of Oct. 12 and 14 for suppression of passport visas.
- Nov. 16. Treaty of conciliation and judicial settlement signed with Switzerland at Berne.
- Dec. 14. Commercial treaty with Sweden signed.
- Dec. 28. Ratifications exchanged of commercial agreement with Greece of Oct. 18, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- See also under *Austria*, July 21, Aug. 8; *Belgium*, March 4; *Czechoslovakia*, March 2; *Estonia*, May 17.

France

- 1927, Jan. 4. France and Turkey deposited with Permanent Court of International Justice *compromis* signed on Oct. 12, 1926, submitting to Court questions arising out of collision on Aug. 2, 1926, between Turkish boat and French steamer *Lotus*. Sept. 7, Court delivered judgement by President's casting vote to effect that Turkey had not contravened principles of international law in instituting criminal proceedings against officer of watch on board *Lotus* at time of collision.
- Jan. 26. Commercial agreement with Italy regarding duties on silk signed. Ratifications exchanged on May 16 (Text: *E.N.* 31.3.28).
- Jan. 28. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Germany of May 22, 1926, regarding commercial air navigation.
- Feb. 5. Agreement concluded with Great Britain for French payments on account of War Debt during 1927-8.
- Feb. 8. Agreement with Netherlands signed in Paris regarding reduction of taxation.
- Feb. 21. Notes exchanged with Great Britain on Feb. 17 and 21 regarding New Hebrides Protocol of Aug. 6, 1914 (*Cmd.* 2829).
- March 1. Agreement reached by exchange of notes with U.S.A. for French payments on account of War Debt during year 1927-8.
- March 12. Claims convention with Mexico signed additional to that of Sept. 25, 1924. Ratifications exchanged on Oct. 22.
- March 12. Ratifications exchanged with United States of liquor smuggling treaty of June 30, 1924 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi).
- March 16. Agreement with Peru regarding military service signed.
- March 31. Commercial agreement with Germany signed in Paris. Came into force on April 11 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvi).

- April 6. M. Briand made statement to Associated Press that France would be willing to conclude with United States an engagement to outlaw war between the two countries. June 20, memorandum sent setting forth French Government's views as to Franco-American Pact, to replace Arbitration Treaty of 1908, due to expire on Feb. 27, 1928. Dec. 28, U.S. reply sent suggesting inclusion of other Powers in Pact to outlaw war.
- April 12. Wines and spirits convention with Norway signed in Paris.
- April 14. Convention with Saar regarding circulation of motor traffic signed in Paris. Came into force on May 15 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- May 16. Ratifications exchanged of commercial agreement with Italy of May 29, 1926.
- June 6. Ratifications exchanged of commercial agreement with Haiti of July 29, 1926.
- June 29. Ratifications exchanged with Siam of convention of Aug. 25, 1926, regarding Siam and French Indo-China.
- Aug. 17. Commercial agreement signed with Germany in Paris to come into force for 18 months as from Sept. 6 (Text: *E.N.* 17.9.27). Supplementary agreement signed on Oct. 29.
- Aug. 29. Agreement signed with United States at Washington regarding American War Memorials in France (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxiii; *U.S. Daily*, 28.9.27; *U.S. Treaty Series* No. 757).
- Aug. 30. Protocol signed with Japan in Paris regarding navigation between Indo-China and Japan (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).
- Aug. 30. Agreement regarding military service signed with Paraguay at Asuncion.
- Sept. 14. Notes exchanged with Great Britain on Aug. 31 and Sept 14, confirming agreement reached on Aug. 18 regarding administration of New Hebrides (Text: *Cmd.* 2988; *L.N.T.S.* lxix).
- Oct. 5. Two legal declarations with Germany signed in Paris. Ratifications exchanged on Nov. 15. Came into force on Nov. 30.
- Oct. 20. Arbitration treaty with Luxembourg signed in Paris.
- Nov. 11. Treaty of friendship and arbitration with Yugoslavia signed in Paris. Ratifications exchanged on Dec. 2 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxviii; *Temps*, 29.11.27; *E.N.* 10.12.27; *E.E.P.S.* 30.11.27).
- Nov. 15. Provisional customs tariff agreement concluded with U.S.A. to come into force on Nov. 21.
- Nov. 21. Agreement concluded with Norway regarding scientific, literary, and scholastic relations (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- Dec. 3. *Modus vivendi* with Italy regarding reciprocal position of nationals of either country, signed in Paris.
- Dec. 7. Agreement with Greece signed regarding war debt.
- Dec. 14. Declarations regarding 'cautio iudicatum solvi' and judicial assistance signed with Saar in Paris (Texts: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- Dec. 29. Ratifications exchanged of legal convention with Switzerland of Aug. 27, 1926.
- See also under *Albania*, March 19, May 27; *Argentina*, Jan. 26; *Belgium*, March 3, May 14, Sept. 3, Oct. 6; *China*, Feb. 22, March 23; *Danzig*, Jan. 7; *Finland*, Jan. 20; *Geneva Naval Conference*; *Germany*, Jan. 31, Aug. 26; *Greece*, June 14; *League of Nations*

March 21; *Permanent Court of International Justice; Saar; Tangier*, Feb. 9.

Geneva Naval Conference

1927, Feb. 10. President Coolidge sent special message to Congress on limitation of naval armaments; U.S. memorandum presented to British, French, Italian, and Japanese Governments suggesting negotiation of a new agreement limiting naval armaments, and applying to classes of vessels not covered by Washington Treaty. March 11, France and Italy having refused invitation and Great Britain and Japan accepted it, U.S. Government formally invited Great Britain and Japan to Three-Power Conference. June 20–Aug. 4, Conference held at Geneva between delegates from U.S., Japan, Great Britain and Dominions. Italy represented by an observer, France by an ‘informatteur’. Plenary sessions held on June 20, July 14, and Aug. 4. Conference failed to agree on question of cruisers.¹

Germany

1927, Jan. 12. Treaty of commerce and treaty regarding right of domicile signed at Angora with Turkey. Ratifications exchanged on June 22.

Jan. 24. Convention with Poland (and Danzig) concerning the execution of Art. 312 of the Treaty of Versailles signed in Berlin. Ratifications exchanged on Dec. 19 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).

Jan. 31. Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control withdrawn from Germany. Feb. 1, Conference of Ambassadors approved agreement concluded on Jan. 31 between French and German delegates regarding fortifications on eastern and southern frontier and reached settlement of question of trade in war materials.²

Feb. 8. German Government referred to Permanent Court of International Justice claim against Polish Government for indemnity in respect of expropriated factory at Chorzow. July 26, Court rejected Poland's preliminary objection to its competence.

Feb. 16. Agreement with Poland regarding administration of section of Warthe constituting frontier, signed at Posen.

March 12. League of Nations Council decided that Swiss expert should be appointed to settle question as to what children belonged to German minority in Upper Silesia and should attend German schools. Nov. 14, German Government informed Council that in their opinion resolution of March 12, 1927, was not being correctly applied. Dec. 8, Council decided to refer question to Permanent Court of International Justice.

March 15. Exchange of notes with Hungary of Nov. 17, 1926, and March 15, 1927, regarding application of extradition laws.

March 26. Railway convention with Poland signed at Warsaw. Ratifications exchanged on May 20 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiv).

April 11. Agreement with Poland signed regarding improvement and upkeep of Drewenz River. Ratifications exchanged on Nov. 22 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).

¹ See pp. 34–82 above.

² See pp. 98–9 above.

- April 27. Agreement with Norway concluded by exchange of notes regarding the importation into Germany of certain kinds of fish. Ratifications exchanged on Dec. 5, 1927 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).
- May 10. Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation of June 11, 1873, denounced by Persia as from May 10, 1928.
- May 14. Ratifications exchanged of frontier treaty with Poland of Jan. 27, 1926. Came into force on June 16 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- May 19. Ratifications exchanged of railway traffic agreement with Poland of March 27, 1926.
- May 20. Air navigation agreement with Italy signed in Berlin.
- June 8. Ratifications of agreement with Poland of Aug. 19, 1926, regarding administration of frontier territory of the Oder, exchanged in Berlin.
- June 29. Air Convention with Great Britain signed in Berlin.
- July 4. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of agreement of June 16, 1926, regarding customs, transport, and communications (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxv), and of agreement of June 23, 1923, regarding Polish use of buildings at Kurzebrack.
- July 6. Ratifications exchanged of sanitary convention with Latvia of July 9, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- July 14. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration treaty with the Netherlands, of May 20, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvi).
- July 14. Convention with Poland regarding unemployment assistance and insurance signed in Berlin. Came into force on July 18.
- July 20. Commercial treaty with Japan signed in Tokyo. Came into force on Aug. 17.
- July 21. Declaration with Portugal regarding application of Hague Convention of July 17, 1905, on civil procedure, signed at Lisbon.
- July 26. Notes exchanged with Sweden on June 21 and July 26 regarding import into Germany of Swedish horses.
- July 28. Commercial *modus vivendi* with Haiti concluded by exchange of notes.
- Aug. 26. Agreement reached between French and British Governments for reduction of Allied troops of occupation in Germany by 10,000 men, leaving about 60,000 in all. Sept. 5, Dr. Stresemann formally notified of reduction at Geneva.
- Sept. 1. Agreement with Italy, relating to questions concerning Articles 296 and 297 of the Versailles Treaty, signed in Rome. Ratifications exchanged on Oct. 18.
- Sept. 18. President Hindenburg, speaking at dedication of memorial of Battle of Tannenberg, repudiated German responsibility for the War and declared that Germany was ready to submit to an impartial inquiry into the question of war guilt.
- Oct. 6. Commercial treaty with Yugoslavia signed in Berlin. Ratifications exchanged on Dec. 17.
- Oct. 13. Social insurance agreement with Saar Territory signed. Came into force on Nov. 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- Oct. 18. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Poland of Dec. 22, 1926, regarding exchange of archives (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxviii).

Nov. 14. Treaty with Poland regarding immigration of Polish seasonal labour into Germany signed at Warsaw.

Nov. 21. Commercial treaty with Panama signed.

Nov. 30. Agreement signed with Poland regarding timber trade between the two countries. Came into force on Dec. 5.

Dec. 2. Protocol regarding opening of customs roads across German-Polish frontier signed at Poznan (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).

Dec. 3. Agreement with Great Britain for suppression of passport visas signed in London.

Dec. 9. Agreement with Spain signed for air line between Berlin and Madrid. Further notes exchanged on Dec. 16.

See also under *Albania*, March 19; *Austria*, Feb. 5; *Belgium*, March 3, May 24, July 9, Oct. 22, Dec. 22; *Bolivia*, Aug. 31; *Bulgaria*, June 17, July 2; *Czechoslovakia*, Feb. 3, Feb. 22, March 25; *Denmark*, April 9, Oct. 8; *Estonia*, April 5, June 1; *Finland*, May 14, June 18; *France*, Jan. 28, May 31, Aug. 17, Oct. 5; *Reparation*.

Great Britain. See under *Albania*, Jan. 29, March 19, May 27; *Arabia*, May 20; *Austria*, July 18, Sept. 19; *Belgium*, May 6; *Bulgaria*, June 17; *China*, Jan. 1, Jan. 3, Jan. 6, Jan. 12, Jan. 14, Jan. 16, Jan. 17, Jan. 24, Jan. 26, Jan. 27, Jan. 28, Jan. 29, Feb. 2, Feb. 4, Feb. 7, Feb. 8, Feb. 10, Feb. 19, Feb. 24, March 12, March 22, March 23, April 4, May 17, Aug. 16, Sept. 1, Oct. 20, Nov. 3, Nov. 30, Dec. 13; *Danzig*, Jan. 7; *Denmark*, March 15, April 5; *Egypt*, May 23, June 29, July 4; *Finland*, April 28; *France*, Feb. 5, Feb. 21, Sept. 14; *Geneva Naval Conference*; *Germany*, Aug. 26, Dec. 3; *Greece*, Jan. 11, Jan. 19, Feb. 17, April 9, May 28, June 14; *Hungary*, July 26; *Iceland*, March 15; *Irāq*, Oct. 20; *Japan*, July 29; *Jugoslavia*, Aug. 9; *Latvia*, June 24, Nov. 16; *League of Nations*, March 21; *Lithuania*, May 29; *Maskat*; *Mexico*, March 30; *Permanent Court of International Justice*; *Portugal*, Jan. 4, Jan. 15, Oct. 6; *Russia*, Feb. 23, May 12; *Siam*; *Spain*, April 5, Sept. 8; *United States of America*.

Greece

1927, Jan. 11. Commercial treaty with Great Britain signed.

Jan. 19. New contract signed for British Naval Mission. Amendment to contract signed on Dec. 22.

Feb. 17. Notes exchanged with Great Britain at Athens regarding compensation of expropriated British subjects.

Feb. 25. Commercial treaty with Latvia signed at Riga.

March 3. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with the Netherlands of May 12, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi).

March 5. Agreement regarding expropriation of immovable goods in Greece concluded with Italy by exchange of notes.

March 28. Commercial convention with Rumania signed at Athens. Came into force on April 2 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).

April 9. Agreement signed in London for funding of Greek War Debt to Great Britain (Text: *Cmd.* 2848; *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).

May 23. Ratifications exchanged with Switzerland of provisional commercial convention of Nov. 29, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).

- May 27. Ratifications exchanged of provisional commercial agreement with Sweden of Sept. 10, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- May 28. Greek Government filed claim with Permanent Court of International Justice against British Government on ground that latter as Mandatory for Palestine had caused loss to M. Mavromatis, a Greek subject, by its delay in approving the plan for his readapted concession. Aug. 11, British Government filed preliminary objection with Court, denying Court's competence. Oct. 10, Court upheld British Government's objection.
- June 1. Ratifications exchanged of commercial agreement and fishing convention with Italy of Nov. 24, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).
- June 10. Notes exchanged with Switzerland on May 4 and June 10 regarding exercise of professions.
- June 14. Greek Government asked League of Nations Council to assist them in obtaining an international loan of £9,000,000 (to be used to complete the work of refugee settlement, stabilize currency, and liquidate deficits) and to authorize the Financial Committee to help in the work of financial reorganization. June 17, Council approved Greek Government's proposals in principle. Sept. 15, Council approved Protocol embodying conditions for issue of new loan and scheme of financial reform drawn up by Financial Committee; protocol signed at Geneva by Greek Finance Minister. Oct. 27, Agreement signed between Greek Government and National Bank of Greece for establishment of a new Bank of Issue. Nov. 10, Protocol of Sept. 15, 1927, and agreement for creation of Bank of Issue ratified by Greek Government. Dec. 8, Declaration issued by representatives of France, Great Britain, and Italy accepting responsibilities imposed by protocol of Sept. 15 on International Finance Commission established at Athens in 1898 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- June 23. Ratifications exchanged of agreement with Turkey regarding property of Dec. 1, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxviii).
- June 29. Treaty of commerce and navigation signed with Norway.
- Aug. 25. Greek Chamber rejected treaty of alliance with Yugoslavia and conventions regarding Salonica Free Zone and Gevgeli-Salonica Railway signed on Aug. 17, 1926.
- Sept. 11. Provisional commercial agreement with Italy signed.
- Nov. 2. Commercial treaty with Yugoslavia signed at Athens.
- Dec. 1. Establishment and judicial protection convention with Switzerland signed.
- Dec. 5. Agreement signed for settlement of Greek war debt to United States.
- See also under *Bulgaria*, Feb. 28, Dec. 9; *Estonia*, Jan. 4; *Finland*, Dec. 28; *France*, Dec. 7.

Guatemala

- 1927, May 12. Commercial treaty with Netherlands signed.
- Dec. 20. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Italy of Sept. 15, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- See also under *Belgium*, June 14.

Haiti

1927, Jan. 3. Commercial convention signed with Italy at Port-au-Prince.

See also under *Dominican Republic*; *France*, June 6; *Germany*, July 28.

Hijāz. See under *Arabia*, May 20.

Honduras

1927, Feb. 1. Supplementary extradition treaty with United States signed.

Dec. 7. Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with United States signed.

Hungary

1927, Jan. 5. Ratifications exchanged with Rumania of agreement of Nov. 17, 1926, regarding Arad-Csanád Railway (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi).

Jan. 10. Mixed Hungarian-Rumanian Arbitral Court declared itself competent in 22 cases under Treaty of Trianon to try claims brought by Hungarian nationals that their property had been confiscated under Rumanian agrarian laws. Feb. 24, Rumanian Government denied Mixed Court's competence to try agrarian cases, announced decision to withdraw their Judge from Court when such cases came before it, and asked League Council for hearing in support of their decision. March 7, Hungarian and Rumanian delegates heard by League Council. Rumanian delegate pleaded that Mixed Court had exceeded its powers; Hungarian delegate asked Council to appoint two deputy arbitrators to replace Rumanian Judge on Mixed Court, and suggested that question of Court's competence in agrarian disputes be referred to Permanent Court of International Justice. March 8, Council referred question to special committee of three (Sir A. Chamberlain Rapporteur). Sept. 17, special committee reported that Mixed Court was not competent to judge claims arising from application of agrarian laws as such and that Treaty of Trianon could not prevent agrarian reform being applied to Hungarian landowners, provided there was no discrimination against them. Committee recommended that Rumanian Judge should return to Mixed Court. Sept. 19, League Council decided to postpone question to December session and recommended special committee's conclusions to both parties for consideration. Nov. 25, League Secretariat informed that Rumanian Government accepted committee's report. Nov. 29, Hungarian Government notified League that they could not accept special committee's report, but had made direct proposals for settlement to Rumania. Dec. 5, Council decided to postpone question till March and to recommend Rumania to consider Hungarian proposals for settlement.

Feb. 2. Ratifications exchanged of treaty with Italy of April 6, 1922, regarding legal protection.

March 15. Agreement signed at Budapest with Italy, additional to the convention of March 27, 1924, relating to pre-war Hungarian Public Debt. Ratifications exchanged at Rome on Nov. 14 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxvii).

March 29. Conference of Ambassadors, after consulting Little Entente Governments, decided that Military Control Commission should cease to function in Hungary on March 31. Aug. 16, Conference of Ambassadors notified League of Nations that Control Commission had been withdrawn and drew Council's attention to certain reservations expressed by Commission regarding application of Hungarian recruiting laws.

April 5. Treaty of friendship, conciliation and arbitration with Italy signed in Rome (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvii; *E.N.* 10.12.27). Notes exchanged approving arrangement made on March 17 regarding Hungarian traffic in Port of Fiume. Ratifications of treaty of friendship exchanged on Aug. 8.

May 21. Two conventions and declaration with Italy signed in Rome regarding settlement of (i) questions raised by the annexation to Italy of Fiume; (ii) claims brought before mixed arbitral tribunal; (iii) procedure for compensation.

June 19. Agreement signed with Conference of Ambassadors regarding application of Art. 128 of Treaty of Trianon (air navigation).

July 25. Convention with Italy signed at Rome, regarding the use by Hungary of the port of Fiume. Notes exchanged regarding Hungarian traffic through port of Trieste.

July 26. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Great Britain of July 23, 1926 (Text: *Cmd.* 2933; *L.N.T.S.* lxvii).

Aug. 26. Ratifications exchanged at Budapest of treaty of commerce with Turkey of Dec. 20, 1926. Came into force on Sept. 26.

Dec. 10. Convention with Italy signed in Rome for amicable settlement of certain questions in suspense. Notes exchanged regarding liquidation of expenses incurred by Italy in connexion with frontier delimitation and repatriation of Hungarian prisoners.

See also under *Albania*, Nov. 4; *Austria*, March 11; *Czechoslovakia*, May 31, June 3; *Egypt*, Feb. 16; *Germany*, March 15.

Iceland

1927, March 15. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Great Britain of June 4, 1926, renewing that of Oct. 25, 1905, for the pacific settlement of international disputes (Text: *Cmd.* 2836).

May 25. Commercial convention with Russia concluded by exchange of notes (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).

See also under *Denmark*, Aug. 11, Oct. 13.

International Labour Conference

1927, May 25–June 16. Tenth session of Conference held at Geneva. Two draft conventions adopted dealing with sickness insurance for workers in industry and commerce and domestic servants and for workers in agriculture; and a recommendation concerning general principle of sickness insurance.

‘Irāq

1927, March 19. Turco-‘Irāqī Frontier Commission met at Mosul to begin work of delimitation provided for in Anglo-‘Irāqī-Turkish Treaty of June 5, 1926. Report of Commission signed on Sept. 23.

Oct. 20. King Faysal arrived in London. Oct. 25, formal negotiations

for revision of Anglo-'Irāqī treaty relations began. Dec. 14, new treaty signed in London (Text: *T.* 21.12.27; *Cmd.* 2998; *E.N.* 19.5.28).

Italy

1927, Jan. 13. Claims convention with Mexico signed.

Jan. 25. Ratifications exchanged of commercial agreement with Latvia of July 25, 1925 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lx).

Jan. 25. Treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia of Jan. 27, 1924, extended for six months.

Feb. 9. Declaration signed at Rome with Switzerland regarding unemployment insurance.

March 7. Italian Government notified Soviet Government that it intended to ratify treaty of Oct. 28, 1920, giving Bessarabia to Rumania. March 8, treaty ratified by Italy. March 17, Soviet Government replied to Italian note (Texts: *E.E.P.S.* 31.3.27). May 23, Italian ratification of treaty deposited in Paris.

March 8. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of friendship and commerce with Siam of May 9, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi).

March 26. Convention signed with San Marino regarding construction of electric railway from Rimini to San Marino and installation of a wireless station in San Marino. Ratifications exchanged on Sept. 27.

June 8. Agreement with Mexico of July 26, 1871, regarding issue of death certificates denounced by Mexico as from Sept. 8, 1927.

June 28. Agreement concluded with Netherlands by exchange of notes regarding reciprocal recognition of navigation certificates (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).

July 18. Ratifications exchanged of pact of friendship and collaboration with Rumania of Sept. 16, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxvii).

Aug. 5. Ratifications exchanged at Berne of convention with Switzerland of Oct. 22, 1923, regarding navigation in Lake Maggiore and the Lake of Lugano. Came into force on Nov. 5 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxv).

Aug. 15. Air navigation convention with Spain signed. On Aug. 30, convention signed regarding air line from Genoa to Barcelona.

Aug. 26. Notes exchanged with Switzerland regarding suppression of Italian customs posts at Varzo and Peglia.

Sept. 17. Treaty of conciliation and judicial settlement and trade agreement signed in Rome with Lithuania.

Sept. 24. Protocol signed with Switzerland regarding interpretation and application of commercial treaty of Jan. 27, 1923. Came into force on Nov. 1 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxiii).

Oct. 24. Notes exchanged with Peru regarding exchange of diplomatic mails.

Nov. 28. Financial convention with Spain signed.

See also under *Albania*, Jan. 24, March 19, May 27, Nov. 22; *Arabia*, June 1; *Austria*, Dec. 9, Dec. 20; *Chile*, Feb. 24; *China*, Jan. 6, Feb. 24, March 23; *Czechoslovakia*, March 8, March 26; *Danzig*, Jan. 7; *Denmark*, Oct. 26; *France*, Jan. 26, May 16, Dec. 3; *Geneva Naval Conference*; *Germany*, May 20, Sept. 1; *Greece*, March 5, June 1, June 14, Sept. 11; *Guatemala*, Dec. 20; *Haiti*; *Hungary*, Feb. 2,

March 15, April 5, May 21, July 25, Dec. 10; *Permanent Court of International Justice*; *Tangier*, Oct. 27.

Japan

1927, April 7. Additional protocol signed to commercial treaty with Latvia of July 4, 1925.

May 20. Convention with Mexico of April 26, 1917, concerning free practice of medical profession, denounced by Mexico as from May 20, 1928.

July 29. Ratifications exchanged of supplementary commercial convention with Great Britain of July 30, 1925 (Text: *Cmd.* 2931; *L.N.T.S.* lxxv).

Dec. 5. Notes exchanged with Sweden abolishing passport visas as from Jan. 1, 1928.

See also under *China*, Jan. 21, March 23, April 3, May 28, June 27, July 18, Aug. 24, Sept. 20; *Denmark*, Oct. 15; *France*, Aug. 30; *Geneva Naval Conference*; *Germany*, July 20.

Jugoslavia

1927, Aug. 9. Agreement for funding Yugoslav war debt and relief debt to Great Britain signed in London (Text: *Cmd.* 2973; *L.N.T.S.* lxxix).

Nov. 6. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of conciliation and arbitration treaty of Nov. 18, 1926.

See also under *Albania*, March 19, May 27; *Austria*, June 8; *Bulgaria*, Oct. 7; *France*, Nov. 11; *Germany*, Oct. 6; *Greece*, Aug. 25, Nov. 2; *Hungary*, March 29; *Italy*, Jan. 25; *Little Entente*.

Latvia

1927, March 9. Latvian and Soviet delegates negotiating for guarantee pact initialled certain clauses on which they had agreed.

May 20. Notes exchanged with Lithuania on May 6 and 20 regarding passport visas for travel in connexion with military service.

June 2. Trade agreement (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxxviii; *E.E.P.S.* 15.12.27; *Temps*, 28.10.27) and treaty for mutual assistance in legal matters signed with U.S.S.R. at Moscow. Ratifications of trade treaty exchanged on Nov. 5.

June 24. Agreement signed with Great Britain regarding tonnage measurement certificates (Text: *Cmd.* 2911; *L.N.T.S.* lxxvii).

Sept. 12. Extradition treaty with Norway signed.

Oct. 10. Convention with Russia, regarding arbitral procedure in civil and commercial matters, signed at Riga.

Oct. 15. Frontier treaty with Lithuania signed at Riga.

Nov. 16. Agreement with Great Britain signed regarding importation of samples. Came into force on Dec. 23.

Nov. 17. Agreement with U.S.S.R. signed regarding tonnage measurement certificates.

Dec. 22. Provisional commercial treaty with Poland signed.

See also under *Austria*, June 30, July 26; *Belgium*, June 2; *Czechoslovakia*, April 14; *Estonia*, Feb. 5, Feb. 23, May 28, July 15, July 22, July 25, Aug. 31; *Finland*, May 14; *Germany*, July 6; *Greece*, Feb. 25; *Italy*, Jan. 25; *Japan*, April 7.

League of Nations

- 1927, Feb. 7-18. Special Body of Experts appointed by Council to investigate traffic in women and children met at Geneva and drew up report, in two parts, on result of two years' work.
- March 7-12. Forty-fourth session of Council held at Geneva.
- March 21-April 26. Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference held third session at Geneva. Draft conventions on limitation of armaments submitted by British and French delegates considered and text drawn up for further discussion.
- March 22-April 2. Third Annual Session of Committee of Experts on Progressive Codification of International Law held at Geneva. First part of committee's work completed in readiness for Codification Conference.
- May 4-23. International Economic Conference met in Geneva, attended by representatives of 50 countries, including United States and Soviet Russia, and of international organizations, and drew up programme for lowering of tariff barriers and freer trade in general.
- June 13-17. Forty-fifth session of Council held at Geneva.
- July 4-12. International Conference held at Geneva attended by representatives of 42 states to consider creation of an International Relief Union for assistance of peoples overwhelmed by disaster. Convention and statute for creation of union adopted by Conference and signed on July 12 by 9 states.
- Aug. 23-Sept. 2. Third General Conference on Communications and Transit held at Geneva, 34 countries represented.
- Sept. 1-28. Forty-sixth session of Council held at Geneva.
- Sept. 5-27. Eighth session of Assembly held at Geneva. Sept. 24, Assembly adopted resolution proposed by Polish delegation prohibiting all aggressive wars. Sept. 26, Assembly adopted resolution dealing with arbitration, security, and disarmament.
- Oct. 17-Nov. 8. International Conference on import and export prohibitions met at Geneva, 33 states represented. Convention drawn up by Conference signed on Nov. 8 by 18 countries.
- Nov. 30-Dec. 3. Fourth session of Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference held at Geneva; Soviet Government represented for first time. Nov. 30, Soviet delegate put forward proposals for complete universal disarmament.
- Dec. 1-2. New Committee on Arbitration and Security, constituted by Preparatory Commission on Nov. 30, held first meeting. On Dec. 2, Committee adjourned till Feb. 1928.
- Dec. 5-12. Forty-seventh session of Council held at Geneva.
- See also under *Germany*, March 12; *Greece*, June 14; *Hungary*, Jan. 10; *Lithuania*, Oct. 15; *Saar*.

Liberia

- 1927, Nov. 24. Ratifications exchanged of extradition convention with Monaco of Oct. 28, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxviii).

Lithuania

- 1927, May 29. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of extradition treaty of May 18, 1926 (Text: *Cmd.* 2897; *L.N.T.S.* lxi).

Sept. 27. Concordat with Vatican signed in Rome. Ratifications exchanged on Dec. 10.

Oct. 15. Lithuanian Government appealed to League against treatment of Lithuanians in Vilna District. Dec. 10, Polish and Lithuanian representatives accepted resolution proposed by League Council.¹

See also under *Denmark*, Oct. 12; *Italy*, Sept. 17; *Latvia*, May 20, Oct. 15.

Little Entente

1927, May 13-15. Conference of Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania held at Joachimstal.

Luxembourg

1927, Sept. 26. Notes exchanged with Norway on Aug. 25, Sept. 12 and 26 abolishing passport visas as from Jan. 1, 1928 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxviii).

See also under *Belgium*, Oct. 17, Dec. 15; *France*, Oct. 20.

Maskat

1927, Feb. 11. Agreement with Great Britain signed prolonging for one year treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation of March 19, 1891 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiv).

Mexico

1927, March 21. Convention with United States regarding contraband goods, immigration and fisheries, signed at Washington on Dec. 23, 1925, denounced by U.S. as from March 28, 1927.

March 30. Claims convention signed with Great Britain.

Aug. 16. Convention with United States, prolonging the General Claims Convention of Sept. 8, 1923, for at least two years as from Aug. 30, 1927, signed at Washington. Ratifications exchanged on Oct. 12 (Text: *U.S. Treaty Series* No. 758; *L.N.T.S.* lxviii).

See also under *France*, March 12; *Italy*, Jan. 13, June 8; *Japan*, May 20.

Monaco. See under *Liberia*.

Netherlands

1927, May 10. Treaty of friendship and commerce with Persia of July 3, 1857, denounced by Persia as from May 10, 1928.

May 21. Treaty of conciliation with Sweden signed at The Hague.

June 11. Ratifications exchanged with Switzerland of treaty of conciliation and arbitration of Dec. 12, 1925 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).

June 14. Notes exchanged with Portugal regarding reciprocal notification of penal sentences.

Nov. 5. Notes exchanged with Spain regarding reciprocal notification of penal sentences.

Dec. 27. Declaration exchanged with Sweden concerning reciprocal recognition of certificates of gauging.

Dec. 30. Agreement concluded with Sweden by exchange of notes regarding reciprocal notification of penal sentences (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxx).

See also under *Austria*, March 1, March 29; *Belgium*, Jan. 24, March 3,

¹ See pp. 240-7 above.

March 24, Oct. 25, Oct. 26; *China*, Jan. 16; *Denmark*, Feb. 19, June 27; *France*, Feb. 8; *Germany*, July 14; *Greece*, March 3; *Guatemala*, May 12; *Italy*, June 28.

Nicaragua

1927, Jan. 10. President Coolidge sent special Message to U.S. Congress explaining his policy in Nicaragua and referring to Mexican support of Liberal revolutionaries.

April 9. Mr. Henry L. Stimson left for Nicaragua as special envoy of President Coolidge. April 18, Mr. Stimson arrived at Corinto. April 22, President Diaz communicated to Mr. Stimson peace terms for submission to Liberal forces. April 30-May 1, Conference between Mr. Stimson and representatives of Señor Sacasa. May 4, Conference between Mr. Stimson and General Moncada began. May 5, President Diaz proclaimed general amnesty. May 12, General Moncada and other Liberal leaders (excluding General Sandino) agreed to lay down arms and accept conditions that President Diaz should hold office until Presidential elections of 1928, which should be supervised by U.S.

July 12. American marines sent ultimatum to General Sandino. July 16, General Sandino repulsed in fight with American marines and Nicaraguan police. Occasional fighting between U.S. Marines and forces of Generals Sandino and Salgado continued till end of year.

Norway

1927, Feb. 9. Ratifications exchanged with Siam of treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation of July 16, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lx).

March 9. Convention signed with Sweden at Stockholm regarding commercial travellers. Ratifications exchanged on May 12.

March 10. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration convention with Sweden of Nov. 25, 1925 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lx).

April 11. Commercial agreement concluded with Spain by exchange of notes of April 7 and 11.

Aug. 30. Ratifications exchanged at Oslo of treaty of commerce and navigation with Poland of Dec. 22, 1926. Notes exchanged on Dec. 23 and 28 regarding accession of Danzig (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxvi).

Nov. 19. Notes exchanged with Sweden regarding construction of a railway partly on Swedish territory (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxviii).

Nov. 30. Agreement with Portugal signed regarding mutual recognition of freehold certificates. Came into force on Dec. 31 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxix).

See also under *Argentina*, Oct. 17; *Chile*, Feb. 8; *Denmark*, March 9; *Finland*, March 15, Sept. 30; *France*, April 12, Nov. 21; *Germany*, April 27; *Greece*, June 29; *Latvia*, Sept. 12; *Luxembourg*.

Panama

1927, Jan. 26. Panama National Assembly referred treaty of July 28, 1926, with U.S.A. back to President for further negotiation.

See also under *Germany*, Nov. 21.

Paraguay. See under *Bolivia*, April 22; *France*, Aug. 30.

Permanent Court of International Justice

1927, June 15–Dec. 16. Twelfth ordinary session held at The Hague. July 26, Court gave judgement rejecting Polish Government's objection to its competence in case of German claim for indemnity for expropriated factory at Chorzow. Sept. 7, Court gave judgement in Franco-Turkish dispute regarding steamship *Lotus*. Oct. 10, Court gave judgement upholding British Government's objection to its competence in case of Greek claim in connexion with Mavrommatis concessions in Palestine. Dec. 8, Court gave an advisory opinion on the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, in favour of the view maintained by Great Britain, France, and Italy. Dec. 16, Court gave an interpretation of its judgements concerning the Chorzow factory.

See also under *China*, Jan. 13; *France*, Jan. 4; *Germany*, Feb. 8, March 12; *Greece*, May 28; *Hungary*, Jan. 10.

Persia

1927, March 19. Treaty of friendship and commerce with Poland signed.

May 10. Persian Government notified Powers enjoying special jurisdictional privileges that those privileges would be abolished from May 10, 1928.

Aug. 14. Exchange of notes with Russia at Teheran regarding the institution of outposts at various points on the frontier.

Oct. 1. Pact with Russia signed at Moscow consisting of (i) guarantee of neutrality; (ii) commercial agreement; (iii) agreement regarding fisheries on south bank of Caspian; (iv) customs convention; (v) notes regarding the port of Pekhlivi. (i) ratified by Persia on Oct. 21 (Text: *E.E.P.S.*, Oct. 15, 1927; *E.N.* 29.10.27).

Oct. 1–6. Notes exchanged with Turkey regarding frontier disturbances.

Nov. 24. Protocol with Russia signed regarding air lines.

Dec. 14. Ratifications exchanged of postal and telegraph conventions with Russia of April 25 and 27, 1923.

See also under *Afghanistan*, Nov. 28; *Arabia*, May 20; *Germany*, May 10; *Netherlands*, May 10.

Peru. See under *Brazil*, July 28; *Chile*, Jan. 12; *France*, March 16; *Italy*, Oct. 24.

Poland

1927, Feb. 9. Ratifications exchanged with Rumania of treaty of alliance of March 26, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lx).

March 23. Ratifications exchanged with Sweden of treaty of conciliation and arbitration of May 28, 1926.

March 25. Consular convention signed with Turkey.

March 28. Ratifications exchanged at Warsaw of conciliation and arbitration treaty with Sweden of Nov. 3, 1925.

June 7. M. Voikov, Soviet Minister to Poland, mortally wounded at Warsaw.¹

July 5. Commercial agreement with Switzerland signed at Zurich.

¹ See p. 231 above.

- July 30. Notes exchanged with Switzerland on May 24 and July 30 regarding unemployment insurance.
- Oct. 22. Notes exchanged with Sweden on Sept. 29 and Oct. 22 regarding termination of provisional air traffic treaty of Oct. 1, 1925.
- Nov. 14. Air navigation convention with Sweden of Oct. 1, 1925, denounced by Sweden as from Sept. 23, 1927.
- Nov. 16. Agreement with Russia signed regarding execution of Art. 11 of Treaty of Riga.
- Nov. 22. Extradition treaty with United States signed.
- See also under *Afghanistan*, Nov. 3; *Austria*, March 23, April 2; *Brazil*, Feb. 19; *Bulgaria*, Jan. 12; *Czechoslovakia*, Feb. 8, July 23, Oct. 12; *Danzig*; *Denmark*, April 4; *Estonia*, Feb. 19; *Germany*, Jan. 24, Feb. 8, Feb. 16, March 12, March 26, April 11, May 14, May 19, June 8, July 4, July 14, Oct. 18, Nov. 30, Dec. 2; *Jugoslavia*, Nov. 6; *Latvia*, Dec. 22; *League of Nations*, Sept. 5; *Lithuania*, Oct. 15; *Norway*, Aug. 30; *Permanent Court of International Justice*.

Portugal

- 1927, Jan. 4. Exchange of notes with Great Britain prolonging for five years, as from Nov. 16, 1926, arbitration treaty of Nov. 16, 1914 (*Cmd.* 2796).
- Jan. 15. Agreement concluded with Great Britain for suppression of passport visas.
- May 17. Agreement with Sweden signed at Lisbon for reciprocal recognition of free embarkation certificates (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiv).
- June 15. Agreement signed with Uruguay for suppression of passport visas as from June 15, 1927.
- June 17. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Spain of June 29, 1926, for frontier delimitation.
- July 30. Agreement concluded by exchange of notes with Spain relating to fishing in River Mino. Came into force Aug. 14.
- Aug. 11. Agreement regarding the utilization of the water-power of the River Douro signed with Spain at Lisbon. Ratifications exchanged on Aug. 22.
- Oct. 6. Notes exchanged with Great Britain regarding boundary between Swaziland and Mozambique (Text: *Cmd.* 3066) and with Union of South Africa regarding boundary between Mozambique and South Africa (Text: *Cmd.* 3070).
- See also under *Austria*, March 28; *Belgium*, Jan. 6, July 9, July 19; *Czechoslovakia*, Nov. 23; *Germany*, July 21; *Netherlands*, June 14; *Norway*, Nov. 30.

Reparation

- 1927, Jan. 13. Agreement signed in Paris regulating amounts to be allocated out of Dawes annuities for armies of occupation, Rhine-land High Commission and Military Commission of Control for period April 1, 1926, to Jan. 10, 1930 (*Cmd.* 2886).
- Jan 29. Special Arbitration Tribunal, set up in accordance with London Agreement of Aug. 1924, ruled that compensation paid by Germany to her nationals on account of liquidation &c., of

property under Versailles Treaty could not be included in Dawes annuities.

Oct. 20. Agent-General for Reparation Payments presented memorandum to German Government on Germany's financial policy (Text: *T.* 7.11.27). Nov. 5, German Government replied.

Rumania

1927, May 28. Commercial agreement with Spain concluded by exchange of notes of May 9 and 28. Came into force June 11.
See also under *Albania*, Jan. 14; *Austria*, Nov. 19; *Greece*, March 28; *Hungary*, Jan. 5, Jan. 10, March 29; *Italy*, March 7, July 18; *Little Entente*; *Poland*, Feb. 9.

Russia

1927, Jan. 8. Convention concluded with Turkey at Kars regarding the utilization of the waters of the rivers Arax and Arpatchai.
Feb. 2. Notes exchanged with Sweden regarding consular treaty.
Feb. 23. Note from Great Britain protesting against breaches of Trade Agreement of 1921 and of undertaking to abstain from propaganda of June 4, 1923, presented to Soviet representative in London (Text: *Cmd.* 2822; *T.* 24.2.27). Feb. 26, Russian reply presented (Text: *Cmd.* 2822; *T.* 28.2.27).
March 11. Treaty of commerce and navigation concluded with Turkey at Angora. Ratifications exchanged June 6.
March 11. Ratifications exchanged with Turkey at Angora of protocol of July 31, 1926, concluded in execution of Art. 12 of the Treaty of Moscow of March 16, 1921, and of the Treaty of Kars of Oct. 10, 1921, regarding the inhabitants of frontier regions.
April 14. Protocol signed in Berlin settling with Switzerland dispute resulting from the murder of M. Vorovski at Lausanne in 1923.
May 12. Premises of Arcos Ltd. in London raided by British police.
May 27, British note (dated May 26) presented announcing termination of trade agreement of March 16, 1921, and breach of diplomatic relations.¹
Oct. 23. Trotsky and Zinoviev expelled from Central Executive Committee of Communist Party. Nov. 15, Trotsky expelled from Russian Communist Party; a number of other opposition leaders expelled from Central Executive Committee of Communist Party.²
Oct. 8. Agreement with Sweden signed in Moscow, regulating status of Soviet Trade Delegation in Sweden (Text: *E.E.P.S.*, 15.11.27).
See also under *Afghanistan*, April 10, Nov. 28; *China*, March 1, April 6, June 12, Nov. 7, Nov. 17, Dec. 11, Dec. 14, Dec. 16; *Denmark*, Dec. 23; *Estonia*, Aug. 8, Aug. 31; *Finland*, March 29, Sept. 2; *Iceland*, May 25; *Italy*, March 7; *Latvia*, March 9, June 2, Oct. 10, Nov. 17; *League of Nations*, Nov. 30; *Persia*, Aug. 14, Oct. 1, Nov. 24, Dec. 14; *Poland*, June 7, Nov. 16.

Saar

1927, March 12. League Council decided to approve proposal of Saar Governing Commission for creation of an international Railway Defence Force of 800 men, on understanding that French troops

¹ See pp. 266-71 above.

² See pp. 253-5 above.

should be withdrawn from Territory within three months, that new Defence Force should only be used in exceptional circumstances and that Governing Commission should, if desirable, reduce number below 800 without further reference to Council. Evacuation of French troops completed by June 10.

See also under *France*, April 14, Dec. 14; *Germany*, Oct. 13.

San Marino. See under *Italy*, March 26.

Siam

1927, Feb. 2. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration convention with Great Britain of Nov. 25, 1925 (Text: *Cmd.* 2813; *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).

See also under *Belgium*, March 25; *France*, June 29; *Italy*, March 8; *Norway*, Feb. 9.

South Africa. See under *Portugal*, Oct. 6.

Spain

1927, Jan. 14. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration treaty with Uruguay of March 23, 1922.

Jan. 29. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of conciliation and judicial regulation of disputes with Switzerland, signed on April 20, 1926. Came into force same day (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lx).

April 5. Convention with Great Britain revising commercial treaty of Oct. 31, 1922 signed. Came into force April 24 (Text: *Cmd.* 2855).

Aug. 4. Ratifications exchanged of declaration of Aug. 4, 1926, renouncing Swiss capitulatory rights in Spanish Zone in Morocco.

Sept. 1. Agreement concluded with Turkey regarding certificates of origin for goods imported into Turkey.

Sept. 8. Notes exchanged with Great Britain respecting reciprocal recognition of proof-marks on fire-arms (Text: *Cmd.* 2975; *L.N.T.S.* lxix).

Nov. 27. Commercial convention concluded with United States.

See also under *Belgium*, July 19; *Chile*, May 28; *China*, Feb. 2, Aug. 8; *Costa Rica*; *Cuba*; *Czechoslovakia*, Feb. 3; *Germany*, Dec. 9; *Italy*, Aug. 15, Nov. 28; *Netherlands*, Nov. 5; *Norway*, April 11; *Portugal*, June 17, July 30, Aug. 11; *Rumania*; *Tangier*, Feb. 9.

Sweden

1927, Feb. 24. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Uruguay of Feb. 24, 1923, for pacific settlement of disputes (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).

Nov. 20. Commercial agreement concluded with Turkey by exchange of notes of May 23 and Nov. 20.

See also under *Austria*, March 29, Oct. 8, Dec. 20; *Belgium*, Sept. 27; *Colombia*, Sept. 13; *Denmark*, March 8; *Finland*, April 1, May 10, Dec. 14; *Germany*, July 26; *Greece*, May 27; *Japan*, Dec. 5; *Netherlands*, May 21, Dec. 27, Dec. 30; *Norway*, March 9, Nov. 19; *Poland*, March 23, March 28, Oct. 22, Nov. 14; *Portugal*, May 17; *Russia*, Feb. 2, Oct. 8.

Switzerland

1927, April 8. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of friendship with Turkey of Sept. 19, 1925 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxi).

May 4. Treaty of commerce concluded with Turkey at Angora. Ratifications exchanged Sept. 29. Came into force Oct. 29.

June 3. Ratifications exchanged with Uruguay of extradition treaty of Feb. 27, 1923, and of additional protocol of Nov. 26, 1926 (Text: *L.N.T.S.* lxiii).

Aug. 7. Establishment convention with Turkey signed at Angora.

See also under *Austria*, March 15, April 19, Oct. 24; *Belgium*, Feb. 5, March 3; *China*, April 12; *Colombia*, Aug. 20; *Czechoslovakia*, Feb. 16, Nov. 16; *Denmark*, Dec. 13; *Estonia*, May 24; *Finland*, June 24, Oct. 14, Nov. 16; *France*, Dec. 29; *Greece*, May 23, June 10, Dec. 1; *Italy*, Feb. 9, Aug. 5, Aug. 26, Sept. 24; *Netherlands*, June 11; *Poland*, July 30; *Russia*, April 14; *Spain*, Jan. 29, Aug. 4.

Tangier

1927, Feb. 9. Franco-Spanish negotiations on status of Tangier opened in Paris. Negotiations suspended in Aug. 1927 without agreement having been reached.

Oct. 27-31. Italian naval squadron visited Tangier.

Transjordan. See under *Arabia*, May 20.

Turkey

1927, Jan. 18. United States Senate rejected treaty of friendship with Turkey signed at Lausanne on Aug. 6, 1923.

Feb. 17. Agreement with United States concluded by exchange of notes at Constantinople providing for resumption of diplomatic relations and regulation of trade.

July 27. Representatives of Turkish Government and bondholders reached provisional agreement in Paris for resumption of service of Turkey's share of Ottoman Public Debt.

See also under *Afghanistan*, Nov. 3; *Belgium*, Aug. 28; *Brazil*, Sept. 8; *Chile*, Jan. 6; *Czechoslovakia*, May 31; *Estonia*, Dec. 10; *Finland*, Jan. 24, Oct. 14; *France*, Jan. 4; *Germany*, Jan. 12; *Greece*, June 23; *Hungary*, Aug. 26; *Irāq*, March 19; *Persia*, Oct. 1; *Poland*, March 25; *Russia*, Jan. 8, March 11; *Spain*, Sept. 1; *Sweden*, Nov. 20; *Switzerland*, April 8, May 4, Aug. 7.

United States of America

1927, Jan. 4. U.S. Government sent note to Great Britain regarding reciprocal release of property sequestrated under Trading with the Enemy Acts. Feb. 23, British reply sent.

May 2. British Government sent note (Text: *T.* 5.5.27) to U.S. Government contradicting certain statements made in letter of March 15 (Text: *T.* 13.4.27) from Mr. Mellon, Secretary of U.S. Treasury, to Dr. J. G. Hibben, on subject of War Debts. May 5, State Department replied that they did not wish to enter into formal diplomatic exchanges on subject of correspondence between Mr. Mellon and Dr. Hibben. Mr. Mellon issued statement in explanation of his letter.

May 19. Agreement concluded with Great Britain by exchange of notes regarding disposal of certain pecuniary claims arising out of the war (Text: *Cmd.* 2877; *L.N.T.S.* lxiv).

See also under *Austria*, July 9; *Belgium*, April 15; *Chile*, Jan. 12; *China*, Jan. 27, Feb. 4, Feb. 17, March 23, Nov. 29; *France*, March 1, March 12, April 6, Aug. 29, Nov. 15; *Geneva Naval Conference*; *Greece*, Dec. 5; *Honduras*; *Mexico*, March 21, Aug. 16; *Nicaragua*; *Panama*; *Poland*, Nov. 22; *Spain*, Nov. 27; *Turkey*, Jan. 18, Feb. 17.

Uruguay. See under *Portugal*, June 15; *Spain*, Jan. 14; *Sweden*, Feb. 24; *Switzerland*, June 3.

Vatican. See under *Czechoslovakia*, Dec. 17; *Lithuania*, Sept. 27.

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
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CHINA



This map is a diagram illustrating the geography of China in 1926 from the particular standpoint of international relations. Accordingly, the prominence given to the treaty-ports, and to the foreign settlements or concessions at that time existing in certain of these, must not be taken as meant to imply a corresponding degree of foreign dominance over Chinese national life. Although the points of Chinese territory which were frequented by foreigners coincided, on the whole, with the focuses of economic activity in China, the great majority of the Chinese people in the greater part of the country, even in 1926, were living their lives with little consciousness of the foreigner's presence in their midst.

MANCHURIAN RAILWAYS



This map does not profess to be complete. It does not include various branch and side lines in South Manchuria which do not concern the particular phase dealt with in this volume.

THE WORLD



